


Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology

# Social Structure, Value Orientations and Party Choice in Western Europe



Oddbjørn Knutsen



# Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology

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Value Orientations  
and Party Choice in  
Western Europe

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# Introduction and Presentation of the Research Problems

## 1.1 INTRODUCTION

Traditional explanations for why voters prefer the party they vote for have been found in socio-structural variables such as social class, religion, urban–rural residence and region. These are the structural variables that are included in the famous Lipset–Rokkan model for party cleavages in industrial societies. During recent decades, there have been major changes in social structure and also how social structure determines people’s voting behaviour.

Political issues and value orientations are considered to be more important for individual voter’s preferences in advanced industrial societies. This has partly been explained by the decline of social cleavages and partly by the fact that voters have become more politically sophisticated or cognitively mobilised.

There have also been shifts in the political preferences of the mass publics in value orientations, for example, from religious to secular values and from more authoritarian to libertarian values. It has been hypothesised that value orientations and political issues have become more important determinants of party choice and also that values and issues have become important intervening variables between social structure and party

preferences. The impact of socio-structural variable could increasingly be an indirect effect via value orientations.

The current work is a comparative study of 18 West European countries with data from 2008–2010. The main research problems are:

1. How do (a) social structure and (b) value orientations influence party choice in advanced industrial democracies?
2. To what extent is the impact of social structure transmitted via value orientations?
3. To what extent is the impact of value orientations on party choice a *causal effect* when controlling for prior structural variables?

Research problems 1b and 1b are examined in detail in [Chapters 4](#) and [5](#) where they are devoted more space than the two other research problems. The reason for this is that the nature of the topics requires considerable space. The more concrete research questions that are addressed are: a) the comparative strength of the correlations with party choice, and b) the location of the parties grouped into party families on the structural variables and the value orientations. In particular, the second topic requires much space for a comparative analysis of 18 countries. The two other research questions are examined in a single chapter ([Chapter 6](#)) where three types of voting are differentiated. Two of these reflect the types relevant to these research questions.

This chapter is organised as follows.

First, in [Section 1.2](#), the notions of stable alignment, dealignment and realignment are discussed on the basis of relevant literature. Preference formations and party choice in advanced industrial societies are then reviewed on the basis of the important works of Ronald Inglehart and Herbert Kitschelt ([Section 1.3](#)). [Section 1.4](#) outlines the notions cognitive mobilisation and political sophistication and how these might be expected to be relevant for the research problems in this work. [Section 1.5](#) outlines some details regarding the theoretical framework concerning the main variables in this work: social structure, value orientations and party choice. [Section 1.6](#) discusses the explanatory macro-level variables that are used to explain the empirical patterns. [Section 1.7](#) discusses methodological and statistical considerations, first and foremost related to the fact that the dependent variable – party choice – is a nominal-level variable that might be difficult to analyse in a cross-national context, while [Section 1.8](#) outlines the organisation of the book.

## 1.2 STABLE ALIGNMENT, DEALIGNMENT AND REALIGNMENT

Since the 1970s there has been considerable change in the electoral behaviour of voters. Rather than stable alignment, researchers began talking about dealignment and realignment. One important perspective in Lipset and Rokkan's well-known work (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) was the persistent impact of social structure on party choice, which they called the "freezing of party alignments". This *stable alignment* was – according to the authors – caused by the persistent impact of the socio-structural variables that they focused upon in their seminal essay – and party choice.

Later research has documented considerable decline in the impact of at least some of the structural variables that they considered important. In the literature there has been a focus on "defreezing" of party alignments, structural or secular dealignment (Dalton et al. 1984) and the decline of cleavage politics (Franklin et al. 1992). There has also been discussion of possible realignments associated with the advanced industrial societies or post-industrial societies. These concepts have also been used in important and more recent contributions focusing on post-industrial dealignment and realignment perspectives (Kitschelt and Rehm 2015).

The discussion of changes in social cleavages is then frequently discussed using the terms dealignment and realignment (Dalton et al. 1984). Here dealignment and realignment will be discussed within the framework of the impact of socio-structural variables and value orientations.

*Dealignment* means first and foremost that the impact of the structural variables has become smaller. Voters do not vote according to their location in the social structure to the same degree as previously, and issues and values do not have large explanatory power and/or do not contribute to stable support for the various parties. The increased instability in the party system is frequently associated with and considered to be caused by dealignment. The functional model which Dalton et al. (1984) associated with the dealignment process indicated a decline of the social and political roles of the political parties and a decline of the role of party identification. Kitschelt and Rehm (2015: 183) associate the post-industrial dealignment perspective with an occupational diversification that makes the organisation of collective interests increasingly difficult, accelerated social mobility and breakdowns of stable social networks, neighbourhoods and social "milieus". As to perspectives related to voting, dealignment is coupled to the increased importance of voting on the basis of perceived competence of parties and politicians and issue ownership, and not so much with voting on the basis of position issues.

*Realignment* implies the eclipse of old cleavages and the rise of new ones. There is first a dealignment from the old cleavages and then a new alignment related to the new cleavage structure. While Lipset and Rokkan focused on the national and the industrial revolutions, Dalton et al. (1984: 455–456) couple the realignment perspective to a social cleavage model that incorporated a third post-industrial revolution which might create a new basis of social cleavages.

There are several kinds of cleavages and conflict lines that have been focused in the literature on realignment: New structural cleavages and value-based conflict lines have to a larger degree than in typical industrial society – according to some researchers – become more important. As to structural cleavages, we might differentiate between new structural cleavages and transformation of the impact of the traditional structural variables on party choice.<sup>1</sup>

Gender and new “horizontal” structural divisions within the new middle class are examples of such new structural divisions.<sup>2</sup> These horizontal divisions might be public versus private sector location (Knutsen 2001, 2005) or various work logics according to a competing framework (Oesch 2006a, 2006b).

Gender is a borderline case between this category and the next because previously (and partly at present) there was a traditional gender gap where women voted more frequently for Christian and Conservative parties, while they increasingly vote for leftist parties more frequently than men.

In addition to gender, the most pronounced example of transformation of social cleavage variables is possibly related to education and social class. Increasingly, the higher educated strata and the new middle class vote for leftist parties, in particular New Leftist parties, while part of the working class votes for the rightist parties, in particular the New Rightist parties. Values and issues related to New Politics are frequently stated as the main explanations for this changing relationship between important class variables and party choice (Kitschelt 1994, 1995; Knutsen 2006a: 4–5).

The impact of issues and value orientations has been shown to be increasing. That which is most frequently focussed upon in the literature is the rise of issue voting, but there are also important perspectives based on New Politics literature related to the increased importance of political value voting. These perspectives are quite similar since – to a large degree – they are both based on approaches with multidimensional policy spaces that reflect issues or values.

This increased impact of issues and values is considered to be a causal effect when prior structural variables are controlled for and is first and foremost associated with the so-called cultural or New Politics dimension (s). However, more general perspectives have also been formulated where Old Politics values have become more important compared with the equivalent socio-structural variables. This is discussed later.

Most of the literature associates the eventual increased impact of issues and values on party choice with the New Politics orientations (Inglehart 1984, 1997: Chapter 8; Dalton et al. 1984). However, many of the arguments imply that all types of issues and values – both Old and New Politics – might increase since they are based on structural factors such as increased level of education and political knowledge, and increased exposure to the mass media. There might then be an increase in the impact of *all* value orientations (Borre 2001: 134–136). Old Politics values were in typical industrial societies strongly anchored in social structure, and therefore, the causal impact of these values on party choice was small, but in advanced industrial societies this has changed and Old Politics values are not so strongly anchored in social structural variables, but have significant causal impact on party choice (Knutsen 1988).

Another type of realignment is one which follows from the changes in social structure. *Ecological realignment* implies that changes in party support follow directly from the changes in social structure. Ecological realignment contributes not only to change the support of the various parties but also to change political agenda and party strategies. Parties try to appeal to some of the new expanding social groups.

For Kitschelt and Rehm (2015: 180–182) the post-industrial realignment perspective implies that parties act strategically and realign with the evolving preference distribution in the population induced by changing occupational and socio-demographic group sizes. Given the high level of cognitive mobilisation and sophistication of many post-industrial voters who can discriminate between the programmatic positions of the parties and the multidimensionality of the space on salient competitive issue dimensions, party systems tend to fragment through programmatic diversification. Post-industrial party systems are, therefore, highly fragmented if the electoral system allows this, and voters gravitate to parties with positions and appeals that are closest to the voter's preferences in a multi-dimensional space. The post-industrial realignment perspective may then generate cross-nationally quite distinct party system configuration and multidimensional space.



### 1.3 PREFERENCE FORMATION AND PARTY CHOICE IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES

The impact of issues, values and “ideology” are important factors for explaining voter’s party choice. Given that the impact of social structure has declined and given that there has been large changes in the social structure, some authors have argued that the impact of issues and values are expected to increase, both in an absolute sense and relative to socio-structural factors. The reduced role of party identification and social identifications like class identification can also explain the increased role of issues, values and ideology to explain party choice. These identities are, however, not examined here.

The changes from industrial to advanced or post-industrial societies have produced shifts in the formation of the political preferences in the population. Most well known is perhaps the Silent Revolution which Ronald Inglehart focussed upon in his major earlier works, and Herbert Kitschelt’s works on a new libertarian–authoritarian conflict dimension that accumulate the economic left–right dimension in advanced industrial societies.

Many years ago Ronald Inglehart (1984) formulated a couple of interesting perspectives that can be taken as a point of departure. His main perspective was (a) a change from a class-based to a value-based pattern of polarisation or conflict structure and (b) two key hypotheses which he called an issue polarisation hypothesis and a group polarisation hypothesis.

Here we broaden these perspectives by including all central structural variables and all central political value orientations, while Inglehart mainly focused social class (social structure) and the materialist/post-materialist value orientations. The perspectives implied both a hypothesis about structural dealignment and as we shall see – realignment – and value realignment that according to his view was underlying the electoral change in advanced industrial democracies.

The main perspective in Inglehart’s work is that traditional left–right class voting has declined which, to a large degree, is caused by the rise of the materialist/post-materialist value orientations as a major determinant for political attitudes, identities and party choice. People with post-materialist values want social change, identify with the left and vote for New Left parties and thereby undermine the old order with a radical working class and a conservative new middle class. However, Inglehart also formulated two more concrete hypotheses that can be a fruitful departure for this work, namely an issue polarisation hypothesis and a group polarisation hypothesis.

*The issue polarisation hypothesis* was related to the rising importance of New Politics and the materialist/post-materialist issue and value dimension. The increased importance of this dimension was compared to not only the economic left–right dimension in particular, but also the role of religion. These Old Politics dimensions would become less significant over time.

The *group polarisation hypothesis* indicating that a new group polarisation had developed parallel to the old class cleavage. This new “axis of group polarisation” was coupled to the rising importance of political issues that reflected a shift in value priorities along the materialist/post-materialist dimension. The social basis of the new support for the parties and policies of the left tended to come disproportionately from middle-class sources because the New Leftist voters had post-materialist values, and post-materialists were disproportionately higher educated and new middle-class people.

The group polarisation hypothesis implies two important perspectives:

(a) The traditional pattern where the upper and middle class supported the right and the workers supported the leftist parties may be weakened and even reversed. The rise of the materialist/post-materialist dimension can also explain the decline of class voting in post-industrial society. The new middle class and the better-educated strata are most likely to support “the post-material left”. As post-materialist issues become more important, this stimulates a materialist counter-reaction whereby some of the working class side with conservative or bourgeois parties to reaffirm the traditional materialist emphasis on economic growth, military security and law and order (Inglehart 1984: 28, 1997: 252–256).

(b) Value orientations will play an important intermediate role for explaining the “new” impact of social structure on party choice. It is – according to Inglehart – the materialist/post-materialist orientations that explain the changing impact of class variables on party choice.

If the perspective is broadening somewhat, we can discuss Inglehart’s perspective as a change from social structural determinants of party choice to values and basic political issues as the major determinants of party choice. Not only social class but all socio-structural variables have become weaker determinants of party choice over time, and value orientations will play a greater role in the future.

The two hypotheses (issue and group polarisation) can also be broadened to include several structural variables and value orientations. Issue and value orientations will be increasingly important for people’s identities and party choice, and a large part of the impact of the socio-structural variables will be transmitted via these value orientations. The impact of social structure on

party choice will then – in advanced industrial societies – be explained by various value orientations that are important for individual's political identities and party choice. Inglehart discusses the decline of conventional left–right class voting, but his group polarisation hypothesis can also be interpreted as a realignment hypothesis where social structural variables increasingly will influence party choice in new ways which deviate from the traditional in typical industrial societies, and where value orientations will be central intermediate variables between social structure and party choice.

In Kitschelt's (1994, 1995) important works on the strategies of the parties on the left and radical right, a major theoretical part comprises the preference formations and changing conflict dimensions in advanced industrial democracies. Kitschelt argues for a new libertarian–authoritarian conflict dimension that has become increasingly important and complement the economic left–right dimensions with regard to party competition. Kitschelt argues that the two dimensions are separate but that the main competition takes place along an orthogonal axis from left-libertarian to right-authoritarian values. The libertarian–authoritarian dimension is fairly similar to Inglehart's materialist/post-materialist dimension (Kitschelt 1994: 28–29).

Central in his theoretical perspective on political preference formations in advanced industrial societies are *social transactions* in work settings characterised by labour markets and authority relations, and *interactive processes* among people on everyday life that generate beliefs and dispositions on which people act (Kitschelt 1994: 12–30).

Central in *the social transaction processes* are market locations, and Kitschelt emphasises social class, public versus private sector employment and sectors of jobs and assets that are orientated towards international competition versus domestic and local markets. These processes are most important for economic left–right orientations, and the higher educated strata, part of the new middle class, public sector employees and those who work in the domestic market sector will have leftist orientations.


The *interactive processes* relate to daily environment of work organisations and the sphere of social consumption. Work environment and opportunities to participate in communicative social processes are important factors in this respect. Work experiences that offer job autonomy and involve communicative skills foster preferences for social reciprocity and individual creativity, and libertarian values. In contrast, authoritarian values are fostered in work environments where the work is routine, steered from above and where the rewards are monetary earning external

to the social process. The work situation that individuals encounter in their daily occupation tasks are then central for developing preferences for libertarian or authoritarian values, and Kitschelt indicates that education and gender are important socio-structural determinant for this dimension. Higher educated people typically work in settings where they have greater control over their job environments and women tend to be overwhelmingly employed in people-processing organisations. These groups have, therefore, libertarian values and tend to support the New Left, while lower educated strata and men to a larger degree tend to have authoritarian values and support the Radical Right.

The relationship between social structure, conflict dimensions (which is called value orientations here) and party choice is central in Kitschelt's approach. His approach is mainly a spatial one where social groups and parties and their strategies are located in a two-dimensional space, but underlying this is a model of preference formation where social structure and value orientations are central.

The basic causal model that underlies this work is shown in shown in Fig. 1.1.

It should be underscored that both social structural variables and value orientations are multidimensional and comprises several variables. The impact of social structure is both direct on party choice and indirect via value orientations. Ingleharts group polarisation hypothesis and Kitschelt's model for the relationship between social structure, the two conflict dimensions and party choice and party strategies can be understood as being focussed on the indirect effect from social structure via value orientations to party choice.



**Fig. 1.1** Causal model for explaining party choice

The second main research questions can be understood as the indirect effect of social structure on party choice via value orientations, while the third research problem is the strength of the impact of value orientations when social structure is controlled for (indicated by the arrow from value orientations to party choice in the model). These types of voting will be referred to as cleavage voting and pure value voting below, respectively.

The impact of social structure on party choice is frequently referred to as cleavages. According to this conceptualisation a cleavage basically reflects broadly based and long-standing social and economic divisions within society, and the political cleavage structure is thought of in terms of social groups, the loyalties of individuals to their social group and how these loyalties influence party choice and political action (Franklin et al. 1992: 5).

Throughout this book, we use the notion of cleavages in this way. Newer conceptualisations tend to reserve the cleavage concept to the indirect effect from social structure via value orientation to party choice. In Sections 6.4 and 6.5, the cleavage concept is used in this way when the strength of this indirect effect (research problem 2) is tested. Otherwise, we will use the notion deep-seated cleavage or full-grown cleavage for this indirect effect.

#### 1.4 COGNITIVE MOBILISATION AND POLITICAL SOPHISTICATION

The theory of cognitive mobilisation implies that issue and value voting will increase over time. According to this perspective advanced industrial societies have produced a tremendous expansion of secondary and higher education and a diffusion of greater quantities of political information via the electronic media. This has raised the political resources and cognitive skills of large segments of the population in advanced societies.

The process of cognitive mobilisation has two separate parts (Dalton 2014: 21–25): the ability to acquire political information and the ability to process political information. There has been an enormous expansion of mass media and the public have obtained a greater ability to process political information. More people also have the resources and skills necessary to deal with the complexities of politics and to reach their own political decisions, and do not have to rely on external cues or

heuristics. Cognitive mobilisation, therefore, reduces many people's need to rely on parental influence, party identification and other cues for making political decisions. Socio-structural location is also a case in this respect: Cognitive mobilisation works against the stable social cleavages and the dominance of large, disciplined organisations and has contributed to a shift from social group to value and issue politics and a change from social group to value and issue-based conflicts (Dalton et al. 1984: 18–19, 474).

Dalton has developed a model comprising party identification and cognitive mobilisation. The groups of highly cognitive mobilised without a party identification – the so-called *apartisans* – are politically involved and sophisticated citizens who are unattached to any political party. This group votes regularly and places greater weight on issues and values when they cast their vote. However, their voting pattern might also be more variable and reflecting the changing context of the elections and the political strategies of the political parties (Dalton 1984, 2014: 198–204).

Cognitive mobilisation and political sophistication are similar concepts and a process of cognitive mobilisation has raised the public overall level of political sophistication. Cognitively mobilised voters have clear positions on political issues and values, can discriminate between the political parties' programmatic positions in a multidimensional space and make political choices on the basis of these calculations.

Research has shown that issue- and value-based voting varies strongly with levels of political sophistication (Lachat 2008; Macdonald et al. 1995: 467–470). Therefore, if the cognitive mobilisation theory is correct, issue and value voting should increase due to the increased cognitive mobilisation and political sophistication among the electorate.<sup>3</sup> It can also be argued that cognitive mobilisation is relevant to cleavage voting. Cognitively mobilised voters have values that are formed from their structural position; these voters vote according to these values.

Most of the literature associates the eventually increased impact of issues and values on party choice with the New Politics orientations (Dalton et al. 1984). However, many of the arguments based on cognitive mobilisation imply that *all* types of issues and values – both Old and New Politics – might increase since the arguments are based on structural factors such as increased level and education and political knowledge, and increased exposure to mass media. Consequently, there could be an increase in the impact of *all* value orientations (Borre 2001: 134–136).

## 1.5 SOCIAL STRUCTURE, VALUE ORIENTATIONS AND PARTY CHOICE

### 1.5.1 *The Party Choice Variable*

Much of the research on the impact of socio-structural variables on party choice, dichotomise the dependent party choice variable into leftist and non-leftist parties, and the findings about a fairly strong decline in the impact of social structure on party choice is based on this approach. In a previous work on the impact of the socio-structural model based on Eurobarometer data for eight West European countries from the 1970s to the late 1990s, I found (Knutsen 2004a: chapter 7) a marked difference in the decline of socio-structural variables depending on how the party choice variable was treated. The average decline based on the dichotomous party choice variable was 46%, while the decline based on all parties treated as separate categories was only 17%. There is obviously considerable impact of the socio-structural variables that are still present, but tends to cut across the left–right division of parties. Similar differences were found for class voting in particular when it was analysed using different treatments of the dependent variable (Knutsen 2006a).

The traditional way of examining the impact of socio-structural variables on party choice is to use a dichotomous dependent party choice variable. In this work dichotomisation is not used but the whole party system is analysed; all significant parties are included as separate categories. Given that the impact of social structure declines considerably less when the left–right division of parties is replaced with a nominal-level party choice variable where all significant parties are included as separate categories, it could be that the relationship between social structure and value orientations has interesting intermediate effects on party choice

In the previous works mentioned earlier (Knutsen 2004a, 2006a), the party choice variable was based on the party choice variable where all parties were treated as separate categories and party choice was also based on a dichotomous left–right party choice variable. Due to lack of space the dichotomous approach has been dropped in this work.

### 1.5.2 *Social Structure*

It is now a conventional view that the impact of social structure on voting behaviour is declining in advanced industrial democracies. Another perspective is that the impact has *changed* due to changes in the preferences of

the voters and changes in the conflict structure. It is evident that both dealignment and realignment processes are taking place in advanced industrial democracies, and it is also obvious that the way of treating the dependent party choice variable is important in this respect as indicated by the perspectives of Inglehart and Kitschelt. The realignment perspective might first and foremost be related to the class variables, but – as we have seen – the perspectives from Kitschelt’s work indicate that several socio-structural variables might be relevant in this respect.

By including value orientations as intermediate variables, it is possible to examine how much of the impact of social structure is transmitted via value orientations and how much that is not. Works by Daniel Oesch (2013) and Rune Stubager (2013) have, for example, showed empirically that the New Politics party conflict between the New Left and Radical Right can be considered as a deep-seated cleavage related to class variables (social class and education), libertarian–authoritarian values and support for the New Left versus the Radical Right.

### 1.5.3 *Value Orientations*

Politically relevant value orientations are multidimensional. This work takes issue with the notion of two dimensions, an economic left-right and a so-called cultural dimension. These dimensions are sometimes also referred to as Old and New Politics dimensions, respectively.

Old Politics is frequently coupled to the structural variables in the Lipset–Rokkan model for cleavages in industrial societies. Lipset and Rokkan did not emphasize value orientations as distinct conflict lines, but indicated that values might be part of given cleavages. The most important value orientations that can be considered as equivalent to these structural cleavages and which emerged from industrial societies were economic left–right values related to economic redistribution and the size of the welfare state, and religious–secular (moral) values. The religious–secular values seem mistakenly to have been ignored in some of the most recent literature conflict dimensions in advanced democracies.

The moral value dimension and economic left–right values are often referred to as “Old Politics” because they capture the essence of the traditional lines of conflict in industrial society. In contrast, “New Politics” refers to value conflicts emerging from post-industrial society. More specifically, New Politics-related value dimensions involve conflicts over a more modern set of issues related, for instance, to environmental quality, alternative life



styles, social and political participation, minority rights and social equality. Some observers have argued that the tranquillity of West European electoral politics has been disrupted by the rise of new social movements and a number of Green, New Left and Radical Rightist political parties. These developments have led to a debate over the possibility of a partisan realignment on the basis of new politics issues and values.

One approach to New Politics values is Inglehart's materialist/post-materialist dimension. This is a comprehensive dimension which includes as materialist values both values that tap economic and physical security, and post-materialist values that both tap belongingness (such as participatory values) and aesthetical values (such as environmental protection and emphasis on ideas instead of money).<sup>4</sup> Kitschelt's libertarian–authoritarian dimension is very similar, although it is not measured with the same set of indicators across surveys in the same way and with indicators that clearly tap value orientations in the same way as Inglehart's indicators,

Other approaches differentiate between different New Politics orientations on the basis of both theoretical discussions and empirical analyses (mainly factor analyses). A basic differentiation within New Politics orientations is between libertarian–authoritarian values and environmental values. Theoretically, it can be argued that these values tap different orientations. While the first dimension taps orientations towards authorities and different child-rearing values, the other taps orientations that reflect different trade-offs related to concern for the environment versus economic growth, productivity and economic efficiency. Various analyses have shown that these values do tap different dimensions (Knutson 1995a; Knutson and Kumlin 2005). In recent publications, Kitschelt has added a third dimension related to his economic left–right and libertarian–authoritarian dimensions, namely one that reflects orientations towards immigration and multiculturalism (Kitschelt and Rehm 2014, 2015: 180–181).

The data material used in this work is rich in the sense that it contains many value indicators which measure the relevant social and political value dimensions. It is, therefore, possible to examine the dimensionality of politically relevant value orientations in greater detail than in many other comparative surveys.

Comparative studies that examine the relationship between value orientations and party choice and do not restrict the analyses to two dimensions in addition to those mentioned above are Gunther and Hsin-chi (2007) and Moreno (1999, 2016). Important studies of individual countries which examine more than two dimensions include Middendorp's well-known

study of ideology in the Netherlands (Middendorp 1991), and Shalom Schwartz et al.'s (2010) important study of the relationship between personal and political values and voting. Schwartz et al. identify eight "core political value" dimensions that are examined in relation to personal values and party choice. The election surveys in Norway and Sweden also contain a large number of political issues and value indicators which have produced multidimensional spaces based on dimensional analyses.

Schwartz, a leading researcher on value orientations, defines the following regarding the idea of two dimensions in value research: "Two dimensions can hardly capture the richness of individual and cultural differences in values. For this purpose, a more finely tuned set of basic values is needed" (2006: 173). This applies decisively both to basic personal values and to basic political values.

*The idea of Old and New Politics value orientations:* A basic idea in the literature on New Politics is that the value orientations included in New Politics – whether one or several – will be increasingly more important in explaining party choice, whereas the Old Politics orientations that will fade away with the class and religious structural cleavages (Inglehart 1990: chap. 9, 1997: 252–266).<sup>5</sup> This work do not have longitudinal data, but focus on the relative importance of Old and New Politics orientations and determine which of the macro-level variables that are correlated with this relative importance of these value orientations.<sup>6</sup>

*Value competition and positional competition:* The existence of several significant value orientations that are important for the voter's choice of political parties in a multiparty system insert special issue or value dimension competition between the political parties (Green-Pedersen 2007). The parties would like to have the issues and values they emphasise as dominating the political agenda, and they will, of course, try to convince the voters that their position on a given dimension is the best. They therefore compete in two ways: (a) in having the issue dimension that they primarily focus upon to be dominant, for example, in an election campaign,<sup>7</sup> and (b) for different party positions on the given issue dimension(s). As to the first point, some parties, for example, focus on economic issues; others focus on religious issues or the environment, whereas yet others focus on law and order, or refugees and immigrants. Issue competition does not imply that political parties will each select and emphasise one or a few issue dimensions and then just ignore the others. The central aim of a political party in issue competition is to get other parties to pay attention to those issues that it would like to see dominating electoral competition, but in most cases they will also

formulate positions on the other dimensions (Green-Pedersen 2007: 609). As Green-Pedersen (2007: 612) remarks: “This does not mean that the two types of competition are necessarily unrelated, and growing issue competition does not necessarily mean less positional competition, but rather that party competition becomes considerably more complex.” Green-Pedersen (2007: 618–623) shows that the emphasis of issue dimensions varies systematically between various party families on the basis of the programmes of the political parties.

## 1.6 EXPLANATORY MACRO-LEVEL VARIABLES

In order to explain many of the comparative findings in this work, a few macro-level variables are used, namely advanced industrialism and fragmentation and polarisation of the party system. This study does not examine changes over time, but there are significant differences between the 18 Western European countries concerning these macro variables to test hypotheses about the impact of degree of advanced industrialism on various aspects on conflict structure.

### 1.6.1 *Advanced Industrialism and Post-industrialism*

The notion of advanced industrial society is used here to tap an important social structural dimension that is used as a macro-level framework. Other terms that are used to mean more or less the same are “advanced capitalism” (Beramendi et al. 2015), “post-industrial societies” (Bell 1973) and “rich democracies” (Wilenski 2002). Frequently, these notions are used interchangeably even in the same works. Bell (1973) used the notion the “post-industrial society” to indicate a structural transformation from the production of a good to the production of services, and where knowledge and technology play an important role in the economy. The advanced industrial societies have de-industrialised and “tertiarised”, producing considerable changes in the occupational structure. Similarly, there have been large increases in the education level in the population. Oesch (2015) uses the notion of education and occupation upgrading for the large upward trends in education and occupation patterns.

Deindustrialisation, meaning that a smaller portion of the workforce is working in the manufacturing sector of the economy, is also a major transformation trait. Technological change has eroded the numbers of production workers and office clerks, and the service economy has worsened

the job and mobility prospects of production workers, semiskilled clerks, owners of small stores and independent artisans. On the other hand, there has been strong job growth in highly skilled, high-quality professionals in the private and public service sectors.

The increase in standard of living and wealth is also a major characteristic of advanced industrial societies. Here, national GDP per capita and the size of the working population in the service sector are used as indicators of advanced industrialism. The first is an indicator of “rich democracies”; the other as an indicator of post-industrialism according to Bell. Here we consider both as indicators for advanced industrialism.

The main hypotheses are that advanced industrialism induces preference formations and conflict structure, and that party system characteristics do the same, in particular related to the conflict structure.

This work does not examine the impact of the economic recession that started in 2008 on value orientations and party choice. It can be objected that the economic recession would have an impact on the findings, and that can be the case. However, a thorough work on values and the economic crises concluded that basic value orientations did not change during the recession, but various social and political attitudes did, and to some degree also the relationship between values and attitudes (Voicu, Mochmann and Dülmer 2016).

### 1.6.2 *Party System Polarisation*

Party system polarisation can be defined as the distance between the parties in a party system on central policy dimensions. The theoretical expectation for why the degree of polarisation in party systems might influence the size of the impact of social structural and value orientation on voting choice is fairly straightforward: Individuals should be better able to compare the political parties and recognise which party is best positioned to represent them. It may also become easier for citizens to choose a party and form an identification with that party if parties are more distinct.

More detailed arguments (see Knutsen and Kumlin 2005: 157–161) for why party system polarisation might increase the impact of value orientations on party choice are as follows. First, if party representatives use overarching values or ideological concepts in a consistent manner, more citizens may be stimulated to do likewise. If parties present coherent issue packages that are explicitly tied together, then more voters should learn to use such value-laden concepts themselves. Second, polarised party

conflict may also make it easier for citizens to choose on the basis of values. According to Zaller's (1992: 44–45) model of opinion formation, it is easier for people to make value-based political choices if they possess a rich supply of “cuing information”. This information is about the relationship between their values and the incoming information.

A third mechanism has to do with affective responses to polarised party conflicts. Frequently used orientations tend to become emotionally stronger: People feel stronger about opinions and attitudes that they express and use often. In turn, we also know that emotionally strong orientations are typically more accessible in voters' minds compared to less intense orientations. More clearly polarised ideological party conflict may thus increase the electoral impact of values by making values more emotionally charged and more accessible in citizen's minds. Voters in intense campaigns and in setting with polarisation of parties' ideological positions make more sophisticated decisions and rely less.

Some of the arguments for why party system polarisation increases party identification (see below) can also – somewhat reframed – be used as theoretical arguments for why party system polarisation will increase the impact of value orientations on voting (Lupu 2015: 334–336).

Voting based on value orientations will increase as parties become increasingly salient in political discourse. When parties agree on policies, they become irrelevant to citizens. But when they disagree, partisan conflict becomes more heated and parties seem to be more important. Polarisation clarifies party positions for the mass publics, which in turn influences the importance and salience of parties. This would increase voting based on values.

A rationalistic perspective takes as a point of departure that citizens evaluate parties over time to form a “running tally” and chose the party that is most likely to benefit them. Citizens calculate their net utility from supporting a particular party and evaluate this based on their expected gains from supporting other parties. When parties are close together, the net benefit from supporting one party over the other is small, but when differences between the parties are large, the net benefit for voting for the party that in beneficiary is also large, all else equal.

The arguments above are related to the impact of value orientations on party choice. It could be argued that this also applies to positions in the social structure, in particular when socio-structural position is transmitted via value orientations. Socio-structural positions and interests can more easily lead to distinct choice of political parties for many of the same reasons as those formulated for value orientations.

Empirical studies have shown that the impact of value orientations on voting choice increases when the party system is polarised. Knutsen and Kumlin (2005) analysed the influence of the left–right polarisation on the total impact of value orientations in five West European countries (and 21 elections), and found that the impact of value orientations increased strongly with the degree of polarisation of the party system. Van der Eijk et al. (2005) worked with the same data material and examined the variation in the impact of voter’s left–right self-placement on party choice and found that the larger the ideological distance between the parties, the stronger was the impact of voter’s left–right self-placement.

In a more comprehensive and sophisticated analysis based on the 2009 European Election Study from 12 countries, Lachat (2008) found support for the perspective that left–right polarisation influences the impact of left–right ideology on the vote. He found that level of political sophistication and party identification condition left–right polarisation strongest among the more sophisticated strata among the voters and among those without party identification. Lachat argues strongly against using voter’s perception (from the survey) of left–right location of the parties because it could be argued that the respondents’ perceived level of polarisation might be influenced by their own left–right location: Voters who rely on values and ideology for their party choice could also have the more accurate perceptions of the parties’ location. Lachat argues that one should use expert judgements of the left–right location of parties instead.

Given this convincing arguments, we also rely on expert judgement in order to generate a measure of left–right location of parties in the respective party systems. Data on the left–right location of the parties in the party systems should be based on other sources than the respondents in the survey.

### *1.6.3 Party System Fragmentation*

Party system fragmentation is the number of parties in a party system taking their relative size into account. The theoretical arguments for fragmentation are less clear-cut and more difficult to formulate. The main idea is that a greater number of parties are thought to benefit voters by making it easier for citizens to find a party that represents their particular interests.

In a party system with many significant political parties, voters will have greater possibility to express their interests, socio-structural position and values when they vote for a given party than in party systems with a smaller

number of parties. In multiparty systems or party systems with a high number of effective parties, voters are offered several “packages” from which they can choose according to their value orientations. In two party systems or in party systems with fewer effective parties, such possibilities are smaller. One might also expect that the same applies to the impact of socio-structural variables. Various interests and socio-structural positions are more easily expressed in party systems with many political parties than in systems with fewer parties.

The most relevant literature on this topic is on the relationship between the number of social cleavages and the number of parties. The general proposition that is supported by much empirical evidence is that the more socially heterogeneous a country is, the more electoral parties it will have, controlling for the permissiveness of the electoral system (see Stoll 2008 for an overview). In the literature, social cleavages seem to be considered as an independent variable that explains the number of parties. However, here we consider the number of parties as a macro-level context that might influence the strength of the relationship between social structure and value orientation with regard to party preference.

The relationship between party system fragmentation and the impact of value orientations on party choice is strongly confirmed in a comparative analysis. The correlations between fragmentation and the size of the correlations were 0.50–0.72 for five of six value orientations (Knutsen 1995a: 40–43).

An important issue is whether party system fragmentation can have stronger or additional influence on voting pattern than polarisation or if these aspects of the party system tap more of less the same aspect of the size of the impact of socio-structural and value orientations on party choice party. Given that political parties in Western European countries are to a large extent are programmatically different from each other, the number of significant parties in the party system first and foremost taps programmatic diversification.

If fragmentation does not reflect diverse programmatic orientations, we should not expect significant correlations between the number of parties and the size of the impact of social structural variables or value orientations on party choice. However, in a multiparty system with several cross-cutting socio-structural and value-based conflict lines, it is difficult to find measures of party system polarisation that tap all these dimensions. The macro-based measure is conducted by asking political experts to locate the political parties on a general left–right scale. This is a catch-all measure

since “left” and “right” can be associated with several policy dimensions, but it nevertheless locates the various parties in only one position, and given that the conflict structure might be multidimensional both at the party and the voter levels, this is a fairly rough measure because the party voters have different relative locations on the various dimensions.<sup>8</sup>

## 1.7 METHODOLOGICAL AND STATISTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

### 1.7.1 *General Considerations*

The methodological and statistical measures that are used in empirical social science works are of considerable importance. Some general considerations are initially outlined followed by some relevant traits for the statistical analyses in this work from multinomial regression analysis.

The empirical data material in this work is from the European Values Study. The main reason for choosing this study is that it contains a large number of questions measuring the central social and political value orientations that are relevant for the research questions in this work. Frequently, one sees works on political attitude and value orientations that are based on a small number of indicators (one or two), and therefore, have a low level of content validity and a high degree of measurement error. The indices used for tapping value orientations are altogether based on around 30 indicators where each index is based on five to eight items, thus probably increasing content validity and decreasing measurement error considerably compared to constructs with very few indicators (Adcock and Collier 2001; Trochim 2006).

It is the research questions and also the readability that are decisive for the statistical methods which should be used in publications from research projects. Research questions should – as a principle – be formulated before the choice of statistical methods. One should then choose between the available statistical procedures. This should not be done the opposite way where the statistical procedures decisively influence the research problems that are formulated and the units (here countries) that are chosen to be included in the analysis.

Multilevel analyses with a dependent nominal-level variable are complex and do not produce the coefficients relevant for the research problems in this work. Such analyses would need to use party families as the dependent variable, and the party system in the various countries varies with regard to which party families that are represented. This makes it



problematic also to perform analyses with all countries included in the same analyses. Countries should have fairly similar party systems (with the same party families), and one might end up with choosing countries on the basis of the values of the dependent variable.<sup>9</sup>

The approach in this work is, therefore, to perform analyses with the party choice variables in the various countries separately, and then compare the correlations and effects of various variables or groups of variables within countries and between countries. This strategy also makes the work comparatively genuine since the tables allow us to compare the coefficients for the countries. In the various tables, the countries are ranked on the basis of these coefficients to obtain a comparative pattern. The analyses with macro-level variables are then undertaken in the next step by examining how characteristics of the countries are related to the comparative patterns.

The point of departure is that we want to analyse the impact of explanatory variables on party choice or voting given that the dependent variable is at the nominal level with more than two values. The party systems of nearly all Western democracies are multiparty systems and it is assumed that these comprise more than two significant parties and consequently that the party choice variable is not a dichotomous variable. Since the dependent variable is a nominal-level variable, ordinary least-squared (OLS) regression cannot be used.

The main approach in this work is to compare the relative strength of the impact of social structural and value orientations on party choice within countries (both individual variables and groups of variables), and the comparative strength between countries.

The textbooks tell us that we should use unstandardised coefficients for comparing the strength of correlations and effects when comparisons are made between samples (countries) for the same variable. The *b*-coefficient from OLS cannot be used, given that the dependent variable is a nominal-level variable. Does it make any difference whether standardised or unstandardised measures are used? The standardised coefficients are frequently used simply because the unstandardised alternatives for measures with a dependent variable at the nominal level are fairly unknown to researchers and are not part of any software statistical procedure. If we employ standardised coefficients instead, does this result in misleading conclusions?

According to textbooks, standardised measures should be used for comparing the associations and effects of independent variables within the same sample – country in this context. In another work based on the same data (Knutson 2014), results based on various measures for analysing

the main research problems in this book with the same data, are reported. The focus in that paper was the relationship between party choice and value orientations. The choice – given that the dependent variable is at a nominal level of measurement – has usually been considered to be between discriminant analysis (DA) and multinomial logistic regression (MNL). For the various research problems, measures from MNL, DA and analysis of variance (ANOVA), which also is an alternative for bivariate analyses, were compared. The rest of this section is based on the results and reflections from this paper (Knutsen 2014). Detailed references are also found in that paper, but are to a large extent dropped here.

One way of indicating the similarities and differences between correlation coefficients, controlled effect and explanatory power is to correlate the various measures with each other using the countries as units for the analyses. A macro file has been generated with the various measures tapping these aspects of the relationship between value orientations and party choice.

Four measures were first examined to tap the bivariate relationship between value orientations and party choice. Two of these were standardised and two unstandardised measures. These measures showed an impressively similarity regarding the ranking of the countries and also the relative strength between the countries. In order to examine the degree of similarity between the various measures, these were correlated with each other in analyses with the 18 countries as the units for analysis. The correlations between the various measures were remarkably strong; nearly all were stronger than 0.90. It can be concluded that when many studies have used standardised measures to analyse trends over time and cross-national patterns, it is not so frequent that this results in wrong conclusions. This depends, of course, on the standard deviations of the interval-level variables, but if they do not differ significantly, the conclusion from the analyses in the paper which then is based on the same data as those used in this work, was that one should not be too careful (selective) in using such standardised measures for making comparisons between samples.

Another important conclusion is that some central measures from DA and MNL produce extremely similar results with regard to the explanatory power of groups of variables with regard to party choice. The similarities in strength between these measures are consistent in the various analyses that were performed although these measures are based on quite different calculation principles.

The two coefficients that are used in this work for measuring the bivariate correlations are:

*The squared root of Nagelkerke's  $R^2$  from multinomial logistic regression:* There is no standardised or unstandardised coefficient that measures the strength of the relationship between the nominal-level dependent variable and the independent variables in MNL. However, the pseudo- $R^2$  measures can be useful in this context. Nagelkerke's  $R^2$  is equivalent to explained variance, and the square root of this measure is used as a bivariate correlation between party choice and each of the value orientations. This measure was one of the four coefficients compared in the analyses outlined above for the relationship between party choice and value orientations.

One advantage with pseudo- $R^2$  measures is that they can be used not only with a dependent variable at the nominal level but also with independent variables both at the nominal level (as factor variables) and the interval level (as covariates) of measurement. In this way variables of different levels of measurement can be included as independent variables and the relative strength of the correlations with party choice can be compared. This is more problematic for some of the traditional measures such as eta and Cramer's V.

*Eta from analysis of variance:* The eta coefficient, also called the correlation ratio, is closely associated with analysis of variance, but eta can be a useful coefficient outside the context of ANOVA. The eta coefficient requires that the dependent variable is at interval or ratio level while the independent variable is at a nominal level. Eta squared is the explained variance in a one-way analysis of variance (with one independent variable) and is identical to  $R^2$  in OLS (Iversen and Norpoth 1980: 30–37).

In practice, the ratio-level variable (which in the paper was the value orientations) has to be treated as the dependent variable and the nominal-level variable (party choice in this case) as the independent variable when eta coefficient is calculated. This has the important consequence that there is no multivariate coefficient with which eta can be compared when other independent variables are included in the analysis. The eta coefficient is then very useful for examining the bivariate correlation between party choice and independent variables at a ratio level.<sup>10</sup> For example, Granberg and Holmberg (1988: 50) examine the impact of single issues on voting and use the eta coefficient, which they label the issue voting coefficient for their purposes. However, there is no direct equivalent coefficient that can be used in multivariate analyses with a dependent variable that is at a nominal level of measurement.

Another result from the analysis was that the Nagelkerke's  $R^2$  measure is a very good pseudo-measure which corresponds very closely to  $R^2$ , while the other pseudo-measures (see below) showed considerable less explanatory power than the  $R^2$  measure or coefficients from ANOVA. Therefore, Nagelkerke's measure is used. In [Sections 6.3](#) and [6.4](#) we also use this measure for decomposing pseudo-variance. Nagelkerke's  $R^2$  varies from 0.00 to 1.00 and the measure is "linear" in the sense that the explanatory power from 0.10 to 0.20 is equal to the change from 0.20 to 0.30, in contrast to the  $b$ -coefficients in binary logistic regression and the kappa index (see below) which do not allow for such decomposition.

Standardised coefficients are used because: (a) the analyses in the paper showed that these coefficients showed the same patterns as for the unstandardised alternatives; (b) we then have only one set of coefficients for each analysis, not two, and (c) standardised coefficients are considerably easier to understand for the reader than unstandardised coefficients.

