research-article

Giving advice to people in path selection problems

Authors:

Zinovi Rabinovich,

Claudia V. Goldman,

Omer TsimhoniAuthors Info & Claims

AAMAS '12: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1

Pages 459 - 466

Published: 04 June 2012 Publication History

Abstract

We present a novel computational method for advice-generation in path selection problems which are difficult for people to solve. The advisor agent's interests may conflict with the interests of the people who receive the advice. Such optimization settings arise in many human-computer applications in which agents and people are self-interested but also share certain goals, such as automatic route-selection systems that also reason about environmental costs. This paper presents an agent that clusters people into one of several types, based on how their path selection behavior adheres to the paths presented to them by the agent who does not necessarily suggest their most preferred paths. It predicts the likelihood that people will deviate from these suggested paths and uses a decision theoretic approach to suggest paths to people which will maximize the agent's expected benefit, given the people's deviations. This technique was evaluated empirically in an extensive study involving hundreds of human subjects solving the path selection problem in mazes. Results showed that the agent was able to outperform alternative methods that solely considered the benefit to the agent or the person, or did not provide any advice.

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Cited By

Hafızoğlu FSen SObaid MMubin ONagai YOsawa HAbdelrahman YFjeld M(2020)Comparing Human Trust Attitudes Towards Human and Agent TeammatesProceedings of the 8th International Conference on Human-Agent Interaction10.1145/3406499.3415082(50-59)Online publication date: 10-Nov-2020
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3406499.3415082
Levy PSarne DAumann YElkind EVeloso MAgmon NTaylor M(2019)Selective Information Disclosure in ContestsProceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3306127.3332021(2093-2095)Online publication date: 8-May-2019
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3306127.3332021
Alkoby SSarne DSingh SMarkovitch S(2017)The benefit in free information disclosure when selling information to peopleProceedings of the Thirty-First AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3298239.3298385(985-992)Online publication date: 4-Feb-2017
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Information & Contributors

Information

Published In

cover image ACM Other conferences

AAMAS '12: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1

June 2012

592 pages

ISBN:0981738117

General Chairs:
Wiebe van der Hoek
University of Liverpool, UK
,
Lin Padgham
RMIT University, Australia
,
Program Chairs:
Vincent Conitzer
Duke University
,
Michael Winikoff
University of Otago, New Zealand

Sponsors

The International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: The International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

In-Cooperation

SIGAI: ACM Special Interest Group on Artificial Intelligence

Publisher

International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

Richland, SC

Publication History

Published: 04 June 2012

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Research-article

Conference

AAMAS 12

Sponsor:

The International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

AAMAS 12: International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

June 4 - 8, 2012

Valencia, Spain

Acceptance Rates

Overall Acceptance Rate 1,155 of 5,036 submissions, 23%

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Cited By

Hafızoğlu FSen SObaid MMubin ONagai YOsawa HAbdelrahman YFjeld M(2020)Comparing Human Trust Attitudes Towards Human and Agent TeammatesProceedings of the 8th International Conference on Human-Agent Interaction10.1145/3406499.3415082(50-59)Online publication date: 10-Nov-2020
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3406499.3415082
Levy PSarne DAumann YElkind EVeloso MAgmon NTaylor M(2019)Selective Information Disclosure in ContestsProceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3306127.3332021(2093-2095)Online publication date: 8-May-2019
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3306127.3332021
Alkoby SSarne DSingh SMarkovitch S(2017)The benefit in free information disclosure when selling information to peopleProceedings of the Thirty-First AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3298239.3298385(985-992)Online publication date: 4-Feb-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3298239.3298385
Plonsky OErev IHazan TTennenholtz MSingh SMarkovitch S(2017)Psychological forestProceedings of the Thirty-First AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3298239.3298336(656-662)Online publication date: 4-Feb-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3298239.3298336
Hajaj CSarne D(2017)Selective opportunity disclosure at the service of strategic information platformsAutonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems10.1007/s10458-016-9357-131:5(1133-1164)Online publication date: 1-Sep-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s10458-016-9357-1
Shvartzon AAzaria AKraus SGoldman CTsimhoni OMeyer JWeiss GYolum PBordini RElkind E(2015)A Game for Studying Maintenance Alerts' EffectivenessProceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/2772879.2773370(1655-1656)Online publication date: 4-May-2015
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/2772879.2773370
Azaria ARichardson AElmalech ARosenfeld ABazzan AHuhns MLomuscio AScerri P(2014)Automated agents' behavior in the trust-revenge game incomparison to other culturesProceedings of the 2014 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems10.5555/2615731.2617487(1389-1390)Online publication date: 5-May-2014
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/2615731.2617487
Azaria ARichardson AKraus SBazzan AHuhns MLomuscio AScerri P(2014)An agent for the prospect presentation problemProceedings of the 2014 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems10.5555/2615731.2617403(989-996)Online publication date: 5-May-2014
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/2615731.2617403
Hajaj CSarne DBabaioff MConitzer VEasley D(2014)Strategic information platformsProceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation10.1145/2600057.2602864(839-856)Online publication date: 1-Jun-2014
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2600057.2602864
Azaria ARabinovich ZGoldman CKraus S(2014)Strategic Information Disclosure to People with Multiple AlternativesACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology10.1145/25583975:4(1-21)Online publication date: 29-Dec-2014
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2558397

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