## 1.7.2 *Multinomial Logistic Regression*

### 1.7.2.1 *Description of the Statistical Method*

The main preoccupation of binary logistic regression in the case of party choice is to examine the probability of voting for a given party in comparison to a reference category when other independent variables are controlled for. Binomial logistic regression can be used for a dichotomous dependent variable – that is a two-party system. The essence of the analysis is to calculate the probability of voting for a party for different social groups such as, for example, workers, employers, higher-level non-manuals and so on for a class variable. It is important to understand that the probability, the odds and the logit are three different ways of expressing exactly the same thing in logistic regression (Menard [2002](#): 13).

MNL allows for more than two categorical values on the dependent variable and is then suitable for analysing predictors of party choice in a multiparty setting. MNL is a straightforward extension of binomial logistic regression. One value on the dependent variable is designated as the reference category and the probability of membership in other categories is compared to the probability of membership in the reference category (Menard [2002](#): 91–92). This is indeed the essence of the MNL model: the various measures in MNL are generally calculated for each logistic function (pair of groups).

The impact of the whole independent variable (in particular for nominal-level variables with more than two categories) is frequently lost in MNL analyses. While there is a  $b$ -coefficient for the binary logistic regression analysis which indicates the effect of the independent variable, there is no such coefficient in MNL. The focus is then more on a comparison of the probability of voting for a given party as indicated above. There are numerous examples whereby the research problem is adopted to exactly this in the literature given the use of MNL.

#### 1.7.2.2 *Pseudo- $R^2$ as a Measure of Goodness-of-fit*

There are several pseudo- $R^2$  measures which are supposed to tap the goodness-of-fit or the explanatory power for the full model of explanatory variables. These measures have received relatively little attention in the literature concerning binary logistic regression and MNL, although some texts deal significantly with this aspect (see Menard 2002: 20–27). These measures are calculated based on the predicted probabilities and observed classification for all categories of the dependent variable (Menard 2002: 94). There are several such measures, each producing quite different results concerning explanatory power. Since they formally do not measure explained variance, we use the notion of “explanatory power” instead in this work.

Three pseudo- $R^2$  measures are reported in the SPSS NOMREG programme: McFadden, Cox and Snell and Nagelkerke. The McFadden measure is recommended by Menard (2002: 27), but it is well known that it produces quite low explanatory power, much lower than  $R^2$  when these measures are compared (Demaris 1992: 54). Cox and Snell’s and Nagelkerke’s measures are based on the same approach. The  $R^2$  is based on the improvement of the likelihood from a null model to a fitted model. While Cox and Snell’s measure can never equal 1.00 even if the full model predicts the outcome perfectly and has the likelihood of 1, Nagelkerke’s  $R^2$  adjusts for this and can achieve the level of 1.00 if the full model perfectly predicts the outcome. This is one reason why this measure is chosen to tap the explanatory power based on MNL.

In the case of only one independent variable, the pseudo  $R^2$  measure can be considered as a standardised measure of the explanatory power of a given independent variable, and the square root can be considered as a coefficient similar to  $r$  from regression analysis and eta from ANOVA. In the bivariate analyses between the value orientations and party choice below, the Nagelkerke’s pseudo-measure is used in this way.

MNL does not make any assumptions of normality, linearity and homogeneity of variance for the independent variables as does DA. Because it does not impose these requirements, it is argued that this is preferable to DA when the data does not satisfy these assumptions (Demaris 1992: 61). The main reasons for preferring MNL to DA are however that: (a) nominal-level variables cannot be used as independent discriminating variables and (b) the measure that was used to measure the strength of the relationship between social structure, value orientations and party choice in the DA analyses is not frequently used.

Empty cells are a significant or even a major problem in logistic regression and MNL in particular. If a cell is empty in the contingency table upon which the analysis is based, the odds and logit for that particular category will be  $\pm$  infinite ( $\infty$ ) and the results will be a very high estimated standard error for the coefficient associated with the category. Generally, this results in instability of the estimates of coefficients and their standard errors. The problem applies especially to categorical variables and appears in particular when such variables have many categories since this generally increases the likelihood for empty cells. This applies both to the dependent variable and categorical independent variables. This problem occurs frequently in analyses of party choice as the dependent variable, in particular in systems with many parties. The solution is often to collapse categories on the dependent party choice variable or independent variables. This can, however, result in a cruder measurement of the independent variable and may bias the strength of the relationship between the predictor and the dependent variable towards zero (Menard 2002: 78–79, 93). Menard's textbook provides an illustrative example. In an analysis of a variable with four values on the dependent variable and six values on an independent ethnicity variable, four of the groups on the ethnicity variable had to be collapsed into an "other" category. "Failure to do this would have resulted in problems with zero cells, and instability in estimates of coefficients and their standard deviations" (Menard 2002: 93). One might argue that important aspects of the original analysis have to be dropped in order to satisfy the assumptions for the statistical procedure. This problem emerges frequently when dealing with many parties. The estimates become problematic and the method cannot be used for the purpose.

In one of the standard articles about MNL, the method (and also probit modelling) is illustrated by an analysis based on the election survey from the 1994 Dutch election survey (Alvarez and Nagler 1998). The analyses

are based on the five largest parties. This is considered good because “the data were *rich enough* to allow us to explore voting for give of the partiers...” (italics added here). The other parties are simply dropped from the analyses and this is not considered as an important problem at all in the paper.

Van Der Eijk et al. (2006: 438) have pointed out that this analysis had excluded four smaller parties, and 10% of the sample that had indicated a party choice was consequently omitted. This will bias the estimated coefficients since the probabilities for voting for these parties are not included in the calculations. When these authors use their alternative approach (electoral utility approach) and exactly the same independent variables that are used by Alvarez and Nagler (1998),  $R^2$  was 0.48 for an analysis based on the five parties and which then omits 10% of those who had indicated a party choice in the survey.  $R^2$  increased to 0.59 when all party voters and voting for the four smaller parties was included in the analysis. The reason for omission of these smaller parties is not explained in the Alvarez and Nagel article, but this is surely caused by problems with empty cells.

The approach in this work is to include all respondents with a party choice in the analyses for each country. Parties with a support of between one and three per cent are grouped into an “Other parties” category both for avoiding empty cell problems and also because there are large confidence intervals associated with such small samples for these parties. In a few cases in the multivariate analyses, the empty cell problem nevertheless occurs and categories on the dependent or the independent variables have been collapsed. These cases are, however, few.

### 1.7.2.3 *The Use of Log Odds Ratios as a Basis for Calculating Cleavage Strengths*

The Alford index for class voting has been criticised for being sensitive to the distribution of the two variables (dichotomous class and party choice), and it has been suggested that log-odds ratios should be used instead to measure the so-called relative class voting in contrast to the absolute class voting tapped by the Alford index (Hout et al. 1993: 265–266; Weakliem 1995; Nieuwbeerta 1995: 39–42).

When more than two classes or social groups are used to tap the social class or social variables, the analyses become more complicated. Hout et al. (1993: 265–266; 1995) suggest using the *kappa index*. This index calculates several log-odds ratios between a reference category on the class variable and each of the other classes, and uses the standard deviation of

these log-odds ratios as a measure of class voting. The higher the value of the kappa index, the higher is the level of class voting. The kappa index has several desirable statistical properties. The most desirable property is that the index is based on log-odds ratios and is therefore not dependent on the marginal distributions of the independent or dependent variables.

This way of measuring class voting is to some extent also found in analyses of other social cleavages. For example, in some works on the impact of various structural variables on party choice the kappa index is frequently used (Brooks et al. 2006; Jansen 2011). The calculation of kappa is, however, based on a nominal-level independent variable (such as a class variable based, for example, on the Erikson and Goldthorpe class scheme) or religious denomination, but not for interval- or ratio-level variables.

It is the researcher who calculates the kappa indices but these are based on the logic of logistic regression and MNL. Kappa values can be calculated for each political party. In such analyses, the coefficients for each category of the independent conflict variable are assigned the same weight independently of the size of the category. It has also been proposed that the average kappa coefficient for each significant party in a party system can be used as a measure of the overall cleavage strength simply by calculating the average kappa across the various parties. These overall cleavage strengths are supposed to have properties that allow comparison of strength across social conflict variables (at a nominal level of measurement) (Brooks et al. 2006; Jansen 2011).

There are, however, two important critical questions regarding these measures when they are aggregated from a given party to the whole party system. It might be justified that all social groups shall count equally when the focus is on the analysis of a single party, but when the kappa measure is aggregated to the whole party system, the question arises whether all classes and also the kappas for all parties should count equally even though the classes are different sizes and the parties have different levels of support in the surveys. This is not discussed in the literature on these measures of social cleavages.

The other limitation of these measures is that they are developed for nominal-level independent variables, not variables at a higher level of measurement. When, for example, frequency of church attendance is included as a determinant of party choice, it is dichotomised.

Generally, the kappa measure for calculating cleavage strength is not used, partly due to some of the weaknesses indicated above. However, the kappa index is used for calculating class voting for party families in [Chapter 5](#).



### 1.7.3 *Conclusions*

The main methodological and statistical approaches in this chapter are briefly summed up below.

The central value orientations are tapped by composite measures based on several indicators (5–8), not just a few.

The empirical analyses are performed by comparing the results from bivariate and multivariate analyses at the country level.

The bivariate correlations are based on standardised measures, mainly eta coefficients from analysis of variance and the squared root of the Nagelkerke's  $R^2$  from MLN.

For comparing the explanatory power of groups of variables (such as the socio structural variables and all value orientations) Nagelkerke's  $R^2$  is used. This measure is also used for decomposing the explanatory power into relevant components for the research problems.

The empty cell problem in MNL is paid much attention to in the empirical analyses. This is treated by collapsing smaller parties into an "Other party" category and in some cases by collapsing smaller parties and categories on the independent social structure variables in the multivariate analyses. All respondents with a party choice are, however, included in the multivariate analyses with party choice as the dependent variable.

## 1.8 ORGANISATION OF THIS BOOK

The subsequent chapters contain the following.

*Chapter 2* first outlines the data material, the European Values Study, and discusses the 18 West European countries that are analysed in this work. Then the party choice variable that is used is outlined, and the parties in the 18 countries are grouped into party families. Finally the macro-level variables for advanced industrialism and party system characteristics are outlined.

In *Chapter 3* the socio-structural variables are outlined and comparative distributions are shown on the basis of the data material. The value orientations are then discussed by theoretical discussion of various value orientations. Factor analyses are performed to derive at meaningful value dimensions; index constructions are outlined and comparative distributions of values are discussed and explained. In the last part of the chapter the relationship between social structure and value orientations are examined empirically and in a comparative pattern.

*Chapters 4 and 5* examine the two parts of the first research problem. *Chapter 4* contains a detailed analysis of the relationship between social structure and party choice. The main part examines the comparative strength of the relationship for each single socio-structural variable and party families. This is followed by examining the relative strength of the relationship within countries and the comparative relationship between various types of socio-structural variables (ascribed, semi-ascribed and achieved) and party choice is examined. Finally, the explanatory power of the whole socio-structural model in a comparative perspective is examined.

*Chapter 5* examines the relationship between party choice and value orientations, first through a detailed analysis of the relationship between party choice and each of the value orientations followed by an analysis of the comparative impact of all Old and New Politics orientations. Finally, the total impact of all value orientations is outlined and explained by the macro-level variables.

*Chapter 6* examines the second and third research questions. In this chapter the total explanatory power of social structure and value orientations are decomposed into unique components that a) social structure, and b) value orientations explain separately, and c) a component that is an indirect effect transmitted from the social structure via value orientation to party choice. The two last components address research problems 2 and 3. In general, this chapter compares the impact of the socio-structural variables and value orientations and examines the total explanatory power of these variables. This analysis is important given the theoretical considerations in *Section 1.5*.

*Chapter 7* sums of the main results in this book based on the research questions that were formulated in *Section 1.1* and discusses possible changes over time and how social structure and value orientations might influence party choice in the future.

## NOTES

1. For an overview of the changing impact of social structure on party choice in European countries, see Knutsen (2013).
2. By horizontal divisions is meant divisions which cut across vertical or hierarchical divisions. Public versus private sector employment and other sectoral divisions are examples of these.

3. Cognitive mobilisation is frequently measured by indices comprising education, political interest and/or political knowledge.
4. See Inglehart (1997: chap. 2; 1990: chap. 4; 1997: chap. 4).
5. The assumption that the Old Politics orientations will decline following the decline of structural voting is seldom explicitly formulated in the literature.
6. For a study of Old and New Politics values over time in five Western European countries, see Knutsen and Kumlin (2005).
7. Green-Pedersen who builds his discussion on Carmines and Stimson (1993) defines issue competition as those issues that the political parties would like to see being dominant in electoral competition. Green-Pedersen does not discuss single issues, but focuses on broad-based issue dimensions and on the same dimensions as those discussed in this work.
8. Party system polarisation and fragmentation are not frequently used as systematically contextual explanatory variables as in this work. A recent exception is Carlin et al.'s (2015) comprehensive study of voting behaviour In Latin America.
9. Countries are the macro-level variables in this study. Selection of cases on the basis of values of the dependent variable should generally be avoided according to influential books in social science methodology (see King et al. 1994: 129–146).
10. The strength of the relationship between various independent variables and party choice which use the eta coefficient is found in Granberg and Holmberg (1988), van der Eijk et al. (2005) and Knutsen (1995a, 1995b). Eta is also used frequently in the Norwegian and Swedish election studies for this purpose.

# The Data Set and the Party Systems of the 18 Countries

## 2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter focuses on describing the data, countries, party systems and the macro-level variables used for explaining the empirical patterns in the subsequent chapters. [Section 2.1](#) presents a brief description of the comparative data set that is used. [Section 2.2](#) outlines the 18 countries that are included in the study and argue for the grouping of the countries into four regions. [Section 2.3](#) presents the party choice variable that is used, and [Section 2.4](#) argues for the grouping of the parties into party families. [Sections 2.5](#) and [2.6](#) present the macro-level variables, first the measures for advanced industrialism, and then the party system characteristics.

## 2.2 ABOUT THE EUROPEAN VALUES STUDY 2008

The European Values Study 2008 (EVS 2008) is the fourth wave of the study covering all 47 countries of Europe with a population of 100,000 or more and represents a major accomplishment in the social sciences.<sup>1</sup> In this study, data from 18 West European countries is used. These represent all countries in Western Europe with regard to population with a population above 300,000 inhabitants.

Representative multi-stage or stratified random samples of the adult population of 18 years old and above were drawn. Face-to-face interviews with a standardised questionnaire were conducted between 2008 and

2010. The exceptions were Finland (Internet panel) and Sweden (postal survey). EVS 2008 has a persistent focus on a broad range of values related to life, family, work, religion, politics and society.

The total number of respondents in the West European countries is approximately 1500 in most countries, but considerably less in some countries such as Iceland (808), Ireland (1013), and Norway (1090), but considerably more in Germany (2038). The number of respondents in each national survey and the number with party choice is shown in [Table 2.2](#).

The national weight variable that adjusts the socio-structural characteristic in the samples to the distribution of gender and age of the universe populations is used consistently. For German and Belgium data, an additional country-specific weight variable for the regions of Germany (East and West) and of Belgium (Brussels capital region, Flanders and Walloon regions) are used. This design weight corrects for the disproportionate sample size of these regions in both countries.

## 2.3 THE COUNTRIES AND GROUPING OF COUNTRIES INTO REGIONS

In [Table 2.1](#), the 18 countries are outlined, showing how they are grouped into regions of countries. The grouping of the regions is made for pedagogic and organising purposes but is based on the assumptions that the countries within the regions have something in common which is relevant to the research problems. Means for the various regions are shown in each table and the first comments to the various tables are based on these means.

**Table 2.1** The grouping of the countries into regions

<i>The Nordic countries</i>	<i>Central Western region</i>	<i>The Islands</i>	<i>Southern region</i>
Denmark	Austria	Britain	France
Finland	Belgium	Ireland	Greece
Iceland	Germany		Italy
Norway	Luxembourg		Portugal
Sweden	Netherlands		Spain
	Switzerland		

The most important variable in this respect is the party systems or the political systems, and also – as an important background variable – different welfare state regimes. These differ with regard to institutions and organisations, and generosity regarding income maintenance schemas and social services, and are central for economic security and preference formations.

The similarities between the countries, within the various regions regarding the historical development of the party systems, are most pronounced for the Nordic and central western countries.

In the *Nordic countries*, the cleavages in the labour and the commodity market have been of considerable importance, and the party systems have been characterised as a five-party system model originally comprising Communists, Social Democrats, Liberals, Agrarians and Conservatives (Berglund and Lindström 1978; Sundberg 1999). The distinctiveness of the Nordic party systems has been the existence of significant Agrarian parties and the strong position of the Social Democratic parties, at least in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. This party system was “frozen” until the 1960s and 1970s when new parties emerged, first and foremost religious parties, which were not part of the five-party model, and New Politics parties, Radical Right, Greens and Left Socialists (Arter 2012).

The Nordic welfare states<sup>2</sup> have been generous based on universalist and social democratic principles and highly distributive benefits not dependent on individual contributions. Social policy within this type of welfare state is based on aiming at a maximisation of capacities of individual independence. Women are encouraged to participate in the labour market and do so, particularly in the public sector. Social services are well developed and publicly financed (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999).

Based on *Continental European* party systems have historically been based on class and religious cleavages, and the classical European continental party systems have comprised Socialist, Christian, and Liberal forces in the party system for many of the countries, based on a three-party formation. The Christian parties have been large and central in the Christian Democratic movement that developed after the war. The Socialist and Liberal parties have been more secular and have stood against the Christian parties along the religious cleavage. The Socialist and Liberal parties have been main antagonists along the class economic left–right conflicts with social bases among the working class, the bourgeoisie and upper middle-class, respectively. The

religious cleavage has been strong, and the countries are dominated by Roman Catholicism or are a religious mix with various types of Protestantism in addition as in Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland.

The welfare states in these countries have been characterised as conservative and corporatist, having been shaped by Catholic social policy and corporatism, and etatism. The role of the state has been to provide income maintenance benefits related to occupation status. Labour market participation by women has been discouraged because corporatist regimes – influenced by the Church – have been committed to the preservation of traditional family structures. Another importance characteristic has been the principle of subsidiarity; the state will only interfere when the family’s capacity to service its member is exhausted.

*The Southern European countries* have historically been characterised by a highly polarised conflict between a clerical right and an anti-clerical left. “Political Catholicism” developed in these countries as a consequence of the deep conflicts between the state and the Catholic church. The leftist parties have been split, and significant Communist parties emerged after the Russian revolution (Rokkan 1970: 129–138). It has been argued that the uniqueness of the party systems in the southern region has been the strong religious cleavage and the considerable split among the leftist parties. These are common traits for the party systems of Greece, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain, and distinguish them from the Continental party systems (Manow 2013, 2015).

Whether the welfare states in the Southern European countries comprise a special model or should be grouped under the Continental model as merely underdeveloped species, is debated in the literature. Nevertheless, the welfare states in these countries have several characteristics that to some degree are more extreme and to some degree deviate from the Continental model (Arts and Gelissen 2002: 142–146, Esping-Andersen 1999: 90–94; Manow 2013, 2015; Rhodes 1996). These include the following.

- “Familialism”, that is, the employment protection for the mainly male core work force, has been even stronger than in the Continental Conservative welfare model.
- The income maintenance systems are characterised by dualism and polarisation with a high level of youth unemployment and low female labour force participation.

- The health care systems are to some degree different from the Conservative Continental model since these include national health services.
- There is relatively little state intervention in the welfare sphere with a low level of welfare spending.
- There are extensive clientelism and “patronage machines” that distribute cash subsidies to political client groups.

France is a borderline case between the Southern and Central Western regions. Historically, the state–church conflict has been pronounced in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, no party for Christian defence emerged during the Third Republic between 1871 and 1940. When a Christian Democratic party finally emerged on the scene after World War II, it failed to integrate successfully in the party system. The French welfare system resamples the blueprint of the conservative regime type according to some scholars, but others see the French welfare state as belonging to a distinct southern European regime type (Manow and Palier 2009). For these reasons, France is classified in the Southern region.

*The island countries* comprising Britain and Ireland are to a large extent a residual category. These two countries in the Island group probably do not have so much in common in terms of their party systems and conflict structure, and may be considered as a residual category. These countries will largely be commented separately.

However, both Britain and Ireland belong to the liberal or residual welfare regime, which embodies individualism and the primacy of the market. Social benefits are often means-tested and kept at a modest level for the demonstrably needy. There is little redistribution of income, and the realm of social rights is rather limited. The operation of the liberal or residual principle leads to divisions in the population: on the one hand, a minority of low-income state dependents and, on the other hand, a majority of people able to afford private social insurance plans.

## 2.4 THE PARTY CHOICE VARIABLE IN EVS 2008

In the EVS 2008 surveys, the respondents were first asked the traditional question about voting intention “if there was a general election tomorrow” If the respondents answered, “Yes, I would vote”, they were asked which party they would vote for. There was then a follow-up question for



those who replied that they would not vote. These were asked, “Which party appeals to you most”. The number of those who indicated a specific party on this question is added to those who indicated a party on the voting intention question in the party choice variable used here. The party choice variable then aims at including as large a portion of the samples as possible, and then to increase the portion for which a partisan component is relevant. This variable is named “Party choice”. It should be underscored that this is not a behavioural variable since it does not tap actual electoral voting behaviour. It can be argued that vote choice in an actual election is more likely to be affected by a host of factors other than political preference such as short-term scandals, campaign differences, or strategic voting. Asking what party they would vote for outside of campaigns might actually tap more stable political preference to a larger degree.

On the country-level average, 58.0% of respondents indicated a party choice based on the question on voting intention. The average percentage increases to 68.9% when the best-liked party is included. The cross-national variations in the willingness to indicate a party choice according to the procedures above are shown in [Table 2.2](#).

There are considerable variations in the proportions indicating a party choice even when those who do indicate a party choice on the second question on the best-liked party are included, as can be seen in [Table 2.1](#). On average, the proportion is largest in the Nordic countries and smallest in the Southern region, ranging from 89% in Norway to 45% in Portugal.

## 2.5 PARTY FAMILIES

Political parties can be grouped into party families on the basis of criteria such as names, historical traditions the parties represent or their terms of origin, policy and ideology, as stated in their party programs, for example, and membership in transnational party organisations (Mair and Mudde 1998). The classification is based on the first two and partly also the last criteria. It is also based on other major efforts of grouping West European parties into party families (Von Beyme 1985: chapter 2; Gallagher et al. 2011: chapter 8) and my own classification in an earlier work (Knutsen 2004a: 14–19).

The reason for using party families as an organising tool is to be able to compare the location of the parties in the 18 countries on the five-value orientation and to examine the relationship between socio-structural variables and party choice in meaningful ways.

**Table 2.2** Percentages with a party choice (pc)

<i>A. Countries grouped after region</i>				<i>B. Ranking according to percentage of total sample with a party choice</i>	
	N <i>with pc</i>	N <i>total</i>	<i>Percentage with pc of total sample (%)</i>		(%)
Denmark	1266	1507	84.0	Norway	89.3
Finland	803	1134	70.8	Netherl.	86.3
Iceland	598	808	74.0	Denmark	84.0
Norway	973	1090	89.3	Belgium	80.8
Sweden	909	1174	77.4	Sweden	77.4
				Iceland	74.0
Austria	919	1510	60.8	France	73.5
Belgium	1218	1507	80.8	Finland	70.8
Germany	1412	2038	69.3	Germany	69.3
Luxemb.	941	1609	58.5	Britain	68.0
Netherl.	1341	1554	86.3	Greece	67.7
Switzerl.	701	1272	55.1	Ireland	65.6
				Spain	62.0
Britain	1062	1561	68.0	Austria	60.8
Ireland	665	1013	65.6	Luxemb.	58.5
				Italy	56.8
France	1102	1499	73.5	Switzerl.	55.1
Greece	1014	1498	67.7	Portugal	45.1
Italy	863	1519	56.8		
Portugal	700	1553	45.1		
Spain	930	1500	62.0		
<b>Means</b>				<b>Means</b>	
Nordic	910	1143	78.3	Nordic	78.3
Central West	1089	1582	68.3	Central West	68.3
Islands	864	1287	66.8	Islands	66.8
South	922	1514	61.1	South	61.1
All countries	968	1408	68.9	All countries	68.9

It should be underscored that the correlations between party choice and value orientations and socio-structural variables are based on all parties, not the division in the party families. This is important because for some countries more than one party is grouped in a party family, while

for other countries such as the Netherlands, several parties are grouped in the other category without a party family location.

The relevant party families and the classification of the parties in the 18 countries into party families is indicated in [Table 2.3](#).<sup>3</sup>

A description of the party families and a brief discussion of which parties that are grouped into the various party families follows below. The discussion focuses in particular on some of the parties where placement in a given party family could be disputed. The table is organised by party family and region. More than one party is grouped into the same party family when the policy distance between these parties is not considered to be significant.

*Communist parties.* These parties can be identified on the basis of their names, programs and for some, their historical traditions. Most parties within this party family are communist parties that have survived the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. There are also splinter parties originating from the former Communist Party that have changed position to one seen as more moderate and left the communist platform. The parties in Denmark and Norway are not traditional communist parties but new parties with a different background. There are nine significant communist parties in the 18 countries. Four of these are found in Southern Europe, three in the central western region and two in the Nordic countries. Most of the parties gain small support according to the data; the largest (with support ranging from 6% to 10%) are found in Portugal, Greece and Italy.

*Left socialist parties.* These parties typically place themselves to the left of the Social Democratic parties on the economic left–right dimension. They have articulated pacifism and anti-militarism as well as individualism and the acceptance of alternative lifestyles.

These parties have often emphasised New Politics orientations and in particular libertarian value orientations in addition to the traditional leftist concern for equality. Herbert Kitschelt describes these parties as Left-Libertarian in one of the first analyses of this party family. They link “libertarian commitments to individual autonomy and popular participation with a leftist concern for equality” (1988: 195). Some of the parties in this party family have a communist origin and have been transformed with organisational continuity from a communist party (such as the Finnish and Swedish parties). Others are organisations comprising communist and left-socialist forces like the United Left in Spain and Syriza in Greece.<sup>4</sup> A borderline case is the so-called extreme left parties in France. These

**Table 2.3** Political parties grouped into party families' Nordic countries

	<i>Communists</i>	<i>Left-socialist</i>	<i>Social democrats</i>	<i>Green</i>	<i>Ethnic/regional</i>	<i>Agrarian</i>	<i>Liberal</i>	<i>Christian</i>	<i>Conservative</i>	<i>Radical right</i>	<i>Other p.</i>
Denmark	Red-Green Alliance/ Unity List	Socialist People's P.	Social Dem.			Agrarian Lib.	Radical Lib.		Conservative People's P.	Danish People's P.	
Finland		Left Alliance	Social Dem.	Green League	Swedish People's P.	Centre P.		Christian Dem.	National Coalition Party	True Finns	
Iceland		Left-Green Movement	Alliance Party			Progress Party			Independence P.		Citizen Movement
Norway	Red	Socialist Left P.	Labour P.			Centre P.	Liberal P.	Christian People's P.	Conservative P.	Progress P.	
Sweden		Left P.	Social Dem.	Green P.		Centre P.	Liberal P.	Christian Dem.	Conservative P.		

## Central Western countries

	<i>Communists</i>	<i>Left-socialist</i>	<i>Social democrats</i>	<i>Green</i>	<i>Ethnic/regional</i>	<i>Liberal</i>	<i>Christian</i>	<i>Radical right</i>	<i>Other p.</i>
Austria	Austrian Communist Party (KPO)		Austrian Social Democratic Party (SPO)	Green P./ Die Grünen		Liberal Forum	Austrian People's Party (ÖVP)	Freedom Party (FPÖ) and Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ)	
Belgium <sup>1</sup>			Socialist parties (SP.A-Spirit and PS)	Agalew/Groen! and Ecolo	New Flemish Alliance (N-VA)	Liberal parties (VLD and MR)	Christian Parties (CD&V and CDH)	Vlaams Belang and Front National	Lijst Delecker
Germany		Left P.	SPD	Greens		Free Democratic party (FDP)	CDU and CSU	Republican P., National Democratic P. (NDP) and People's Union (DPU)	
Luxem-bourg	Communist P.	Left P.	Socialist P.	Green P.		Democratic P.	Social Christian. P.	Alternative Democratic Reform Party	
Netherlands		Socialist P.	Labour P. (PvdA)	Green Left		People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD)	Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA)	Freedom Party (PVV)	D66, Christian Union, SGP, <sup>2</sup> PvdD <sup>3</sup> and Group Verdonk
Switzerland	Labour P.		Social Dem.	Green P. and Green Liberal P.		Radical P. and Liberal P.	Christian Dem.	Swiss People's P.	

No Agrarian or Conservative parties

<sup>1</sup>The abbreviations are the abbreviations for the Flemish and the Walloon parties within the respective party families

<sup>2</sup>SGP Reformed Party

<sup>3</sup>PvdD Party for the Animals Island countries

## Island countries

	<i>Left socialists</i>	<i>Social democrats</i>	<i>Greens</i>	<i>Ethnic/ regional p.</i>	<i>Liberal</i>	<i>Christian</i>	<i>Conser-native</i>	<i>Other p.</i>
Britain		Labour P.	Green P.	Scottish Nationalist Party and Plaid Cymru	Liberal Democrats		Conservative P.	
Ireland	Sinn Fein	Labour P.	Green P.			Fine Gael	Fianna Fail	Independents

No Communist, Agrarian and Radical Rightist parties

## Southern Europe

	<i>Communists</i>	<i>Left-socialist</i>	<i>Social Democrats</i>	<i>Green</i>	<i>Ethnic/regional</i>	<i>Liberal</i>	<i>Christian</i>	<i>Conservative</i>	<i>Radical Right</i>	<i>Other p.</i>
France	French Communist Party (PCF)	Left Wing Parties <sup>4</sup>	French Socialist party (PS)	Green Party and other environmental parties.		Democratic Movement and New Centrist Party		Union for a Popular Movement (UMP)	Front National and National Republican Movement (MNR)	<sup>5</sup> See footnote
Greece	KKE	Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza)	Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)					New Democracy	Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS)	
Italy	Communist Refoundation P. and Communist Workers' Party (PCL)	Left and Freedom Party	Democratic P.	Lista Bonino-Pannella	Lega Nord		Union of the Centre	People of Freedom	Tricolor Flame	Italy of Values
Portugal	Democratic Unity Coalition (PCP/PEV) <sup>7</sup>	Left Bloc	Socialist Party (PS)			Social Democratic P. (PPD/PSD)		Popular Party (CDS/PP)		
Spain		United Left (IU)	Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE)		GIJ, ERC, PNV and other regional p. <sup>6</sup>			Popular Party (PP)		

No Agrarian parties

<sup>4</sup> Revolutionary Communist League, Workers' Struggle and Workers' Party

<sup>5</sup> Other parties in France are: Other left-wing parties, Hunting, Fishing, Nature and Tradition, and Movement for France

<sup>6</sup> PNV - Basque Nationalist Party

GIJ - Convergence and Unity

ERC - Republican Left of Catalonia

<sup>7</sup> The Democratic Unity Coalition is an electoral and political coalition between the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and the Ecologist Party "The Greens" (PEV). Since the Communist Party is the major force inside the coalition, the coalition is grouped as a communist party

parties have a Trotskyist ideology but share many of the issues of the Left Socialist, and the communist category is occupied with the traditional communist party. An alternative would have been to group these parties into the “Other parties” category.

The parties grouped into this party family are decisively leftist on the economic left–right dimension, but they can vary considerably with regard to how “New Left” or libertarian they are.

Left socialist parties are found in 14 of the 18 countries, in all the Nordic and South European countries, and in three Central European countries and in Ireland. The largest levels of support are found in Iceland and Denmark (20–21%) and then in the Netherlands, Germany, Greece and Ireland (10–12%)

*The Social Democratic or Socialist parties* are found in all 18 countries. These parties are traditional Old Left parties that historically have been anchored in the industrial economic left–right conflict and which now have a centre–left position in the various party systems. The support for these parties in the data material varies from 47% in Spain to 16%–19% in Finland and the Netherlands, and just 9% in Ireland.

*Green parties.* Most of the green parties in Western Europe were established in the late 1970s and 1980s. The parties that are grouped in this party family frequently use the Green Party label and identify themselves as Green/Ecologist parties. In Switzerland, there are two green parties, and in France, there are also “other green parties” than the Green Party (Les Verts). These parties are collapsed in the Green Party families in these countries. There are significant Green parties in 12 of the countries, in all Central European countries and in two countries in each of the other regions. Their support varies from between 14% and 17% in Luxembourg, Finland, Austria, Switzerland and Belgium, to 2% in Italy.

*The ethnic/regional parties* are those which support specific ethnic groups and articulate their cultural and economic interests and which in some instances articulate autonomist or even separatist claims. There are significant such parties in five of the countries: Italy, Belgium, Spain, Britain and Finland. In general, their support is small from 1% to 8%.

*Agrarian parties* are parties that originated in the cleavage in the commodity market according to Lipset and Rokkan’s conceptualisation and which articulate the economic and cultural interests of the farmers and other self-employed persons in the primary industries. These parties also focus on the economic interests of the peripheral regions and the countryside in general. These parties are only found in the Nordic countries



among the 18 Western democracies included in the present study. The parties in Finland, Norway and Sweden have changed name to centre parties, while the Danish Agrarian Liberal party is a borderline case because it attracts voters outside the farming community and the countryside and has become the largest non-leftist party in Denmark. It can also be classified as a liberal party, but here we stick to the traditional classification of the party. There is another Liberal party in Denmark with a fairly different political profile (see below). The Danish Agrarian Liberals has considerably larger support (30%) than the corresponding parties in the other countries (4%–14%) according to the surveys.

*Liberal parties.* It is sometimes difficult to determine which parties should be grouped in the liberal party family.<sup>5</sup> Liberal parties have generally less ideological coherence than the other major party families (Conservative, Christian, and Social Democrats). Liberal parties have advocated constitutional reforms, strengthening the protection of civil liberties, economic freedom, and opposed the interests and privileges of the church. The emphasis of these conflicts has varied between parties and countries. Different authors have grouped different parties in this party family or divided liberal parties into two different groups: Liberal-Radical and Liberal-Conservative (Smith 1989: 122–123, Von Beyme 1985: 45). We have used only one category and as a rule included the liberal parties that have been the historical liberal party and label themselves as such.

In Denmark, the Radical Liberals (sometimes called Social Liberals) are included, but not the Agrarian Liberals which is grouped as an Agrarian party. This party belong to the Radical-Liberal group according to those who use two liberal categories.

In the Netherlands, the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) – a historically traditional right-wing liberal party – is included. Another party – D66 – is also considered as a liberal party in the Netherlands, but it is significantly more left-wing, and it is not natural to collapse these two parties in the same party family. D66 is then not classified into any party families. For Denmark and the Netherlands, two liberal party families might have been an alternative, but this does not apply to the other countries. In France, both the Democratic Movement (Modem) and the splinter party, New Centrist Party, are included as liberal parties.

*Christian parties* are first and foremost the Christian Democratic parties in the Central region, but also the smaller Christian parties in the Nordic countries. These parties express religious and moral values

and principles in the political space and are based on mainly Catholic, Protestant and biconfessional denominations in different countries. The German CDU/CSU and the Austrian ÖVP can be considered borderline cases between Christian and Conservative parties, but they are grouped as Christian parties in accordance with other classifications (Gallagher et al. 2011: 253–256). The Irish Fine Gael is also grouped in this party family in accordance with some previous classifications.

In the Netherlands, the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) is a classical Christian Democratic Party, although it is a merger party based on three pillar parties from the various religious confessions in the Netherlands. Two other Christian parties that are grouped under Other parties in the Netherlands are the Christian Union and the Reformed Political Party (SGP), and can be considered Calvinist fundamentalist parties which have political profiles that are different from the CDA. For this reason only CDA is grouped in the Christian party family in the Netherlands, while the Calvinist fundamentalist parties are grouped under the Other party category.

There are Christian parties in 11 countries, where support varies from 37% in Germany to 9% in Italy and 2%–6% in the three relevant Nordic countries (Finland, Norway and Sweden).<sup>6</sup>

*Conservative parties:* These parties are found in the Nordic countries, Britain, Ireland and Southern Europe, but not in the Central European countries. In the latter countries, the Christian parties can be considered as functionally equivalent parties (Gallagher et al. 2011: 260). In France, the successor party to the New Gaullist RPR, Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) is classified as a conservative party, the same is the Irish Fianna Fáil and the short-lived merger of Forza Italia and National Alliance (*Alleanza Nazionale*) in Italy, the People of Freedom.<sup>7</sup>

There are Conservative parties in 12 countries – in all countries apart from the Central Western region. The support varies from 41% in Ireland and 37% in Britain to 8% in Denmark and 3% in Portugal.

*The Radical Rightist parties* have appeared in many West European countries during the 1970s and 1980s. These parties have different origins, but have some similar programmatic profiles. Their main focus is on sociocultural issues such as immigration, and law and order.

There are radical rightist parties in 12 of the 18 countries according to the data. These parties appear in all the Central European countries, three of the Nordic countries and three of the Southern European countries.

According to the survey, support for the Radical Right varies from 20%–25% in Austria, Norway and Switzerland, 12% in Finland and 2%–9% in the remaining relevant countries.

Table 2.4 shows the support for parties within the various party families in the 18 countries according to the surveys. It is difficult to examine the average support for the various party families due to the fact that several party families are not represented in a number of countries, and some of the relevant parties are so small that they are grouped under “Other parties”.

Only the Social Democratic parties are represented in all 18 countries. Somewhat surprisingly Left Socialist parties are represented in 14 of the countries, while many party families are found in 11–12 countries, namely established party families such as the Conservative, Christian, and Liberals, and newer party families such as the Greens and the Radical Right. Communist parties are found in nine countries and ethnic-regional and Agrarian parties are found in five countries. The Agrarian parties are all found in the Nordic countries where these parties represent a distinct trait of the party systems. The countries in the Central Western region have significant Christian parties but not parties that can be grouped under the Conservative party family as defined here, while Conservative parties are found in the other regions, including Southern Europe.

If we base the calculation on the number of countries where the parties are present, support is largest for the Social Democratic parties and then the Conservative, Christian and Liberal parties followed by the Agrarian parties. Support is smallest for the Ethnic/Regional and Communist parties.

It is evident from Table 2.4 that the Other parties category is significant in some of the countries. This is partly due to the fact that this category was significant in some countries, but it is also parties with significant support that are grouped in this category in other countries. The Other parties category is particularly large in the Netherlands mainly for reasons given. It should again be underscored that all statistical analyses have been undertaken with all relevant parties at the country level, and not using the party family variable.

## 2.6 THE STRUCTURAL MACRO VARIABLES FOR ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES AND WEALTH

As indicated in Section 1.6, GDP per capita and the proportion of the working population in the tertiary sector is used as measures of advanced industrialism. Table 2.5 shows the comparative patterns regarding these variables based on data from the World Bank.

Table 2.4 Support for parties in the various party families according to the surveys

	Denmark	Finland	Iceland	Norway	Sweden	Austria	Belgium	Germany	Luxemb.	Netherl.	Switzerl.
Communist	1.8			2.1		1.4			2.8		2.7
Left socialist	20.4	5.6	20.9	6.7	7.5			11.5	1.7	11.9	0.0
Social Democrats	22.0	18.9	25.4	29.8	29.4	33.9	23.7	25.1	24.0	15.8	21.0
Green		16.2			9.5	15.0	13.9	11.6	16.6	5.8	14.1
Ethnic/regional		1.4					7.7				
Agrarian	30.2	14.1	13.0	7.8	4.1						
Liberal	7.0			6.2	8.5	3.3	17.7	9.6	19.5	15.6	18.7
Christian		2.4		6.0	3.7	23.5	25.6	37.1	27.3	21.2	12.7
Conservative	8.2	28.0	29.4	17.6	27.7						
Radical Right	8.9	11.7		22.3		19.8	6.1	3.0	3.4	3.1	22.5
Other P.	1.5	1.7	11.2	1.6	9.7	3.1	5.3	2.1	4.7	26.6	8.3
Sum	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1266	803	598	973	909	919	1218	1412	941	1341	701
<b>Support according to the survey (cont.)</b>											
	Britain	Ireland	France	Greece	Italy	Portugal	Spain	No. of countries	Mean support		
Communist			4.1	7.4	5.9	10.4		9	4.3		
Left socialist		9.9	6.2	10.6	2.9	7.7	8.1	14	9.4		
Social Democrats	30.2	8.6	28.5	32.1	33.0	36.2	46.7	18	26.9		
Green	8.9	5.8	10.3		2.2			12	10.8		
Ethnic/regional	2.2				7.9		5.6	5	5.0		
Agrarian								5	13.8		
Liberal	14.8		15.4		9.0	31.2		12	15.2		
Christian		22.2						11	17.3		
Conservative	36.6	40.5	21.6	30.5	26.8	3.0	32.6	12	25.2		
Radical right			3.1	3.7	2.2			12	9.2		
Other P.	7.3	13.1	10.9	15.8	10.1	11.4	7.0		8.4		
Sum	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0				
N	1053	659	1102	1014	863	700	930		17,402		

Table 2.5 Comparative patterns regarding degree of advanced industrialism

<i>A. Countries grouped after region</i>			<i>B. Ranking of countries and regions</i>			
	<i>GDP per cap.</i>	<i>Size of service sector</i>	<i>GDP per cap.</i>	<i>Size of service sector</i>		
Denmark	34,007	74	Luxemb.	73,849	Luxemb.	78
Finland	33,626	70	Norway	48,557	Britain	77
Iceland	36,676	73	Ireland	38,954	Sweden	76
Norway	48,557	74	Netherl.	38,135	Denmark	74
Sweden	34,301	76	Switzer.	38,086	Norway	74
Austria	36,193	68	Iceland	36,676	Netherl.	74
Belgium	33,556	73	Austria	36,193	France	74
Germany	33,758	69	Sweden	34,301	Iceland	73
Luxemb.	73,849	78	Denmark	34,007	Belgium	73
Netherl.	38,135	74	Britain	33,868	Finland	70
Switzerl.	38,086	68	Germany	33,758	Germany	69
Britain	33,868	77	Finland	33,626	Austria	68
Ireland	38,954	68	Belgium	33,556	Switzerl.	68
France	30,358	74	France	30,358	Ireland	68
Greece	26,900	66	Portugal	28,340	Portugal	68
Italy	28,168	66	Italy	28,168	Greece	66
Portugal	28,340	68	Greece	26,900	Italy	66
Spain	21,962	59	Spain	21,962	Spain	59

<b>Means</b>						
Nordic	37,433	73				73
Central west	42,263	72	35,946		42,263	73
Islands	36,411	73			37,433	72
South	27,146	67			36,411	67
All	36,072	71			27,146	71
					36,072	
					35946 for the Central Western region is calculated by omitting Luxembourg	

Source: World Bank. 2005. *World Development Indicators 2005*. Washington, DC: World Bank

Concerning GDP per capita, Luxembourg is a clear outlier with a value that is 52% higher than the next richest country, Norway. This also applies to the bivariate analyses, so the correlations for GDP per capita are performed excluding Luxembourg. The central western region is the richest region due to Luxembourg, but when Luxembourg is excluded from the calculations, this region declines to the third richest region according to the average figures. The main difference between the regions is now between the poorer Southern region and the other three regions, and all the five Southern countries (including France) form a group with the five lowest levels of GDP per capita.

Regarding the size of the service sector, the differences are much smaller, ranging from 59% in Spain to 78% in Luxembourg. The same applies decisively to the regional averages that show somewhat smaller percentages work in the service sector in the Southern region than in the other regions.

## 2.7 PARTY SYSTEM FRAGMENTATION AND POLARISATION

### 2.7.1 *Fragmentation*

Party system fragmentations should be measured by how many political parties there are in the party system taking their relative size into account. The most commonly used measure for party system fragmentation is that developed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979). This measure is widely used in comparative research within political science. It is called the effective number of parties and is calculated as follows:

$$1/\sum p_i^2$$

where  $p_i$  is the proportion of support for the  $i$ th party in the party system. It is readily seen that in a two party system with two equally strong parties, the effective number of parties is 2.0, with three equally strong parties the effective number formulae yields a value of 3.0, and so on.

The support for the parties in the survey is used to calculate the effective number of parties. Table 2.6A shows the party fragmentation by the number of effective parties in the 18 countries according to the survey.

**Table 2.6** Effective number of electoral political parties (ENEP) and party system polarisation

<i>A. Effective number of parties</i>		<i>B. Party system polarisation (Taylor and Herman measure)</i>	
Netherl.	7.75	Switzerl.	8.47
Switzerl.	6.45	France	7.81
France	6.35	Norway	5.61
Finland	5.59	Austria	5.46
Belgium	5.50 (9.92)	Italy	5.45
Norway	5.33	Spain	5.24
Sweden	5.07	Netherl.	4.87
Denmark	4.97	Belgium	4.72
Luxemb.	4.95	Iceland	4.55
Italy	4.80	Luxemb.	4.28
Austria	4.60	Sweden	3.99
Iceland	4.58	Denmark	3.66
Germany	4.20	Germany	3.56
Greece	4.19	Greece	3.54
Ireland	4.10	Portugal	2.92
Portugal	3.86	Finland	2.84
Britain	3.84	Ireland	2.25
<b>Means</b>		<b>Means</b>	
Central west	5.57	Central west	5.23
Nordic	5.11	South	4.99
South	4.44	Nordic c.	4.13
Islands	3.97	Islands	1.73
All	4.95	All	3.51

The figures for Belgium is based on party families (by collapsing the Flemish and Francophone parties) while the figure in the parenthesis are based on all parties

Fragmentation is based on all parties in the party systems, not only those that are grouped into the party families.

There are large differences in levels of fragmentation. Fragmentation is originally decisively largest in Belgium mainly due to the split between the Flemish and Francophone parties (see the figures in parentheses in the table for Belgium). The Netherlands, Switzerland and France have also very fragmented party systems according to the surveys, followed by four of the Nordic countries. Fragmentation is smallest in Britain, Ireland, Spain, and Portugal.



The fragmentation of the Belgian party system is an outlier due to the split between the regional parties. If we collapse the Francophone and Walloon parties that belong to the same party family (see Table 7.6), then party system fragmentation in the Belgium case is strongly reduced and fragmentation is larger in several other countries.

All analyses have been conducted with both all Belgian parties and by collapsing the parties within the same party families. The impact of the structural variables and value orientations is fairly similar for the Belgian case for all parties and the party families. Note that Region is not included as a structural variable. This implies that the various party families within the two regions in Belgium have fairly similar locations in the social structure and among value orientations which are also controlled by detailed analyses. When the results from the survey analyses of all parties were correlated with the effective number of parties with the large number of effective parties for Belgium, this country was not only a univariate outlier but also a bivariate outlier, contributing to reduce the correlations so that Belgium had to be excluded from the analyses. When the results based on party families were used instead, the bivariate outlier status did not occur. It was therefore decided to use the results from the survey based on party families for the Belgian case, and to use the subsequent number of effective parties (5.50) instead of the measure based on all parties (9.92).

This also influences the regional average for the Central Western region that declines from 6.28 to 5.57, but is still higher than in the other regions. As to the regions of countries, fragmentation is then largest in the Central Western region followed by the Nordic countries, then Southern Europe, and lowest on the Islands

The level of fragmentation according to the survey data is highly correlated with fragmentation according to the closest general election (2008 or earlier); Pearson's  $r$  between the two measures of fragmentation is 0.90 for the 18 units. Only in France and the Netherlands is there a significant difference between the two measures; fragmentation is larger in the survey data than the fragmentation measures according to electoral support.

### 2.7.2 *Polarisation*

Given that it was indicated in [Section 1.6](#) that it was advisable to use data from other sources than the respondents in the survey for data on the

location of the political parties, the data I use are from the 2006 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Hooghe et al. 2010) that was conducted in all EU countries apart from Luxembourg, Cyprus and Malta.

The question formulation to the experts was as follows: “Please tick the box that best describes each party’s overall ideology on a scale ranging from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right).” A scale was then presented to the experts.

The vote percentage of the parties was available in the data set and was the vote percentage by the parties in the national election prior to 2007.

Four countries that are included in the analysis were not included in the 2006 Chapel Hill Expert Survey Luxembourg and the three non-EU members, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. For these countries, I have used the data from Benoit and Laver’s expert survey from 2002 to 2004 (Benoit and Laver 2006). This is a few years before the collection of the EVS data but should not have a significant impact.

In this survey, the experts were asked to locate the parties on a left–right scale from 1 to 20: “Please locate each party on a general left–right dimension, taking all aspects of party policy into account.” For these countries, the mean location of the parties on the 20-point scale was transformed into the 11-point scale (0–10). The polarisation measures were then calculated.

There are several measures for tapping polarisation in the party system. I first calculated polarisation on the basis of two of these and found a very strong correlation between them (0.96), so I decided to use one of them, namely the Taylor and Herman (1971) measure that is most frequently used.

This measure is calculated as follows:

$$\sum f_i(x_i - \bar{x})^2.$$

where  $f_i$  is the percentage of the vote for each party (party no.  $i$ ),  $x_i$  is the (mean) left–right score for a given party ( $i$ ) and  $\bar{x}$  is the overall mean of the scale for all parties calculated on the basis of the percentage of the vote.<sup>8</sup>

Table 2.6B shows the comparative levels of party system polarisation according to the Taylor and Herman measure. There are large differences in polarisation where the largest levels are found in Switzerland and France and the lowest levels are found in Britain and Ireland. According to the

average levels for the various regions, polarisation is largest in the Central Western regions and followed by the Southern region, and decisively smallest on the Islands.

The idea of using the general left–right scale (not an economic left–right scale) is that the general left–right scale has been shown to have an enormous absorptive capacity, being able to incorporate many conflict dimensions (Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990; Knutsen 1995d). When the experts are locating the parties on a scale that is labelled with the concepts “left” and “right”, they take into consideration the positions of the parties along several conflict dimensions and the comparative differences in the distances between the parties reflect differences among several dimensions.

It is not possible to include similar policy scales based on expert judgements for different policy dimensions in the analyses given that the analyses of the macro-level variables only include 18 units. Such scales based on expert judgements do not exist for all the value orientations focused upon in this work.

### 2.7.3 *Correlations Between the Various Macro-Level Variables*

GDP per capita and the size of the service sector is strongly correlated for the 18 units (0.59), GDP per capita is moderately correlated with party system fragmentations (0.23) and not correlated with party system polarisation (0.02). The only correlations that change significantly when the Luxembourg case is dropped, is for party system fragmentation, the correlation increases from 0.23 to 0.44.

The size of the service sector is fairly strongly correlated with party system fragmentation (0.44), but not with polarisation (−0.14). Finally, party system fragmentation and polarisation are strongly correlated (0.51).

In summary:

- The two measures for advanced industrialism are strongly correlated: the largest portion of the workforce work in the service sector in the richest countries.
- The advanced industrial democracies have the most fragmented party systems, but not the most polarised; polarisation is not correlated with advanced industrialism.
- Finally, there is a strong tendency for fragmented party system also to be the most polarised.

### 2.7.4 *The Analyses Based on the Macro-Level Variables*

As previously indicated, a two-stage analysis is performed. The comparative results from the various country-specific analyses are correlated with the four macro-level variables. One can argue that multivariate analyses should be performed, but given that there are so few units (18) it is difficult to perform such analysis. Such analyses have been performed and showed somewhat unstable results, frequently with negative adjusted  $R^2$ .<sup>9</sup>

Significant testing is questioned when there is no sample of countries and no universe to generalise to outside the countries included in the study. One reasonable choice in this case is to set a fixed value and to consider correlations that are equal to or above this level to be significant. This level is set to  $r$  equal to or greater than 0.25. These results will be considered significant and referred to in the subsequent chapters. The analysis of the explanatory macrolevel variables should be considered tentative and could be extended to a larger number of countries in other analyses. The results from the correlation analyses are presented in the text, not in separate tables.

## NOTES

1. Major works on personal and social values and attitudes based on this survey are Arts and Halman (2014) and de Hart et al. (2013).
2. The presentations of the various welfare regimes are generally based on Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999), and Arts and Gelissen (2002)
3. As a rule, parties that were supported with around 20 respondents or less have been grouped into the “Other parties” category. These are not included in the classification of party families here.
4. Syriza became a unitary party in 2013, several years after the EVS survey.
5. For a thorough overview of the literature of classification of West European Liberal parties, see Steed and Humphreys (1988).
6. Supporters of the Danish Christian Democrats were too few ( $N = 4$ ) in the data material to be included as a separate category.
7. The People of Freedom was launched by Silvio Berlusconi in late 2007. It was a federation of parties 2007–09, and a separate party from 2009 to 2013 when it was dissolved and Forza Italia was reestablished.
8. The other alternative measure is derived from a work of John Huber on the left–right scale (Huber 1989: 615). He presents a measure that is based on the logic of dummy regression, but which can easily be transformed to an equivalent measure to the logic of variance statistics. This measure can be written as follows:  $\sum f_i |x_i - \bar{x}|$   $|x_i - \bar{x}|$  is the absolute value of the difference between the mean score on the left right scale of voters for

party  $i$  and the “grand mean”, i.e. the mean (of voters) for all parties. On this measure, unlike the measure advanced by Taylor and Herman, deviations from the overall mean are not squared. For a detailed comparison of these measures, see Knutsen (1998).

9. For a similar two-stage strategy, see Delhey and Newton (2005) analysis of generalised social trust in comparative perspective. They use data from 60 countries based on the World Values Survey. Since they have considerably more countries than in the current work, they are able to perform simple multivariate causal analyses.

# Socio-structural Variables and Value Orientations

## 3.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter outlines how the socio-structural variables and the value orientations are operationalised and shows the comparative distributions of these variables. [Section 3.2](#) focuses on the socio-structural variables. [Section 3.3](#) outlines the rich data material on social and political values which the EVS 2008 represents, discusses results from factor analyses of the value indicators, outlines the index construction of the value orientations that are used in the subsequent analysis and shows the comparative distribution of the value orientations. [Section 3.4](#) examines the relationship between value orientations and party choice in a comparative perspective while [Section 3.5](#) sums up the findings in the chapter.

## 3.2 SOCIO-STRUCTURAL VARIABLES

### 3.2.1 *Introduction*

The socio-structural model that is used in this project is traditional variables that – to a large degree – are anchored in the Lipset–Rokkan model for structural cleavages in the industrial society. The four cleavages that Lipset and Rokkan (1967) emphasised were the centre–periphery

cleavage, the religious-state cleavage and the cleavages in the commodity and the labour market.

The centre–periphery cleavage is measured by region and is a quite complicated variable in comparative research. It is not included in this project due to its complexity. Regions are different in each country, and although a standard for classification of regions in Europe exists, the variable remains complex and problematic in multivariate analyses.

The religious cleavage is measured by religious denomination, not church attendance. The argument for this is outlined below.

The conflict in the commodity market was a conflict between the urban and rural interests. Rural primary producers wanted to sell their products at higher prices while the urban population wanted lower prices for food and sustenance. This conflict can be measured by comparing the voting pattern of the self-employed class in the primary sector with other social classes, but also with the size of residence where the respondent lives. Here we focus mainly on urban–rural residence. The conflict in the labour market is one between owners and employers on the one side, and tenants, labourers and workers on the other, i.e. a class conflict. Education and family income are also included as indicators of social class and status. Some of these variables – in particular the social class variables – may have achieved new meanings and may cause new structural divisions.

In addition to these variables, I have included age and gender. These are ascribed variables not included in the conflict model but included here because they are important structural divisions and could cause variations in value priorities and party choice. There are, for example, discussions about a change from a traditional to a modern gender gap in party choice, and age differences in value priorities have been discussed in relation to different experiences in the formative years and over time interests related to the role of pensioners. Some authors also consider age and gender to be of importance for political realignments in advanced industrial democracies (Kitschelt and Rehm 2015: 181). The other variables are outlined below, and comparative patterns in distributions briefly examined.<sup>1</sup>

### 3.2.2 *Religious Denominations*

The religious cleavage has proven to be very important in West European politics regarding value orientations and party choice. According to some authors, religious voting has two aspects: the various religious communities of which people are members, including a category for those who are not a

member of any religious community (religious denomination), and how religious they are – independent of the religious community to which they belong (Bean 1999: 552; Dalton 2014: 165–173). Other scholars argue in favour of three dimensions: Belonging (to a denomination), Behaving (the practice of faith, e.g. attending church) and Believing (accepting religious tenets and doctrines) (Kotler-Bergowitz 2001: 524–526).

In this work, we consider religious denomination to be a structural variable while the believing aspect is considered to belong to value orientations. Structural variables require that there are “objectively” identified groups within a society (Knutsen and Scarbrough 1995: 494). Of the various aspects of religion and religious voting, only religious denominations satisfy this criterion. We do not include church attendance because this variable has proven to be “extremely high” related to religious beliefs and the magnitudes of these correlations are rarely found in non-experimental research (Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere 1995a: 87–96). Church attendance also shows very much the same strength and location of party voters as religious beliefs and values related to party choice (Knutsen 2010: 10–11). We do then not consider church attendance as a structural variable. Religious denomination is considered as a structural variable because religious membership is related to objectively social groups and membership that to a large degree is transmitted from generation to generation within families (Knutsen and Scarbrough 1995: 499–500).

Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 33–41) suggested a three-fold division based on religious denomination that had consequences for the party alignment: (a) Protestant countries, on the basis of a dominant national church which in the nation-building process did not stand in opposition to the nation-builders; (b) Roman Catholic countries where the overwhelming part of the population were Catholics; and (c) religiously mixed countries where Protestants had allied with the nation-builders, but where there were largely Roman Catholic minorities, producing lasting political divisions that had consequences for the party system.

These three types are represented among the 18 countries as we saw in the previous chapter: The Nordic countries and Britain belong to the Protestant group; Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland belong to the religiously mixed group, while Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg among the countries in the Central Western region, Ireland and all countries in the Southern region apart from Greece, are predominantly Catholic countries. Greece is the only country with a dominant Orthodox Christian religion.



In Britain, the Anglican Church of England is dominant in England, while the Calvinist Church of Scotland is the established church in Scotland. There are also considerable numbers of Catholics and non-conformists (Methodist, Baptists and others). The Catholics are predominantly immigrants from Ireland, who came to Britain particularly in the 1920s (Kotler-Berkowitz 2001; Tilley 2015). Great Britain is a borderline case between the first and the third groups (religiously mixed population).

In the Netherlands, the Protestant Dutch Reformed Church experienced conflicts within the church in the nineteenth century. A group of committed Calvinist Christians established their own religious communities, free of ties to the state and the nation. These Orthodox Reformed (Gereformeerd) churches are offshoots of the Dutch Reformed Church (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 15–17; Lijphart 1974: 228–229).

In the Nordic countries, the religious structure is a somewhat more complicated than the fact that these countries have had, and in some of the countries still have, Lutheran state churches. The portion that belongs to the established Lutheran churches has traditionally been very high given the tradition with state or folk churches. Many scholars have emphasised the overwhelming homogeneity of the populations of these countries in terms of formal church membership (Madeley 1977: 270–271).

The paradoxical situation, with a high level of membership and low level of church attendance and religiosity, has led Scandinavian social scientists to concentrate on the distinction between popular or “folk” religiosity on the one hand, and personal religion on the other.<sup>2</sup> Others have focused on the fact that there are low religious organisations partly found within and partly without the established Protestant state church that have devoted religious voters which are not so frequently found among traditional members of the established church (see below).

The religious structure in Western Europe varies then considerably. The traditional division is between predominant Protestant countries in the Nordic countries, religiously mixed countries with both a Protestant and Roman Catholic Population (Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland) and countries with a dominant Roman Catholic Church. In addition, Greece has a dominant Orthodox church.

In EVS, the respondents are asked whether they belong to a religious denomination and then – if they indicate that they do belong to a denomination – are shown a card and asked which denomination this is.<sup>3</sup>

There were separate categories also for non-Christian religions (Jews, Muslims, Hindus and Buddhists). However, there were few respondents in these categories,<sup>4</sup> and they had to be collapsed into the “other” category which then comprises both those who belong to other Christian denominations and those who belong to non-Christian religions.

There are large variations in the portion that does not belong to any denomination (see [Appendix Table 3.1B](#)). More than 50% of the population in France and the Netherlands down to less than 10% in Iceland and Greece do not belong to any denomination. The smallest portions without any denomination belonging are generally found in the South European countries (apart from France) and in the Nordic countries (apart from Sweden). The Nordic countries have a tradition of Protestant Lutheran state churches which are also folk churches and include many people that are not so religious. The large portion that belongs to the denomination in Southern Europe might be explained by a high degree of religiosity and religious belonging.

The distributions of religious denominations (see [Appendix Table 3.1A](#))<sup>5</sup> reveal in general the three-fold division outlined earlier. As to the Netherlands, the religious structure is more complicated, and the non-conformist category comprises the Gereformeerde denominations that represent a split within the Protestant church indicated above

### 3.2.3 *Urban–Rural Residence*

Urban–rural residence is an important variable for tapping the cleavage in the commodity market which was one of the two cleavages that Lipset and Rokkan coupled to the industrial revolution.

This variable is tapped by the size of the town or city in which the respondents live. This information was then coded into the following eight categories with values from 1 (fewer than 2,000 inhabitants) to 8 (500,000 and above).

1. Under 2,000
2. -5,000
3. -10,000
4. -20,000
5. -50,000
6. -100,000
7. -500,000
8. 500,000 and above

This variable is mostly treated as a continuous variable in the analyses in this work with values from 1 to 8. There is a problem with this variable in three countries. It is omitted in Iceland, and there are large numbers of missing values in Britain and Ireland (38–39%). Multivariate analyses are performed both with and without this variable in order to see if the high number of missing values changes the results. It is not possible to include urban–rural residence in any analyses for Iceland.

Appendix Table 3.2 shows the percentage of the samples that live in localities that have fewer than 10,000 inhabitants, the percentage that live in urban areas with more than 1,000,000 inhabitants, and the mean score for the eight category variables (1–8) for the 18 countries.

The South and the Islands (due to the Irish case) have the largest portion of the population living in smaller communities (fewer than 10,000 inhabitants) according to the surveys, while the South and the Nordic countries have the largest portion of the population living in large communities (above 100,000 inhabitants). According to the mean scores which take all categories into consideration, the Nordic countries and the Southern Europe have the most urban regions while the other regions are more rural. There are, however large variations within the four regions. France, Spain, Sweden, Finland, Britain and the Netherlands have the most urbanised population, while Portugal, Ireland, Luxembourg, Austria and Switzerland have the most rural population according to the data.

### 3.2.4 *Class Variables*

These variables are related to the conflict in the labour market and are generally related to hierarchical variables regarding status, wealth and related factors.

### 3.2.5 *Education*

There are two education variables in the EVS 2008 data set. In one question the respondents are asked at what age they completed their education, and in a subsequent question, the respondents were asked about the highest level of completed education. This latter variable

originally had seven categories and is based on the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED).

The various education levels on the latter variable are:

0. Pre-primary education or none education
1. Primary education or first stage of basic education
2. Lower secondary or second stage of basic education
3. (Upper) secondary education
4. Post-secondary non-tertiary education
5. First stage of tertiary education
6. Second stage of tertiary education

These two variables are highly correlated with each other, above 0.50 in all countries.<sup>6</sup> Given the research problems in this context, results based on the 7-category variable are used in the analyses below where it is considered as a continuous variable. For some purposes the 7-category variable is collapsed into three categories: 0–2 for primary and lower secondary education, 3–4 for upper secondary education and 5–6 for tertiary education.

There are considerable variations between the countries regarding education levels according to both variables. According to the regional averages for the seven-level variable (see [Appendix Table 3.3](#)), the proportion with tertiary education is significantly higher in the Nordic countries than in the other regions. The portion with primary and lower secondary education (categories 0, 1 and 2) is considerably lower in the Nordic countries and the Central Western region than in the South and on the Islands.

### 3.2.6 *Social Class*

The class variable used in this study is a variant of the Erikson/Goldthorpe (EG) class schema.<sup>7</sup> This schema was originally developed in connection with social mobility studies but has been used in various other studies as well. It has also been used in British election studies and a comparative study of class voting in Western democracies and is considered the most influential conceptualisation and operationalisation of the social class in European sociology.

The principles of differentiation in the EG schema have been derived mainly from classic sources, in particular from Marx and Weber. Under the

influence of various later authors, the principles have been adapted to try to meet specific requirements of analysing class mobility within the total populations of mid-twentieth-century industrial nations, both capitalist and state socialist (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992: 37). The basic approach, however, remains Weberian.

The aim of the class schema is to differentiate positions within *labour markets* and *production units* – more specifically, to differentiate such positions in terms of the employment relations that they entail (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992: 37). The basic distinction in the schema is within the category of employees. “In consequence of employer–employee relations being based on quite heterogeneous principles, employees in fact occupy a range of different labour-market and work situations, among which meaningful distinctions can and should be made in class terms” (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992: 41).

The distinction between employees involved in a service relationship with their employers and those whose employment relationships are essentially regulated by a labour contract is what underlies the way different employee classes have been delineated. A “service relationship”, rather than one formulated in terms of a labour contract, is found where the employees are required to exercise *delegated authority* or *specialised knowledge and expertise* in the interest of their employing organisation. Such employees must be accorded a legitimate area of autonomy and discretion, and their performance will depend on the degree of moral commitment that they feel towards the organisation rather than on the efficacy of external sanctions. The organisation must to a significant extent trust these employees to make decisions and to carry them through in ways consistent with the values and goals of that organisation (Goldthorpe 1982; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992: 42).

Different employee classes are delineated on the basis of the theoretical distinction between employees involved in a service relationship with their employer and those whose employment relationship is essentially regulated by a labour contract. The main division is that between the predominantly salaried professional – higher technical, administrative and managerial – positions and the predominantly wage-earning manual occupations. The former are positions with which a service relationship is associated, and thus constitute the basis of the “service class” of modern industrial society. The latter, where the labour contract usually prevails, constitutes the basis of the working class. The argument for treating professional, administrative and managerial employees as holding basically

similar class positions is that these employees, being typically engaged in the exercise of delegated authority or the application of specialised knowledge and expertise, operate in their work tasks and roles with a distinctive degree of autonomy and discretion; and in direct consequence of the element of trust that is thus necessarily involved in their relationship with the employing organisation, they are accorded conditions of employment which are also distinctive in both the levels and the kinds of rewards that are involved (Goldthorpe 1982: 169).

The higher-level service class has positions which typically involve the exercise of authority, within a wide range of discretion, and with considerable freedom from control by others. Typical examples are professionals, higher-grade administrators and officials in public and private enterprises (including company directors), and higher-grade administrators and officials in central and local government and in welfare institutions.

The lower-level service class comprises lower-grade professionals (typically called semi-professionals) and lower-grade administrators and officials. The occupational roles of the middle-level non-manual employees are located in the middle and sometimes also in the lower range of bureaucratic hierarchies of some type or another; they exercise some degree of autonomy and discretion in the performance of their work tasks, while at the same time being subject to more or less systematic, if not particularly close, control from above.

Routine non-manuals are largely clerical personnel, employees in administration and commerce, sales personnel and other rank-and-file employees in the service sector. Lower-level non-manual employees, or routine non-manual employees as they are called in the EG schema, do non-manual work, but they do not belong to the new middle class or the service class. They are functionally associated with, but marginal to, the service class (Goldthorpe 1980: 40). This is a class that may be regarded as “intermediate” in the sense that it comprises positions with employment relationships that appear to take on mixed forms. It covers the range of routine non-manual positions, usually involving clerical, sales or personal-service tasks, which exist on the fringes of professional, administrative and managerial bureaucracies. I also use the notion routine non-manual employees in addition to lower-level non-manual employees.

As to the working class, a differentiation is made between skilled and unskilled manual wage-earners in all branches of industry. Skilled workers

include supervisors of manual workers (foremen) and lower-grade technicians while farm labourers are included among the unskilled workers.

The farmers and other mainly self-employed in the primary industries are separated from the (other) within the petit bourgeoisie class because of their special class location and interests. Larger employers are few in survey materials. In accordance with Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992: 40) they are included in the higher-level service class.

Table 3.1 presents an overview of the class schema and main types of occupation that are grouped within the various EG-classes

The classes in the EG schema are coded on the basis of International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88) which is a detailed occupation variable that is available in the data set. The coding is done according to well-known coding schemas and includes information about the respondents present or, if not working when interviewed, their previous work. Respondents are not coded on the basis of spouses (previous) work. The EGP classes are, in fact, pre-coded in the available data set.

As to the distributions of the class variables, these are shown in Appendix Table 3.4. If we collapse the two groups within the service classes and working classes, respectively (see the last part of the table), the service class

**Table 3.1** Erikson/Goldthorpe class schema and the name of the social classes used in this work

<i>Name of the various social classes</i>	<i>Types of occupations</i>
Higher-level service class	Higher-grade professionals, administrators and officials, managers in industrial establishments
Lower-level service class	Lower-grade professionals, administrators and officials, higher-grade technicians, supervisors of non-manual employees
Routine non-manual workers	Routine non-manual employees in administration and commerce, sales personnel, other rank-and-file employees
Petit bourgeoisie	Small proprietors with and without employees
Farmers	Farmers and small-holders, other self-employed in primary production
Skilled workers	Supervisors of manual workers Skilled manual workers
Unskilled workers	Semi- and unskilled manual workers Agricultural workers and other workers in primary production

Source: Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992: 38–39, Table 2.1)

comprises on average 46% in the Nordic countries, 40% in the Central Western region, 36% on the Islands and 28% in Southern Europe, while the working class comprises, 37% in Southern Europe, 30–33% in the Central Western countries and on the Islands and 23% in the Nordic countries. There are some interesting differences within the central region of countries in particular. Germany has a relatively small service class (28%) and large working class (40%), while the opposite is the case for the Netherlands (51% and 19% respectively). France (40% and Italy (33%) have considerably larger service class than the other countries within the southern region (19–24%).

The routine non-manual class is fairly similar on average across the regions (22–25%). The petit bourgeoisie is small (less than 10%) everywhere apart from Greece and Spain, and the farmer class is even smaller, again with Greece as an exception.

### 3.2.7 *Household Income*

The income variable that is used is household income and has 12 categories. The respondents were shown a card and asked to group their household income which was defined as “all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes” in one of these categories. The incomes are finally coded in euros. According to the average income level indicated by the means of the 12 categories, income level is highest in the Nordic countries and the Central Western region and then on the Islands, and considerably lower in Southern Europe;

21.6% of the respondents did not reply to the question. These are assigned the mean for their country in the multivariate analyses. The income variable is not examined as detailed as the other structural variables; bivariate correlations are presented, and the variable is included in the multivariate analyses.

## 3.3 VALUE ORIENTATIONS

### 3.3.1 *Introduction: Conceptualisation of Politically Relevant Value Orientations*

The concept of values is used in many social sciences. Values are considered to be a basic aspect of individual’s belief systems and central in the culture of a given social group and in a given country. Several definitions have been put forward in the literature.<sup>8</sup> A well-known definition is given



by Kluckhohn (1951: 395): “A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable, which influences the selection of available modes, means and ends of action”. A value is not something which is desired but is standards which tell us what we ought to desire and they are central for explaining the attitudes and behaviour (Kluckhohn 1951: 395–402).

Another well-known definition is formulated by Milton Rokeach (1973: chapter 1) who defines values as prescriptive beliefs that signify that certain end-states or modes of conduct are personally or socially preferable to other end-states or modes of conduct. Values are deeply rooted motivations and fairly stable beliefs and abstract motivations that guide, justify and explain attitudes, norms, opinions and actions.

There are two types of values according to this definition: terminal values which are end-states that individuals prefer, and instrumental or mean values which correspond to the formulation “modes of conduct”. The first type of value is ultimate goals that are worth striving for, while instrumental values refer to beliefs or conceptions about desirable modes of behaviour that are instrumental in attaining the desired end-states.

Values are sometimes contrasted with attitude, which are often defined as a set of beliefs organised around a specific object or situation. The main differences between values and attitudes according to Rokeach are that whereas values are a single (prescriptive) belief, attitudes refer to an organisation of several beliefs that all are focussed on a given object or situation. In addition, a value transcends objects and situations whereas an attitude is focussed on specific objects or situations. Values occupy a more central position than attitudes within the individual’s personality and cognitive system, and values are therefore determinants of attitudes as well as of behaviour. A value is then considered to be a basic (prescriptive) belief that often influences a specific attitude together with other beliefs.

The central more recent contributors within the studies of values basically support these definitions of values. For example, Hofstede (2001: 5–9)<sup>9</sup> considers values to be held by individuals as well as by collectivities and defines a value – explicitly inspired by Kluckhohn and Rokeach – as “a broad tendency to prefer certain states of affair over others”. According to Hofstede, the term values is reserved for “mental programs that are relatively unspecific”, while attitudes and beliefs refer to more specific mental programs.

Shalom Schwartz (1994: 20–21, 2006: 170–171; Schwartz and Bilsky 1987: 551); who have been very influential in research on human values the last 30 years, build on those scholars and others mentioned above, identify several main features of basic human values:

- Values are beliefs that pertain to desirable end-states or modes of conduct (behaviour)
- Values refer to desirable goals that motivate action.
- Values transcend specific situations and situations
- Values serve as standards or criteria. Values guide the selection or evaluation of actions, policies and events. Values are determinants of attitudes and behaviour.
- Values are ordered by importance relative to one another. The ordered set of values forms a system of value priorities
- The relative importance of multiple values guide action
- Values are beliefs that are linked inextricably to effects. When values are activated, they become infused with feelings

Schwartz is strongly influenced by Rokeach in his definition of values. Both Rokeach and Schwartz underscore that values are intermediate variables in a causal chain. Values are determined by social structural, personality and basic cultural factors and are determinants of attitudes and behaviour.

Other researchers such as Jan van Deth and Elinor Scarbrough (1995) consider the relationship between values and attitudes as a reciprocal one that, at the individual level, provides opportunities for the modification and adaptation of values. These scholars use the notion “value orientation” for constellations of attitudes that can be patterned in some empirical way and can be interpreted in a meaningful way theoretically. This implies that value orientations can be studied by indicators that can be attitudes.

In this study, we use the notion value orientation or political value orientation for a set of political values or broad-based issues that are (a) theoretically meaningful, and (b) are empirically constrained (that is, constitute a dimension empirically). This is in accordance with van Deth’s and Scarbrough’s conceptualisation (Van Deth and Scarbrough 1995: 42)

In political science, the concept of values is at the core of David Easton’s well-known definition of politics as those interactions through

which values are authoritatively allocated for a society. A point of departure for conceptualising the notion “political values” is the distinction made by Rokeach (1973: 7–8) between personal and social (terminal) values. Values may be self-centred or society-centred, intra-personal or inter-personal in focus. Some values may refer to the individual’s own life, while others refer to society or even the political sphere.<sup>10</sup> These latter values can then be considered as political values.

Terminal political values can be considered as end-states that individuals would like to see characterising society as a whole and see implemented through the political system. Instrumental political values are modes of conduct that are considered legitimate (or illegitimate) in influencing political decisions, for example, various types of political participation and ways of influencing political decisions (Knutsen 2011). Inspired by Rokeach, Schwartz and others, Goren et al. (2009: 805) define “core political values” as abstract normative beliefs about desirable end-states or modes of conduct that operate in the political realm. These political values are quite stable and guide preferences on short-term political controversies and the issues of the day. Similarly, McCann (1997: 565) defines a citizen’s core political values as consisting of overarching normative principles about government, citizenship and (American) society. These principles and assumptions facilitate positions taking on more concrete domains by serving as general focal points in the otherwise confusing environment. Kinder (1998: 808) used the notions of “principles” and “values” interchangeably, indicating that the former is used more frequently within political science while “values” are used more frequently within social psychology. His definition of political principles and values is that they transcend particular objects and specific situations; they are relatively abstract and durable claims about virtue and the good society. Furthermore, they are motivating; they lead to taking particular positions in political issues and help people to evaluate and judge.

Goren (2013: chapter 3) differentiates between issue attitudes and attitudes towards policy principles. An issue attitude is a psychological tendency to evaluate a specific policy proposal or rival proposals with some degree of positive or negative affect. A policy proposal denotes an idea about an explicit course of action the government should take to address some identifiable problems. The issue may centre on something unique in a given election campaign, while others might recur over several elections.

An attitude towards a policy principle is a psychological tendency to evaluate with some degree of favour or disfavour a general claim about the proposer's source of action to be followed in a given issue domain. Policy principles reference more abstract ideas than preferences about a lone issue. Core principles stand above the issue attitude.

Goren (2013: chapter 7) finds that Schwartz's basic human values correlate strongly with each of the policy principle orientations that Goren uses. Policy principles express then a deeply held value, something which further underscores the centrality of core principles in political attitude structure, and functions as powerful heuristics in the belief systems of most people. Goren's attitudes towards policy principles are close to the concept of political values and how political values are operationalised in this work.

Core principles furthermore represent the only class of policy attitudes that consistently and powerfully shapes voter choice according to Goren's empirical analyses based on 1998–2008 NES presidential election surveys from the USA.

### 3.3.2 *The Five Value Orientations*

Here I first outline five theoretical value orientations that are central in the literature on social and political values. This is then tested to see whether these value orientations comprise separate dimensions by factor analyses.

Some important political value orientations can be derived from the structural cleavages incorporated in the Lipset–Rokkan model for cleavages in industrial society while others are focussed upon in the literature of the so-called New Politics that are associated with advanced industrial or post-industrial societies. Here, we first discuss two value orientations that can be coupled to the Lipset–Rokkan model, and then we discuss the New Politics value orientations.

#### 3.3.2.1 *Religious and Secular Values*

Christian values focus on the importance of Christian morals and principles in society and politics, and on traditional moral guidelines in school and society in general. Secularisation is often understood as a process whereby mundane reality is less and less interpreted from a supernatural perspective, and secular values are based on more modern norms of

morality which people want to decide for themselves without the guidelines of the church (Halman and Moor 1994).

Religious orientations are often considered to comprise two different aspects (Halman and Pettersson 2006: 41–42; Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere 1995a). One aspect is the religious beliefs that people hold. This can be tapped by concrete questions about which of the religious conceptions and dogmas the respondents believe in, how important God is in the respondent's life or what type of God – if any – the respondent believes in. Norris and Inglehart (2004: 40–42) even differentiate between religious values and religious beliefs in their discussion of religious/secular dimensions. Religious values are tapped by indicators about how important religion and God is in individual's life, while religious beliefs are tapped by those religious dogmas the respondents believe in. This difference is, however, difficult to uphold since both can be considered as central religious beliefs that are similar to values.

The other aspect is church-oriented religion or church religiosity. The essence of this dimension is “church integration”. According to Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere (1995a: 86) the more people participate in the relevant church's rites and services, the more church integrated they are. This latter aspect is frequently measured by frequencies of church attendance.

In the discussion of secularisation in Europe (at the micro-level, see below) some have argued that this applies only to the church-oriented dimension, not the belief dimension. Comparative longitudinal empirical research has however found that these two sides of religious involvement are highly correlated and even that the distinction between them is difficult to uphold in empirical analysis. Church-oriented and belief-oriented religious involvement tends to “go together” and are difficult to separate in empirical research (Halman and Pettersson 2006: 43–44; 54–55; Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere 1995a: 87–90). Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere (1995a: 91–96) even find that the change in the two measures takes place simultaneously: Changes in church integration is paralleled by similar changes in religious beliefs.

Much of the discussion of religious beliefs and values is concerned with the process of secularisation in the Western world. Secularisation is a multidimensional phenomenon which can refer to three relatively independent processes. At the macro-level societal secularisation implies that there is a differentiation between religious and secular institutions (so-called laicisation). Secularisation at this level is functional

specialisation where the Church loses control over other institutions and spheres of society. At the meso-level, religious change implies a decline of traditional religious organisations and a possible emergence of new religious organisations, and at the micro-level a decline or religious involvement among the mass public (Dobbelaere 1981, 1999). The most important aspect of secularisation at the individual level is, of course, the decline in religious beliefs and church religiosity. Another aspect at the micro-level which is somewhat equivalent to the processes at the macro-level is a differentiation between religious beliefs and involvement, and individuals' beliefs and views on secular matters. This process has been discussed as "secularisation-in-mind" or the complementalisation. According to this perspective on secularisation, religious beliefs have become less consequential in the sense that they do not guide individuals' views on "secular" or the non-religious sphere such as social and political attitudes to the extent as they did earlier. Religious beliefs should then not steer individual's orientations to the same degree as previously (Dobbelaere 1999: 291, 2002: 169–172; Halman and Pettersson 2006: 34–37). This latter aspect of the secularisation theory at the micro level is highly relevant for the analysis in this work because it implies that the relationship between religious orientations and various "secular" attitudes, identities and behaviour such as political behaviour and party choice, should decline (over time) and be small.

### 3.3.2.2 *Economic Left–Right Values*

The most important political value orientations that emerged from the Industrial Revolution were economic left–right values or left–right materialist values. These value orientations are economic in nature, and they refer in particular to the role of government in creating more economic equality in society versus the need for economic incentives and efficiency. These value orientations incorporate value conflicts related to control, power, and the degree of distribution of resources in the production sphere, and include workers' control and state regulation of the economy versus private enterprise, private property and the market economy; economic and social equality versus the need for differentiated rewards for stimulating effort (Inglehart 1984: 25; Knutsen 1995c).

*The economic right value orientation* in industrial society is associated with economic liberalism: a belief in the market and in economic competition between independent enterprises, as well as personal freedom, a relatively weak state, resistance to governmental

regulations and the political aims of social and economic equality, together with a strong belief in private property, also concerning the means of production. Emphasis on the market is a central prescriptive belief in an economic rightist value orientation. A free market is the desired end-state of society which is linked with a series of other positive values. A market-oriented society with private property and few governmental regulations is seen as the best way to organise production and distribute goods. The market is thus a motivation system which stimulates personal achievement, which in the long run will contribute to important collective interests. The market is also an effective information system for decentralised decisions and a useful steering instrument for the distribution of scarce resources.

By contrast, an economic *leftist political value orientation* is based on belief in the importance of the government playing an active role in achieving such overarching political goals as *economic security, solidarity and equality in income and living conditions between social classes and strata*. Government regulation of markets and private enterprises, together with societal planning, governmental redistribution via progressive taxation and welfare reforms are necessary for obtaining important political goals like full employment and a larger degree of equality between social classes and strata in society.

The arguments for a strong government which regulates private enterprises, redistributes incomes, runs enterprises and has a responsibility for the basic welfare of its citizens are based on the belief that market mechanisms cannot succeed in achieving important goals. Free market mechanisms create major social and economic inequalities, occasional economic crises and severe social conflicts. Another argument is that leftist values like economic security and economic equality contribute to economic efficacy and work efforts, and consequently to high productivity and economic growth – which clearly contradicts the bourgeois argument of a contradiction between equality and a strong government on the one hand, and efficacy and productivity on the other.<sup>11</sup>

These value orientations are also called welfare state attitudes, attitudes towards redistribution and class attitudes in the research which have mainly been conducted by sociologists, and developed the last 10–15 years. These are called attitudes because they tap more political orientations and sometimes refer to the existing situation. However, the relationship between values and attitudes is somewhat confusing in the literature on economy left–right orientations.

### 3.3.2.3 *New Politics Values in General*

The notion of New Politics orientations was outlined in [Section 1.5](#). There are, however, different ways of conceptualising the new politics value dimensions. According to Ronald Inglehart, value conflicts related to *materialist/post-materialist value orientations* reflect the New Politics conflict dimension. Inglehart argues that “new” post-materialist values are deeply rooted and stand in opposition to more traditional materialist values. He identifies a “silent revolution” in which a gradual value change along the materialist/post-materialist dimension takes place. This involves a shift from a preoccupation with physical sustenance and safety values, towards a greater emphasis on belonging, self-expression and quality-of-life values. The spread of post-materialist values is explained by generational replacement, the growth of the new middle class and the spread of higher education (Inglehart 1977, 1990). In one way, Inglehart’s influential dimension has a broad or “catch-all” character. One might argue that it combines elements from somewhat different ways of conceptualising New Politics.

### 3.3.2.4 *Environmental Values*

One way of conceptualising “New Politics” is represented by *environmental versus economic growth values*. Today, this conflict is firmly rooted in the public mind, and in many West European countries conflicts over environmental values seem to be the most manifest expression of the “New Politics” conflict. A clear manifestation of this is the emergence of green parties that have gained considerable electoral support in many western democracies.

Support for environmental values and the increased importance of these values has been explained both by deteriorating environmental conditions and by new value orientations. Both processes are at work: Conditions in the local and national environment may cause environmental concern, and the same applies to profound value change away from traditional concerns for economic and physical security in advanced democracies (Dalton and Rohrschneider 1997, 1998; Inglehart 1995; Rohrschneider 1988). Environmental concerns are often explained by the interplay between individual and macro-level factors. In his study, Rohrschneider (1988) develops two other models for priorities of environmental issues in addition to the value model. These models hold that environmental priorities as caused by pollution problems in people’s local environment (“the self-



interest model”) and pollution problems on the national level (“the sociotropic model”). Rohrschneider finds that there are two distinct and largely independent processes leading to the formation of favourable attitudes to environmental protection. One is related to *internal processes* (individual’s materialist/post-materialist value system), and the other is related to *external process* – the conditions of the environment in the local community and in the nation where people live. The latter process appears to exercise the strongest influence on environmental attitudes.

Several studies have found clear support for the hypothesis that environmental values are significantly correlated with materialist/post-materialist values in particular in advanced societies even though other factors such as economic prosperities and the level of environmental pollution also are important for explaining such values (Inglehart 1995; Franzen 2003; Kimmelmeier et al. 2002; Kidd and Lee 1997).

Other scholars have argued that environmental values are part of a new environmental consciousness – a New Environmental Paradigm – which interconnects several specific beliefs concerning the environment (Dunlap and Van Liere 1978; Catton and Dunlap 1980; Milbrath 1984).

We consider environmental values as a central component of New Politics even though it is evident that other factors also are important for explaining such values. Environmental values are coupled to New Politics social movements such as the environmental movement, and such values are linked to a considerable degree to other New Politics orientations such as the broad materialist/post-materialist value orientations (Rohrschneider et al. 2014).

### 3.3.2.5 *Libertarian/Authoritarian Values*

In a series of articles, Scott Flanagan has emphasised that Inglehart’s conceptualisation of value change combines two dimensions: a *materialist/non-materialist dimension* and a *libertarian/authoritarian dimension* (Flanagan 1987; Flanagan and Lee 1988, 2003). The overarching concept that integrates libertarian values is self-actualisation, and the central value orientations within the notion of libertarian values are autonomy, openness, and self-betterment. The authoritarian value orientation “designates a broader cluster of values, which, along with concerns for security and order, includes respect for authority, discipline and dutifulness, patriotism and intolerance for minorities, conformity to customs, and support for traditional religious and

moral values” (Flanagan 1987: 1305). The libertarian/authoritarian value orientations are also the central components in Herbert Kitschelt’s (1994, 1995) important work on changes in the party systems of Western democracies as indicated in Section 1.3. In essence, Kitschelt’s conceptualisation of libertarian values is that they emphasise maximum social and democratic participation and individual autonomy in both politics and culture, while authoritarian values emphasise hierarchical arrangements in politics, together with a limitation of diversity and individual autonomy in cultural expression.

In addition to the mentioned debate within political science, there is a vast literature within social psychology (and political psychology) on authoritarianism from publication of the famous *The authoritarian personality* (Adorno et al. 1950) to the present, and many controversies have developed around the concept.

The literature on authoritarian values often considers authoritarian values as a consequence of inconsistent child-rearing practices and psychodynamic defence mechanisms, and quite often couples such values to personality factors.

An alternative way of conceptualising authoritarianism is to take people’s orientation towards society as a point of departure. Living alongside other people in a society creates a tension between the goals of personal autonomy and social cohesion. This tension is manifested in people’s desire for social restrictions on behaviour, and a central component of the authoritarian/libertarian dimension has to do with how highly people value personal autonomy when it comes into conflict with their desire for social conformity (Feldman 2003: 46–51). Authoritarian values are then strongly linked to social conformity, and such values are most consequential for people with such values when they perceive a threat from a specific group and from other general social forces (Feldmann and Stenner 1997).

There is, however, a fairly strong agreement indicating that authoritarian/libertarian orientations are a central dimension within an individual’s belief system which has important consequences for social and political attitudes and behaviour (Altemeyer 1988; Feldman 2003; Middendorp 1991, 1993; Stenner 2005).

Both theoretically and empirically we follow the literature above and consider libertarian/authoritarian values as personal and social values and do not use indicators that are clearly tapping political values along this dimension.

### 3.3.2.6 *Immigration Orientations (Restrictive Versus Liberal Orientations)*

The third set of New Politics orientation is related to immigration and immigrants. This has become a major policy area in Europe with different views among the mass publics. Two broad types of such public views can be identified: attitudes toward immigrants and attitudes toward immigration. The two constitute distinct domains of study according to some authors, while others tend to group them together (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010: 313).

Central to immigration orientations are values and identities. Social identity theory (Tajfel 1982; Tajfel and Turner 1986) states that individuals tend to think favourably about themselves and the groups to which they belong. A person's positive identification with his or her own group is thought to be accompanied by a simultaneous process of differentiation from outsiders through the expression of unfavourable orientations (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010: 317) although individuals identifying with their in-group may not necessarily tend to contra-identify with out-groups (Reijman et al. 2008: 199). Social identity theory is nevertheless considered as a central approach for understanding immigration orientations.

This theoretical tradition has led to an extensive examination of the relationship between various individually-held national (and supranational) attachments and exclusionary attitudes. Immigration orientations are coupled to national identity. Restrictive immigration orientations are more prevalent among people with a strong sense of national identity and in particular among those who have a national identity that emphasises an "ethnic" definition of the nation (Sides and Citrin 2007). Sometimes, a differentiation is made between patriotism and chauvinism in this respect. Chauvinism is the type of national attachment that also includes negative orientations to outgroups, while patriotism is considered as a positive in-group evaluation that also leads to positive evaluation of out-groups (Reijman et al. 2008).

Immigration orientation is associated with values and basic attitudes like generalist social trust, desire for cultural and religious homogeneity versus heterogeneity (multiculturalism) (Citrin and Sides 2008; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007: 429–434; Sides and Citrin 2007). Davidov et al. (2008) find that immigration orientations are anchored in central values in Shalom Schwartz's 10 basic human value types. Those who have a liberal immigration orientation emphasise the values

incorporated in the self-transcendence dimension, universalism and benevolence, while those who have a restrictive orientation emphasise the conservation dimension which includes values like tradition, conformity and security. In Inglehart and Welzel's well-known two-dimensional model of value orientations, ethnic and cultural diversity beliefs are correlated with the second dimension which marks value orientations associated with the change from industrial to post-industrial society. Restrictive immigration orientations are close to the survival pole while liberal orientations are close to the self-expression pole on the survival-self-expression dimension (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 54–56).

One might argue that these orientations are attitudes, not values, but here they are considered as basic orientations which are close to values. Comparative research has shown that these orientations are closely related to and reflect basic values and beliefs about different conceptions of national identity, ethnicity and multiculturalism as we have seen above.

### 3.3.3 *Indicators, Dimensional Analyses and Index Construction*

#### 3.3.3.1 *Introduction: Two Political Attitude and Value Dimensions, or More?*

In the study of political attitudinal and value dimensions, there are two approaches or schools. One approach sticks to two dimensions, mostly for theoretical reasons. These dimensions are an economic dimension which is very similar or even identical to what we here label economic left–right. The other dimension is a cultural dimension which frequently is a New Politics dimension and contains many of the elements that are included in the materialist–post-materialist dimensions, or contains elements of two or three of the new politics orientations that we have discussed above.

Herbert Kitschelt's important works on European Social Democracy (1994) and the Radical Right (1995) is theoretically based on a two-dimensional model with an economic left–right dimension and a libertarian–authoritarian dimension. These are merged to one competitive space dimension regarding party competition from right-authoritarian to left-libertarian, but the attitudinal structure is supposed to be two-dimensional. In Kitschelt (1994) the empirical analyses are based on a two-dimensional space based on survey data and expert judgements. In Kitschelt's work in the Radical Right (Kitschelt 1995), exploratory factor analyses from the 1990 World Values Survey shows a three dimensional

structure in all countries examined. In addition to an economic left–right and a libertarian–authoritarian factor, a separate ecology factor emerge in all countries examined (France, Denmark, Norway, Austria, Italy and Germany). Kitschelt also uses confirmatory factor analyses and a two-dimensional space in part of the empirical analysis.

Kriesi et al. (2006, 2008, 2012) argue that the party space is two-dimensional, comprising an economic left–right dimension and a cultural dimension, which over time has been transformed to include issues of European integration and immigration “which corresponds to the new political and cultural form of competition linked with globalisation” (Kriesi et al. 2008: 13). The cultural dimension has changed to its present content from “a dimension mainly defined in terms of religious concerns, to one opposing culturally liberal or libertarian concerns on the one hand, and the defence of traditional (authoritarian) values and institutions (including traditional Christian religion, traditional forms of families, and a strong army) on the other” (Kriesi et al. 2008: 13). The religious conflict line has then been transformed into a new cultural conflict which corresponds to a New Politics conflict. It is explicitly argued that the religious cleavage has lost much of its traditional structuring capacity for politics (Kriesi et al. 2008: 11–12).

Kriesi et al.’s spatial analyses are partly based on analyses at the party level and partly at the voter levels. The analyses at the party level are based on content analyses of articles in two newspapers related to the up-coming elections in each of six West European countries. They comprise in-depth analyses of this two-dimensional space which is found in all six countries. A variant of multidimensional scaling is used to represent the data “in a low-dimensional space” (Kriesi et al. 2008: 72). In the analyses at the demand side (the voter level) two dimensions are identified by factor analyses “as we always extract two factors. The analyses are, however, only based on five items (Kriesi et al. 2012: 69).

Another well-known approach is conducted by the Chapel Hill expert surveys (Hooghe et al. 2002; and Marks et al. 2006). Experts were asked to place the political parties on an economic left-right scale and a New Politics scale referred to as the GAL-TAN dimension: One pole combines ecology (or “greenness”), alternative politics (including participatory democracy) and libertarianism, while the opposite pole combines support for traditional values, opposition to immigration and defence of the national community. These two poles are summarised as green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) versus traditional/authoritarian/nationalism (TAN).

According to this approach, it is *assumed* that the various elements go together in one dimension. In the quite complicated question that is used for establishing the location of parties on this dimension, several of the elements that are listed above are mentioned, but there are no green elements related to environmental protection versus various trade-offs in the question (Marks et al. 2006: 172). The focus on these two dimensions is deep-rooted in the scholarly community and is found in many works.

The other approaches frequently use a larger number of items and identify more than two dimensions which appear to be theoretically meaningful. In Section 1.5 some of these studies were mentioned and below results from the Norwegian election studies are briefly outlined.

### 3.3.3.2 *Political Value Dimensions in EVS 2008*

The indicators that are included in the indices are based on both theoretical and empirical criteria. Several types of factor analyses are performed, but they are all based on the pooled data from all 18 countries. To allow for country-specific value dimensions would be far beyond the scope of this work. The factor analyses are performed with more than 30 items that theoretically should tap the five dimensions. The factor analyses were performed as exploratory factor analyses and with all items in the same analysis. Eight factors had eigenvalues above 1.00, but by using the scree test criterion (Hair et al. 1998: 104–05; Kim and Mueller 1978: 44–45)<sup>12</sup> we extracted five factors that were rotated.

The five factors showed nicely the five dimensions that were hypothesised with two exceptions that are discussed below. All factor loadings, apart from the two exceptions, were above 0.40. The first factor with the highest eigenvalue is based on the immigration orientation items; the second is based on the economic left-right items, the third on the religious-secular items, the fourth and fifth by the environmental and libertarian–authoritarian items, respectively. The indices that are constructed for the five value orientations are then based on five to eight items.

The two items that did not load as expected were one of the items that intended to tap economic left–right and immigration orientations (v197 and v273 in the Appendix, respectively).

The results from factor analyses are sometimes accepted without critical views regarding acquaintance affects. Sometimes one sees factors where one factor consists of items, where those who agree with all statements indicate, for example, an economic leftist position and the

opposite (agreement with rightist statements) comprises another factor. The real explanation could be that the tendency to agree with statements creates two factors where one is more reasonable. Among the economic left–right items, there are no such one-sided statements, but the leftist alternatives on all the other items are located close to the maximum number in the scale (10) but close to 1 on the income equality item (V197). The same applies to one of the items in the battery for tapping immigration orientations. Because we believe this to be the main reason for the fact that these items do not load high on the expected dimensions that they are included in the indices. These items contribute considerably to increasing the content validity of the indices. Indices without these items have also been constructed, and the differences in correlations with socio-structural variables and party choice are very low. Details regarding the items and the index constructions can be found in the appendix.

In this work, I combine two frequently used measures used for tapping *religious beliefs and values* (or orientations towards God). The first component is religious beliefs: The respondents are asked whether they believe in five central religious dogmas, and the index that is constructed is simply an additive index based on the number of dogmas that the respondent believes in (see appendix). This measure is, for example, used (among others) by Halman and Pettersson (2006), Norris and Inglehart (2004) and Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere (1995a) to tap religious beliefs. The other component is a ten-point scale about the importance of go in the respondents' life. These two elements are assigned similar weight, and the items load strongly on a common factor in the factor analyses that have been performed.<sup>13</sup>

Religious items are frequently not included in factor analyses of issues and values, partly based on the idea that such orientations are not important for party politics and determinants of party choice. This idea is however seldom examined by empirical evidence.

*Economic left–right orientations* are tapped by five 10-point scale items which tap basic principles towards the welfare state, regulation of the economy, income equality, private versus public ownership and competition. The loading for the income equality item was low, but it was decided to include this item because this aspect of economic left–right orientations is very central (see also above).

*The index for environmental values* is based on seven Likert items which tap evaluations of environmental pollution versus other concerns which

often are trade-offs to other concerns like increased taxes and reduced personal income. Several of these indicators are adapted from the New Ecological Paradigm developed by Dunlap and van Liere (1978/2008).

In order to tap *libertarian/authoritarian values*, I rely on an index which comprises eight indicators. Five of these indicators are alternative child-rearing values which tap the respondents' subscription on a dimension which runs from a belief at the one end that children should be well-behaved, obedient and hard-working to the view at the other end that they should be independent and imaginative. Such values have been used successfully in previous research seeking to measure individual's orientations towards authority (Kohn 1977,<sup>14</sup>; Feldman and Stenner 1997: 747; Barker and Tinnick 2006). The other items tap attitudes towards respect for the respondents' parents, general respect for "authorities" and a work value related to whether one always should follow instructions. All of these items have significant loadings on a common factor in the factor analyses. The libertarian/authoritarian values included in the index are personal and social values, not directly political values, and are strongly inspired by the influential work of Flanagan and Aie-Rie (2003).<sup>15</sup> However, these authors also include religious/secular items in the libertarian/authoritarian dimension (both theoretically and empirically). These items are not included in the approach in this work, and the factor analyses show that libertarian/authoritarian values and religious–secular values are separate dimensions.

The index for *immigration orientations* is based on six 10-point scales that tap central aspects of various basic beliefs and orientations to immigrants. The questions do not directly relate to immigration and immigration policy, but indirectly they do, because they are relevant for how many immigrants there should be in the given country, and therefore, touch on the question of a restrictive versus a liberal immigration policy.

All indices are constructed as equal-weighted additive indices with values from 0 to 10. Missing values on single indicators are assigned a neutral "neither agree nor disagree"-value on Likert items and other similar indicators. On scales from 1 to 10, those who did not answer were assigned the mean score for the various countries. The number of cases in the bivariate and multivariate analyses with party choice as the dependent variable equals then the number of respondents who have indicated a party choice in all countries.

The operationalisations of the value orientations and the index construction are shown in Appendix 1. In order to be able to interpret the



signs and directions in the various tables, it is important to mention that *religious, economic leftist, green, libertarian and liberal immigration orientations are assigned high values on the indices.*

The five value dimension model challenges the two-dimensional model that is found in much political science literature regarding spatial models of party competition. However, as we have seen, some of these approaches impose a two-dimensional structure on the dimensional solutions and when exploratory factor analyses are performed more than two dimensions occurs. Other explanations for the different number of dimensions might be caused by the fact that many analyses do not include religious–secular values, and many works do not have so many indicators for New Politics issues and values as those that are available in EVS. The other school is represented by the various scholars and works that were outlined in [Section 1.5](#) and is also represented by the election studies in Norway, and Sweden shows a larger number of meaningful attitude and value dimensions as we have seen.

Here the findings will be discussed in relation to other analyses of attitude and value dimensions based on EVS 2008 and also by factor analyses from election studies in the Nordic countries.

Van Hauwaert and Baudewyns (2015) examine attitude value dimensions based on EVS data from the waves conducted in 1990, 1999 and 2008. They find an increasing number of dimensions due to the fact that items related to new topics have been included. The confirmative factor analysis based on the 2008 data is based on a much larger number of countries (41) than those countries included here. Their analysis shows four factors, an economic left–right, a libertarian/authoritarian, an immigration and an attitude towards EU dimension. Environmental and religious–secular values were not included in their dimensional analyses.

Enyedi and Kmetty (2015) perform factor analyses based on 24 items that are supposed to tap six dimensions theoretically based on EVS from 1999 and 2008 and 29 and 34 countries, respectively. The exploratory factor analyses show a fairly stable pattern from 1999 to 2008, and a six factor hypothesis is confirmed. These dimensions are economic left–right (called socialism–capitalism), religious–secular, traditional-permissiveness (very close to libertarian–authoritarian values, but the authors will avoid this conceptualisation), environmentalism, xenophobia (tapped by immigration orientation indicators) and Euroscepticism. The authors also performed confirmatory factor analyses which confirmed the structure from the explanatory analyses. When the power of the various factors was

compared, the conclusion was that “the model that came closest in power to the original six-factor solution was the one in which Euroscepticism and xenophobia was replaced by a common latent factor, probably best captured by the label ‘nationalism’. It seems that the most important political attitudes in Europe can be captured with either a five- or a six-dimensional model“ (Enyedi and Kmetty (2015: 11). Five of the six original factors are then substantially identical to those we have found here although we have used some other names for some of the factors. EU orientation is not examined here due to the fact that these orientations are more similar to political attitudes than value orientations.

In the election studies in Norway and Sweden, 40–50 political issues have been asked in the surveys. In the Norwegian survey there have been six dimensions derived from factor analyses which are fairly easy to interpret: an economic left–right, a religious–secular, immigration orientations, an environmental, a global–national and a centre–periphery dimension (see, e.g., Aardal 2011). The first four of these dimensions are identical to four of those found on the basis of EVS (see below), while we do not have indicators to tap the two latter dimensions. Libertarian–authoritarian issues are few in the Norwegian surveys, but they tend to load on the immigration orientation dimension. There are also two Old Politics dimensions, not only one, because religious–secular issues comprise a separate dimension. In Aardal’s analyses, these dimensions are also seen to group the parties in different ways at the voter level.

### 3.3.4 *Value Priorities in a Comparative Setting*

Appendix Table 3.5 shows the means of the indices for the various value orientations. The comments will first focus on the averages for the various regions and then on some main patterns for the individual countries.

*Religious values* are most widespread in the Southern and Island regions because of the high degree of religiosity in Ireland. Religious values are least and secular values most emphasised in the Nordic countries and then in the Central Western countries. As to the Southern regions, France is a deviant case and has one of the most secular populations according to the data. Regarding the Nordic countries, the Icelandic and partly also the Finnish population are considerably more religious than the population of the other Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden).

Religious values are most emphasised in less advanced societies; the correlation with GDP per capita is  $-0.30$  and with the size of the service sector,  $-0.63$ . Religious values are also more emphasised in less fragmented party systems ( $-0.41$ ) while there is no substantial correlation with party system polarisation. Secular values are then most widespread in advanced industrial societies and fragmented party systems.

*Economic leftist values* are strongest in the Southern region followed by the Central Western region, and least emphasised in the Island region and in the Nordic countries. Four of the five Nordic countries (and the two Island countries) are among the six countries with the most rightist value orientations. Leftist economic values are most widespread in less advanced industrial societies, the correlations with GDP per capita and size of the service sector are  $-0.63$  and  $-0.66$  respectively.

One way of explaining the difference between the countries in the Southern region and the Nordic countries is the diminishing marginal utility perspective. In countries at a high level of economic development where many of the leftist policies are implemented, public support for further leftist policies tends to diminish (Inglehart 1997: 260–265). The questions tapping economic left–right values also ask the respondent if they want *more* regulation of business, equality and public ownership. The existing situation regarding implementation of rightist or leftist policies might therefore be crucial for the cross-national distributions of economic left–right priorities.

*Environmental values* are most emphasised in the Southern region and then the Central West. This finding might seem surprising, but environmental values are frequently associated with both post-material values in advanced societies and also objective environmental problems in less advanced societies (Inglehart 1995; Rohrschneider et al. 2014). Support for environmental values is *negatively* correlated with GDP per capita and size of the service sector with  $-0.47$  and  $-0.37$ , respectively. Support for environmental values is strongest in polarised party systems (0.29).

In contrast to environmental values, *libertarian values* are decisively most emphasised in the Nordic countries and least emphasised in the Southern region, and are positively correlated with advanced industrialism;  $0.54$  and  $0.28$  for GDP per capita and size of the service sector, respectively.

The rankings of the regions are quite similar for *immigration orientations* as for libertarian-authoritarian values, but the countries in the Southern region are decisively less restrictive on this dimension than

they are libertarian on the former dimension, scoring at nearly the same level as the Nordic countries. Correlations with the macro-level variables shows that immigration orientation values are only significantly correlated with polarisation in the party system, 0.29: liberal immigration orientations are most widespread in polarised party systems

The eta-coefficients indicate the strength of the correlation between the means of the various value orientation and the 18 countries. It is evident that the cross-country differences are largest for libertarian–authoritarian values and then religious–secular values and somewhat smaller for the other three value orientations.

### 3.4 VALUE ORIENTATIONS AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE

#### 3.4.1 *Bivariate Analyses*

If there should be strong indirect effects from socio-structural variables via value orientations to party choice, then there should be strong correlations between socio-structural variables and value orientations. The relationship between value orientations and social structure is not the main research topic in this work. In this section, the relationship between value orientations and social structure will be examined by first reviewing previous findings from comparative research, and then by examining some main comparative patterns from the EVS data material.

Below, I first comment upon the bivariate relationships between the various value orientations and the socio-structural variables. There are seven socio-structural variables, five value orientations and 18 countries. Most of the analyses below focus on the main pattern for the various regions, and in only a few cases are patterns for specific countries addressed. The main regional patterns are based on the calculation of average scores and coefficients, first, within the various regions and then for all countries. The mean for all countries is based on these regional analyses weighted by the number of countries within each region.

I use the Pearson  $r$  correlations for all variables apart from religious denominations and the social class variable where the eta-coefficient is used. The latter coefficient is also standardised, and the absolute magnitude of  $r$  and eta can be compared.<sup>16</sup> Results from the multivariate analyses based on pooled data for the various regions are then reported. Since the relationship between socio-structural variables and party choice is not a major research question, I have not formulated concrete and well-argued

hypotheses in this section, but commence by reviewing literature that examines the relationship between the given value dimension and social structural variables.

The mean correlations between the five value orientations and the socio-structural variables for the various regions and the mean for all the 18 countries are shown in [Appendix Table 3.6](#) where the socio-structural variables are ranked according to the strength of the correlation. The signs of the correlations tell us which social groups that are included are closest to one of the poles on the various dimensions, but this does not apply to the religious denomination and social classes since they are nominal-level variables and the eta coefficient is used. Which denomination and social class that have value priorities close to one of the two poles on each value orientation are outlined in the text, not in separate tables.

#### *3.4.1.1 Old Politics Values*

##### **Religious–Secular Values**

*Review:* A comparative study of the relationship between socio-structural variables and different religiosity variables conducted by Dobbelaere and Jagodzinski (1995) found that religious denomination, age and gender were the most important predictors while the class variables were relatively unimportant predictors (see also Norris and Inglehart 2004: 69–71).

*Empirical analysis:* Religious–secular values are first and foremost fairly strongly correlated with a religious denomination, then age and gender. As to religious denomination, the main difference is between those who belong to a denomination and those who do not. In the religiously mixed countries, those who belong to the Roman Catholic Church have higher average scores (are more religious) than the Protestants. There is one exception to this pattern, namely the Netherlands where the Protestants and in particular those who belong to the Gereformeerde Church have the highest score. However, in many countries, the small groups that are grouped into the “Other denomination” category have the highest scores on religious–secular values. This might be caused by those who belong to other religions or other Christian denominations or both. The correlations are high for most countries but lower in the Nordic countries than in other regions. The highest correlations are found in the Netherlands (0.73), Belgium (0.65) and Italy and France (0.60); the regional correlations are 0.52–0.55 for the Central West, Island and South, and 0.31 in the Nordic countries.

In the Nordic countries, the tradition with folk churches is shown by the relatively smaller differences in religious beliefs and values between those who belong to the dominant Protestant Lutheran church and those who do not belong to any denomination. Those who belong to “other” denominations in these countries also have much higher scores on the index indicating a very high degree of religiosity, but this is a small group.<sup>17</sup>

As to age and gender, the average correlations for all countries are 0.18 and 0.17, respectively. Women and older age groups are supporters of religious values and beliefs to a considerably larger degree than younger age groups and men. These patterns are fairly similar in the various regions and countries within the regions. Age differences are largest in Ireland (0.32) and gender differences are somewhat larger in the Southern region (0.20) but also considerable in the other regions (0.15–0.17). Urban and rural differences are surprisingly small regarding religious–secular values. Educational differences are also moderate. The lower educated strata are, however, the consistently more supporters of religious values than those with higher education; these differences are largest in the Southern region (–0.19), and followed by the Central Western regions (–0.13), and small on the Island region and in the Nordic countries (–0.04 – –0.08). The correlation with income is also moderate and quite similar in the various regions. There are also moderate but significant relationships between social class and religious values. The service class is most secular while farmers are most religious followed by routine non-manuals and unskilled workers, placing the petit bourgeoisie and the skilled workers in a median position. These patterns are fairly consistent across the various regions.

### **Economic Left–Right Values**

*Review:* Previous comparative studies have shown that economic left–right issues and values are first and foremost anchored in the class variables social class, education and income. Social class is particularly important for these values (see, e.g., Knutsen 1995c; Van De Werfhorst and De Graaf 2004: 224–225)

*Empirical analysis:* The strongest correlations, according to the average figures, are found for social class (0.21) and income (–0.19). The unskilled workers, then the skilled workers and the routine non-manuals, have the most leftist values, while the petit bourgeoisie and the higher-level service class have the most rightist values. Those with lower income are most leftist. Those with lower education are also most leftist, but the mean correlation for education (–0.12) is generally considerably lower than for

social class and income. Gender is also significantly and consistently correlated with economic left–right values. Women in all regions are more leftist than men. The average correlation is 0.11 and the correlations are generally somewhat larger in Northern and Central European countries (0.12–0.14 on regional average) than on the Islands and in the southern countries (0.07). There are small correlations between age, urban–rural residence and economic left–right values. The same applies to a religious denomination.

#### 3.4.1.2 *New Politics Values*

As to *New Politics values*, we could expect that these values are related to age, education and social class in particular. According to New Politics theory, these groups have had a high degree of formative security that would induce them to support post-materialist values along the three sets of value orientations that tap such values.

The emergence of New Politics has turned the old order upside-down in the sense that radical and change-oriented post-material (green, libertarian and liberal immigration orientations) tend to be strongest supported by the higher educated strata and those who belong to the service class (Inglehart 1990: 259, 277–279; Knutsen 2006b: 142–145). Education in particular has proven to be a strong predictor of post-material values.

### **Environmental Values**

*Review:* Class variables, and in particular, education are the strongest predictors of environmental values according to previous comparative research. Women and the younger age groups are also most likely to support environmental values (Dalton and Rohrschneider 1997; Franzen and Vogl 2013; Marquart-Pyatt 2012; Weakliem 2002).

*Empirical analysis:* As to environmental values, these have surprisingly low correlations with structural variables. The highest correlations according to the average corrections are found for social class, education and religious denomination. The higher educated strata and the service class fairly consistently support environmental values to a larger degree than the other classes, and workers (skilled and unskilled) and farmers, are the classes that are found on the other end of the scale with least support for environmental values. These patterns are fairly consistent in the various the regions and countries, and so are the strengths of the correlations. Regarding religious denomination, those who do not belong to any

religious denomination are most supportive of environmental values, but the differences are small as the average correlations indicate. There are surprisingly small correlations between age and these values and the same applies to gender.

### **Libertarian–Authoritarian Values**

*Review:* Previous research has shown that libertarian–authoritarian values are associated with social class variables, and education has proven to be the most important class variable in this respect: Higher education strata are located towards the libertarian pole while lower education strata are located towards the authoritarian pole (Stubager 2008a, 2008b; Weakliem 2002; Van De Werfhorst and De Graaf 2004: 223–225)

*Libertarian–authoritarian values* are on average fairly strongly correlated with education, social class, religious denomination and age and somewhat lower correlated with urban–rural residence and income, while the correlations with gender generally are small. The younger age groups, those with higher income and education, and those living in urban areas are more libertarian than those with opposite values on these variables. The differences between the various social classes largely follow the same pattern as for environmental values: the service class is most libertarian and the two groups of workers, the farmers and the petit bourgeoisie, considerably more authoritarian. These patterns are very consistent across the various regions and across countries within the regions. A somewhat deviant pattern between the regions is that women in the Nordic countries are more libertarian than men (0.13) while there are smaller and mostly insignificant correlations in the countries in the other regions.

As to religious denomination, the correlations are larger in the Central Western and Southern regions (0.21–0.22) than in the Nordic countries and on the Islands (0.13–0.14). In the religiously mixed countries, those who belong to the Roman Catholic denomination is quite consistently more authoritarian than Protestants, and it is the relatively large distance between those who belong to the Roman Catholic Church and those without any denomination which contributes to the comparatively large correlations in these countries.<sup>18</sup>

### **Immigration Orientations**

*Review:* Many comparative studies have found that education is an important socio-structural predictor of *immigration orientations*. A higher



educational level deters the expression of anti-immigrant and anti-immigration. Among the possible reasons is that better-educated individuals generally hold more sympathetic opinions of immigrants and immigration frequently mentioned in the literature is education's liberalising effect, that is broader knowledge, increased reflexivity, a more critical stance, greater personal and familial security, substantial exposure to foreign cultures, and higher acceptance of diversity (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Ceobanu and Escandell 2010: 319). The service class has also a more liberal immigration orientation than the working class, in particular, unskilled workers (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010: 319).

Several studies have found that older respondents, men, and those residing in rural areas are more likely to hold restrictive immigration orientations than younger individuals, women and those living in urban areas (see Ceobanu and Escandell 2010: 320 for a brief review).

*Empirical analysis:* The structural differences regarding *immigration orientations* follow very much the same patterns as for the two other New Politics orientations. The correlations are highest for education and social class: there are also significant correlations for the religious denomination, age, urban–rural residence and income. Restrictive immigration orientations are found in older age groups, those living in rural areas, those with lower education and income, and among the farmers, working class and petit bourgeoisie. Gender differences are again more pronounced in the Nordic countries (0.10) while age differences are smaller in this region than in the other regions.

As to religious denomination, those who belong to no denomination are generally more liberal than those who belong to the dominant church. There is no systematic difference between Protestants and Catholics in religiously mixed countries. An important component of the correlations is that the group of “other” denominations and religions are the most liberal in most countries. This group includes respondents from other religions who often have an immigrant background.

Among the New Politics orientations, correlations with social structural variables are considerably stronger libertarian-authoritarian values and immigration orientations than for environmental values.

### 3.4.2 *Multivariate Analyses*

The multivariate analyses are OLS regressions where the ascribed variables age and gender are included in the first step, then the semi-ascribed

variables religious denomination and urban-rural residence, and finally the class variables (see [Appendix Table 3.7](#)). The figures in the table are based on averages for country-specific analyses of the 18 countries. The effects of each variable are not included in the table but are sometimes commented. The variables that have the largest effects are generally those with the largest correlations in the bivariate analyses above.

As to *religious-secular values*, the multivariate analyses show that the socio-structural model explains 34–42% variance in the Central Western and Southern regions and on the Islands, and considerably less variance in the Nordic countries (17.4%). Religious denomination – and then Model 2 – clearly has the strongest effects. Age and gender are the other two important predictors of religious-secular values as we have seen above, and therefore Model 1 has considerable impact, while the class variables add less than one additional percentage in all region apart from the south (1,2%). The impact of social class is frequently insignificant. The explanatory power in the Nordic countries is considerably smaller than in the other region due to the smaller impact of religious denomination.

The explanatory power of the structural model is considerably smaller for *economic left-right values* than for religious, secular values; 4–11%, and it is the class variables, in particular income and social class, that have the largest effects. The explanatory power of the model as a whole is largest in the Nordic countries (10.5%), then in the Central Western region (8.8%) and smaller in the other regions (around 6%). An important finding from these analyses is that class variables do not have very large impact on economic left-right values. The explanatory power of these variables in the causal model is 3–7 percentage points within the various regions although, on the other hand, these variables have the largest explanatory power compared with the other groups of variables.

As to *environmental values*, the explanatory power of the socio-structural model is low, 2–3% in all regions apart from the South (7.4%), and it is the same variables that have the largest effects as those indicated from the bivariate analyses: religious denomination, social class and education. The larger impact in the Southern region is caused by the semi-ascribed variables in Model 2 and by a significant effect of religious denomination.

Regarding *libertarian-authoritarian values* the explanatory power of the socio-structural variables is 9–10% in the Nordic region and on the Islands, and 12–13% in the Central Western countries and the Southern region. It is

first and foremost the stronger impact of the religious denomination that contributes to the higher explanatory power in the latter region. In the Southern region, the semi-ascribed variables have largest explanatory power first and foremost due to the impact of religious denomination, while class variables are most important in the other regions.

The multivariate analyses with the *immigration orientations* as dependent variable show that the explained variance of the whole structural model is 7–10% in the various regions. The class variables have the strongest explanatory power in all regions while education has the strongest effect among all the structural variables with regard to immigration orientation.

In sum, the explanatory power of socio-structural variables on party choice is largest for religious–secular values due to the strong influence of religious denomination. Based on mean explained variance, there is a large difference from religious–secular values (32.9%) to the other value orientations. Among them, the explanatory power is largest for libertarian–authoritarian values (11.2%), immigration orientations (9.2%), economic left–right orientations (7.8%) and finally environmental values (4.1%).

Model 2 (the semi-ascribed variables) has largest explanatory power for religious secular and environmental values compared with the other two models, while Model 3 (the class variables) has strongest explanatory power for the other three value orientations (economic left–right, libertarian–authoritarian and immigration orientation).

### 3.5 CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, the socio-structural variables and the value orientations that are used in the following chapters have been presented, and the empirical relationship between them has been examined. The socio-structural variables that are used are partly derived from the Lipset–Rokkan model for party cleavages in industrial society (religious denomination, urban–rural residence and class variables), and in addition, age and gender are included.

The subchapter on value orientations discussed the concept of values and political values and then examined the dimensionality among the large number of relevant indicators that is evaluable in EVS 2008. On the basis of the theoretical discussion and the factor analyses of more than 30 items, the following value dimensions are used for analysing the relationship between value orientations and party choice:

*Old Politics orientations:* Religious versus secular values and economic left–right values;

*New Politics orientations:* Libertarian/authoritarian values, environmental versus economic growth, higher taxation, etc. (environmental orientations) and orientation towards immigration and immigrants (immigration orientations).

The analyses of the relationship between the distribution of the value orientations and the macro-level variables showed that religious and economic leftist values are more widespread in less advanced industrial societies. Somewhat surprisingly, only libertarian values are most widespread in advanced industrial democracies among the New Politics orientations, while environmental values are even more widespread in less advanced western societies.

The empirical analysis of the relationship between value orientations and social structure showed that religious–secular values are first and foremost anchored in the religious denomination variable, and then in gender and age. The economic left–right values are first and foremost anchored in the social class and household income, and then in education and gender.

Environmental values are lowly correlated with social structural variables. The highest correlations are found for social class, education and religious denomination. The higher educated strata and the service class support environmental values to a larger degree than the other classes, and workers and farmers are those classes that are least inclined to support environmental values.

With regard to libertarian–authoritarian values, the strongest predictors are education, social class, religious denomination and age. The younger age groups, those with higher income, education, the service class and those living in urban areas are more libertarian than those with opposite values on these variables.

Concerning immigration orientations, the strongest predictors are education and social class, followed by religious denomination, age, urban–rural residence and income. Restrictive immigration orientations are found older age groups, those living in rural areas, individuals with lower education and income, and among farmers, the working class and petit bourgeoisie.

Environmental, libertarian and liberal immigration values are all most likely to be found among those who do not belong to any religious denomination.

## APPENDIX TABLES

**Appendix Table 3.1** Religion denomination. Distributions according to countries**A. Distributions***Nordic countries*

	Denmark	Finland	Iceland	Norway	Sweden
No denom	12.3	23.9	8.1	19.9	34.3
Protestant	85.5	73.4	80.8	71.8	59.9
Other	2.2	2.7	11.0	8.3	5.8
Sum	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1505	1121	798	1089	1118

*Central West*

	Austria	Belgium	Germany	Luxemb.	Netherl.	Switzerl.
No denom	17.2	42.5	27.4	26.2	51.6	27.9
Roman Cath	72.8	51.4	34.8	66.0	23.3	32.5
Protestant	5.2	0.0	0.0	2.7	11.9	29.5
Free church/ Non-conformists	0	0	0	0	8,7*	0
Other	4.8	6.1	37.8	5.1	4.4	10.1
Sum	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1507	1506	2020	1597	1547	1246

\* This category contains members of the rereformed churches in the Netherlands

*Island countries*

	Britain	Ireland
No denom	12.9	44.7
Roman Cath	82.2	10.7
Protestant	3.3	35.8
Other	1.6	8.8
Sum	100.0	100.0
N	960	1540

**Appendix Table 3.1** (continued)

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<i>South</i>	France	Greece	Italy	Portugal	Spain
No denom	50.7	3.6	18.4	18.8	25.4
Roman Cath	42.7	0.0	80.5	76.1	56.3
Protestant	1.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Orthodox		93.4			
Other	5.4	2.9	1.1	5.1	18.3
Sum	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<i>N</i>	1495	1493	1491	1549	1490

**B. Percentage that do not belong to any denomination**

		Ranking of countries	
Denmark	12.3	Netherl.	51.6
Finland	23.9	France	50.7
Iceland	8.1	Britain	44.7
Norway	19.9	Belgium	42.5
Sweden	34.3	Sweden	34.3
Austria	17.2	Switzerl.	27.9
Belgium	42.5	Germany	27.4
Germany	27.4	Luxemb.	26.2
Luxemb.	26.2	Spain	25.4
Netherl.	51.6	Finland	23.9
Switzerl.	27.9	Norway	19.9
Britain	44.7	Portugal	18.8
Ireland	12.9	Italy	18.4
France	50.7	Austria	17.2
Greece	3.6	Ireland	12.9
Italy	18.4	Denmark	12.3
Portugal	18.8	Iceland	8.1
Spain	25.4	Greece	3.6

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*(continued)*

**Appendix Table 3.1** (continued)

<i>Means</i>		<i>Means</i>	
Nordic	19.7	Central West	32.1
Central West	32.1	Islands	28.8
Islands	28.8	South	23.4
South	23.4	Nordic	19.7
All	25.9	All	25.9

**Appendix Table 3.2** Urban–rural residence. Distributions and means according to countries and regions

	<i>Below 10,000</i>		<i>Above 100,000</i>		<i>Means<sup>1</sup></i>
Portugal	66.8	France	39.1	Spain	5.5
Ireland	60.6	Spain	39.0	Finland	5.3
Luxemb.	60.3	Finland	34.4	Sweden	5.3
Austria	53.2	Britain	32.3	Netherl.	5.2
Switzerl.	53.1	Sweden	32.0	Britain	5.0
Germany	42.6	Austria	27.4	Belgium	4.7
France	41.7	Greece	27.2	France	4.6
Denmark	40.4	Netherl.	26.8	Italy	4.5
Greece	37.8	Norway	24.3	Greece	4.4
Italy	36.6	Italy	22.6	Norway	4.4
Norway	35.3	Denmark	15.9	Denmark	4.1
Britain	25.0	Germany	15.4	Germany	4.1
Finland	23.3	Switzerl.	13.2	Austria	4.0
Sweden	21.0	Belgium	13.1	Switzerl.	3.6
Spain	19.5	Portugal	10.9	Luxemb.	3.3
Netherl.	15.7	Ireland	10.6	Ireland	3.1
Belgium	15.0	Luxemb.	0.0	Portugal	2.8
<b>Means</b>		<b>Means</b>		<b>Means</b>	
Islands	42.8	South	27.8	Nordic	4.8
South	40.5	Nordic	26.6	South	4.4

**Appendix Table 3.2** (continued)

	<i>Below 10,000</i>		<i>Above 100,000</i>		<i>Means<sup>1</sup></i>
Nordic	30.0	Islands	21.4	Islands	4.1
Central West	29.5	Central West	14.0	Central West	4.0
All	38.1	All	22.6	All	4.3

<sup>1</sup>Means on scale from 1 (under 2,000 inhabitants) to 8 (500,000 inhabitants and more)

**Appendix Table 3.3** Education level. Distributions according to countries and regions

<i>Primary and lower secondary</i>		<i>Upper secondary</i>		<i>Tertiary</i>	
Portugal	61.3	Austria	61.2	Finland	52.9
Britain	53.6	Germany	60.3	Norway	39.7
Spain	48.0	Switzerl.	56.4	Denmark	35.3
Italy	40.6	France	45.5	Netherl.	33.2
Greece	38.2	Greece	42.9	Sweden	32.9
Ireland	38.1	Italy	41.4	Iceland	32.7
Luxemb.	36.6	Denmark	40.0	Belgium	31.9
Netherl.	36.1	Belgium	34.5	France	31.5
Belgium	33.6	Luxemb.	33.1	Luxemb.	27.0
Norway	29.2	Ireland	29.6	Britain	26.7
Iceland	26.7	Sweden	29.1	Switzerl.	23.9
Denmark	24.7	Finland	27.2	Ireland	22.4
France	23.1	Portugal	25.1	Greece	18.9
Austria	18.8	Iceland	24.0	Germany	18.6
Sweden	18.6	Norway	23.4	Spain	18.0
Switzerl.	17.8	Netherl.	21.3	Italy	15.3
Germany	16.9	Spain	18.6	Portugal	13.6
Finland	14.2	Britain	18.4	Austria	9.7
<b>Means</b>		<b>Means</b>		<b>Means</b>	
Islands	45.8	Central West	44.5	Nordic	38.7
South	42.2	South	34.7	Islands	24.5
Central West	26.6	Nordic	28.8	Central West	24.0
Nordic	22.7	Islands	24.0	South	19.5
All	32.0	All	35.1	All	32.9



Appendix Table 3.4 Erikson and Goldthorpe classes. Distributions according to countries and regional means

	Denmark	Finland	Iceland	Norway	Sweden	Mean
<b>Nordic countries</b>						
Hi serv.	18.6	22.4	17.6	19.5	14.4	18.5
Lo serv.	26.6	24.6	29.4	25.6	30.9	27.4
Rout nman.	21.6	27.5	16.6	26.0	25.7	23.5
Petit bourg.	6.1	6.8	11.7	7.5	5.7	7.5
Skilled work.	10.7	7.5	10.0	8.3	9.6	9.2
Unskilled work.	16.4	11.2	14.6	13.1	13.8	13.8
Sum	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1388	1054	710	1056	1076	
<b>Central West</b>						
Hi serv.	11.9	14.6	9.3	15.9	21.0	Mean
Lo serv.	19.5	27.7	18.7	25.8	29.9	14.9
Rout nman.	28.2	15.6	26.8	21.0	22.8	25.0
Petit bourg.	9.5	7.3	4.7	5.6	7.1	4.7
Skilled work.	13.6	13.6	21.0	11.7	8.0	13.9
Unskilled work.	17.3	21.3	19.4	19.9	11.1	11.7
Sum	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1359	1335	1767	1455	1446	1200
	Austria	Belgium	Germany	Luxemb.	Netherl.	Switzerl.

<b>Islands</b>		Britain	Ireland	Mean			
Hi serv.	18.9	9.7	14.3				
Lo serv.	25.1	17.4	21.2				
Rout nman.	21.1	27.9	24.5				
Petit bourg.	7.5	7.4	7.5				
Skilled work.	9.5	14.0	11.7				
Unskilled work.	18.0	23.5	20.8				
Sum	100.0	100.0	100.0				
N	1437	821					
<b>Southern Europe</b>		France	Greece	Italy	Portugal	Spain	Mean
Hi serv.	14.4	10.4	11.1	6.1	6.6	9.7	
Lo serv.	25.8	13.8	21.4	15.7	12.2	17.8	
Rout nman.	21.1	17.2	19.6	25.9	24.1	21.6	
Petit bourg.	6.0	29.9	17.1	5.8	9.9	13.7	
Skilled work.	13.9	10.6	13.1	18.3	15.7	14.3	
Unskilled work.	18.9	18.2	17.8	28.2	31.5	22.9	
Sum	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
N	1413	1168	1194	1335	1252		

(continued)

Appendix Table 3.4 (continued)

	Comparison of regions based on means					Mean
	Nordic	Central west	Islands	South		
Hi serv.	18.5	14.9	14.3	9.7		14.4
Lo serv.	27.4	25.0	21.2	17.8		23.3
Rout nman.	23.5	23.2	24.5	21.6		23.0
Petit bourg.	7.5	6.5	7.5	13.7		8.9
Skilled work.	9.2	13.6	11.7	14.3		12.4
Unskilled work.	13.8	16.8	20.8	22.9		18.1
Sum	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		100.0
Serv class	45.9	39.9	35.5	27.5		37.6
Rout nman.	23.5	24.5	25.5	26.5		28.5
Petit bourg.	7.5	6.5	7.5	13.7		8.9
Workers	23.0	30.4	32.5	37.2		30.5
Sum	100.0	101.3	101.0	104.9		105.5

Appendix Table 3.5 Value orientations and countries. Means

<i>Religious-secular values</i>	<i>Economic left-right values</i>	<i>Environmental values</i>	<i>Libertarian-authoritarian values</i>	<i>Immigration orientations</i>	
Greece	6.79	5.13	7.12	6.02	5.22
Ireland	6.48	5.07	Greece	Sweden	Luxemb.
Italy	6.25	4.71	Finland	Norway	Sweden
Portugal	5.57	4.69	Switzerl.	Denmark	France
Iceland	5.08	4.62	France	Germany	Iceland
Austria	5.00	4.51	Luxemb.	Finland	Denmark
Switzerl.	4.85	4.47	Spain	Austria	Portugal
Spain	4.84	4.29	Portugal	Switzerl.	Spain
Britain	4.39	4.28	Italy	Iceland	Finland
Finland	4.19	4.28	Austria	Netherl.	Netherl.
Luxemb.	4.14	4.23	Denmark	Ireland	Switzerl.
Germany	4.06	4.22	Belgium	Greece	Italy
Belgium	4.00	4.11	Germany	Spain	Norway
Netherl.	3.98	4.10	Norway	Luxemb.	Greece
Norway	3.69	4.09	Britain	Britain	Germany
France	3.56	3.97	Netherl.	France	Ireland
Denmark	3.10	3.86	Iceland	Belgium	Belgium
Sweden	2.73	3.80	Iceland	Italy	Britain
Total	4.57	4.37	Sweden	Portugal	Austria
<b>Mean</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Mean</b>
Islands	5.44	4.76	South	Nordic	Nordic
South	5.40	4.33	Central West	Central West	South
Central West	4.34	4.14	Nordic	Islands	Central West
Nordic	3.76	3.98	Islands	South	Islands
All	4.60	4.36	All	All	All
Eta	0.328	0.232	Eta	Eta	Eta
			0.261	0.393	0.242

**Appendix Table 3.6** Average correlations between value orientations and socio-structural variables, ranked according to the strength of the correlations

	<i>Nordic</i>	<i>Central West</i>	<i>Islands</i>	<i>South</i>	<i>Mean</i>
<b>Religios-secular values</b>					
Rel den	0.307	Rel den	0.519	Rel den	0.483
Gender	0.171	Gender	0.156	Gender	0.169
Social class	0.139	Social class	0.100	Social class	0.142
Education	-0.043	Urbrur	0.037	Urbrur	-0.052
Urbrur	-0.084	Income	-0.077	Income	-0.112
Income	-0.094	Education	-0.114	Education	-0.119
Birthyear	-0.159	Birthyear	-0.270	Birthyear	-0.179
<b>Economic left-right values</b>					
Social class	0.244	Social class	0.149	Social class	0.213
Gender	0.142	Rel den	0.077	Gender	0.107
Rel den	0.066	Gender	0.072	Rel den	0.077
Urbrur	0.014	Urbrur	0.035	Urbrur	0.029
Birthyear	-0.054	Birthyear	0.019	Birthyear	-0.012
Education	-0.078	Education	-0.074	Education	-0.116
Income	-0.196	Income	-0.198	Income	-0.192

<b>Environmental values</b>							
Social class	0.106	Social class	0.150	Social class	0.139	Social class	0.132
Rel den	0.061	Rel den	0.078	Education	0.110	Rel den	0.087
Education	0.054	Education	0.076	Birthyear	0.106	Education	0.083
Gender	0.051	Gender	0.066	Rel den	0.092	Birthyear	0.046
Urbrur	0.041	Income	0.028	Income	0.048	Gender	0.033
Birthyear	0.023	Urbrur	0.009	Urbrur	0.010	Income	0.027
Income	-0.044	Birthyear	-0.056	Gender	0.000	Urbrur	0.026
<b>Libertarian-authoritarian values</b>							
Education	0.246	Education	0.214	Education	0.291	Education	0.261
Social class	0.231	Social class	0.197	Social class	0.233	Social class	0.232
Rel den	0.134	Rel den	0.139	Rel den	0.209	Rel den	0.186
Gender	0.125	Birthyear	0.130	Birthyear	0.185	Birthyear	0.144
Urbrur	0.103	Income	0.101	Income	0.151	Income	0.117
Income	0.074	Urbrur	0.057	Urbrur	0.117	Urbrur	0.091
Birthyear	0.068	Gender	0.052	Gender	-0.025	Gender	0.040
<b>Immigration orientations</b>							
Social class	0.227	Education	0.238	Education	0.237	Education	0.228
Education	0.226	Social class	0.194	Social class	0.220	Social class	0.213
Urbrur	0.104	Rel den	0.186	Rel den	0.170	Rel den	0.146
Gender	0.097	Birthyear	0.113	Birthyear	0.133	Urbrur	0.113
Rel den	0.085	Urbrur	0.106	Urbrur	0.112	Birthyear	0.110
Income	0.068	Income	0.084	Income	0.107	Income	0.091
Birthyear	0.057	Gender	-0.010	Gender	-0.011	Gender	0.018

The correlations are the eta correlation for religious denomination and social class, and Pearson's r for the other socio-structural variables.

Rel den = religious denomination

Urbrur = urban-rural residence

**Appendix Table 3.7** Explanatory power ( $R^2$ ) from regression analyses of various models of socio-structural variables on value orientations

<b>Averages based on country analyses</b>				
<b>Religious-secular values</b>	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Total
Nordic	0.053	0.112	0.009	0.174
Central West	0.049	0.287	0.004	0.340
Islands	0.055	0.364	0.005	0.424
South	0.056	0.310	0.012	0.378
Mean	0.053	0.268	0.008	0.329
<b>Economic left-right values</b>				
Nordic	0.025	0.022	0.058	0.105
Central West	0.014	0.007	0.067	0.088
Islands	0.006	0.011	0.041	0.058
South	0.007	0.021	0.031	0.059
Mean	0.013	0.015	0.049	0.078
<b>Environmental values</b>				
Nordic	0.002	0.016	0.007	0.025
Central West	0.005	0.007	0.016	0.028
Islands	0.005	0.008	0.022	0.035
South	0.009	0.052	0.013	0.074
Mean	0.005	0.021	0.015	0.041
<b>Libertarian-authoritarian values</b>				
Nordic	0.014	0.034	0.051	0.099
Central West	0.027	0.041	0.056	0.124
Islands	0.020	0.018	0.06	0.098
South	0.029	0.055	0.042	0.126
Mean	0.023	0.037	0.052	0.112
<b>Immigration orientations</b>				
Nordic	0.017	0.012	0.043	0.072
Central West	0.021	0.019	0.055	0.095
Islands	0.016	0.033	0.055	0.104
South	0.022	0.037	0.037	0.096
Mean	0.019	0.025	0.048	0.092

Model 1 is the explanatory power ( $R^2$ ) of age and gender.

Model 2 is the additional explanatory power ( $R^2$ ) of religious denomination and urban-rural residence.

Model 3 is the additional explanatory power ( $R^2$ ) of education, social class and income.

Total is the explanatory power ( $R^2$ ) of all variables.

## NOTES

1. For thorough analyses of comparative patterns of social structure widely defines in Western Europe, see Crouch (1999) and in most European countries, see Gabriel (2013).
2. In these countries, folk religiosity encompasses a positive orientation to the church as a provider of appropriate ceremony for the major milestones of an individual's life (*rites de passage*) from birth through marriage to death and a set of beliefs about life, death and general morality that relates very loosely if at all to the theological orthodoxy (Madeley 1977: 271).
3. This differs from the European Social Survey where the respondents are asked whether they *consider themselves* to belong to a religious denomination.
4. The portion of Muslims in the samples is 3% in Belgium and Switzerland and less than 3% in all other countries.
5. In many predominantly Protestant and Roman Catholic countries there are a few percentages of the other Christian religion, but they were so few so they were recoded into the "Other" (denomination and religion) category.
6. The eta-correlations with party choice are very similar: the differences are less than 0.03 in all countries.
7. For a more detailed overview of the EG class schema and its use, see Knutsen 2006a: chapter 2.
8. For thorough discussions of the value concept, see also; Van Deth and Scarbrough 1995; Ester et al. (2006).
9. See also Hofstede and Hofstede (2005: chapter 1).
10. A somewhat different conceptualisation considers some values to serve individualistic interests while other serve more collective interests. According to this conceptualisation, individualistic versus collective values comprise a dimension where some people have more individualistic values while others have more collective values (Hofstede 2001: chapter 5; Triandis 1995). Another conceptualisation is to consider the personal and the social/political as separate domains in which people can have different value priorities. This is the approach in this work. Rokeach did not operate with an individual-collective dimension, but used value batteries where the respondents should rank both personal and social values. He therefore analysed whether personal or social values had priorities, an approach which is similar to that of Hofstede and Triandis, although not identical.
11. Central elements in the leftist materialist value orientation in Western Europe are discussed at length in Castles (1978), Esping-Andersen (1985) and Scharpe (1991).
12. The scree test is performed by examining a graph of the eigenvalues of the various factors, and stop factoring at a point where the eigenvalues begin to



level off forming a straight line with an almost horizontal slope. This applies clearly in the main factor analysis after the five first eigenvalues.

13. In Knutsen (1995a) these two elements of religious beliefs and values were examined separately in relation to party choice. They showed very similar correlations regarding strength and location of parties.
14. Such child-rearing values were developed by Kohn (1977) who argues that they tap such a dimension fairly good.
15. All eight items in the index are also used by Flanagan and Aie-Rie (2003: 237–243) in their index for libertarian/authoritarian values. Flanagan and Lee also use several other items. Their data source is WVS 2 from 1990 and they find that the items load on a single factor with the expected signs for the libertarian and authoritarian items in all 12 countries which are included in their study.
16. Eta is always positive due to the fact that one of the variables is a nominal-level variable, in contrast to  $r$ .
17. The mean scores for the Nordic countries on the religious–secular index are 2.2 for those who do not belong to any religious denomination, 3.9 for those who belong to the Lutheran churches and 7.1 for those belonging to other denominations and religions.
18. The correlation is nearly at the same level in the Southern region (0.209 versus 0.221 in the Central West).

## Party Choice and Social Structure

### 4.1 THE RESEARCH PROBLEMS AND THE STATISTICAL MEASURES

The research questions for the analyses of the relationship between socio-structural variables and party choice are the following:

1. What is the comparative strength of the correlation between a given social structural variable and party choice? How does the impact of a structural variable vary between countries?
2. Which party families reveal the greatest difference in support from the various social groups on any given socio-structural variable? How does this vary between the four regions of countries? To some degree the patterns for the countries within the regions will be examined.
3. Which party families are contributing most to the correlations between a given structural variable and party choice? This research problem is different from the second. See below for a more detailed explanation.

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The statistical measures that are used to examine these research problems build on previous works (Knutsen 2004a: 34–41). In Table 4.1 we have given an example from the data material based on the cross-tabulation between party choice and gender in Finland.

In order to tap the first research problem, the eta coefficient and the squared root of Nagelkerke's pseudo- $R^2$  is used (see Chapter 1.7). When the structural variable is a nominal level variable, eta cannot be used, and Cramer's V is used instead. This applies to the two nominal level variables: religious denomination and social class.

In order to test the second research problem, consideration has to be made whereby support for parties and average support for party families varies. Therefore, traditional measures based on percentage differences (PDI) cannot be used because such measures give an advantage to the larger parties. Therefore, the log odds ratio (hereafter lor), which is the regression coefficient from logistic regression, is used. This measure makes it possible to compare differences in support from given socioeconomic groups for parties that receive different support, and it is possible to compare the absolute magnitudes for the coefficients for parties that receive stronger support from men than women, and vice versa, in contrast to odds ratios (see Knutsen 2004a: 34 for details).

**Table 4.1** Illustration of the statistical measures based on the relationship between party choice and gender in the Finnish data from EVS 2008

	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>PDI</i>	<i>Lor</i>	<i> PDI </i>
Centre Party	13.6	14.5	14.1	0.9	0.08	0.9
Nat. Coal. Party	29.9	26.3	28.1	-3.7	-0.18	3.7
Social Democrats	18.7	19.1	18.9	0.4	0.03	0.4
Left Alliance	6.1	4.8	5.5	-1.2	-0.24	1.2
Green League	11.4	21.2	16.2	9.7	0.73	9.7
Christian Dem.	2.4	2.3	2.4	-0.1	-0.06	0.1
Swedish P. P.	1.5	1.5	1.5	0.1	0.05	0.1
True Finns	13.9	9.4	11.7	-4.4	-0.43	4.4
Other p.	2.4	0.8	1.6	-1.7	-1.17	1.7
Sum	100.0	100.0	100.0			
N	411	392	803		Sum	11.1
Eta	0.159					
Sq root of Nagelkerke's pseudo- $R^2$	0.161					

In order to examine the third research problem, the PDI measure is used. The research problem here is which parties and party families cause the strength of the correlation between the structural variable and party choice in the whole party system. For this purpose, the percentage difference measure is relevant and important. The higher percentage differences are the most important for the overall impact of the structural variable on the party system. A larger percentage is normally easier to obtain for a larger party, but smaller parties can also contribute significantly if the impact of the structural variable results in a large PDI. In the approach in this chapter, we use the notion *polarisation* for the parties and party families which contribute most strongly to the overall correlation with opposite signs. For example, if a Green party receives the strongest PDI by receiving strongest support among men, while a Radical Rightist party receives the strongest PDI with the opposite sign by receiving strongest support from men, these two parties (or party families) contribute strongest to the impact of gender on party choice, and therefore, to the polarisation.

PDI is calculated for each party and also for the whole party system. This is done by summing the absolute values for all PDIs for the parties and dividing this sum by 2. This measure – which we can call the overall PDI – can be considered as a correlation coefficient which can vary from 0 to 100.

The various research problems and the corresponding statistical measures will be illustrated by the cross-tabulation and the calculated statistical measure between party choice and gender in the Finnish data in EVS 2008. This is shown in [Table 4.1](#).

The two correlation coefficients are (as so to say always in the data) nearly identical and show a moderate correlation between party choice and gender.

As to the second research question, the lor score for the Green League is largest in absolute magnitude followed by the lor scores for the True Finns, the Left Alliance and the National Coalition Party.<sup>1</sup> The former party received strongest support from women, while the other three parties with significant lor scores receive strongest support from men, given that “woman” is assigned the higher value on the gender variable.

According to the third research problem, we should examine the PDIs to identify the parties that contribute most significantly to the correlation. The highest PDI (in absolute magnitude) is found for the Green League, and then for the True Finns and the National Coalition Party. The most significant polarisation between women and men is found between the

Greens versus the Conservative and Radical Right in the Finnish party system.

Gender is a natural dichotomous variable. The other structural variables contain more than two categories. The calculation of PDI and Iors as outlined above assumes a dichotomous structural variable. Therefore, the structural variables are dichotomised when the PDIs and Iors are calculated.

The chapter is organised in the following way. First, the relationship between party choice and each of the structural variables is analysed. Then the relative bivariate strength of the correlations within each country is focussed upon, followed by multivariate analyses.

The analyses of the relationship between party choice and each of the structural variables are organised in the following way: First, the existing literature is examined. Hypotheses about the following factors are then formulated:

- 1) The strength of the correlation is a comparative perspective;
- 2) The location of the various party families on the structural variable;
- 3) The party families that are expected to contribute most to structural polarisation on a given structural variable.

The empirical analysis generally follows the same order as the hypotheses.

## 4.2 GENDER: FROM THE TRADITIONAL TO THE MODERN GENDER GAP

### 4.2.1 *Introduction*

Until the end of the 1960s, women tended to have more conservative and traditional political orientations than men. Comparative studies indicated that women were more inclined to vote for religious and conservative parties and less inclined to vote for socialist parties. According to the *traditional gender gap*, women were expected to be more conservative or centre-right than men, and a common finding was that women were more likely to support the Christian parties and vote less frequently for the leftist parties. This was, for example, documented in *Electoral Behavior: A Comparative Handbook* (Rose 1974), with data mainly from the 1960s.

Traditional women's values emphasising "private" orientations associated with religion and family responsibilities were identified as the basis for these differences. Moreover, women have been less integrated into trade

unions and working-class culture, and have thus been less solidaristic and collectively oriented than men. The most important explanation was their higher degree of religiosity, since the major differences were found with regard to support for the Christian parties, and the gender differences were more strongly reduced when controlling for religiosity (Emmenegger and Manow 2014; Rose 1974).

In the course of the past two or three decades, however, women in many Western countries have changed from being more conservative than men to being more leftist. The term *modern gender gap* has been used to characterise these new gender-based value differences and differences in voting patterns between women and men in many western democracies (Norris 1999: 150). The changes from a traditional to a modern gender gap are well documented in comparative research from West European countries (Giger 2009; Knutsen 2004a: chapter 6).

Various explanations have been advanced for how and why the modern gender differences occur and what they imply. Here we may distinguish between two main types of explanation: those emphasising *structural accounts* or *economic interests*, and those emphasising *cultural and value differences* between women and men.

Explanations that emphasise *structural factors* and *interests* see changes in the gender-based division of work associated with the labour market and the family as the most important reasons for changes in women's and men's interests. The transition from an economy based on one bread-winner to one based on the two-income family has meant that women have increasingly become independent economic actors. Paid employment directly exposes women to gender inequalities that they are less likely to experience as homemakers, while also providing them with a means of economic independence that may shape their political behaviour. Women are also more dependent on the public sector and the welfare state for employment than men and they tend to depend more on social welfare to support and subsidise their families. For these reasons, they increasingly support parties of the left which most frequently pursue policies of expanding public welfare institutions and equal opportunity policies (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006; Manza and Brooks 1998: 1243–1244; Togeby 1994).

Political attitudes and value orientations of women might also partly explain the modern gender voting gap. It is argued that the societal transformation processes described above also contributes to the formation of political attitudes in favour of social policies traditionally delivered by leftist parties. Moreover, smaller gender differences in religiosity can

explain why the gender gap in support for the Christian Parties has decreased (Emmenegger and Manow 2014). A further crucial aspect of the described societal changes is the spread of post-materialist, Green and feminist values which might affect the traditional gender role socialisation throughout the last decades. To the extent that these values are more supportive among women than among men, these new values also spurred women's support for left-wing and Green parties (Abendschön and Steinmetz 2014).

Another explanation for the modern gender gap, which is supplementary to those mentioned above, focuses on generational changes among women. The traditional gender gap is expected to be found among the older cohort, while the post-war cohorts, who received their formative experiences in the 1960s and 1970s, have been more strongly influenced by the transformation of sex roles, the women's movement and changes in political attitudes and values (Norris 1999: 154).

Inglehart and Norris (2000, 2003: chapter 4); have formulated a developmental theory of the gender gap or of gender realignment. According to this theory, there will be (a) systematic differences in the gender gap between societies based on their level of political and economic development; (b) differences within societies between generations; and (c) the explanations of the gender differences will be found in both structural and cultural factors. The change from a traditional to a modern gender gap will first be a dealignment process and expressed by decreasing differences between women and men in voting behaviour. This will be followed by a realignment process where women increasingly will vote for the leftist parties compared to men.

The various elements of this theory are supported by comparative survey data advanced industrial societies, post-communist societies and developing societies (Inglehart and Norris 2000, 2003: chapter 4). In their empirical analysis of the modern gender gap in advanced industrial societies, cultural factors seem to explain the gender gap better than structural factors (Inglehart and Norris 2000: 453–457). However, in a study of 10 Western democracies, Iversen and Rosenbloth (2006: 14–16) find that when controlling for a large set of structural variables, the gender differences in party choice vanish.

In a comparative longitudinal study based on the election data from the three Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden) from the 1970s to the late 1990s, which focused on the working population, women

increasingly supported the Left Socialist and Green parties compared to men, while men disproportionately and increasingly supported the Conservative and Radical Rightist parties. In a causal analyse where social class and sector employment were used as intermediate variables to explain the gender gaps, between 30% and 75% of the gender gap for voting for the Left Socialist and rightist parties could be explained by the fact that women worked in the public sector to a much larger degree than men. It was sector employment, not the class location that explained the gender voting gap (Knutsen 2001: 338–344). Sector employment was, however, a much stronger determinant of party choice in the Scandinavian countries than gender.

#### 4.2.2 *Hypotheses*

It is difficult to have expectations about the comparative strength of the non-directional gender gap. The traditional gender gap has been strongest in Continental and Southern European countries, but this gender gap has been strongly reduced in the last decades (Giger 2009; Knutsen 2004a: chapter 6). The dealignment in these countries has reduced the overall gender gap in voting. The modern gender gap has proven strongest in the Nordic countries among the West European countries (Abendschön and Steinmetz 2014: 330–332).

H1: We expect that the overall gender gap will be largest in the Nordic countries.

The traditional gender gap was expressed by stronger support from women for Christian and Conservative parties. The modern gender gap seems to be found for Green and Left Socialist parties versus Radical Rightist and Conservative parties. Previous studies have documented that women are fairly consistently more inclined to support the Green parties (Dolezal 2010:544–547) and Left Socialist parties (Knutsen 2001), and the tendencies for men to support the Radical Right to a larger extent than women, has been well documented in the literature (Coffé 2013; Givens 2004; Gidengil et al. (2005)). The Conservative parties in the Nordic countries also tend to get stronger support from men (Knutsen 2001), but it is uncertain whether this applies to other regions. According to the notion of the modern gender gap all leftist parties, including the Social Democrats, will receive stronger support from women.



H2: The Radical Rightist and Conservative parties will receive stronger support from men (H2a), while the Greens, the Left Socialist and also the Social Democrats will receive stronger support from women (H2b). Gender differences will be largest for the Greens and the Radical Rightist parties (H2c).

We still expect Christian parties and Conservative parties to receive stronger support from women, but this pattern will be less pronounced than the pattern for the Radical Right, and Left Socialist parties (H2d).

H3: As to polarisation, we expect in particular that the Greens and the Radical rightist parties will contribute to gender polarisation. Gender differences in terms of PDI will be largest for these parties.

From the literature on the modern gender gap, it is evident that the differences in voting behaviour largely follow a left–right grouping of parties when the Greens will be included among the leftist parties (Giger 2009: 477). The modern gender gap will first and foremost be expressed by stronger support among women for the leftist parties, including the Greens

### 4.2.3 *Empirical Analysis*

#### 4.2.3.1 *Comparative Strength*

Table 4.2 shows the overall strength of the correlation between party choice and gender based on the three measures: the eta coefficient, the squared root of the Nagelkerke's  $R^2$  and the PDI-measure.

The correlations are largest in the Nordic countries and in the Central Western countries. H1 is then supported, but gender differences are nearly at the same level in the Central Western region as in the Nordic countries. Gender differences are generally moderate to small according to the size of the correlations.

#### 4.2.3.2 *Location of Party Families*

In Appendix Table 4.1, the average PDI and lor for the various party families are shown. We focus first on the lor scores which take into account the different sizes of the parties and party families.<sup>2</sup> A positive sign implies that the party family receives stronger support from women. Gender differences are – according to the average scores – considerably larger for

**Table 4.2** Party choice and gender: Correlations

<i>Eta coefficients</i>		<i>PDI</i>		<i>Squared root of Nag R<sup>2</sup></i>	
Norway	0.215	Norway	17.2	Norway	0.219
Sweden	0.187	Sweden	15.0	Sweden	0.190
Switzerl.	0.183	Switzerl.	14.5	Netherl.	0.184
Netherl.	0.181	Netherl.	13.8	Switzerl.	0.184
France	0.169	Belgium	12.5	France	0.170
Belgium	0.161	France	12.5	Finland	0.161
Finland	0.159	Denmark	12.2	Belgium	0.161
Luxemb.	0.155	Finland	11.1	Luxemb.	0.155
Denmark	0.151	Iceland	10.5	Denmark	0.152
Germany	0.141	Luxemb.	10.2	Germany	0.145
Spain	0.129	Germany	9.7	Spain	0.141
Iceland	0.118	Ireland	9.4	Greece	0.126
Greece	0.117	Italy	8.9	Iceland	0.118
Ireland	0.116	Austria	8.9	Austria	0.118
Italy	0.116	Spain	8.7	Ireland	0.118
Austria	0.115	Britain	7.8	Italy	0.118
Britain	0.099	Portugal	6.3	Britain	0.105
Portugal	0.081	Greece	5.8	Portugal	0.084
<b>Means</b>		<b>Means</b>		<b>Means</b>	
Nordic	0.166	Nordic	13.2	Nordic	0.168
Central West	0.156	Central	11.6	Central	0.158
		West		West	
South	0.122	Islands	8.6	South	0.128
Islands	0.108	South	8.4	Islands	0.112
All	0.144	All	10.8	All	0.147

the Green and the Radical Right than for the other party families according to the *lor* scores. Gender differences are largest for the Radical Right in absolute magnitude. Gender differences in voting behaviour are small for the other party families. There is a weak tendency for the Social Democrats to receive stronger support from women, but not for the Left Socialist parties, contrary to H2b. The Conservative parties receive strongest support from men in accordance with H2a but the magnitude is small. The Christian parties receive strongest support from women, but the *lor*-coefficient is small in accordance with H2d.

The findings regarding the Greens and Radical Right are, however, a strong support for the expectations in H2c.

In *the Nordic countries* the Greens, the Communists and the Left Socialist parties receive strongest support from women, while the Radical

Right and the Conservative parties receive strongest support from men. These patterns are fairly consistent across the Nordic countries. There are, however, significant differences for the Left Socialist parties. While women are considerably more likely to support the Left Socialists in Denmark, Iceland and Norway, there are no significant differences in the countries with a strong communist antecedent for the Left Socialist parties, namely Finland and Sweden. In Norway, there is a strong tendency for women to support the Christian party to a larger extent than men, while this is not found in the other two countries with Christian parties. The tendency for the Radical Right to receive stronger support among men is stronger in Norway than in the other two relevant countries, Denmark and Finland.

For *the Central Western countries*, we find an equivalent pattern. The Greens receive strongest support from women, while the Left Socialists, Radical Right and the Ethnic-Regional parties, receive strongest support from men. According to the Ior scores, the magnitudes of the gender differences are fairly similar for the Left Socialists, Radical Right and Ethnic-Regional parties.

The stronger support from women for the Green parties is consistent across the countries but is strongest in Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Switzerland. Gender differences in support of the Christian parties are remarkably small in most Central Western countries and are considerable only in Belgium. The tendency for the Radical Rightist parties to receive the strongest support from men is strongest in Austria, Germany and Switzerland, and not significant in Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The tendency for men to support the Liberal parties to a larger degree than women is most pronounced in the Netherlands and Luxembourg and small and insignificant in the other countries.

On the *Islands*, gender differences are small. In Britain, both Labour and Conservatives receive the strongest support from women, while the Liberal Democrats receive the strongest support from men. In Ireland, the Conservative Fianna Fáil receives the strongest support from women, while Sinn Féin receives the strongest support from men. Gender differences in voting for the Green parties are small in these countries.

In the *Southern European countries*, gender differences are also generally small, and the party families that receive the strongest support from women are not the same as in the other regions. It is the Liberals and the Social Democrats that receive the most support from women, while the Radical Right, then the Ethnic-Regional and the single Christian Party receive the strongest support from men. The pattern whereby the Social

Democrats receive stronger support from women is most pronounced in France, Italy and Spain, while the other patterns are fairly similar across the relevant countries within the region.

#### 4.2.3.3 *Polarisation*

As to polarisation measured by the PDIs, these are generally small for all party families. To the extent that there is polarisation according to gender, this is first and foremost between the Greens and the Social Democrats versus the Radical Rightist parties. This is a pattern that is generally in accordance with H3.

The strongest polarisation is found in the Nordic countries. Here, it is first and foremost the Greens and Left Socialist parties which receive the strongest support from women, while it is the Radical Right and Conservative parties that receive strongest support from men. In the Central Western countries the polarisation is also between the Greens with the strongest support among women, but then there are several other party families (Radical Right, Ethnic-Regional, Liberals and Left Socialists) that have the strongest support from men.

In Britain, polarisation is first and foremost between the Social Democrats versus the Liberals which receive the strongest support from women and men, respectively, while in Ireland gender polarisation is strongest between the conservative Fianna Fáil and the left socialist Sinn Féin which receives the strongest support from women and men, respectively.

In Southern Europe, the polarisation is strongest between the Social Democrats and the Liberal parties which receive the strongest support from women, and the Ethnic-Regional and Radical Rightist parties, and in addition, the Christian party in Italy which receives the strongest support among men.

## 4.3 PARTY CHOICE AND AGE

### 4.3.1 *Introduction*

Age is not so frequently included in studies of the relationship between social structure and party choice as many of the other structural variables that are examined here, and when it is included little attention is given to hypotheses and detailed explanations.

Many studies do not examine age or cohort differences in party choice, but focus upon how the impact of structural variables and issue and value

preferences on party choice vary between cohorts (Van Der Brug 2010, Wagner and Kritzinger 2012; Walczak et al. 2012)

The discussion of age differences in voting behaviour occasionally examines whether the age differences are the result of life-cycle, generation or period effects. Since the analysis here is based on cross-sectional (synchronic) data, we are not able to test these effects. However, some main hypotheses about the relationship between age and party choice can be formulated on the basis of these perspectives (Knutsen 2003: chapter 5; Goerres 2008: 286–287).

One hypothesis – from a life-cycle perspective – is that voters become more conservative with age, and therefore, increasingly vote for Conservative parties. But what is meant by ‘conservatism’? This can be defined in terms of a system of values and beliefs about nature or reality, or simply as resistance to change, reluctance to take risks, cognitive rigidity or some similar characteristics (Glenn 1974: 177). But it might also be related to a rightist position on the economic left–right dimension (Goerres 2008: 286). From this perspective, we expect older age groups to be more inclined to support conservative parties than younger age groups.

On the other hand, older age groups might be strongly supportive of welfare state efforts that are central to their well-being such as state pensions and care for the elderly. These are policies that traditionally have been promoted by the leftist parties (Goerres 2008: 302)

Another obvious life-cycle effect is related to the Christian parties. Although this is not clearly documented in the literature, it is reasonable to hypothesise that people will increasingly support the Christian parties as they grow older. In Scandinavia as well as on the Continent, it is well documented that the Christian parties get stronger support from the older age groups (Hanley 1994; Knutsen 2003: chapter 7). According to this hypothesis, religion begins to play a more central role in people’s lives as they approach old age, perhaps partly as a preparation for the next life. The Christian parties appeal directly to such religious values, and they also articulate interests of the older segments of the population. One can also argue that the age differences in support for Christian parties are generation effects.<sup>3</sup>

Samuel Barnes (1988, 1989) found on the basis of panel data a substantial shift in every age group (cohort) from minor to major party preferences across the years. He found that support for the major rightist or centre-rightist parties in the system increased across the life cycle, while support for the major leftist party remained constant or decreased slightly. He concluded that “support for left parties tends to be constant throughout the life-cycle, while the more conservative of the two major parties

receives in support over the life-cycle in country after country” (Barnes 1988: 8–9). According to Barnes, people increasingly vote for and identify with the major centrist and Conservative parties as they become older.

As to New Politics theory, a major hypothesis is that the younger cohorts that have grown up under an economically secure environment and with absence of war will have Green and Libertarian values, and support parties with such orientation (Inglehart 1977: chapter 2 and 3). One could therefore expect that Green and Left Socialist parties that focus on libertarian and environmental values might receive stronger support from the post-war cohorts.<sup>4</sup> This might also apply to some Liberal parties that have focussed on Green and Libertarian values. Comparative research has documented that younger age groups tend to vote for Green parties to a larger extent than older voters (Dolezal 2010: 544–547). This also applies to the Left Socialist parties in the Scandinavian countries where age differences have been largest for the Left Socialist parties (Knutsen 2003: chapter 7).

There are different ways of conceptualising the New Politics conflict. One way is to emphasise that the new issue and value conflict will polarise between the New Left and the New Right. This might be a polarisation that is strongest among the younger generations, and consequently, the New Right would also have strongest support among the younger generations. However, since the New Right also is associated with authoritarian values which we have found to be strongest among older age groups, this view might be challenged. Comparative studies have shown mixed and partly contradictory results. In a study of Radical Rightist parties across West European and post-communist countries van der Burg et al. (2013: 58–65) report that these parties receive the strongest support from younger voters, but the explanatory power of age is small. Oesch (2013: 42) reports that the Radical Rightist parties in four countries with large Radical Rightist parties (Austria, Denmark, Norway and Switzerland) have the oldest or second oldest electorate in contrast to the New Left parties that in all these countries have the youngest electorate.

The Social Democrats and the traditional Communist parties represent the Old Left in the party systems in Western Europe. It is, however, difficult to have clear expectations regarding the support for these parties among different age groups, but the main hypothesis is that these parties receive the strongest support from older voters, given their traditional focus on Old Left and class issues and values.

In the USA, the so-called New Deal realignment that favoured the Democratic Party has been much focussed upon. This has been studied extensively by political scientists and others. The main finding is that it was “new” voters who contributed significantly to the realignment in favour of the Democratic Party; moreover, this has been found to represent a lasting generation-based attachment with an impact also in the post-war period.

In the Nordic countries, similar process took place. The Social Democrats became established as dominant parties in Denmark, Norway and Sweden during the 1930s. Their electoral support increased as support for the non-socialist or “bourgeois” parties decreased. This is a phenomenon widely seen in connection with the Great Depression and the way the labour movement and the Social Democratic parties managed to handle the urgent political problems that it gave rise to. There was a political realignment in the 1930s in Norway, Denmark and Sweden. All three countries experienced a significant increase in support for the social democratic movement. The Social Democratic parties were seen as a new political force associated with vigour and efficiency. They managed – in the minds of large section of the mass publics – to relieve the effects of the crisis for the population and they were positively associated with the economic recovery in the late 1930s.<sup>5</sup> By contrast, the non-socialist parties were associated with the economic depression in a negative way. Their policy of balanced budgets may have been considered as a policy that failed.

The question is then whether this realignment was generation-based. In a previous study (Knutsen 2003: chapter 9) one of the present authors found a clear tendency for the Social Democratic parties in the three mentioned Scandinavian countries to have larger support in the pre-war generations, and clear generation effects explaining these patterns, but life-cycle effects were also present.

In a West European setting, the Scandinavian experience was, however, unique: support for Social Democratic parties did not increase during the Great Depression in other countries. On the other hand, all over Western Europe, the Social Democratic parties articulated the leftist economic values to be so important for the generations that grew up the economic depression of the 1930s; and, they emphasise materialist values which were also important for that generation.

The argument about issue priorities for larger pensions and care for the elderly among the older age groups might also lead us to expect that older

age groups will support Social Democratic parties and leftist parties in general to a larger extent than younger age groups.

#### 4.3.2 *Hypotheses*

The review of the literature above indicates several hypotheses about the relationship between age and the various party families, but there are few comparative perspectives or empirical findings. It is difficult to have expectations about the comparative strength of age differences in party support in general, and for given party families. A major perspective might be that given that to a certain degree the electorate is dealigned; trends of given time periods (*Zeitgeists* or period effects) might be stronger in the younger cohorts.

The review above has also revealed that there are contradictory perspectives which might lead to alternative hypotheses. We have no comparative hypothesis regarding the strength of the correlation between party choice and age. As to the relationship between party families and age, the following hypotheses are formulated:

H1a: Conservative parties will receive stronger support from older age groups.

H1b: Christian parties will receive strongest support from the older age groups.

H1c: Social democratic parties will receive strongest support from the older age groups.

H1d: Stronger support from the older age groups for the Social Democratic parties will be more pronounced in the Nordic countries than in other regions.

H1e: Green and Left Socialist parties will receive the strongest support from the younger age groups.

H1f: The Radical Rightist parties will receive the strongest support from the younger age groups.

H1f alt: The Radical Rightist parties will receive the strongest support from the older age groups.

It is difficult to have clear expectations regarding polarisation according to age. From H1a, H1b and H1d we can, however, formulate the following hypothesis:



H2: Polarisation will first and foremost take place between the Conservative and Christian parties versus the Greens and Left Socialist parties.

### 4.3.3 Empirical Analysis

#### 4.3.3.1 Comparative Strength

Table 4.3 shows the strength of the correlations between party choice and age according to the three measures: the eta coefficient and the squared root of the Nagelkerke's  $R^2$  are based on the continuous age variable, while the PDI measure taps the total differences in support for all parties between the age groups 70 years and older, and 18–29 years. The limit of 70 years is chosen because it matches the socialisation experiences close to the pre-war

**Table 4.3** Party choice and age: Correlations

<i>Eta</i>		<i>PDI</i>		<i>Squared root of Nag R<sup>2</sup></i>	
Greece	0.340	Greece	39.7	Ireland	0.363
Ireland	0.335	Germany	37.8	Greece	0.348
Austria	0.327	Austria	37.4	Germany	0.336
Germany	0.327	Ireland	32.6	Austria	0.335
Finland	0.245	Netherl.	30.9	Finland	0.247
Sweden	0.234	Finland	30.7	Sweden	0.239
Netherl.	0.222	Sweden	27.3	Spain	0.232
Spain	0.221	Norway	27.2	Netherl.	0.221
Switzerl.	0.216	Portugal	25.1	Switzerl.	0.219
France	0.214	Luxemb.	23.8	France	0.214
Luxemb.	0.206	Denmark	23.3	Luxemb.	0.212
Belgium	0.198	Spain	23.1	Belgium	0.197
Norway	0.186	Switzerl.	22.8	Norway	0.190
Italy	0.177	France	22.7	Iceland	0.187
Iceland	0.176	Belgium	18.5	Italy	0.179
Denmark	0.165	Iceland	18.3	Denmark	0.167
Britain	0.130	Britain	18.1	Britain	0.134
Portugal	0.121	Italy	14.3	Portugal	0.122
<b>Means</b>		<b>Means</b>		<b>Means</b>	
Central West	0.249	Central West	28.5	Central West	0.253
Islands	0.233	Islands	25.4	Islands	0.249
South	0.215	Nordic	25.4	South	0.219
Nordic	0.201	South	23.1	Nordic	0.206
All	0.224	All	25.8	All	0.230

PDI is based on differences between the age groups 18–29 years and 70 years and older

generation, the war and the first post-war period with a shortage of material supplies. Those who were 70 years or older in 2008–10 were born in 1940 or earlier. The three measures show very similar ranking of the countries and are highly correlated ( $r = 0.88 - 1.00$ ). There are small differences between the regions of countries, but nevertheless, considerable cross-national differences between the individual countries.

Age differences in party choice are – according to the eta coefficients and the square root of the Nagelkerke's  $R^2$  – largest in Greece, Ireland, Austria and Germany. There is then, for these two measures, a significant distance to the other countries. The strength of the correlations seems to cut across the regional grouping of countries, and there are small differences between the regions according to the average regional correlations.

#### 4.3.3.2 *Location of Party Families*

The locations of the various party families on the age variable are shown in [Appendix Table 4.2](#). The average lor scores show that the Christian and Agrarian parties are those party families that receive relatively strongest support from the older age groups followed by the Conservative and Social Democratic parties. The Greens, the Left Socialist and Communist parties receive relatively strongest support from the younger age groups. The Radical Rightist parties receive the strongest support for the younger age groups. H1a-H1c, h1e and H1f, but not H1f-alt are then supported. It should be underscored that the lor coefficients for the Social Democrats and Radical Right are modest.

In *the Nordic countries* the largest age differences according to the lor coefficients are found for the Social Democrats and Agrarian parties among the party families that receive the strongest support from the older age groups, and for the small Communist parties, the Greens and then the Liberals, Left Socialist and Radical Rightist parties among those that receive the strongest support from the younger age groups.

The strong pattern for the Social Democrats can be interpreted as being caused by the basic realignment in the Nordic party systems that took place in the 1930s when the younger generations become affiliated with the parties as explained above. The pattern is consistent across the countries but somewhat smaller in Sweden than in the other countries.

Compared to the other regions, the age differences in support for the Social Democrats are stronger in the Nordic countries than in the other regions in accordance with H1d which is then supported.

The tendency for the Conservative parties to receive the strongest support from the older age groups is strongest in Sweden and Finland, weaker in Iceland and non-existent in Denmark and Norway according to the data.

The average figures for the Left Socialist parties reveal large variations between the countries. In Denmark and Norway where the Left Socialist parties cannot trace their origin to Communist antecedent parties, support from the younger age groups is considerably larger than for the older age groups. There are, however, small differences in the other countries and even a tendency for the older age groups to be the strongest supporters of the Left Socialists in Finland.

The Liberal parties in Denmark and Norway, which have focussed significantly on green and New Politics issues, receive stronger support from the younger age groups, while the opposite is the case in Sweden.

The tendency for the Radical Rightist parties to receive the strongest support from the younger age groups is strongest in Finland where age differences in support for the Radical Right is the strongest in that country according to the Ior scores. Strongest support from the younger age groups is also found in Norway but of a smaller magnitude, while the opposite is the case in Denmark where the Danish People's Party receives strongest support from the older age groups.

In the *Central Western countries* there are basically two party families that contribute to most of the age differences in party choice, namely the Christian and the Green parties. The Christian parties receive the strongest support from the older age groups, while the Greens and with smaller magnitudes, the Left Socialist, Radical Right and Communists receive stronger support from the younger age groups. According to the Ior scores, age differences are larger for the Greens than for the Christian parties.

The patterns for the Christian and Green parties are fairly consistent across the six Central Western countries. The age differences for the Christian parties are largest in the Netherlands, Germany and Austria, while the age differences in support for the Greens are largest in Germany and then in Austria and somewhat lower in the other countries.

There is one exception to the pattern of strongest support for the Greens in the younger age groups, namely the Green Left in the Netherlands which receives small support among the youngest and oldest age groups and stronger support among the age groups 30–59. In the Dutch case it is the Left Socialists (the Socialist Party) that receive the strongest support from younger age groups, not the party we have

classified in the Green party family. The Calvinist Fundamentalist parties also find significantly stronger support from the younger age groups.

Age differences in support for the Radical Rightist parties are not consistent across the central countries, but the younger age groups tend to be the most likely to support these parties in Austria, Germany and Switzerland, while there are small and insignificant age differences in the other countries (Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands). Age differences in support for the Radical Right are much smaller than for the Greens and Christian parties.

In contrast to the strong age differences in support for the Social Democrats in the Nordic countries, there are small such differences in the Central Western countries, and they are not consistent. In Austria and Luxembourg, the older age groups are most inclined to support the Social Democrats, while the opposite is the case in Switzerland. There are small and insignificant differences in the other countries.

As to the Liberal parties, both the right-wing VVD and the more left-wing D66 in the Netherlands receive stronger support from the younger age groups, while the opposite is the case in Luxembourg and Switzerland. The Liberal parties receive stronger support from the older age groups. In Austria, Belgium and Germany there are insignificant differences in support for the Liberal parties.

The average coefficients for the two *Island countries* are based on the following patterns for the two countries: In Britain the Greens and then the Social Democrats receive the strongest support from the younger age groups, while the Conservative and Ethnic-Regional parties receive stronger support from older voters. In Ireland, it is the Left Socialist Sinn Fein and the Greens that receive the strongest support from younger voters, while the Conservative Fianna Fail receive the strongest support among the older voters.

In *Southern Europe*, age differences are largest in Greece and then in Spain, followed by France. Age differences in Italy and Portugal are small in a comparative setting.

The Conservative and then the Social Democratic parties (and the single Christian) parties receive the strongest support from the older age groups, while in the Greens and Left Socialist receive the strongest support from the youngest age groups.

Then tendency for the Conservative parties to receive the strongest support from the older age groups are found in all Southern countries and are strongest in Greece, and then Spain and France and weakest in Italy and Portugal.

The Left Socialists and Greens receive the strongest support from the younger age groups in all the relevant countries. The Communist parties in France and Portugal receive the strongest support from the older age groups, while the opposite is the case for the Italian and – to a smaller extent – the Greek Communists.

Age differences for the Social Democrats are small in France, Italy and Spain, but in Greece and Portugal, the older age groups are supporting them to a much larger degree than the younger age groups.

The average PDI coefficients for the party families indicate strong support for H2. The polarisation takes place between the Christian and Conservative parties versus the Greens and Left Socialists. The Social Democrats and the Agrarian parties also receive significantly stronger support among the older age groups, but the figures are much smaller than for the Christian and Conservative parties.

There are some regional variations: In the Nordic countries the polarisation is first and foremost between the Social Democrats and the Greens, but other party families contribute significantly. In the Central Western region there is a large polarisation between the Christian parties and the Greens. The contributions of other party families are small. The PDI figures for the Islands cover the same pattern as outlined above for the *lor*-scores and need not be repeated. In the Southern region the polarisation takes place between the Conservatives who receive the strongest support from the older age groups and the Left Socialist and Greens that receive the strongest support from the younger age groups. The Social Democrats and the Christian parties also contribute significantly to the polarisation by receiving stronger support from the older age groups.

#### 4.3.3.3 *Polarisation*

As to polarisation, the four countries with the largest correlations between party choice and age are of particular interest and below the polarisation according to the PDIs are outlined.

The large age difference in support for the parties in *Ireland* is caused by mainly three parties. The left socialist Sinn Fein and the Green party receive large support from the younger age groups, while the conservative Fianna Fail receives strongest support from the older age groups. 33% of the age groups lower than 30 years support Sinn Fein and the Greens, and only 2% of those 70 years and older, while there is a similar difference in the opposite direction for Fianna Fail (34% and 64%).

The large age difference in support for the *Greek* political parties is first and foremost caused by the younger age groups to support the left socialist Syriza and to a smaller extent, the Radical Right and the Communists, and the older age groups to support the conservative New Democracy and the Social Democrats (PASOK).

The high correlations between age and party choice in *Austria and Germany* are caused mainly by the large differences in support for the Christian and Green parties: In Austria the Christian Democrats (ÖVP) is 14% in the age group 18–29 years and 40% in the age groups over 70 years, while the corresponding figures for the Greens are 30% and 3%. In Germany, the corresponding figures are 25% and 58% for the Christian Democrats and 32% and 1% for the Greens.<sup>6</sup> The age differences in voting for parties within these party families are equivalent in the other countries in the region, but smaller.

## 4.4 PARTY CHOICE AND RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION

### 4.4.1 *Introduction*

In their seminal article on the development of the party cleavages in Western democracies, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) were impressively detailed about the development of the religious cleavage. The religious cleavage was first shaped by the Protestant Reformation which created divisions between Catholics and Protestants. These divisions had political consequences because the control of the nation-building process often became intermixed with the religious cleavage. Protestants frequently found themselves allied with nationalist forces in the struggle for national autonomy. In Anglican England the Calvinist Netherlands, the Protestant church supported national independence and became a central element in the emerging national political identity. In other nations, religious conflicts also ran deep, but these differences side-tracked the nation-building process (Dalton 1990: 66; Martin 1993: 100–108).

Gradually the political systems of Europe accommodated themselves to the changes wrought by the Reformation. The French Revolution renewed religious conflicts in the nineteenth century. Religious forces – both Catholic and Protestant – mobilised to defend church interests against the Liberal, secular movement spawned by the events in France. Conflicts over church/state control, the legislation of mandatory state education and disestablishment of state religion occurred

across the face of Europe. These conflicts often were intense, as in the *Kulturkämpfe* in Germany and Switzerland. In reaction to these liberal attacks, new religious political parties formed in Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, Italy and Belgium. These parties ranged from the Calvinist Anti-Revolutionary Party in the Netherlands (named in reaction to the French Revolution) to the Vatican-allied Catholic Partito Popolare in Italy (Dalton 1990: 66–67). The party alignments developed at the start of the twentieth century institutionalised the religious cleavage in politics, and many basic features of these party systems have endured to the present.

Being a member of a religious denomination is an expression of a belonging to a religious community and accepting at least some of the beliefs and values that the church stands for, although this will vary considerably between the members. Membership in a denomination is probably the last aspect of religious involvement that a person considers in a secularisation process. The loss of religious beliefs and values, and decline of attending the church probably comes first, and the members of religious communities are therefore a fairly heterogeneous group. Nevertheless, we expect that there will be significant division in voting behaviour between those who are member of a denomination and those who are not (called affiliated and unaffiliated below). We therefore believe that there will be a major division in voting behaviour between those who are members of a religious denomination and those who are not.

Lipset and Rokkan (1967) emphasised that the established churches in the Scandinavian countries and in Britain did not stand in opposition to the nation-builders in the way the Roman Catholic Church did, and pre-industrial “‘Left’ movements in the Nordic countries opposed to the religious establishment found most of their support among newly enfranchised dissenters, nonconformists, and fundamentalists in the peripheries“(1967: 38)

“The broad ‘Left’ coalitions against the established powers recruited decisive support among orthodox Protestants in a variety of sectarian movements outside and inside the national churches” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 38).<sup>7</sup> The supporters of the pre-industrial left movements and later the Christian People’s Parties in the Scandinavian countries are not primarily active members of the dominant state churches. They belong most frequently to more fundamentalist sects, partly found within and partly outside the Lutheran Church.

Many researchers have noted that there is a somewhat paradoxical situation related to the importance of the religious cleavage. Only a small number of political issues clearly follow the religious/secular conflict line. By the same token, there are very few issues that are completely divorced from them. Despite the paucity of explicitly religious issues and the lack of religious themes in most campaigns, religious beliefs have proven to be a strong predictor of party choice in many West European democracies. Smith (1989: 20) has therefore characterised the religious cleavage as a passive rather than an active force in shaping political behaviour.

Perhaps the most important reason why religion continues to play an influential role for voter choice is that religious conflicts helped determine the structure of the modern party system, and therefore, still affect the electoral choices open to the voter. The religious cleavage is also important because it reflects deeply held human values which have a great potential for influencing behaviour. Although religious issues are not very prominent on the political agenda, religious values are related to a wide range of social and political beliefs: work ethics, achievement aspirations, lifestyle norms, parent-child relations, morality, social relations, attitudes towards authority and acceptance of the state. Religion signifies a *Weltanschauung* that extends into the political area (Dalton 1990: 86). Religious faith is strongly connected not only to party choice; the connection encompasses political ideology, issue outlook, and attitudes towards a wide range of political objects (Wald 1987: chapter 3).

Empirical research on mass behaviour has underscored the continuing importance of the religious cleavage. Rose and Urwin (1969) conducted one of the first comparative analyses of the topic, examining the social basis of party support in 16 Western democracies. Contrary to conventional wisdom, their finding was that, “religious divisions, not class, are the main social basis of parties in the Western world today” (Rose and Urwin 1969: 12). In a comparative study that included most West European countries, Rose (1974: 16–18) compared the impact of religion, social class and region on left-right voting on the basis of data from mainly the 1960s, and found that religion was much more important in all the Catholic and religiously mixed countries. Only in Britain and the Scandinavian countries was social class the most important predictor of left-right party choice.

Several studies have examined the impact of the religious cleavage (the two faces of it or only one) over time and in a comparative setting



(Dalton 1990: 82–88, 2014: 165–173; Elff 2007; Inglehart 1977: 216–225, 245–249), and numerous studies have focused on trends within a single country. The main findings from these studies are that although there has been a considerable change in the distribution of the religious variables in the direction of a more secular mass public, the correlation with party choice has shown a surprising persistence at a high level. For example, Dalton (1996: 185) compares the impact of religion on voting with the impact of social class in a comparative longitudinal study and concludes that “the time lines of religious voting...do not show the marked drop-off found for class voting.... Despite the paucity of explicit religious issues and the lack of religious themes in most campaigns, religious characteristics can still be a strong predictor of party choice”.

One of the author’s longitudinal study of eight West European countries from the early 1970s to the late 1990s based on Eurobarometer data showed, however, a considerable decline in the impact of religion on party choice in the countries where the religious cleavage has been most pronounced in the 1970s – Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands. Due to these declines, there was a trend towards convergence in the impact of the religious variables on party choice at a somewhat lower average level than in the 1970s. There were, however, also signs of a considerable persistent in the impact of religion in the other countries (Knutsen 2004a: chapter 2, 3, 234–236, 2004b).

Similar findings are reported in van der Brug, Hobolt and de Vreese (2009: 1274–1279) on the basis of the European Election Studies. They found that there was a significant decline in the impact of religious variables on party choice from 1989 to 1999, but then a small increase from 1999 to 2004 based on data from the countries that were EU-members throughout the whole period they examined.

#### 4.4.2 *Hypotheses*

The hypotheses focus on the contrasts between the affiliated and unaffiliated groups and not on the different voting patterns of Catholics and Protestants in the religiously mixed countries. The differences between Catholics and Protestants will only be described in some detail in the empirical analysis.

The religious cleavage has traditionally been stronger in Catholic and religiously mixed countries than in Protestant countries. After the

collapse of the Italian Christian Democrats, the largest Christian Democratic parties are to be found in the Central Western region (and in Ireland according to the data). The following hypothesis is then formulated:

H1: The strength of the correlations between party choice and religious denominations will be found in the Central Western region.

It is difficult to have any clear expectations regarding differences between the other regions. The religious conflict is first and foremost associated with Christian parties that articulate the religious interests, beliefs and values in the party. Conservative parties and the Agrarian parties in the Nordic countries have also articulated tradition and religious values, and issue positions. Previous studies have shown that the Radical Rightist parties are not significantly influenced by the denominational cleavage (Knutsen 2004a: 55–58.; Van Der Brug et al. 2013: 58–65). The Liberal parties in continental Europe and partly also in Southern Europe have been central in the *Kulturkämpfe* against the Churches and the Christian parties, and are expected to have stronger support among non-affiliated voters. In the Nordic countries and in Britain, the Liberal party have historically been associated with non-conformist denominations, but at least in the Nordic countries, these Christian voters have supported the Christian parties when they emerged as breakaway parties from the liberal parties.

All the leftist party families including the Greens are expected to receive the strongest support from the non-affiliated. The differences in support will probably be smallest for the Social Democrats when the *lor* measure is examined because these parties attract voters across the denominational conflict.

H2a: The Christian parties will receive most strong support from the affiliated compared to the non-affiliated. The Conservative and Agrarian parties will also receive the strongest support from the affiliated groups.

H2b: In accordance with Lipset and Rokkan's discussion of the character of the religious cleavage in the Nordic countries, we expect that the small Christian People's Party receives stronger support from the "other" denominational groups than from the members of the Lutheran State Church.

H2c: The liberal and the leftist parties will receive the strongest support from the unaffiliated group.

As to polarisation, it is expected that strongest polarisation will be between the Christian and Conservative parties (in countries without Christian parties) which receive relatively strong support in many countries, and the leftist parties. It is difficult to have clear expectations regarding which party family among the leftist parties will contribute most in this respect. On the one hand, the Social Democrats are the largest leftist party in most countries, but on the other hand there are reason to expect that the voters of these parties will not be so concerned with the denominational conflicts. The New Leftist parties – Greens and Left Socialists – are expected to have a clearer profile with greater support from the unaffiliated group. These parties articulate secular values and the voters of these parties have a more unconventional lifestyle and less traditional morals.

H3: The polarisation along the religious denomination cleavage will take place between Christian, Conservative and Agrarian parties versus the Greens and the Left Socialists.

### 4.4.3 *Empirical Analysis*

#### 4.4.3.1 *Comparative Strength*

Table 4.4 shows the correlations between party choice and religious denomination in the 18 countries. Because there are more denominations and the denomination variable is at nominal level, Cramer's V coefficient is used, not the eta coefficient.<sup>8</sup>

The PDI measure is based on the difference between the dominant denomination and those who are not affiliated to any denomination. For the religiously mixed countries (including Britain) PDIs are calculated for each denomination in relation to this who do not belong to any denomination. The PDIs for each denomination are then weighted according to the size of the denomination in the data. For example, in the Swiss data, 45.4% of those who indicated a party choice and a denomination were Catholics and 54.6% were Protestants. The PDI scores for these denominations were consequently weighted by 0.454 and 0.546 to obtain the PDI for Switzerland. For the countries with a dominant religion (other than the four mentioned above), the PDI scores are based on the voting

**Table 4.4** Party choice and religious denomination: Correlations

<i>Cramer's V coefficients</i>		<i>PDI</i>		<i>Squared root of Nag R<sup>2</sup></i>	
Sweden	0.326	Netherl.	43.7	Netherl.	0.579
Netherl.	0.320	Greece	37.5	Belgium	0.405
Belgium	0.286	Germany	35.9	Germany	0.397
Finland	0.256	Belgium	31.7	Switzerl.	0.395
Germany	0.255	Austria	30.3	Finland	0.333
Switzerl.	0.243	Italy	28.3	France	0.327
Norway	0.211	Finland	27.8	Sweden	0.313
Italy	0.198	Portugal	27.0	Austria	0.303
Spain	0.193	Luxemb.	25.3	Spain	0.298
France	0.187	Spain	25.0	Norway	0.295
Luxemb.	0.173	Switzerl.	24.4	Italy	0.285
Austria	0.171	France	23.2	Luxemb.	0.281
Britain	0.155	Ireland	22.9	Ireland	0.266
Ireland	0.148	Iceland	20.7	Portugal	0.257
Portugal	0.142	Norway	20.6	Britain	0.253
Denmark	0.140	Denmark	19.1	Iceland	0.179
Iceland	0.137	Britain	10.5	Greece	0.173
Greece	0.119	Sweden	9.1	Denmark	0.170
<b>Means</b>		<b>Means</b>		<b>Means</b>	
Central West	0.241	Central West	31.9	Central West	0.393
Nordic	0.214	South	28.2	South	0.268
South	0.168	Nordic	19.4	Islands	0.260
Islands	0.152	Islands	16.7	Nordic	0.258
All	0.203	All	25.7	All	0.306

PDI's are based on the differences between the major denomination and no denomination. For the religiously mixed countries

For Britain, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland, the PDI's between the support from respondents that are members of a given denomination and those who are not member of any denomination are weighted according to the size of the denomination according to the surveys

pattern for those who do not belong to any denomination and the dominant denomination.

The coefficients show similar patterns but with important differences. The PDI does not – for countries with a dominant religion – take into account the distribution of the religious denomination variable. For example, the high PDI for Greece is based on a comparison of the 93% who belong to the Orthodox Church and the 4% who do not belong to any denomination. According to the squared root coefficients, the strength of

the correlation is outstanding in the Netherlands in accordance with other findings (Knutsen 2004a: 53–60; 2010). The coefficients are also large in the other religiously mixed countries, Germany and Switzerland, and in several of the Catholic countries. There are also significant correlations in three of the Nordic countries, Finland, Norway and Sweden. These are the countries with significant Christian parties in the region.

The correlations are, on average, highest in the Central Western region in accordance with H1, and then in the Southern region, according to two of the measures, while Cramer's V shows the second highest correlation for the Nordic countries.

There are extreme broad differences in the relative strength of correlation based on Cramer's V (high) and PDI (low) for Sweden. We also find comparatively larger correlations based on CV (and the squared root of Nagelkerke's  $R^2$ ) than for PDI in Finland and Norway. This can be explained by the religious structure discussed above. The Christian parties receive 1% of the support from those who do not belong to any religious denomination in all the three countries, 2% to 6% support from those who belong to the dominant Lutheran church and 17% to 18% of the small group of "other denominations" in Finland and Norway, and 39% in Sweden. The other denomination includes – as a dominant component – various non-conformist Protestant denominations which, to a large extent, forms the basis of the Christian parties.<sup>9</sup> When the "other denomination" category in the Swedish data is set to "missing values" and the correlation is calculated without this category, the correlation drops from 0.326 to 0.141. The CV coefficient seems to be very sensitive to the pattern that is found for the Swedish Christian party in a relative small category (5.6% of those with party choice) on the religious denomination variable, while this is not the case for the Nagelkerke's measure.

#### 4.4.3.2 *Location of Party Families*

Appendix Table 4.3 shows the PDI and lor scores based on the averages for the various party families. Both coefficients are calculated in the same way as outlined above. The coefficients are based on the differences between the dominant denomination and those who do not belong to any denomination and for the four religiously mixed countries by using the weighting procedure that was explained above.

According to the lor scores the religious parties receive most different support from those who are members of a denomination, followed by the Agrarians and the Conservatives, while the Left Socialists, Greens and Communists receive most support from those who do not belong to any

denomination. The average PDI and lor-scores for the liberal and Social Democratic parties are small and insignificant. The Radical Rightist parties receive the strongest support from the unaffiliated but the coefficients are small. These findings are all in accordance with H2a and H2c, but the small coefficients for the Liberal and Social Democrats cast some doubts about this part of the hypothesis. H2b is strongly confirmed by the pattern for the Christian parties in the Nordic countries described above.

These patterns are fairly consistent across countries and regions. The main differences are the following. The Liberal parties in the central region receive relatively more support from those who do not belong to any denomination to a larger degree than in other regions. An example of the opposite situation is found in Portugal where the parties classified as "Liberal" receive much stronger support from those who are Catholics. This is the reason for the high positive lor coefficient for the Liberals in the Southern region.

There are small differences for the Social Democratic parties according to the averages for the various regions, but there are some remarkable and significant differences between countries within the various regions. In the Central Region, the Social Democrats receive the strongest support from those who are affiliated in Austria and Germany, while it is the opposite in the four other countries in this region. Similarly, in Greece and Portugal, the socialists receive the strongest support from those who are affiliated, while the opposite is the case in France and Italy. Differences in support for the Radical Rightist parties according to religious denomination are small in most countries apart from Austria where the Radical Right receives much stronger support among the unaffiliated than among the Catholics.

#### 4.4.3.3 *Polarisation*

Examining the PDI scores in order to obtain an impression of the polarisation in the party systems, it is the Christian, Conservative and Agrarian parties which have the highest PDI scores among those party families that receive the strongest support from the affiliated, while it is the Green, Left Socialists and then the Communists which receive the strongest support among the unaffiliated. H3 is then strongly supported.

These patterns are fairly consistent across the various regions with two exceptions. The Christian parties in the Nordic countries do not contribute most to polarisation. It is the Agrarian parties who do that. The polarisation measure is based on the main Protestant denomination

from which, as we have seen, that Christian parties do not receive any significant support. The Liberal parties in the Southern region receive the strongest support from the affiliated due to the Portuguese case discussed above.

#### 4.4.4 *The Denominational Conflict in the Religiously Mixed Countries*

Concerning the religiously mixed countries, the main difference in *Germany* is between Catholics and Protestants in support from CDU/CSU versus the SPD. CDU/CSU receives the strongest support from Catholics, then among Protestants and smallest support among the unaffiliated. SPD receives the strongest support among Protestants while support among Catholics and unaffiliated is similar and significantly lower. For the other parties in the German party system, the main difference is between the non-affiliated and the affiliated, whether Catholics or Protestants. All these parties receive stronger support from the unaffiliated. The largest difference in this respect is found for the Left Party.

In *Switzerland*, the Christian Democrats receive much stronger support among Catholics than among Protestants and unaffiliated. There is no difference in the low support from Protestants and unaffiliated. The Liberals, Social Democrats and the Radical Rightist Swiss People's Party (which previously first and foremost was an agrarian party in the Protestant cantons), all receive stronger support from the Protestants than from the Catholics. Support among Catholics and unaffiliated is fairly similar for the Liberals and the Swiss Peoples' Party while support is highest among the unaffiliated for the Social Democrats. The Green party voters are decisively strongest among the unaffiliated group, and there is no significant difference in support among Protestants and Catholics.

In the *Dutch* case, the relationship between religious denomination and party choice is complicated. The Christian Democrats receive nearly the same support among all three denominations, although somewhat stronger support from the Catholics, and small support among the unaffiliated. The Calvinist Fundamentalist parties receive nearly all of their support among the two Protestant denominations and strongest support among the Rereformed group. The Liberal parties (VVD and D66) receive the strongest support among the unaffiliated group. This pattern is strongest for D66: VVD receive significant support from the

Catholics and the main protestant denomination. The Left Socialists have a similar pattern as D66 with much stronger support among the unaffiliated than among those who belong to any of the three denominations. The Social Democrats receive the strongest support among the unaffiliated and the Catholics and smaller support from the two Protestant denominations. Differences in voting pattern according to denomination are large. When the voting pattern between the unaffiliated and the various denominations is compared, this is largest for the Rereformed (compared to unaffiliated). The PDI index for the strength of the denomination cleavage is based on three PDI for each of the denominations. These PDIs are 33, 51 and 62 for the Catholics, the main Protestant church and the Rereformed, respectively.

Finally, the denomination conflict in *Britain* is much less significant than in the three countries in Central Europe as can be seen from [Table 4.4A](#). The main differences are found for the Conservatives and Labour. The Conservative party receive stronger support from the Protestant Established Churches and smallest support from the Catholics, even smaller support than from the unaffiliated. For Labour this is opposite; support is strongest among the Catholics than among the unaffiliated, and smallest among the Protestants. According to the data, there are no significant differences in support for the Liberal party according to religious denominations. The British Green party receives strongest support from the unaffiliated group, but differences between the unaffiliated and affiliated with the various denominations is small.

## 4.5 THE CONFLICT IN THE COMMODITY MARKET: PARTY CHOICE AND URBAN–RURAL RESIDENCE

### 4.5.1 *Introduction*

The cleavage in the labour market is the central class cleavage, but not the only one according to Lipset and Rokkan. The other cleavage is the conflict in the commodity market between peasants and others, mainly the self-employed in the primary sector and those who want to buy products from the primary sector, particularly the urban population. This cleavage also sprang out of the Industrial Revolution. The peasants wanted to sell their wares at the best possible prices and to buy what they needed from the industrial and urban producers at low cost, while the urban population often had opposing economic interests (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 20–21).




This is, then, essentially an urban–rural conflict. Such conflicts did not invariably prove to be party-forming. They could be dealt with within broad party fronts or could be channelled through interest organisations into more narrow arenas of functional representation and bargaining. In many countries, the religious interests of the rural population were more influential than the strictly economic interests, and where the economic interest articulation took place within the Christian parties. Distinct Agrarian parties emerged only in some countries where strong cultural opposition had deepened and embittered the strictly economic conflicts (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 44–46).

The two class cleavages were not discussed in relation to each other in particular in Lipset and Rokkan’s work, but Rokkan developed a more elaborate model based on the two economic cleavages in an important work on the Norwegian cleavage structure (Rokkan 1966: 89–105). This model has been used in the other Nordic countries for understanding the major cleavages and economic divisions in the Nordic societies (Knutsen 2004c).

Rokkan’s model considered the functional economic conflicts as comprising three poles of electoral attraction. At each pole we find economic interests, issues, interest organisations and a major social class. These poles also comprise the major political parties strongly associated with economic interests and interest organisations. Between the three poles we find voters with “contradictory” economic and social positions, and – according to Rokkan – the decisive electoral struggles took place between these poles, and involved different political parties.

The “poles of electorate attractions” and the competition between the poles are shown in Fig. 4.1. In the text below the figure, I have indicated the various issues, peak interest organisations and parties located at the poles. The three economic interest groups are the labour unions and their peak organisation, the farmer’s organisations, and the business community and their peak organisations. The three party families which are located at the poles are the Social Democratic, the Agrarian and the Conservative Parties. The commodity market cleavage can be interpreted as various conflicts between the F-pole and the two other poles in the model. Both the Conservatives and the Social Democrats are then supposed to receive stronger support from the urban electorate, and it should be underscored that the Conservative parties in the Nordic countries – in contrast to what might be expected elsewhere in Western Europe – are expected to receive the strongest support from urban voters. Outside the Nordic countries the Liberal



**Pole L:** The workers and their unions  
 Issues/concerns: Wages, pensions, social security, welfare  
 Organisations: Trade unions and their union confederations  
 Parties: Labour/Social Democratic P.

**Pole F:** Farmers (and self-employed in other primary industries) and their organisations  
 Issues/concerns: Prices, subsidies, toll protection and restrictions on import of provisions/food  
 Organisation: Farmers' League  
 Parties: Agrarian/Centre Parties in Finland Norway and Sweden, Agrarian Liberals in Denmark, Progress Party in Iceland.

**Pole B:** Trade and industry/employers  
 Issues/concerns: Prices, taxes and fees, economic regulations  
 Organisations: Trade/employer associations and their confederations.  
 Parties: Conservative P., Independence P. in Iceland

**Fig. 4.1** Rokkan's model of electoral fronts for the Nordic countries: The functional-economic axis

Source: Rokkan (1966: 92-94, Figure 3-3)

parties, which frequently are located to the economic right both at the party and voter levels, have the same urban profile as the Conservative parties in the Nordic countries.

There are generally two aspects of the commodity market conflict: (a) How the class of farmers (and other self-employed in the primary sector) votes compared to other social classes, and (b) the differences in voting behaviour between the urban and rural populations. Here we focus upon the second aspect of the commodity cleavage, while the former will be examined when the class cleavage is analysed.

In addition to party choice which can be derived from different economic interests of the rural and urban populations, the population in the rural areas is generally more conservative and religious than the urban population, and vote for Christian and also Conservative parties. There is often a difference in character as well as size between rural areas and large cities. In rural areas, small communities have centuries of preindustrial history and have been least affected by industrialisation. “Traditional” values have a greater chance of survival in the countryside, even though some people may work in a modern environment (Knutsen 2004a: 132–133).

As to the urban–rural contrasts in voting behaviour, the conclusions of one of the authors’ eight-nation study based on trends from the early 1970s to the late 1990s were that the urban–rural cleavage is still of considerable importance in West European countries, although this has declined somewhat (Knutsen 2004a: chapter 4).

That study only included one country with an Agrarian party, Denmark, and with regard to party families, the Christian parties and then the Conservative parties received relatively strongest support from the rural population, while all the leftist party families, including the Greens,<sup>10</sup> received the strongest support from the rural population. The only non-leftist party family that on average received the strongest support from the urban population was the Liberals, but this pattern was neither very consistent nor strong. The pattern for the Radical Rightist parties was inconsistent and not very strong with an average log score close to zero (Knutsen 2004a: chapter 4).

#### 4.5.2 *Hypotheses*

Because of the presence of Agrarian and Christian parties with the strongest support among the rural population in the Nordic and Central Western countries, respectively, the correlations between party choice

and urban–rural residence will be largest in these regions, but the differences between the regions are not expected to be strong. Conservative parties in the other regions may also receive strong support from the rural population.

H1: The correlations between party choice and urban–rural residence are strongest in the Nordic and Central European countries.

H2a: The Christian parties, the Conservative parties outside the Nordic countries and the Agrarian parties in the Nordic countries are expected to receive the strongest support from the rural population.

H2b: Parties in all the leftist party families and the Liberal parties are expected to receive the strongest support from the urban population. The same applies to the Conservative parties in the Nordic countries.

H3. The main polarisation will be found between the Christian and Agrarian parties versus the Social Democrats which is the largest party family expected to receive stronger support from the urban voters.

### 4.5.3 *Empirical Analysis*

#### 4.5.3.1 *Comparative Strength*

For some purposes in the empirical analysis, those who live in towns with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants and those who live in towns with 50,000 inhabitants or more are compared. The PDI measure (and the lor measure in [Appendix Table 4.4](#)) is based on a comparison of these categories, while the eta and squared root of Nagelkerke's  $R^2$  is based on all categories where urban–rural residence is treated as a continuous variable.

[Table 4.5](#) shows the correlations between party choice and urban–rural residence. The correlations are, on average, strongest in the Nordic countries and Central European countries in accordance with H1. There are, however, considerable variations within the various regions, and the mean correlation are not very different.

#### 4.5.3.2 *Location of Party Families*

[Appendix Table 4.4](#) shows the mean PDI and lor scores for the party families based on the division of the urban–rural variable explained above for all countries and the various regions.

**Table 4.5** Party choice and urban–rural residence. Correlations

<i>Eta</i>		<i>PDI</i>		<i>Squared root of Nag R<sup>2</sup></i>	
Finland	0.290	Finland	26.2	Finland	0.285
Norway	0.267	Denmark	24.0	Norway	0.272
Austria	0.237	Switzerl.	23.9	Austria	0.243
Switzerl.	0.230	Germany	23.9	Switzerl.	0.230
Denmark	0.228	Netherl.	21.3	Denmark	0.226
Netherl.	0.214	Austria	20.8	Netherl.	0.214
Greece	0.209	Norway	19.3	Greece	0.214
Germany	0.208	Greece	17.3	Germany	0.212
France	0.203	France	17.1	France	0.205
Luxemb.	0.181	Luxemb.	16.8	Luxemb.	0.184
Britain	0.157	Belgium	16.6	Britain	0.152
Ireland	0.151	Ireland	16.0	Ireland	0.152
Sweden	0.145	Portugal	13.9	Sweden	0.145
Italy	0.142	Britain	13.3	Italy	0.145
Belgium	0.137	Spain	11.9	Belgium	0.138
Spain	0.135	Italy	10.3	Spain	0.138
Portugal	0.133	Sweden	9.4	Portugal	0.134
<b>Means</b>		<b>Means</b>		<b>Means</b>	
Nordic	0.232	Central West	20.5	Nordic	0.232
Central West	0.201	Nordic	19.7	Central	0.204
				West	
South	0.164	Islands	14.7	South	0.167
Islands	0.154	South	14.1	Islands	0.152
All	0.181	All	17.9	All	0.183

Data for Iceland is lacking

PDI is based on those who live in towns with less than 10,000 inhabitants and those who live in towns with 50,000 or more

According to the *Ior* scores, the Agrarian, Ethnic-Regional, Christian and Radical Rightist parties receive more support from the rural population, while the Greens, communist, Left Socialist and Liberal parties receive the strongest support from the population in the larger cities. The Social Democratic and Conservative parties have the lowest scores and receive consequently very similar support across the urban–rural division when the sizes of the parties and party families are taken into account.

As to variations between regions and countries, these patterns are fairly consistent for party families like the Greens, Left Socialists, Support for the Social Democrats is stronger in the urban areas in all regions apart from

the Nordic countries where there are small differences. Support for the Liberal parties is the strongest in the urban areas in all regions, but according to the Ior scores, this is strongest in the Nordic countries. Regional variations are large for the Conservative parties; they receive the strongest support from the rural areas in the Islands and in Southern Europe, but clearly, stronger support from the urban areas in the Nordic countries. The stronger rural support for the Radical Right is found in the Nordic and Central European countries, but somewhat surprisingly not in the South according to the data. The stronger rural support for Christian parties is found in all regions but is most pronounced in the Central region even when the sizes of the parties is taken into consideration. Finally, the Agrarian parties receive much stronger support from the rural areas in all the Nordic countries, but this tendency is considerably stronger in Finland and Norway than in Denmark, and particularly in Sweden. This contributes to explaining the differences in correlations between urban–rural residence and party choice in the Nordic countries.

The various components of H2a and H2b are generally confirmed. Regarding the parties that were expected to receive the strongest support from the rural voters (H2a), the Christian parties receive stronger support from the rural voters on average, also in all regions. The same applies to the Conservative parties outside the Nordic region. The Agrarian parties in the Nordic countries have an overwhelming rural support, while the Conservatives receive the strongest support from the urban voters in that region.

As to the parties that receive the strongest support from the urban population, hypothesis (H2b) is in generally confirmed. All the leftist party families and the Liberals on average receive the strongest support from the urban population. These patterns are also consistent across the various regions with two exceptions. There are small differences for the Social Democratic parties and the British Liberal party receive the strongest support from the rural population according to the data.

#### *4.5.3.3 Polarisation*

By examining the PDI scores for all countries and within the various regions, we get an impression of which party families receive the strongest support from the urban and rural population and contribute most to the correlations and polarisation. The general hypothesis (H3) about the party families is confirmed in the sense that it is the Agrarian and Christian parties which contribute most to the polarisation among the parties that receive the strongest support from the rural population,

while the pattern among the urban parties is more mixed. The Social Democrats, Greens and Left Socialists have fairly equal average PDI scores.

In the Nordic countries the Agrarian parties receive decisively strongest support from the rural population, while the Conservatives, and then Greens, Left Socialists and Liberals contribute to the polarisation among the urban parties

In the Central Western region, the Christian Democratic parties contribute most to the polarisation among the parties that receive the strongest support from the rural population, while the Social Democrats contribute most among the party families that receive the strongest support among the urban voters. On the Islands, the Conservative parties have a similar rural location as the Christian Democrats in Central Europe, and we find – as in Central Europe – the Social Democrats on the urban side.

In the countries in the Southern region, the correlations between urban–rural residence and party choice are fairly small in Italy, Portugal and Spain, and the patterns for the various party families inconsistent. In France and Greece, the Conservative parties receive significantly strongest support from the rural population. In France, the Social Democrats and the Liberals receive the strongest support from the urban population, while the same applies to the Left Socialists in Greece.

## 4.6 PARTY CHOICE AND EDUCATION

### 4.6.1 *Introduction*

There is an Old and a New version of the impact of education on party choice in the literature on value change and electoral behaviour, related to the conflict structure and opportunity structure in industrial and post-industrial society, respectively.

In the Old version, education was an important indicator of social class or social status, and the voting pattern of those with low and high education was expected to follow the pattern for the working class versus the new and (partly) the old middle classes. Those with lower education were expected to vote for the traditional parties of the left, primarily Social Democratic parties and Communist parties, while those with higher education voted for the parties that articulated class interests of the middle class and the bourgeoisie, in particular, liberal, and partly also Conservative parties. This version of how education has an impact on voting behaviour may be most relevant for the

older cohorts that grew up before World War II, and may become less important over time, but we still expect this pattern to be important.

The New version is inspired by changes in the political landscape in connection with the student protests and the changes in conflict structure of the advanced societies. One line of reasoning focuses on the fact that higher education reflects several things, including cognitive mobilisation, not only social class, and that these other aspects may have become more important over time (Inglehart 1977: 75–76). Characteristic of the New Politics version is the following:

- It reflects general cognitive development: the higher educated have developed certain skills, above all, skills in dealing with abstractions. These skills might enable them to cope more readily with new ideas and remote objects. They may be more open to new values and trends.
- It reflects informal communication patterns: the higher educated talk with different people, and live within communication networks that carry different messages from those received by the less educated. One might expect these influences to shape the values and orientations of the higher educated.
- Explicit development of attachment to certain political parties or political tendencies might also take place among the higher educated. This is partly a contextual effect which takes place when large numbers of young people are gathered together in university communities, relatively isolated from the larger society, but it may have some lasting effects on the political attachments of the higher educated strata.
- There might be generational differences in the cues that the higher educated receive from these environments because in particular the informal communication patterns and the development of party attachment might be different due to the different spirits of the time (“Zeitgeists”). Generational differences in the impact of education on party choice are, however, not tested here.

The New version discusses the new electoral orientation in connection with changes in political values and the conflict structure in advanced societies. Due to the factors outlined above, and because they have grown up in more economically secure environments, the higher educated strata will be more likely to have post-materialist or libertarian values, while people who are not exposed to the effects of higher education will have more traditional materialist and also authoritarian values (Inglehart 1977: 72–84, 1990: 162–168).



In terms of electoral behaviour, the new middle class and the better-educated strata are most likely to support “the post-material left”, that is, mainly Green and Left Socialist parties. And as post-materialist issues become more important, this may stimulate a materialist and authoritarian counter-reaction whereby economically and psychologically marginal segments of society, i.e. part of the working class and those with least education, side with conservative and Radical Rightist parties to reaffirm the traditional materialist emphasis on economic growth, military security, and law and order (Inglehart 1984: 28, 1997: 244–251).

Empirical research has documented that the Greens receive stronger support from the higher educated strata (Dolezal 2010: 544–547), while the Radical Rightist parties receive the strongest support from the lower educated strata. Education also seems to be the most important class variable for explaining support for the Radical Right (Stubager 2013).

To sum up, the electoral consequences of education expansion are, in general, somewhat uncertain. Higher levels of education prepare people for middle-class jobs, higher income and certain lifestyles. According to the Old version of the impact of education, education expansion should benefit those parties that have traditionally articulated the interests of the middle class and the higher educated strata, i.e. Liberal and Conservative parties of the established right. According to the theory of New Politics, the education expansion should lead to an increase of post-materialist and libertarian values, which will increase the support for Green and Left-Libertarian parties among the higher educated strata.

#### 4.6.2 *Hypotheses*

In the Central Western countries and the Nordic countries where the New Left and Radical Right generally have the strongest support, we can expect that the new version of the impact of education is strongest, and to a larger degree supplements the Old version.

H1: We expect that the impact of education to be strongest in the Central Western and Nordic regions.

According to the Old version, the higher educated strata will support the economic rightist parties, the liberal and Conservative parties while the lower educated strata will support the Social Democrats the (old) Communist parties and probably also the Agrarian parties. According to the New version,

the higher educated strata will support the Greens and the Left Socialists, while the lower educated strata will support the Radical Rightist parties.

H2: The Conservative, Liberal, Green and Left Socialist parties will receive the strongest support from the higher educated strata (H2a) while the Social Democrats, communist, Agrarian and Radical Rightist parties will receive stronger support from the lower educated strata (H2b). Of the larger party families, the Christian parties are expected to be less influenced by education (H2c). These parties are “catch all” parties which are anchored in other social cleavages than education and social class.

As to polarisation, we expect the larger parties within the old version to contribute most since they have larger support than the New Politics parties in most countries.

H3: We expect that Conservative and Liberal parties versus the Social Democrats will contribute most to polarisation between the higher and lower educated strata, respectively.

### 4.6.3 *Empirical Analysis*

#### 4.6.3.1 *Comparative Strength*

Results based on the seven-category variable are used in the analyses below. As to the PDI and lor measures, the seven category education variable is collapsed to a three category variable by differentiating between (1) primary and lower secondary education, (2) upper secondary education and (3) tertiary education. The PDI and lor are based on a comparison of the lowest and the highest education levels based on this three-category variable.<sup>11</sup> The other measures are based on all categories of the education variable and education is treated as a continuous variable.

The differences in support according to the PDI and lor measures for education level are then calculated by comparing party support among those with the lowest education and those with the highest education on this three-fold variable. The patterns reported below are very similar to other ways of analysing the relationship, for example, by using the average education level based on the age of the respondent when completing education.

Table 4.6 shows the strength of the correlations between party choice and education in the 18 countries according to different measures.

**Table 4.6** Party choice and education: Correlations

<i>Eta</i>		<i>PDI</i>		<i>Squared root of Nag R<sup>2</sup></i>	
Belgium	0.296	Sweden	39.4	Denmark	0.356
Sweden	0.290	Austria	32.2	Sweden	0.293
Greece	0.285	Greece	30.2	Belgium	0.293
Denmark	0.278	Switzerl.	29.1	Greece	0.290
Netherl.	0.271	Norway	27.4	Norway	0.274
Norway	0.270	Denmark	27.0	Netherl.	0.274
Austria	0.259	Belgium	26.3	Austria	0.261
Finland	0.226	Finland	24.7	Switzerl.	0.226
Switzerl.	0.226	Netherl.	20.8	France	0.221
France	0.220	France	20.7	Finland	0.219
Portugal	0.212	Luxemb.	20.6	Britain	0.212
Britain	0.205	Italy	17.9	Portugal	0.202
Luxemb.	0.195	Britain	16.0	Luxemb.	0.195
Ireland	0.186	Ireland	15.8	Ireland	0.187
Germany	0.160	Germany	14.3	Germany	0.167
Italy	0.159	Spain	12.8	Italy	0.158
Spain	0.146	Iceland	12.7	Spain	0.148
Iceland	0.141	Portugal	10.2	Iceland	0.141
<b>Means</b>		<b>Means</b>		<b>Means</b>	
Nordic	0.241	Nordic	26.3	Nordic	0.257
Central West	0.234	Central West	23.9	Central West	0.236
South	0.204	South	18.4	South	0.204
Islands	0.196	Islands	15.9	Islands	0.200
All	0.224	All	22.1	All	0.229

PDI is based on those who have tertiary education (categories 5 and 6 on the originally education variable) and those who have primary and lower secondary education (categories 0,1 and 2 on the original education variable)

H1 is supported since the average correlations are largest in the Nordic countries and the Central Western region. The differences between the regions are not large, but there are large variations within the various regions. Four of the five Nordic countries, for example, are found among the 10 countries with the highest correlations, while the correlation is lowest in Iceland.

#### 4.6.3.2 Location of Party Families

Appendix Table 4.5 shows the average differences in support according to party families based on PDI and lor support for all countries and for the various regions.

It is the Green and the Liberal parties that tend to have the clearest education differences in party support among those party families that receive the strongest support among the higher educated strata, followed by the Left Socialists and then the Conservative parties according to the  $\lambda$  scores, while the Radical Right, Agrarian, Social Democrats and Ethnic-Regional are the party families that receive the strongest support among those with less education compared to those with tertiary education. The differences are clearly largest for the Radical Right and then Agrarian parties, and then the Social Democrats. The smallest education differences are found for the Communists and the Christian parties.

The various elements of H2 are mainly supported, but the  $\lambda$  scores for the Conservatives are small, and for the Communists, the  $\lambda$  score is close to zero.

#### 4.6.3.3 *Polarisation*

As for polarisation, according to education, the party families that contribute most are the Greens and the Liberals versus the Social democrats, the Radical Right and the Agrarians. H3 is partly confirmed, but in particular, the large contribution for the Greens and the Radical Right and the small contribution for the Conservative parties are not in accordance with the hypothesis.

To sum up: The Old and New versions of the impact of education on party choice are to a large extent confirmed. The Old version is related to the Liberals, Agrarian and Social Democrats, while the New version is related to the Greens, Left Socialists and Radical Right.

In the *Nordic countries*, the Conservative parties should be added to the Liberals and the Greens regarding significantly stronger support among those with higher education. These parties are the main parties expressing the economic rightist issues and values in these countries. The Radical Right is ahead of the Social Democrats by receiving even more differentiated educational support. The Agrarian parties also have significantly stronger support among the lower educated strata, even more different than the Social Democrats when the various sizes of the parties are taken into consideration.

The tendencies for relatively strong differences in support from the lower and higher educated strata are fairly similar across the Nordic regions for the Greens, Liberals and Agrarian parties. The same applies to the Conservatives apart from the Icelandic party where there is no significant difference in support according to education. There are fairly strong educational differences regarding support for the Left Socialist parties in Denmark, Iceland

and Norway. These parties receive stronger support from the higher educated strata, while no such differences are found for the Finnish and Swedish parties. As to the Social Democrats, the average covers large differences, from 28 percentage points in Sweden, 13 in Finland, 8 in Denmark to no significant differences in Iceland and Norway. The tendency for the Radical Rightist parties to receive stronger support from the lower educated strata is much lower in Finland than in Denmark and Norway.

In the *Central region*, we find much of the same pattern. The differences are largest for the Greens, the Liberals and the single Ethnic-Regional party – the New Flemish Alliance. The Social Democrats and Radical Right also in this region receive stronger support from the least education strata. This also applies to the Christian parties but to a smaller degree.

The pattern for the Liberals is consistent across the countries; the same applies to the Greens with one exception: the educational differences for the German Greens are much smaller than in the other countries.

Among the party families that receive the strongest support from the lower educated strata, there are some significant differences. The tendency for the Christian parties is strongest in the Netherlands, but not significant in Germany or Luxembourg, placing the support for the parties in Austria, Belgium and Switzerland (4–6 percentage points) close to the average for the party family within the region. As to the Social Democrats, there are two groups according to educational differences in support: one group with considerable differences (Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg) and one group with small differences (Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland). Finally, with regard to the Radical Right, the educational differences are largest in Switzerland, Belgium and Germany and much lower in the other three countries in the region. In Austria, there is no significant difference in support between the lowest and the highest education levels (9–10%), while support is much higher among those in the intermediate category (upper secondary level, 24%).

In *Ireland*, we find a different pattern than in the Central West regarding the Christian party. The Greens and the Christian Fine Gael receive stronger support from the higher educated strata, while the Conservative Fianna Fáil and the leftist Sinn Féin receive the strongest support from the lower educated strata. In *Britain*, it is first and foremost the Liberals and then the Greens who receive the strongest support from the higher educated strata, while the opposite is the case for the Social Democrats. There are small educational differences in support for the Conservatives.

In Southern Europe, the Left Socialists are added to the Liberals and the Greens among the parties that receive stronger support from the higher educated strata, while the Conservative and Social Democrats receive stronger support from the lower educated strata. The same applies to the Ethnic-Regional parties. The latter pattern is caused by a strong tendency for the Italian Lega Nord to receive stronger support from the lower educated strata, while there is no significant difference in support among the educational groups for the Spanish regional parties. The pattern for the Greens is consistent for the two relevant parties. There are also only two Liberal parties in this region, and the education difference is stronger for the French party than for the Portuguese Liberal party.

The tendency for the Left Socialist parties to receive the strongest support from the higher educated strata is found in all countries in the region, apart from France, and is strongest in Greece. Five percent of those with lower education support the party compared to 20% of those with the highest education level. The average pattern for the Conservatives to receive the strongest support from the lower educated strata is first and foremost found in Greece (20 percentage points) and Italy (8 percentage points). The moderate average education differences in support for the Social Democrats in the region covers some significant differences. These differences are largest in Spain, more moderate in France, Greece and Portugal, while the Social Democrats in Italy receive some stronger support among those with higher education.

As to the Conservative parties, there are large differences between the regions. Although there are significant variations within the regions, the Conservatives in the Nordic countries receive significantly stronger support from the higher educated strata, while the opposite is the case on the Islands (Ireland) and in the Southern region.

#### 4.7 PARTY CHOICE AND SOCIAL CLASS

The social class represents the classic structural cleavage in industrial society. In Lipset and Rokkan's seminal work on the formation of social cleavages in Western democracies, the class cleavage was first and foremost a cleavage in the labour market between owners and employers on the one side and tenants, labourers and workers on the other. It sprang out of the Industrial Revolution and proved much more uniformly divisive than the other major cleavages they focused upon (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 14, 21, 35). The rising masses of workers resented their working conditions and the

insecurity of their contracts. The result was the formation of a variety of labour unions and the development of nation-wide socialist parties. The fact that the labour market cleavage was so uniformly divisive in a comparative setting implied that it tended to bring the party systems closer to each other in their basic structure. While conflicts and compromises along the other cleavages, especially the centre-periphery and the state-church cleavage lines, tended to generate national developments of the party systems in divergent directions, the owner-worker cleavages moved the party system in the opposite direction. "...the owner-worker cleavage tended to bring the party system *closer to each other* in their basic structure" (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 35). In this respect, Rokkan and Lipset focused mostly on the parties of the left, neglecting to some degree to focus in detail on the parties that represented the interests of the owners and employers in a comparative context (Steed and Humphreys 1988: 400-402). The Russian Revolution, however, also brought about a more divisive party structure among parties that articulated the interests of the workers. In some countries, significant Communist parties emerged which created a split among the socialist parties, while the Communists became an insignificant force in other countries (Bartolini 2000: 86-120, chapter 9; Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 46-50).

The impact of the class variables on party choice in advanced industrial democracies are complex due to the fact that both Old and New Politics influence the way different status groups vote. The expectations about the relationship between party choice and social class are to a large degree equivalent to what we expected for the relationship between party choice and education when the higher educated strata is replaced with the service class, and the lower educated strata is replaced with the working class.

*According to the Old Politics, the working class voted for the traditional parties of the left, primarily Social Democratic parties and Communist parties, while those with higher education voted for the parties that articulated the class interests of the higher service class in particular, and voted for Liberal and also Conservative parties.*

The New Politics version frames the new electoral orientation in connection with changes in political values and the conflict structure in advanced societies. The service class is more likely to have post-materialist or libertarian values, while the working class will have more traditional materialist and also authoritarian values (Inglehart 1977: 72-84, 1990: 162-168; Knutsen 2004a: chapter 5).

In terms of electoral behaviour, the service class is expected to be most likely to support “the post-material left”, mainly the Green and Left Socialist parties. As post-materialist issues become more important, this may stimulate a materialist and authoritarian counter-reaction whereby part of the working-class side with Conservative and Radical Rightist parties to reaffirm the traditional materialist emphasis on economic growth, military security, and law and order (Inglehart 1984: 28, 1997: 244–251; Kitschelt 1994, 1995).

There are several ways of studying class voting. One can distinguish between various generations of class voting, most commonly three such generations (Knutsen 2006a, 2007; Nieuwbeerta 1995). Below, I briefly review these generations and how class voting has been measured according to the various generations:

- 1) “Traditional (left–right) class voting” examines the left–right division of parties and incorporates only two social classes (the manual/non-manual division). Traditional class voting has been measured by the Alford index which is based on a percentage difference measure, or more recently the Thomsen index which is based on log-odds ratios.
- 2) “Overall or total left–right class voting” examines the left–right voting of all social classes. This type of class voting has been tapped by the kappa index (see Chapter 1.7 above).
- 3) “Total class voting” considers class differences (based on a detailed class schema) in voting between all the parties in the party system. Total class voting can be measured by Cramer’s V coefficient which is – as shown above – a standardised correlation coefficient for analysing the relationship between two nominal-level variables, and the squared root of Nagelkerke’s  $R^2$ .

Some scholars have argued that in advanced industrial democracies, it is important to study class voting by employing more than two classes, and also by analysing all parties as separate categories in accordance with New Politics theory. There is some evidence that social cleavages, and the class cleavage, in particular, cuts across the left–right division of parties. The New Left parties receive stronger support from the higher educated strata and the new middle class, while the New Right parties receive the strongest support from the less educated and the manual workers. Therefore, newer research on class voting should consider all parties as separate categories (see Knutsen 2006a) Here we focus only on total class voting.



### 4.7.1 *Hypotheses*

Historically speaking, class voting has been most important in the Nordic countries, contrary to what one might think given the relatively low economic inequality in these countries (Rose 1974: 3–24, Oskarson 2005; Bengtsson et al. 2013: 693). While some studies indicate that the steepest decline in class voting has been observed in countries where it used to be highest, converging at a low level (e.g. Knutsen 2006a: 183), there are reasons to believe that it is still strongest in the Nordic countries. It is harder to hypothesise about the other regions, although older studies have found that class voting is second highest in Britain and finally lowest in Continental Europe (Knutsen 2001: 324).

H1: Class voting will be highest in the Nordic countries.

We start with the party families that are likely to be least class-based. The Ethnic-Regional parties are likely to have a foundation in certain classes, depending on the interests and make-up of the separatist movements. However, since the latter differs from country to country, the individual parties within the different countries may mobilise very different groups.

The Christian Democratic parties have a distinct cross-class appeal, and are thus, not expected to have a strong class basis (Von Beyme 1985: 93, Kalyvas and Kersbergen 2010: 187, Knutsen 2006a: 55–56).

H2a: Total class voting will be smallest for the Christian Democratic party family. It will also be small for Ethnic-Regional parties, at least when requiring the party families to have support in the *same* social classes.<sup>12</sup>

We now move on to the clearest class party family of all: The Agrarian parties. These parties were, as mentioned above, founded as interest parties for the farmers and the rural population.

H2b: Total class voting will be highest for the Agrarian parties. Since this will be due to their high popularity among farmers and the petite bourgeoisie, their kappa based on only five classes will not be high.

The Communist, Liberal and Social Democratic parties are traditionally conceived as important class parties, given their emphasis on economic issues. The Conservative parties may be added to this list after their turn

towards neoliberal economic policies since the 1970s. The Communists and Social Democrats are both located towards the leftist end of the left–right economic axis, and consequently appeal to workers’ economic interests (for an overview of the different classes’ economic interests, see Goldthorpe and McKnight 2006). Still, the Social Democrats are much more moderate, and will probably to a lesser degree alienate the service classes – in particular after their turn towards the centre during the 1990s.

H2c: The Communists and the Social Democrats will have a working-class profile, although this will be markedly clearer for the Communists.

The Liberals and Conservatives both espouse right-wing economic values which might attract voters from the service class and the petite bourgeoisie. However, we believe the Conservative parties to appeal to authoritarian values to a larger degree than the Liberal parties although there is considerable intra-family variation here, especially in the latter group. We thus expect the Liberals to have the strongest class basis of these two, as both their economic policies and values are in line with those of the service classes, contrary to the Conservatives whose values are more in line with the workers when it comes to issues such as immigration or a focus on law and order.

H2d: The Liberals and Conservatives will have their basis in the petite bourgeoisie and the service classes, and this will be clearest for the Liberals.

Finally, we have the New Politics parties. The post-materialist Left Socialist and Green parties are both located at the extreme libertarian end of the libertarian–authoritarian axis (Kitschelt 1994, 1995), which means that they are likely to alienate workers, farmers, and the petite bourgeoisie, while attracting the service classes. They are also generally leftist in economic policies, which is likely to reduce support from the higher-level service class and the petite bourgeoisie – in particular for the Left Socialists, who are further to the left than the Green parties and probably emphasise their materialist policies to a higher degree than the Greens. The Radical Right parties are located at the extreme authoritarian end and are thus expected to have the opposite class basis of the Left Socialist and Green parties. Given the extreme outlook of these parties in matters of relevance to the classes and former findings about their clear class bases (Dolezal 2010; Oesch 2013), we hypothesise that their class bases will be strong.

H2e: The Left Socialist and Green parties will have a strong foundation in the service classes, and this will be clearest for the Green parties.

H2f: The Radical Right parties will have a strong foundation in the working classes and the petite bourgeoisie.

When it comes to polarisation, no one single hypothesis can be made because of the multidimensionality of the class conflict. The Old Politics class politics polarises the dominant Old Left party family – the Social Democrats – versus the Old Right – the Liberal and Conservative parties due to their articulation of highly different economic interests. The New Politics class polarisation induces a polarisation between first and foremost the Greens, and probably also the Left Socialists with a service class base, versus the Radical Right with a working class base due to their articulation of highly different values.

H3a: The Social Democrats and the Liberals and the Conservatives will contribute to polarisation.

H3b: The New Left parties (Left Socialist and Green) and the New Right will contribute to polarisation.

## 4.7.2 *Empirical Analysis*

### 4.7.2.1 *Comparative Strength*

Table 4.7 shows the Cramer's V and the square root of Nagelkerke's  $R^2$  correlations based on all parties and all social classes. As hypothesised in H1, total class voting is – according to both correlation coefficients – largest in the Nordic countries. It is second highest in the Central Western countries and smaller on the Islands and in the Southern region. Regardless of the measure used, total class voting is largest in Finland, Norway and Sweden.

Table 4.8 shows the average support for the various party families within the various social classes and the kappa coefficients for the various party families. Four kappa coefficients are shown based on two divisions.

The kappa coefficients treat each class equally, independent of the size of the class. Due to the small number of respondents in the petite bourgeoisie and farmers classes, it might be argued that it is not reasonable to assign the same weight to these social classes as to the others. There are also larger confidence intervals in the figures for party support

**Table 4.7** Correlations between party choice and social class

<i>A Cramer's V</i>		<i>B. Squared root of Nag R<sup>2</sup></i>					
		<i>Countries ranked</i>				<i>Countries ranked</i>	
Denmark	0.166	Finland	0.213	Denmark	0.404	Finland	0.495
Finland	0.213	Norway	0.206	Finland	0.495	Sweden	0.442
Iceland	0.142	Sweden	0.206	Iceland	0.313	Norway	0.435
Norway	0.206	Portugal	0.190	Norway	0.435	Belgium	0.434
Sweden	0.206	Belgium	0.186	Sweden	0.442	Denmark	0.404
		Netherl.	0.176			Netherl.	0.404
Austria	0.160	Denmark	0.166	Austria	0.390	Austria	0.390
Belgium	0.186	Austria	0.160	Belgium	0.434	Portugal	0.382
Germany	0.114	Ireland	0.149	Germany	0.276	Ireland	0.369
Luxemb.	0.139	France	0.148	Luxemb.	0.338	France	0.361
Netherl.	0.176	Italy	0.144	Netherl.	0.404	Italy	0.354
Switzerl.	0.135	Iceland	0.142	Switzerl.	0.352	Switzerl.	0.352
		Greece	0.141			Luxemb.	0.338
Britain	0.136	Luxemb.	0.139	Britain	0.303	Spain	0.318
Ireland	0.149	Britain	0.136	Ireland	0.369	Iceland	0.313
		Switzerl.	0.135			Greece	0.313
France	0.148	Spain	0.124	France	0.361	Britain	0.303
Greece	0.141	Germany	0.114	Greece	0.313	Germany	0.276
Italy	0.144			Italy	0.354		
Portugal	0.190			Portugal	0.382		
Spain	0.124			Spain	0.318		
<b>Means</b>		<b>Means</b>		<b>Means</b>		<b>Means</b>	
Nordic	0.187	Nordic	0.187	Nordic	0.418	Nordic	0.418
Central	0.152	Central	0.152	Central West	0.365	Central	0.365
West		West				West	
Islands	0.143	South	0.149	Islands	0.336	South	0.345
South	0.149	Islands	0.143	South	0.345	Islands	0.336
All	0.160	All	0.160	All	0.371	All	0.371

for these social classes, and the kappa coefficients then become less stable. Therefore, kappa coefficients are calculated based on the five major classes omitting the petite bourgeoisie and farmers classes (kappa 5) in addition to the kappa coefficients for all seven classes (kappa 7).

Kappa coefficients for the party families can also be calculated in two ways; as averages of the kappa for the various parties within the party families, or based on the average support within the party family (Table 4.8 A). The first alternative maximises the variation in support

within the party family without taking into account that the parties may have *different* class bases. If one party within a given party family receives the strongest support from the service class, while the opposite occurs for another party within the same party family, a high kappa value for that party family might be found. The other alternative is based on average class support. The logic for this way of calculating kappa is that the various party families have specific class supports. In the example above, the kappa value would be considerably lower. The latter coefficients are probably most relevant for the research question here.

#### 4.7.2.2 Location of Party Families

Table 4.8 shows the average support for the various party families within the different social classes (A).<sup>13</sup> We then report on the kappa coefficients based on the averages for the various parties within the party families (B), but will emphasise the second alternative mostly in the analysis (C). We first report on the kappa coefficients from Tables B and C and then discuss the pattern of class support for the various party families in greater detail.

**Table 4.8** Average support for the part families within the various social classes and kappa values for the various party families

<i>A. Average support for the various party families</i>								
	<i>Hi serv.</i>	<i>Lo serv.</i>	<i>Rout. non man.</i>	<i>Petite bourg.</i>	<i>Skilled work.</i>	<i>Unskilled work.</i>	<i>Farmers</i>	<i>Total</i>
Communists	4.3	4.1	4.5	3.0	6.1	4.9	1.7	4.3
Left soc.	8.8	11.2	10.6	4.9	9.6	10.1	3.5	9.4
Social dem.	20.8	23.8	28.8	19.3	32.0	33.9	13.3	26.9
Greens	10.6	14.4	12.0	6.7	6.1	7.1	2.4	10.5
Ethnic/ regional	4.5	5.2	6.2	5.1	3.4	5.9	5.3	5.2
Agrarian	11.4	12.3	11.8	23.2	11.3	14.1	52.4	13.6
Liberals	17.3	13.2	12.0	15.7	10.2	9.6	8.0	13.0
Christian	18.7	17.8	18.1	16.8	14.1	16.3	36.9	17.6
Conservatives	34.9	24.8	21.5	30.1	20.8	18.0	31.2	25.1
Radical right	6.1	7.2	9.0	14.3	15.4	12.4	8.4	9.3

*B. Kappas based on averages for individual parties within the various party families**Ranking of the party families according to the kappas*

	<i>Kappa 7</i>		<i>Kappa 5</i>
Agrarian	0.692	Radical right	0.525
Radical right	0.615	Ethnic/regional	0.481
Ethnic/regional	0.513	Liberals	0.462
Left soc.	0.511	Greens	0.447
Liberals	0.505	Left soc.	0.435
Greens	0.478	Communists	0.427
Communists	0.433	Conservatives	0.375
Social dem.	0.425	Agrarian	0.338
Conservatives	0.387	Social dem.	0.273
Christian	0.366	Christian	0.245
Mean	0.493	Mean	0.401

*C. Kappas based on the average support for the various party families (based on Table A)**Ranking of the party families according to the kappas*

	<i>Kappa 7</i>		<i>Kappa 5</i>
Greens	0.551	Radical right	0.341
Agrarian	0.529	Greens	0.323
Left soc.	0.415	Conservatives	0.226
Communists	0.380	Ethnic/regional	0.218
Radical right	0.328	Liberals	0.209
Social dem.	0.306	Social dem.	0.183
Christian	0.287	Communists	0.145
Liberals	0.255	Christian	0.101
Conservatives	0.227	Left soc.	0.086
Ethnic/regional	0.187	Agrarian	0.080
Mean	0.346	Mean	0.191

For Table B and C:

Kappa 7 is based on all seven social classes, while kappa 5 is based on the five major numerical classes omitting the petite bourgeoisie and the farmers.

When all classes are examined, the average kappa coefficients from the various parties within given party families (Table 4.8B), yields the highest total class voting for the Agrarian parties, as hypothesised in H2b. The Radical Right parties are the second most class-based. There is then an important gap to the next group of party families: the Ethnic-Regional, Left Socialist and Liberal parties. Class voting is smallest for the Conservative and Christian party families, the latter in accordance with hypothesis H2a. Based on the five major classes, kappa is largest for the Radical Right parties, then the Ethnic-Regional, Liberals and Greens. The lowest kappa values are found for the Social Democrats and the Christian parties. The much lower placement of the Agrarian parties is the result of the fact that the farmer class is excluded from the calculation of the kappa based on the five major social classes. This was expected following H2b.

As to the kappa coefficients based on the average support from Table 4.8A, we get a somewhat different picture (Table 4.8C). First, we note that the kappa coefficients are significantly lower compared to the calculations based on the first alternative. This is expected given the extra requirement of all parties in a party family having the *same* class basis.

Based on all social classes, variation in support is largest for the Greens and the Agrarian parties, and smallest for the Ethnic-Regional, Conservative and Liberal party families. The much lower placement of the Ethnic-Regional parties follows the logic of hypothesis H2a. These parties are class-based, but their social base varies in different countries. Based on the five major classes, differences in support is largest for the Radical Right and Greens and smallest for the Agrarian, Left Socialist and Christian parties.

#### 4.7.3 *The Class Bases for the Various Party Families: Comparative Variations*

Below, we examine the variation in class support for the various party families. We start with the average support based on Table 4.8A, and then discuss in some detail regional variations including variations between parties in the same party family within the various regions. We have, however, not included the detailed tables upon which these regional and country variations are based on due to lack of space. Discussion of the kappa values for the various party families is based on the data from Table 4.8C.

*The Communist parties* have a moderate kappa value based on the calculation for all parties and a small kappa based on the five major social classes.

In line with H2c, the Communist parties receive the strongest support from the skilled workers and then fairly even support from the other major classes according to the average figures. Support is smaller from the farmers and the petite bourgeoisie. In the Southern region, with significant Communist parties in four countries, the same pattern is found according to the average scores, but class support varies considerably for the various parties. In France and Italy support is largest among the two working-class groups and the routine non-manuals, but this does not apply to Greece and Portugal where support is fairly even among the various classes.

*The Left Socialist parties* have relatively large kappa coefficients based on the calculation for all social classes and the second smallest for the five major classes calculated for the average support (Table 4.8C). Support is small from the farmers and the petite bourgeoisie, and fairly even at a higher level among the other social classes. The relatively strong support from the service classes illustrates the impact of New Politics and the mobilisation of higher educated and service class voters for these parties as hypothesised in H2e. There are, however, two parties that have much stronger support from the working classes than from the other classes, namely the Finnish Left Alliance and the Irish Sinn Fein. These parties have the highest kappa 5 values within this party family, while the opposite is the case for the Norwegian, the Greek and Portuguese Left Bloc, which receive the strongest support from the service class. It should be noted, however, that the Finnish Left Alliance is a former Communist party that has struggled to establish itself as a fully reformed New Politics party, is also facing competition from the Greens for the service class vote (Ziliacus 2001).

*The Social Democratic parties* have traditionally been class parties *per se*. According to the average kappa coefficients, there are relatively moderate class differences in support for these parties compared to other party families. Average support follows, however, a typical pattern for a working-class party, following H2c. Support is largest among the two working-class categories, then the routine non-manuals, the lower and the higher level of the service class, the petite bourgeoisie and the farmers. This pattern is fairly consistent within the four regions. The highest kappa values are found in the Nordic countries and are mainly the result of the small support from the petite bourgeoisie and the farmers in the Nordic countries. The kappa value based



on the five major classes is much smaller and not higher than in the Central Western region or on the Islands.

Although there are small differences in the regional average kappa coefficients based on the five major classes, there are large variations between countries. A major component in the variations across countries is the difference in support from workers relative to the service class. The differences are outstanding in Sweden where the Social Democrats mobilise nearly half (48%) of the workers, but only 17% of the service class. In the Spanish case, the PSOE mobilise 55% of the workers as opposed to 33% of the service class. The cross-national differences in support from workers versus service class are remarkable and a major explanation for the variation in kappa 5 and, of course, of traditional class voting where the Social Democrats comprise a dominant component of the leftist parties.

Previous research has shown that *Green parties* receive the strongest support from the service class. According to the kappa coefficients in [Table 4.8C](#), Green parties have the highest and second highest kappa values. Support is strongest among the lower-level service class, then the routine non-manuals and the higher-level service class, and smallest among the farmers, placing the working class and the petite bourgeoisie in a middle position. These patterns are fairly consistent across regions and countries and are in strong support of H2e. A specific pattern in the Nordic countries is the high support from unskilled workers which applies both to the Finnish and Swedish parties.

The differences in support for the various classes with significant differences in support from the service class and routine non-manuals versus the workers is consistently found in the Central Western countries which have some of the largest Green parties in the data material. The French Greens seem to be an outlier in this respect: Support is fairly even among all the major classes.

As to the *Ethnic-Regional parties* the kappa values based on the seven classes is low, while relatively higher based on the five major classes. The average support is, however, within the range of 3% to -6% for all classes. There are some interesting variations between the parties. The Belgian New Flemish Alliance has a typical class profile with strongest support among the service class and lowest support among the workers, while Lega Nord in Italy has the lowest support among the service class and fairly even support among the other classes. H2a is then, only supported for the analysis based on the five major classes, not for the analysis based on seven classes.

The *Agrarian parties* are clearly class parties with strong support from the farmers. As the kappa coefficients based on the five major classes indicate, there are small differences between the other classes. Support is, however, second strongest among the petite bourgeoisie. Hypothesis H2a receives strong support from the data. The slightly higher support among the unskilled workers than the remaining classes might be caused by the fact that farm labourers are grouped in this class (Langsæther 2014: 37–39).

There are, however, interesting variations between the countries. The kappa coefficients based on all seven classes for Denmark and Iceland are much lower than for the other countries. For Denmark, this is the result of the high support for the other classes, while for Iceland it is caused by the lower support from the farmer class (26% compared to 45–71% for the other Agrarian parties).

The Danish party is an interesting case because the party has developed from a typical agrarian party to a major bourgeois party which enjoys considerable support in all social classes. The Icelandic party competes with the Conservative Independence Party which also has a significant portion of the farmers' vote. The Icelandic Progress Party is also popular in the other classes apart from the higher-level service class.

The Norwegian and Swedish Agrarian Centre parties are the most typical class parties in the party family with large support from the farmers and small support from the other classes. The Finnish party is in a middle position with high support from the farmers and somewhat stronger support from the other classes than in Norway and Sweden.

The *Liberal party family* has relatively low kappa values based on the seven-class variable and fairly average kappa based on the five class variable. Support is highest among the higher-level service class and the petite bourgeoisie and smallest among workers and farmers, in line with H2d.

Class differences are strongest for the Nordic parties, followed by the Central Western parties. In the Nordic region, support for the Liberal parties is highest among the service classes, followed by the routine non-manual. In the Central Western region, where six of the twelve Liberal parties are based, support is highest among the petite bourgeoisie and then the two service classes. Support from the other classes is fairly similar and relatively higher than for the Liberal parties in the Nordic region.

Support for the British Liberal Democrats is highest among the higher service class, but also significant among the other major classes. Support from farmers and the petite bourgeoisie is low. Support for the French minor Liberal parties is limited to the service class and the routine non-manual, while the Portuguese party is a deviate case. The kappa value is low, but support is highest among workers and lowest among the service class.

The *Christian Democrats* are catch-all parties. As hypothesised in H2a, total class voting is indeed lowest for this party family, based on the average kappa coefficients of the parties. The reduction from the seven to the five-class variable is substantial, and the kappa based on the five-class variable is low. As expected, support is much higher among the farmers than among the other classes. There are only small differences in support for these parties among the other classes.

Class differences in support are largest in the Nordic regions. These parties are small and receive stronger support from the routine non-manuals and the service class. The Norwegian party, which is the largest of these parties, attracts 12% of the routine non-manual class, while only 1% to 5% of the other classes vote for this party. Unlike their continental counterparts, the Nordic parties do not attract farmers, probably due to the presence of the Agrarian parties.

In the Central Western region – with six of the eleven Christian parties – more than sixty percent of the farmers vote for the Christian Democratic party, while only 20–26% of the other classes do the same. This pattern is fairly consistent throughout the region, but support from the service class is higher than from the workers in Austria and Luxembourg. Support from the farmers is 70–75% in Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, 53% in Germany and only 17% in Switzerland where the Christian party competes with the Radical Right Swiss People's Party for the farmers' vote.

The Irish Fine Gael receives fairly even support among the various classes. Support is highest among the farmers, followed by the petite bourgeoisie and the service class and routine non-manual. Support is somewhat smaller among the worker categories. One reason for support among farmers is not impressive is that Fine Gael competes with the conservative Fianna Fáil on the farmers' vote (see below). Finally, the Italian Union of the Centre is most popular among the service and routine non-manual classes, and least popular among the farmers. It represents a deviant case (together with the Nordic parties) regarding the small support from the farmers.

Total class voting is relatively low for the *Conservative party family*, although slightly higher when using the kappa 5 measure. Support is highest among the higher service class, the petite bourgeoisie and the farmers, and lowest among the worker categories and the routine non-manuals, as expected (see H2d).

Class voting for the Conservatives is highest in the Nordic countries. In this region, the Conservative parties are most popular with the service classes and the petite bourgeoisie, while being least popular with workers and the routine non-manual class. This type of class voting is strongest in Finland, followed by Norway and Sweden and then Denmark. The Icelandic Independence Party represents a deviation. Support is largest among the petite bourgeoisie, the farmers and the higher-level service class, but support is also relatively high among the other classes. The kappa value for the Icelandic Conservative party is then significantly lower than for the other Conservative parties in the region.

The British and Irish Conservative parties have low kappa values and fairly equal support from the various social classes. The British party receives significantly smaller support from the unskilled workers (22%) than from the other classes (36–47%), while Fianna Fáil receives impressive equal support from all the social classes.

A common trait for the Conservative parties in Southern Europe is the strong support from farmers, which might be caused by the absence of both Agrarian and Christian Democratic parties. This is most pronounced in France, Greece and Spain. In the two latter countries, more than 50% of farmers support the Conservatives. Support is much larger among the service class than among the workers in France and Spain, while the Greece New Democracy and the Italian People of Freedom parties have much more even support from the various classes.

*The Radical Right parties* have a close to average kappa value based on the seven-class variable, and the highest kappa value based on the five-class variable. According to the average support for the parties within this party family, support is highest among the two worker categories and the petite bourgeoisie, as hypothesised in H2f, and significantly lower among the other classes. This pattern is fairly consistent across the various regions and countries. The Austrian Radical Right party, however, seems to have more even support from the various social classes with nearly as high support among the routine non-manuals and the lower-level service class as among the worker categories.

#### 4.7.3.1 *Polarisation*

It is difficult to study polarisation as defined here given that the social class variable is (partly) at the nominal level. Here, we focus on the two largest classes, the service and the working class. The two levels within these main classes are collapsed, and the differences (PDI) in support for the various party families from these classes are calculated. The main test is based on the averages for all 18 countries.

In accordance with hypotheses 3a and 3b, the Conservative parties receive the strongest support from the service class compared to the working class (11 percentage points, hereafter pp.), followed by the Greens (6 pp.) and the Liberals (5 pp.), while the Social Democrats (11 pp.) and the Radical Right (7 pp.) receive the strongest support from the working class. The Conservatives, thus, contribute to greater polarisation than the Liberals, and it is striking that the polarisation for the New Politics parties has nearly approached the degree of polarisation caused by the Old Political parties. The Left Socialists do not contribute to such polarisation (0 pp.) and that part of hypothesis H3b is not supported, and none of the other party families contribute significantly to polarisation.

Given the stronger correlations between party choice and social class in the Nordic countries, it comes as no surprise that polarisation is largest in these countries: The Conservatives receive 18 percentage points more support from the service class and the Liberals and Green 7–8 pp., while the Radical Right and the Social Democrats receive 13–14 pp. more support from the working class.

The party families which contribute to polarisation in the other regions are fairly similar to the patterns commented above although the degrees of polarisation are different.

In summary, we could conclude that the Western European parties are still highly class-based, especially when using the appropriate measure for party choice. When we look at the more nuanced *total* class voting, we are able to find systematic differences between the party families normally grouped together in “Left” and “Right”-categories. These differences would not be discovered when merging the party choice variable. Not only do they have different class bases, but the *strength* of the association is also different. We have seen that class voting is very high for the Agrarian party family, but also important for the Radical Right and New Left parties. In fact, the latter two are often more class-based than the classic “class parties”. Based on data

from eight West European countries covering the period 1970–1997, Knutsen (2006a: 183) concluded that it was still “the old class parties, Communists, Social Democrats, and Liberals, which were most firmly anchored in social classes.” We may now revise this conclusion. Requiring the same class basis for all parties within a party family and based on all seven classes, it is, in fact, the Green, Agrarian, and Left Socialist parties which are most strongly anchored in social classes. Even if we allow the class basis of the parties to differ (i.e. using the kappa based on averages for individual parties), it is the Agrarian and Radical Right which are most class based, closely followed by the Ethnic-Regional parties, the Left Socialists and the Liberal parties. Obviously, New Politics does not equal the end of class politics – only a transformation of it.

#### 4.8 PARTY CHOICE AND HOUSEHOLD INCOME

The analysis of the relationship between party choice and household income is much briefer than for the other socio-structural variables. We do not formulate specific hypotheses, and the empirical analysis is short. For detailed correlations, we refer to [Table 4.9](#) below which mainly focuses on the relative impact of all the structural variables within countries and regions.

The correlations between party choice and family income are generally smaller than for education and social class in particular. The correlations on average are largest in the Nordic countries (0.244) and smallest in the Southern region (0.146) and in the middle in the two other regions (0.18–0.19). The correlation is outstanding in Sweden (0.354).<sup>14</sup>

Voters for the Liberal parties generally have the highest average household income level, while voters for the leftist parties, Social Democrats, Left Socialists and Communists, have the lowest income; the other party families are located between these groups. These patterns are fairly consistent across the regions and countries. In the Nordic countries, the Conservative parties – as the main parties – are located towards the Economic Right, have the highest average income level, while Conservative parties are located more to the average in the other regions. In the Central Western region voters of the Liberal parties seem to have a similar position, having the clearly highest average income level. The party families with the lowest income level at the voter levels are fairly consistent

across the regions, but on the Islands and the Southern region, the differences between the party families are small.

## 4.9 THE CORRELATIONS COMPARED AND MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES

### 4.9.1 *The Correlations Between Social Structural Variables and Party Choice Compared*

We have examined the impact of the structural variables in a comparative perspective by comparing the countries above. This is been done by employing several coefficients, Cramer's V, eta and the square root of Nagelkerke's  $R^2$ . Here the relative impact of the various socio-structural variables within the 18 countries are examined first by comparing the bivariate correlations, and then employing multivariate analyses.

The eta coefficient cannot be used for structural variables at the nominal level of measurement, and the strength of eta and Cramer's V cannot be compared. We, therefore, use the square root of Nagelkerke's  $R^2$  where religious denomination and social class are treated as factor variables (at nominal level), while the other socio-structural variables are treated at covariates (interval level variables).

In [Table 4.9](#) the socio-structural variables are ranked according to the strength of the correlations in each country and also for the averages for the various regions, and for all 18 countries.

According to the average correlations for all 18 countries, the correlation is strongest for social class and the religious denominations. This is confirmation of the fact that these still are the central structural cleavages in Western Europe. Thereafter follows age and education with very similar averages, and then urban-rural residence and family income, and finally gender with the lowest correlation.

Social class has the strongest average correlation in three of regions, while religious denomination is strongest correlated with party choice in the Central Western region. In the former regions, religious denomination reveals the second strongest correlations. We find quite similar ranking of the structural variables across the various regions. Education and family income are relatively more important in the Nordic countries, while age is relatively less important in the region.

Table 4.9 Social structure and party choice: Comparison of correlations (Squared root of Nagelkerke's  $R^2$ )

Means for all countries and for the various regions							
	Soc. cl.	Rel den	Age	Educ	Urb-rur	Fam inc	Gender
All	0.371	0.306	0.230	0.229	0.193	0.193	0.147
Nordic	Soc. cl.	Rel den	Educ	Fam inc	Urb-rur	Age	Gender
	0.418	0.258	0.257	0.244	0.232	0.206	0.168
Central West	Rel den	Soc. cl.	Age	Educ	Urb-rur	Fam inc	Gender
	0.393	0.365	0.253	0.236	0.204	0.194	0.158
Islands	Soc. cl.	Rel den	Age	Educ	Fam inc	Urb-rur	Gender
	0.336	0.260	0.249	0.200	0.183	0.152	0.112
South	Soc. cl.	Rel den	Age	Educ	Urb-rur	Fam inc	Gender
	0.345	0.268	0.219	0.204	0.167	0.146	0.128
<b>Nordic countries</b>							
Denmark	Soc. cl.	Educ	Urb-rur	Fam inc	Rel den	Age	Gender
	0.404	0.356	0.226	0.179	0.170	0.167	0.152
Finland	Soc. cl.	Rel den	Urb-rur	Fam inc	Age	Educ	Gender
	0.495	0.333	0.285	0.268	0.247	0.219	0.161
Iceland	Soc. cl.	Fam inc	Age	Rel den	Educ	Gender	Urb-rur
	0.313	0.195	0.187	0.179	0.141	0.118	Not available
Norway	Soc. cl.	Rel den	Educ	Urb-rur	Fam inc	Gender	Age
	0.435	0.295	0.274	0.272	0.224	0.219	0.190
Sweden	Soc. cl.	Fam inc	Rel den	Educ	Age	Gender	Urb-rur
	0.442	0.354	0.313	0.293	0.239	0.190	0.145

(continued)



Table 4.9 (continued)

Central West									
Austria	Soc. cl.	Age	Rel den	Educ	Urb-rur	Fam inc	Gender		Gender
	0.390	0.335	0.303	0.261	0.243	0.122	0.118		
Belgium	Soc. cl.	Rel den	Educ	Fam inc	Age	Gender	Urb-rur		
	0.434	0.405	0.293	0.226	0.197	0.161	0.138		
Germany	Rel den	Age	Soc. cl.	Fam inc	Urb-rur	Educ	Gender		
	0.397	0.336	0.276	0.217	0.212	0.167	0.145		
Luxemb.	Soc. cl.	Rel den	Age	Educ	Fam inc	Urb-rur	Gender		
	0.338	0.281	0.212	0.195	0.192	0.184	0.155		
Netherl.	Rel den	Soc. cl.	Educ	Fam inc	Age	Urb-rur	Gender		
	0.579	0.404	0.274	0.249	0.221	0.214	0.184		
Switzerl.	Rel den	Soc. cl.	Urb-rur	Educ	Age	Gender	Fam inc		
Islands	0.395	0.352	0.230	0.226	0.219	0.184	0.155		
Britain	Soc. cl.	Rel den	Fam inc	Educ	Urb-rur	Age	Gender		
	0.303	0.253	0.251	0.212	0.152	0.134	0.105		
Ireland	Soc. cl.	Age	Rel den	Educ	Urb-rur	Urb-rur	Fam inc		
	0.369	0.363	0.266	0.187	0.152	0.118	0.114		

<b>South</b>									
France	Soc. cl. 0.361	Rel den 0.327	Educ 0.221	Age 0.214	Fam inc 0.210	Urb-rur 0.205	Gender 0.170		
Greece	Age 0.348	Soc. cl. 0.313	Educ 0.290	Urb-rur 0.214	Rel den 0.173	Gender 0.126	Fam inc 0.105		
Italy	Soc. cl. 0.354	Rel den 0.285	Age 0.179	Educ 0.158	Urb-rur 0.145	Fam inc 0.138	Gender 0.118		
Portugal	Soc. cl. 0.382	Rel den 0.257	Educ 0.202	Urb-rur 0.134	Age 0.122	Fam inc 0.114	Gender 0.084		
Spain	Soc. cl. 0.318	Rel den 0.298	Age 0.232	Fam inc 0.164	Educ 0.148	Gender 0.141	Urb-rur 0.138		

The socio-structural variables are ranked according to the strength of the correlations with party choice

Soc. cl. = Social class

Rel den = Religious denomination

Urb-rur = Urban-rural residence

Fam inc = Family income

Examining the patterns in the countries within the four regions of countries, social class is highest correlated with party choice in all *the Nordic countries*. Religious denomination is the second most important in two of the countries with significant religious parties (Finland and Norway), while family income is more important in Sweden, the third Nordic country with a significant Christian party.

In the *Central region*, religious denomination is strongest correlated with party choice in Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, while social class is strongest correlated in Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg. In Belgium and Luxembourg, religious denomination is the second strongest predictor of party choice, while age has a somewhat stronger correlation in Austria.

Social class has the strongest correlation on party choice in both *Britain and Ireland*. In Ireland, the strong correlation with age places age on nearly equal footing with social class and ahead of religious denomination.

In the *Southern region*, social class is highest correlated with party choice in all countries apart from Greece due to the exceptionally high correlation with age. Religious denomination is the second strongest predictor in all these countries, again with Greece as an exception.

#### 4.9.2 *Multivariate Analysis*

##### 4.9.2.1 *Comparison of the Strength of Three Groups of Variables*

There is no (standardised) coefficient for each of the independent variables in the multinomial logistic regression. It is, therefore, not possible to examine the effects of each of the structural variables on party choice when controlling for the other structural variables. It is, however, possible to examine the explanatory power of the variables when they are included in a causal model.

In [Appendix Table 4.6](#), the impact of the structural variables has been divided into three groups: the ascribed variables Age and Gender, the semi-ascribed variables Religious Denomination and Urban–rural Residence, and finally the three class variables. The explanatory power of each of these three variable groups is first examined without any controls,<sup>15</sup> then (in the two last rows) the explanatory power is examined in a causal order where the ascribed variables are entered first into the model, then the semi-ascribed variables and finally the class variables.

When we first examine the explanatory power of the three groups of variables without any controls, the class variables have largest

explanatory power in most countries [Appendix Table 4.6A](#)). Only in Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland do the semi-ascribed variables have larger explanatory power. The ascribed variables have smallest explanatory power in all countries apart from Sweden, Ireland, Greece and Spain where the semi-ascribed variables have smallest explanatory power, and Germany where the class variables have smallest explanatory power.

These patterns change somewhat when the controlled explanatory power is examined based on the causally based inclusion of the variables outlined above. The dominance of the class variables becomes less significant in many countries outside the Nordic region, and the semi-ascribed variables have about the same explanatory power or approach the explanatory power in Belgium, Luxembourg, Britain and Italy. The ascribed variable becomes most important in Ireland and Greece, and the ascribed variables and the class variables are about equally important in Austria and Spain. The class variables remain most important in France and Portugal in addition to the Nordic countries. The semi-ascribed variables remain most important in the religiously mixed countries: Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland.

According to the averages for the various regions, the class variables have largest explanatory power in all regions apart from the Central West where the semi-ascribed variables have larger explanatory power. In all regions, the ascribed variables have the smallest average explanatory power. When the controlled explanatory power is examined, this is not changed much, but on the Islands, all three groups of structural variables have about the same explanatory power.

The comparative strength of the three variable types is shown in [Table 4.6B](#). For the semi-ascribed and the class variables, both the bivariate and controlled effects are shown. There are large variations in the impact of the ascribed variables Age and Gender, first and foremost due to the large variation in the impact of Age. The four countries where these variables have the largest explanatory power (Ireland, Greece, Germany and Austria) are those where the correlation with Age is largest. There are small regional variations in the total impact of these two variables.

The impact of the two semi-ascribed variables, Urban–rural Residence and Religious Denomination is clearly largest in the Central Western region and fairly similar in the other regions according to the average figures. The impact is outstanding in the Netherlands due to the large impact of Religious Denomination.

The impact of the class variables is largest in the Nordic countries. The relative impact of the class variables in the other regions varies from the “bivariate” to the controlled effects. On the Islands, the uncontrolled impact is second largest, but smallest when the prior variables are controlled for.

### 4.9.3 *The Overall Impact of the Structural Variables in a Comparative Perspective*

Is the impact of the socio-structural variables related to advanced industrialism and characteristics of the party system? On the basis of the discussion in [Chapter 1](#) and our empirical findings in this chapter, we expect that in advanced industrial democracies the impact of the social structural variables will have received new meanings, and to some extent is caused by the influence of structural location related to New Politics and to value orientations.

We, therefore, hypothesise that: The impact of the whole socio-structural model will be largest in advanced and rich industrial democracies, and therefore, will be largest in countries with a) a high GDP per capita, and b) a high portion of the workforce in the service sector. Following the arguments in [Chapter 1.6](#) we also expect that the explanatory power of the socio-structural model will be largest in c) the most fragmented, and d) polarised party systems.

[Table 4.10](#) shows the explanatory power of all socio-structural variables on party choice. There are fairly large cross-national variations in the impact of the socio-structural variables. Based on the regional means, the explanatory power is largest in the Central Western region and then in the Nordic countries, and smallest in the Southern region. The explanatory power is largest in the Netherlands and then in Finland followed by several of the Central Western and Nordic countries. It is smallest in the Southern European countries, Britain, and Iceland. According to the regional means, the explanatory power is largest in the Central Western region and then in the Nordic countries, and considerably smaller in the two other regions.

When the comparative pattern for explanatory power is correlated with the explanatory macro-variables, correlations are small for the measures tapping polarisation in the party system. The correlation is 0.36 with the size of the service sector, 0.57 for GNP per capita (when Luxembourg is omitted), 0.77 for effective number of parties, but not above 0.25 for party

**Table 4.10** The impact of social structure on party choice measured by Nagelkerke's pseudo- $R^2$ 


Netherl.	0.522
Finland	0.444
Belgium	0.388
Norway	0.373
Germany	0.367
Switzerl.	0.365
Austria	0.360
Sweden	0.345
Ireland	0.325
France	0.320
Luxemb.	0.275
Denmark	0.274
Portugal	0.252
Greece	0.244
Iceland	0.235
Italy	0.219
Britain	0.216
Spain	0.179
<b>Means</b>	
Central West	0.380
Nordic	0.334
Islands	0.270
South	0.243
All	0.317

system polarisation. The impact of social structure is then largest in advanced industrial or post-industrial democracies but first and foremost in party systems with a high degree of fragmentation. Hypotheses a, b and c above are then confirmed. It seems as if voters can more easily explain their socio-structural position in their choice of political parties in fragmented systems, and they also do so in the most advanced industrial democracies.

Figure 4.2 shows the strong relationship between the total impact of party choice and the number of effective parties by means of a scatterplot.

The countries are very close to the regression line; however, in Germany, the explanatory power of the socio-structural model is somewhat larger than the expected value according to the effective number of parties, while the opposite is the case for France, Italy and Switzerland.

As to party system polarisation, a similar scatterplot (not shown here) shows that there are several countries that deviate substantially



**Fig. 4.2** Scatterplot for the explanatory power (Nagelkerke's pseudo- $R^2$ ) of all socio-structural variables and the effective number of parties

from the regression line. Most significant in this respect is the fairly moderate explanatory power in the three most polarised party systems (see [Table 2.6B](#)) in France, Switzerland, Spain, and the relatively moderate level of polarisation in the two countries where the explanatory power of the socio-structural model is largest – the Netherlands and Finland.

## 4.10 CONCLUSIONS

The main findings in this chapter can be summed up by returning to the three research questions formulated in [Section 4.1](#) and the hypotheses that have been formulated about comparative strength, relatively most support for the various party families and those party families which contribute to polarisation.

The impact of gender on party choice is weaker in all regions than for any of the other structural variables. It is somewhat larger in the Nordic countries and the Central Western region than in other regions. We find clear support for the modern gender gap and it is the Greens and the Radical Right which have the strongest relative support from women and men, respectively. The main polarisation also takes place between these party families.

The comparative pattern regarding support for the parties according to age showed a nuanced pattern. The differences in the strength of the correlations were considerable but did not follow the regional division so clearly. The following party families receive relatively strongest support from the older age groups, ranked according to the size of the age differences: Christian, Agrarian, Conservative and Social Democratic parties. The younger age groups had relatively strongest support among Green, Left Socialist and the small Communist parties. The Radical Rightist parties also receive the strongest support from the younger age groups, but the differences are small and vary considerably between countries. Polarisation first and foremost takes place between the Christian and Conservative versus the Greens and Left Socialists.

The religious structural cleavage measured by the religious denomination is strongest in the Central Western region, and with a fairly similar strength in the other regions. Religious denomination is generally the strongest social cleavage in the Central Western region and the second most important in the other regions. The Christian parties followed by the Agrarian and Conservative parties receive the strongest support from those who are members of a religious denomination, while the Communist, Left Socialist and Green parties relatively receive the strongest support from the unaffiliated. Polarisation takes mainly place between the same party families.

Urban–rural residence is strongest correlated with party choice in the Nordic countries, but the regional differences are not very large. The Green, the Communist, Left Socialist and Liberal parties receive relatively strongest support from the urban population, while the Agrarian, Ethnic-Regional, and Christian parties receive relatively strongest support from the rural population. The Radical Rightist parties also receive the strongest support from the rural population, but the difference is small. Polarisation takes place first and foremost between the Agrarian and Christian parties on the rural side, while there are many party families that contribute on the urban side.



As to education, the regional differences in the strength of the correlations are fairly small although there are significant differences between the countries. We find strong support for the perspective of Old Political and New Politics processes that contribute to which party families that receive relatively strongest support and contribute to polarisation from the lower and higher educated strata. The Green, Liberal and Left Socialist parties receive relatively strongest support from the higher educated strata, while the Radical Right, the Agrarian and then the Social Democrats receive the strongest support from the lower educated strata. It is basically the same party families that contribute to the polarisation along the various education levels.

The analyses of the social class cleavage showed that social class still is a dominant predictor of party choice, and it is still the most important in Western Europe given the treatment of the party choice variable in this work. The class cleavage is strongest in the Nordic countries, but the regional differences are not large. The various measures of the strength of the correlations between party choice and social class show quite different relative strengths according to party families (see [Table 4.8](#)). When the focus is on the five largest social classes and the averages for the party families, class voting is largest for the Radical Rightist and Green parties, followed by the Conservative, Ethnic-regional and Liberal parties. The Agrarian and Left Socialist parties also show high degree of class voting when the smaller classes (farmers and petite bourgeoisie) are included. Polarisation between the main classes – workers and service class – is greatest for Conservatives, and then the Greens and Liberals among the parties that receive the strongest support from the service class, and for the Social Democrats and the Radical Right among the parties that receive the strongest support from workers.

A major general finding from the analysis of the location of the party families and of polarisation is that the New Politics parties play a central role. These parties receive still less support than many of other party families, and in particular for polarisation, the strength of support is central; it is easier for a large party than for a small party to contribute to polarisation. Nevertheless, the New Politics parties are among those party families that contribute most to polarisation along all structural variables. This is most pronounced for the Green parties which contribute along all structural variables and least so for the Radical Right which contributes most significantly along the gender

and social class cleavage. The Left Socialists contribute significantly along all structural variables apart from gender and social class. These findings are firm evidence of the major role played by the New Politics parties related to new polarisation related to social structure.

Finally, the total explanatory power of the structural variables all together shows large variations between the countries. The comparative strength of the structural model is largest in the countries with the most advanced social structure, first and foremost in fragmented party systems.

## APPENDIX TABLES

**Appendix Table 4.1** Party families and gender. Average PDI and lor for all countries and for the various regions

<b>All countries</b>			
	<i>PDI</i>		<i>Lor</i>
Greens	4.4	Greens	0.37
Social dem.	2.4	Christian	0.10
Christian	1.5	Social dem.	0.09
Left Socialists	0.3	Communists	0.09
Communists	0.2	Agrarian	0.07
Agrarian	-0.3	Liberals	-0.05
Liberals	-0.8	Conservatives	-0.07
Ethnic-reg.	-1.3	Left Socialists	-0.10
Conservatives	-1.3	Ethnic-reg.	-0.16
Radical Right	-4.1	Radical Right	-0.56
<b>Nordic</b>			
	<i>PDI</i>		<i>Lor</i>
Greens	8.5	Greens	0.71
Left Socialists	4.5	Communists	0.39
Christian	1.6	Left Socialists	0.30
Liberals	1.3	Christian	0.25
Social dem.	1.2	Liberals	0.10
Communists	0.8	Agrarian	0.07
Ethnic-reg.	0.1	Ethnic-reg.	0.05
Agrarian	-0.3	Social dem.	0.04
Conservatives	-4.8	Conservatives	-0.22
Radical Right	-6.6	Radical Right	-0.44

(continued)

**Appendix Table 4.1** (continued)

<b>Central West</b>			
	<i>PDI</i>		<i>Lor</i>
Greens	5.9	Greens	0.54
Christian	2.1	Communists	0.10
Social dem.	1.8	Christian	0.09
Communists	0.4	Social dem.	0.09
Left Socialists	-2.3	Liberals	-0.16
Liberals	-2.9	Ethnic-reg.	-0.46
Ethnic-reg.	-3.5	Radical Right	-0.50
Radical Right	-3.7	Left Socialists	-0.53
<b>Islands</b>			
	<i>PDI</i>		<i>Lor</i>
Conservatives	4.7	Social dem.	0.15
Social dem.	3.0	Conservatives	0.12
Christian	1.2	Ethnic-reg.	0.12
Ethnic-reg.	0.3	Christian	0.05
Greens	-0.3	Greens	-0.02
Liberals	-2.6	Liberals	-0.18
Left Socialists	-5.0	Left Socialists	-0.52
<b>South</b>			
	<i>PDI</i>		<i>Lor</i>
Social dem.	4.1	Liberals	0.14
Liberals	3.1	Social dem.	0.13
Greens	0.5	Conservatives	0.02
Communists	-0.2	Communists	-0.08
Conservatives	-0.3	Greens	-0.11
Left Socialists	-1.2	Left Socialists	-0.16
Ethnic-reg.	-1.6	Ethnic-reg.	-0.26
Radical Right	-2.2	Christian	-0.28
Christian	-2.5	Radical Right	-0.81

**Appendix Table 4.2** Party families and age. Average PDI and lor for all countries and for the various regions

<b>All countries</b>			
	<i>PDI</i>		<i>Lor</i>
Christian	13.3	Christian	0.54
Conservatives	11.7	Agrarian	0.42
Social dem.	4.4	Conservatives	0.26
Agrarian	3.3	Social dem.	0.16
Liberals	0.2	Ethnic-reg.	-0.01
Ethnic-reg.	-0.9	Liberals	-0.15
Communists	-2.0	Radical Right	-0.29
Radical Right	-2.4	Communists	-0.63
Left Socialists	-6.9	Left Socialists	-1.10
Greens	-12.2	Greens	-1.38
<b>Nordic</b>			
	<i>PDI</i>		<i>Lor</i>
Social dem.	12.1	Social dem.	0.51
Conservatives	4.7	Agrarian	0.42
Agrarian	3.3	Conservatives	0.17
Christian	2.1	Christian	0.14
Ethnic-reg.	0.0	Radical Right	-0.54
Liberals	-2.1	Left Socialists	-0.57
Communists	-3.0	Liberals	-0.66
Radical Right	-3.9	Greens	-0.89
Left Socialists	-4.3	Communists	-1.01
Greens	-11.5		
<b>Central West</b>			
	<i>PDI</i>		<i>Lor</i>
Christian	22.2	Christian	0.83
Liberals	2.2	Liberals	0.08
Social dem.	1.3	Social dem.	0.03
Ethnic-reg.	-0.3	Ethnic-reg.	-0.04
Communists	-1.3	Radical Right	-0.25
Radical Right	-2.3	Communists	-0.45
Left Socialists	-4.4	Left Socialists	-0.58
Greens	-15.8	Greens	-1.48
<b>Islands</b>			
	<i>PDI</i>		<i>Lor</i>
Conservatives	23.3	Ethnic-reg.	0.91
Christian	2.8	Conservatives	0.54

*(continued)*

**Appendix Table 4.2** (continued)

<b>Islands</b>			
	<i>PDI</i>		<i>Lor</i>
Ethnic-reg.	1.0	Christian	0.12
Liberals	0.2	Liberals	0.02
Social dem.	-6.4	Social dem.	-0.27
Greens	-8.4	Greens	-1.72
Left Socialists	-20.1	Left Socialists	-3.01
<b>South</b>			
	<i>PDI</i>		<i>Lor</i>
Conservatives	14.1	Christian	0.47
Social dem.	4.6	Conservatives	0.25
Christian	4.6	Social dem.	0.13
Radical Right	-1.1	Radical Right	-0.10
Communists	-1.5	Liberals	-0.18
Liberals	-2.4	Ethnic-reg.	-0.45
Ethnic-reg.	-2.7	Communists	-0.58
Greens	-5.5	Greens	-1.21
Left Socialists	-8.3	Left Socialists	-1.55

**Appendix Table 4.3** Party families and religious denomination. Average PDI and lor for all countries and for the various regions

<b>All countries</b>			
	<i>PDI</i>		<i>Lor</i>
Christian	13.2	Christian	1.29
Conservatives	10.4	Agrarian	0.95
Agrarian	6.6	Conservatives	0.53
Liberals	0.4	Ethnic-reg.	0.12
Ethnic-reg.	0.0	Liberals	-0.07
Social dem.	-1.7	Social dem.	-0.08
Radical Right	-1.9	Radical Right	-0.16
Communists	-4.9	Greens	-0.67
Greens	-7.2	Left Socialists	-0.88
Left Socialists	-8.6	Communists	-0.91
<b>Nordic</b>			
	<i>PDI</i>		<i>Lor</i>
Agrarian	6.6	Christian	1.54
Conservatives	3.5	Agrarian	0.95
Christian	3.0	Ethnic-reg.	0.44

**Appendix Table 4.3** (continued)

<b>Nordic</b>			
	<i>PDI</i>		<i>Lor</i>
Social dem.	1.0	Conservatives	0.38
Ethnic-reg.	0.5	Radical Right	0.06
Liberals	0.1	Social dem.	0.04
Radical Right	-0.4	Liberals	0.02
Communists	-4.8	Greens	-0.37
Greens	-7.3	Left Socialists	-0.76
Left Socialists	-7.7	Communists	-1.62
<b>Central West</b>			
	<i>PDI</i>		<i>Lor</i>
Christian	20.6	Christian	1.37
Ethnic-reg.	-0.7	Ethnic-reg.	-0.08
Communists	-2.0	Social dem.	-0.19
Social dem.	-3.0	Liberals	-0.34
Liberals	-3.3	Radical Right	-0.35
Radical Right	-3.7	Communists	-0.59
Greens	-8.4	Greens	-0.66
Left Socialists	-11.2	Left Socialists	-1.05
<b>Islands</b>			
	<i>PDI</i>		<i>Lor</i>
Conservatives	12.4	Christian	0.29
Christian	5.5	Conservatives	0.20
Liberals	2.4	Liberals	0.18
Left Socialists	0.7	Ethnic-reg.	0.16
Ethnic-reg.	-0.2	Left Socialists	0.07
Social dem.	-3.1	Social dem.	-0.15
Greens	-7.1	Greens	-0.78
<b>South</b>			
	<i>PDI</i>		<i>Lor</i>
Conservatives	16.6	Christian	1.07
Liberals	10.8	Conservatives	0.81
Christian	6.9	Liberals	0.50
Ethnic-reg.	0.3	Radical Right	-
Radical Right	0.1	Social dem.	-0.05
Social dem.	-2.3	Communists	-0.79
Greens	-3.6	Ethnic-reg.	-0.79
Communists	-7.2	Greens	-0.87
Left Socialists	-9.7	Left Socialists	-1.10

**Appendix Table 4.4** Party families and urban–rural residence. Average PDI and lor for all countries and for the various regions

<b>All countries</b>			
	<i>PDI</i>		<i>Lor</i>
Social dem.	3.5	Greens	0.44
Greens	3.5	Communists	0.40
Left Socialists	3.4	Left Socialists	0.37
Liberals	1.8	Liberals	0.31
Communists	0.7	Social dem.	0.16
Conservatives	-1.5	Conservatives	0.03
Ethnic-reg.	-2.5	Radical Right	-0.26
Radical Right	-2.9	Christian	-0.40
Christian	-6.1	Ethnic-reg.	-0.79
Agrarian	-12.2	Agrarian	-1.08
<b>Nordic</b>			
	<i>PDI</i>		<i>Lor</i>
Conservatives	7.7	Liberals	0.56
Greens	5.0	Communists	0.50
Left Socialists	4.5	Conservatives	0.45
Liberals	4.0	Greens	0.40
Communists	0.9	Left Socialists	0.40
Ethnic-reg.	-0.6	Social dem.	-0.05
Social dem.	-0.8	Ethnic-reg.	-0.31
Christian	-1.6	Radical Right	-0.34
Radical Right	-4.4	Christian	-0.37
Agrarian	-12.2	Agrarian	-1.08
<b>Central West</b>			
	<i>PDI</i>		<i>Lor</i>
Social dem.	8.5	Communists	0.96
Greens	3.4	Greens	0.39
Left Socialists	2.7	Social dem.	0.34
Liberals	2.4	Liberals	0.28
Communists	2.3	Left Socialists	0.23
Radical Right	-3.8	Radical Right	-0.47
Ethnic-reg.	-3.9	Christian	-0.49
Christian	-9.6	Ethnic-reg.	-0.59
<b>Islands</b>			
	<i>PDI</i>		<i>Lor</i>
Social dem.	6.0	Greens	0.63
Greens	4.2	Social dem.	0.41

**Appendix Table 4.4** (continued)

<b>Islands</b>			
	<i>PDI</i>		<i>Lor</i>
Left Socialists	3.8	Left Socialists	0.39
Ethnic-reg.	0.0	Ethnic-reg.	-0.02
Christian	-2.0	Christian	-0.07
Liberals	-3.3	Liberals	-0.21
Conservatives	-11.6	Conservatives	-0.32
<b>South</b>			
	<i>PDI</i>		<i>Lor</i>
Left Socialists	2.9	Left Socialists	0.43
Greens	1.4	Greens	0.41
Radical Right	0.6	Liberals	0.27
Social dem.	0.1	Radical Right	0.24
Communists	-0.6	Social dem.	0.02
Liberals	-1.0	Communists	-0.08
Christian	-2.9	Conservatives	-0.16
Ethnic-reg.	-3.9	Christian	-0.31
Conservatives	-4.8	Ethnic-reg.	-0.59
Other	4.7	Other	0.28

**Appendix Table 4.5** Party families and education. Average PDI and lor for all countries and for the various regions

<b>All countries</b>			
	<i>PDI</i>		<i>Lor</i>
Greens	9.4	Greens	0.92
Liberals	9.0	Liberals	0.91
Left Socialists	3.5	Left Socialists	0.41
Conservatives	1.1	Conservatives	0.16
Ethnic-reg.	-0.4	Communists	0.04
Communists	-1.4	Christian	-0.07
Christian	-1.6	Ethnic-reg.	-0.15
Agrarian	-5.4	Social dem.	-0.24
Radical Right	-6.4	Agrarian	-0.55
Social dem.	-7.5	Radical Right	-0.60
<b>Nordic</b>			
	<i>PDI</i>		<i>Lor</i>
Greens	10.8	Liberals	1.55
Conservatives	9.6	Greens	1.12

(continued)



**Appendix Table 4.5** (continued)

<b>Nordic</b>			
	<i>PDI</i>		<i>Lor</i>
Liberals	9.3	Communists	0.71
Left Socialists	3.9	Conservatives	0.62
Communists	1.4	Christian	0.28
Christian	1.0	Left Socialists	0.22
Ethnic-reg.	-0.1	Ethnic-reg.	-0.09
Agrarian	-5.4	Social dem.	-0.38
Social dem.	-9.7	Agrarian	-0.55
Radical Right	-11.9	Radical Right	-1.01
<b>Central West</b>			
	<i>PDI</i>		<i>Lor</i>
Greens	11.7	Ethnic-reg.	1.02
Liberals	8.3	Greens	0.74
Ethnic-reg.	7.4	Liberals	0.69
Left Socialists	0.6	Left Socialists	0.27
Communists	-1.1	Communists	0.18
Christian	-5.1	Social dem.	-0.25
Radical Right	-7.2	Christian	-0.37
Social dem.	-9.6	Radical Right	-0.89
<b>Islands</b>			
	<i>PDI</i>		<i>Lor</i>
Liberals	11.8	Greens	0.94
Greens	6.0	Liberals	0.77
Christian	5.5	Christian	0.26
Ethnic-reg.	-0.2	Social dem.	-0.07
Social dem.	-4.0	Ethnic-reg.	-0.07
Conservatives	-5.1	Conservatives	-0.13
Left Socialists	-6.4	Left Socialists	-0.70
<b>South</b>			
	<i>PDI</i>		<i>Lor</i>
Liberals	9.0	Greens	1.22
Left Socialists	6.9	Left Socialists	0.89
Greens	4.7	Liberals	0.67
Christian	4.0	Radical Right	0.41
Radical Right	0.9	Christian	0.37
Communists	-3.0	Social dem.	-0.17
Ethnic-reg.	-4.4	Conservatives	-0.19
Conservatives	-5.0	Communists	-0.41
Social dem.	-5.9	Ethnic-reg.	-0.82



## B. Explanatory power of socio-structural variables compared

	<i>Age and gender</i>	<i>Urbrur and rel denom</i>	<i>Urbrur and rel denom</i> ( <i>contr.</i> )	<i>class vars Uncontrolled</i>	<i>Class vars Controlled</i>				
Ireland	0.161	Netherl.	0.351	Netherl.	0.305	Finland	0.286	Finland	0.219
Greece	0.134	Switzerl.	0.202	Switzerl.	0.173	Sweden	0.257	Sweden	0.207
Germany	0.132	Germany	0.199	Germany	0.163	Netherl.	0.245	Belgium	0.174
Austria	0.123	Finland	0.182	Belgium	0.151	Norway	0.241	Norway	0.168
Sweden	0.090	Belgium	0.179	Finland	0.141	Belgium	0.229	Denmark	0.156
Finland	0.084	Norway	0.149	Norway	0.122	Austria	0.211	Portugal	0.153
Norway	0.083	Austria	0.136	Austria	0.110	Denmark	0.207	France	0.146
Netherl.	0.083	France	0.131	France	0.109	Britain	0.193	Netherl.	0.134
Switzerl.	0.081	Luxemb.	0.108	Britain	0.102	Ireland	0.193	Iceland	0.129
Spain	0.072	Britain	0.102	Luxemb.	0.090	Portugal	0.178	Austria	0.127
Luxemb.	0.069	Ireland	0.087	Italy	0.078	Switzerl.	0.175	Luxemb.	0.116
France	0.065	Italy	0.082	Portugal	0.077	France	0.175	Switzerl.	0.111
Belgium	0.063	Portugal	0.080	Denmark	0.065	Greece	0.159	Ireland	0.102
Denmark	0.053	Denmark	0.076	Ireland	0.062	Luxemb.	0.147	Italy	0.098
Iceland	0.050	Greece	0.071	Iceland	0.056	Iceland	0.143	Britain	0.095
Italy	0.043	Iceland	0.061	Sweden	0.048	Spain	0.129	Spain	0.073
Portugal	0.022	Spain	0.061	Greece	0.046	Germany	0.113	Germany	0.072
Britain	0.019	Sweden	0.052	Spain	0.034	Italy	0.111	Greece	0.064
<b>Means</b>		<b>Means</b>		<b>Means</b>		<b>Means</b>		<b>Means</b>	
Central West	0.092	Central West	0.196	Central West	0.165	Nordic	0.227	Nordic	0.176
Islands	0.090	Nordic	0.104	Nordic	0.086	Islands	0.193	Central West	0.122
Nordic	0.072	Islands	0.095	Islands	0.082	Central West	0.187	South	0.107
South	0.067	South	0.085	South	0.069	South	0.150	Islands	0.099
All	0.079	All	0.128	All	0.107	All	0.188	All	0.130

## NOTES

1. The high lor scores for “Other parties” are not considered here. The same applies in the rest of the analyses.
2. The tables showing the location of party voters on the various structural variables are shown in Appendix Tables.
3. For example, in a pioneering study based on longitudinal data from West European countries, Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere (1995a) found clear trends in the direction of disengagement from institutionalised churches and disengagement from institutionalised churches. They note clear cohort effects in church attendance and religious beliefs, and they find support for *contagion model* of religious change where the process starts among the younger cohorts and spreads towards the older (Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere 1995a: 105–113). In cohort terms, this implies cohort effects combined with a specific type of period effect.
4. Most of the literature emphasises that age difference in support for the Greens and Left Socialist parties is a cohort effect. A relevant scholarly contribution in this respect is Wilhelm Bürklin’s analysis of the support for the German Green party (1987). Bürklin challenges the dominant generation perspective on the left-libertarian parties. Instead of the generation thesis based on the assumption that the reasons behind the left-libertarian vote lie in changing political issues and value preferences, Bürklin has formulated a life-cycle hypothesis which he also calls a “protest” alternative. According to this hypothesis the attitudes of young voters, who are the mainstay of the Green vote, derive primarily from their position in the life cycle.
5. For an overview of literature of the realignment in the Scandinavian countries in the 1930s, see Knutsen (2003: 50–56).
6. In Austria age differences in support for the Social Democrats and the Radical Right also contribute significantly. The Social Democrats gains stronger support from the older age group and the Radical Right from the younger age groups (8 and 7 percentage points, respectively).
7. Lipset and Rokkan also compared the Scandinavian Christian parties with the nonconformists in Britain and the Anti-Revolutionaries in the Netherlands because they were opposed to the tolerant pragmatism of the Established Lutheran Churches, rejecting the lukewarm latitudinarianism of the national Mother Church (1967: 18).
8. Religious denomination is recoded into three categories for the religiously homogeneous countries: No denomination, the Main denomination and Other denominations. For Britain, Germany and Switzerland there are separate categories for the Catholics and the Protestants, while there is an additional category for the Rereformed church in the Netherlands.

9. The data material does not allow separating these categories due to low  $N$ , but as an illustration, support for the Christian Party in Sweden among the small group of members of free churches and non-conformists (included in the “other” denomination category) is 71%, but  $N$  is only 14 for this category.
10. As to the urban base for the support for the Greens, see Dolezal (2010: 544–547).
11. This is done by collapsing categories 0, 1 and 2 (primary, lower secondary), 3 and 4 (upper secondary) and 5 and 6 (tertiary). The correlations between this collapsed education variable and party choice is very similar to those based on all categories. The mean correlation for all countries declines from 0.224 to 0.191, and the ranking of the countries is nearly identical.
12. This is explained in the empirical section.
13. The averages for the various party families are based on the number of countries where the party families are present in the data material. The percentages for the various social classes do not sum up to 100, but exceed 100.
14. The correlation coefficients are the square root of Nagelkerke’s  $R^2$ .
15. The analyses of each group of variables without controls will – somewhat misleadingly – be referred to as “bivariate” below. It is, however, controlled for the other variables within the group, but since the coefficients for these individual variables are not identified, “bivariate” for the group of variables might be justified.

## Party Choice and Value Orientations

### 5.1 INTRODUCTION

What is the relationship between the value orientations and party choice? Where are voters for various parties and party families located on the various scales for the various value orientations? These are the central research questions in this chapter.

The first and longest sections in this chapter (Sections 5.2–5.6) focus on the bivariate relationships between each of the five value orientations and party choice. This is done by first formulating some general hypotheses about the strength of the correlations and the location of parties from the party families followed by empirical analyses. In Section 5.7, the focus is on the relative importance of the five value orientations in the explanation of party choice. In Sections 5.8 and 5.9, the impact of Old and New Politics and the total explanatory power of the value model (all five value orientations) are addressed.

The scales for the five value orientations all have all values from 0 to 10. The comparison of the location of parties and party families on the various indices for value orientations is based on the means of the voters for the various parties. In the tables, the means for the party families within the four regions and for all countries are shown due to the length of presenting similar tables for all countries. One might

object to this since the means within the various countries for all voters varies. When there are a different number of parties with the party families, this can influence the results. Another approach that takes this into consideration would be to calculate the differences from the means of all voters for the various parties. This has been done, and the patterns based on this approach are identical. The eta coefficient is used to examine the strength of the relationship between party choice and value orientations.

## 5.2 RELIGIOUS–SECULAR VALUE ORIENTATIONS

### 5.2.1 *Introduction*

The relationship between religious/secular value orientations and political parties arises from a century-old tension and conflict between religious institutions, first and foremost the Church, the state and secular forces. Religious conflicts defined the structure of elite conflicts and political alliances in late nineteenth century, and the emerging political parties often defined themselves in relation to religious interests – Catholic or Protestant, religious or secular. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the religious cleavage was institutionalised and became a dominant part of the Old Politics alignments (Dalton 2014: 165–173). The religious conflict is first and foremost a conflict over values and cultural identities although it is firmly rooted in institutional forces – affiliation to the Church and various functional organisations around the believers (see Section 4.4).

### 5.2.2 *Hypotheses*

#### 5.2.2.1 *The Impact in a Comparative Perspective*

In a comparative perspective, I expect that religious/secular value orientations will have the strongest impact on party choice in Catholic and religiously mixed countries. Conflicts between the Church and the secular forces have historically been the strongest in these countries. Of the Protestant countries, I expect that religious/secular value orientations will be most significant in countries with particular “Christian” parties which articulate religious value orientations, i.e., in Finland, Norway and Sweden.

On this background, the following hypotheses are formulated:

H1: The strength of the impact of religious–secular values on party choice will be larger in Catholic and religiously mixed countries than in Protestant countries.

H2: Among the Nordic countries, religious–secular values will have a larger impact in Finland, Norway and Sweden than in Denmark and Iceland.

### 5.2.2.2 *The Location of Voters for Different Party Families*

After World War II, one of the most important developments at the party level was the emergence of Christian Democracy as a major political force. Christian Democracy was a new force that promised a new style of politics based on participation, reconciliation at the national and international levels, inter-class cooperation and traditional moral values and “Christian principles” such as a strong commitment to basic human rights, particularly to those of the individuals and families. These parties evolved mainly from previously Catholic confessional parties (Kalyvas and Van Kersbergen 2010).

In the Scandinavian countries, religious interests were incorporated for a long time in the pre-industrial “left” (*Venstre*) movements. Particular Christian parties developed from these movements at a late stage when the necessity to defend the traditions of orthodox evangelism against the attacks of urban secularism was felt. These *Christian parties* can be considered as an equivalent to the emergence of Christian Democracy, but there are several differences between them. Continental Christian Democratic parties aimed at being *Volkspartei* which appealed to general Christian values. The Scandinavian parties are primarily concerned with defending religious values against secularism, are critical to the tolerant pragmatism of the Established Lutheran Church, and have their strongholds among members of various orthodox low church revivalist organisations within the Evangelical Lutheran Church as well as among non-conformist groups outside the state church (Lipset and Rokkan 1967:18; Madeley 2004; Elder et al. 1983: 64–69). The Christian People’s parties subsequently receive support from a much smaller portion of voters than the Christian Democratic Parties in Catholic and religiously mixed countries. Given these differences between the two types of religious parties, I expect the Nordic Christian People’s Parties to be more extreme with regard to emphasis on religious values compared to the typical Christian Democratic parties.



*The religious parties* articulate a religious value orientation most consistently in respective party systems, and I expect that these parties in particular will have voters with a religious value orientation. *The Conservative parties* have also emphasised a religious value orientation. For example, in England, there has been a close association between the Conservative party and the Church of England, and in the Scandinavian countries, High Church clericalism and the Conservative parties have had historical alliances (Elder et al. 1983: 68–69). The voters of *Agrarian parties* are also expected to have religious voters since the rural population is religious.

The parties that historically have articulated a secular value orientation are first and foremost Socialist and other left-wing parties as well as Liberal and Radical “bourgeois” parties. Socialism, Liberalism and Radicalism have traditionally been the main antagonists of the Church, religious individuals and Christian political interests. After World War II, these parties attempted to get rid of their anti-clerical image (Von Beyme 1985: 35–36). To some extent, the same can be said about the Socialist parties. The Liberal parties in the *Protestant* countries have another profile than the Liberal parties on the continent. They have traditionally been associated with religious dissenters (as the Liberal party in Britain) or Low Church individuals and organisations as in the Scandinavian countries. Although the Christian People’s parties have absorbed most of the Low Church voters in these countries, I expect the Liberal parties in Britain and the Nordic countries to have a different placement along the religious conflict compared to the Liberal and Radical parties in Catholic and religiously mixed countries. I also expect that the newer Green and Left Socialist party families will have secular voters. The voters of these parties emerge primarily from the secular segment of the electorate, and most of these parties have emphasised new morality issues like support for women’s liberalisation and liberalising abortion – issues that are strongly opposed to the religious parties’ and voters’ orientations.

As to the Radical Rightist parties, these have emphasised the Christian essence of Europe in connection to the perceived threat from Islam, but the voters of the Radical Rightist parties do not show any clear tendency to focus on religious values (Arzheimer and Carter 2009; Knutsen 1995a: 16–23). On this background, four further hypotheses will be tested:

- H3: a) The Christian parties will have the most religious voters and then b) the voters of the Agrarian and Conservative parties.

H4: The distance between the Christian parties and the other parties will be larger in the Nordic countries than in the other regions.

H5: The Radical Rightist parties will be located close to the centre on the religious–secular dimension.

H6: Voters of the leftist party families and the Greens will have secular voters, the Social Democrats less so than the other party families

### 5.2.3 *Empirical Analysis*

#### 5.2.3.1 *The Comparative Strength of the Correlations*

Table 5.1A shows the eta coefficients between the five sets of value orientations and party choice. The countries are ranked according to the strength of the eta coefficients.

There are large variations in the strength of the correlations. The correlations are outstanding in the Netherlands, followed by Germany, Spain and three of the Nordic countries (Finland, Norway and Sweden). These three Nordic countries are those with significant Christian parties. The smallest correlations are found in the two other Nordic countries without significant Christian parties, Denmark and Iceland, and also in Britain. H2 is then supported regarding the strength of the correlations in the Nordic countries.

The mean correlations for the various regions show that the strongest correlations are found in the Central West region and then in the Nordic countries and the Southern region, while the correlations are smaller for the Islands.

The average correlations for the Catholic religiously mixed and Protestant countries<sup>1</sup> are shown in the bottom rows of Table 5.1A. The major difference is between the religiously mixed countries and the other categories. Consequently, H1 is only partly supported.

#### 5.2.3.2 *The Location of Party Voters*

The tables with the location of party voters are shown in the Appendix Tables.<sup>2</sup> Appendix Table 5.1 shows the average location of voters for the various party families on the religious–secular dimension for all countries (A) and for the four regions (B). Regarding the pattern for all countries, the Christian parties have the most religious voters followed by the Conservative party voters. Close to the secular pole, we find voters for

**Table 5.1** Strength of the correlations between value orientations and party choice. Eta coefficients ranked.

<i>A. Religious-secular values</i>	<i>B. Economic left-right values</i>	<i>C. Environmental values</i>	<i>D. Libertarian-authoritarian values</i>	<i>E. Immigration orientations</i>	<i>F. Mean coefficients</i>
Netherl.	0.556	0.608	0.346	0.378	0.489
Germany	0.443	0.573	0.329	0.348	0.468
Norway	0.420	0.559	0.312	0.338	0.437
Finland	0.402	0.536	0.302	0.324	0.430
Spain	0.397	0.502	0.273	0.304	0.401
Sweden	0.374	0.452	0.248	0.271	0.391
Switzerl.	0.332	0.424	0.245	0.263	0.386
Belgium	0.327	0.389	0.234	0.261	0.374
Italy	0.294	0.356	0.233	0.256	0.356
Austria	0.291	0.345	0.214	0.255	0.327
Ireland	0.278	0.342	0.209	0.245	0.294
Greece	0.270	0.332	0.196	0.243	0.281
Luxemb.	0.233	0.326	0.192	0.233	0.275
Portugal	0.202	0.278	0.191	0.228	0.250
France	0.198	0.263	0.183	0.179	0.244
Britain	0.141	0.238	0.174	0.175	0.222
Denmark	0.118	0.129	0.130	0.165	0.191
Iceland	0.112	0.090	0.104	0.128	0.074
<b>Means</b>	<b>Means</b>	<b>Means</b>	<b>Means</b>	<b>Means</b>	<b>Means</b>
Central	0.364	0.555	0.274	0.295	0.372
West		Nordic	Central West	Nordic	Nordic
Nordic	0.285	0.347	0.243	0.258	0.367
South	0.272	0.290	0.208	0.237	0.265
Islands	0.210	0.216	0.175	0.172	0.251
All	0.299	0.375	0.229	0.255	0.327
countries		All countries	All countries	All countries	All countries
Religious mixed	0.444				Central West
Catholic	0.277				South
Orthodox	0.270				Islands
Protestant	0.261				0.211
					0.297

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the Left Socialists, Communists, Greens and Liberal parties. Voters for the Radical Rightist parties are also below average, indicating that their voters are more secular than the average party voters in Western Europe. Voters of the Radical Right are indeed more secular than the Social Democrats who are more religious than the average voters.

The hypotheses regarding the Christian (H3a), Conservative (H3b), and leftist parties and Liberal parties (H6) are then generally supported. The same applies to the Radical Rightist parties (H5) although they are somewhat more secular than expected. The part of H6 that indicated that the Social Democratic voters would belong to the secular voters is, however, not supported. These party voters are somewhat more religious than the average voter. As to the Agrarian voters, the general secular orientation of these voters can be explained by the general secular orientation of the Nordic population. The Agrarian party voters are the second most religious in the Nordic countries and that part of H3b is then supported.

These patterns are fairly consistent for the various regions. In *the Nordic countries*, the Christian Party voters are, however, significantly closer to the religious pole than in the other regions. The high average score is also overwhelming given the general secular orientation of the Nordic voters. The Agrarian party voters are closest to the Christian voters, but the distance is fairly large. H4 is then clearly supported.

In Iceland, which does not have a religious party, it is the Agrarian party voters who are closest to the religious pole, but the differences between the parties is small as is reflected in the smallest correlation coefficient. The location of the Conservative parties in the Nordic region is somewhat surprising. These parties are located below the average for all voters and fairly close to the secular pole, in clear contrast to the pattern found in the Southern region. This pattern for the Conservative parties in the Nordic countries is most pronounced in Norway and Sweden. According to the data, the Swedish Conservative Party has the most secular voters, while only the voters for the Left Socialist and Communists are more secular than the Conservative party voters in Norway. For the other three countries, the location of the Conservative party voters is closer to the average for all party voters.

In the *Central Western countries*, those parties that belong to the Christian Party family are the only parties which have voters that are closer to the religious pole than the average for all party voters in the respective countries. There is a considerable gap between these party voters and the others regarding the scores on the index, although the

differences are far from those observed in the Nordic countries. The exceptions are the Calvinist Fundamentalist parties in the Netherlands that have far more religious voters than the Christian Democratic CDA.<sup>3</sup> The locations of the former party voters contribute significantly to the high correlation between party choice and religious–secular values in the Dutch setting.

The Social Democratic parties in all countries in this region have voters who are among the most religious, apart from the voters of the Christian parties. The location of the Liberal party voters varies considerably. In Austria and the Netherlands, these are among the most secular, while they are centrist, close to the Social Democratic voters, in the other countries. The Radical Rightist parties have some of the most secular party voters in most of the Central Western countries. Switzerland is a clear exception since the Radical Rightist party voters are closest to the Christian Party. This could be explained by the fact that the Swiss People’s Party was originally an Agrarian party which was transformed into a Radical Rightist party, but the party still has a traditional Agrarian wing. The Austrian Radical Right has also quite religious voters.

Religious voting is weak in *Britain*. The nationalist parties have the most religious voters while the Green Party the least religious voters. Differences between the three major parties, Conservative, Labour and Liberal is small (0.2) on the scale. Religious voting is notably larger in *Ireland* (see [Table 5.1](#)), where religious values are significantly more widespread than in Britain. It is the Conservative Fiánna Fail that has the most religious electoral (7.4), followed by the party we have classified as Christian, Fine Gael (6.8), the Labour Party (6.5) and Sinn Fein (6.1). The party with the clearly most secular voters is the Green Party (4.3).

In the *Southern European* countries, we have seen that the magnitude of the religious conflict line is not very pronounced. It is the Conservative parties and the Christian Party in Italy and – somewhat surprisingly – the Radical Right in France that have the most religious voters. Close to the secular pole, voters for the Green, Left Socialist and Communist parties are found as in most other countries. The Social Democrats are more secular than in the other regions. This applies in particular to France and Italy where the voters of the Social Democrats are among the most secular. The fairly strong correlation between party choice and religious–secular value in the Spanish case is caused by large differences between the major parties – the Popular Party (6.1), Socialist Party (4.4) and United Left (1.7).

## 5.3 ECONOMIC LEFT–RIGHT VALUE ORIENTATIONS

### 5.3.1 *Introduction*

According to the classic model of industrial society, political polarisation was a direct reflection of social class conflict (Inglehart 1984: 25). However, political value orientations were not absent from the political struggle, and the focus on social class or status variables as the dominant polarising conflict variables in industrial society may have been over-emphasised. The value orientations underlying the industrial “left”–“right” polarisation are conflicts over ownership of the means of production, the distribution of income and public regulation and control in relation to private enterprises. These value orientations have been central to political conflicts between Socialist and “bourgeois” political parties and, more generally, for identifying the left–right dimension in politics (Von Beyme 1985: chapter 2; Fuchs and Klingemann 1990; Knutsen 1995b, 1995c). Although there has been clear evidence towards class dealignment, there is evidence that the economic left–right values still have considerable impact in advanced industrial societies (Knutsen 1988).

### 5.3.2 *Hypotheses*

#### 5.3.2.1 *The Impact in a Comparative Perspective*

Class politics, class voting and class issues have traditionally been strongest in the Nordic countries. In accordance with previous findings (Knutsen 1995a, 1995b) it is expected that these values will have the strongest impact on party choice in these countries (H1). It is difficult to have expectations regarding differences between the other regions.

#### 5.3.2.2 *The Location of Voters for Different Party Families*

Economic left–right value orientations are expected to group the parties according to the conventional placement of parties along the *economic* Left–Right axis. I consequently expect the Communist and the Social Democratic parties to have voters with the most leftist materialist political value orientation. These parties have traditionally emphasised state intervention in the economy, political planning, public ownership of the means of production, industrial democracy and a large public sector (Von Beyme 1985: 68–71). A leftist economic value orientation has also been

accentuated by the Left Socialist parties. Although these parties also emphasise “new left” value orientations, they definitely emphasise economic redistribution and worker control of the same kind as the Traditional Left.

The early literature on the Green parties differentiated between different types of Green parties that had somewhat different locations regarding economic left–right value orientations. According to Rüdig (1985) and Müller-Rommel (1985: 491), there were two types of Green Party. Based on party programmes and strategies, these can be divided into *pure green reformist* and *alternative green radical* or “rainbow” parties. The former group of parties focuses genuinely on ecology issues, and tends to reject left–right economic issues as being important in politics. In contrast, the latter group of parties’ places incorporate traditional leftist concerns in their programmes and are placed to the left of the Social Democratic parties on traditional left–right economic issues. Some of the parties within this party family have changed position over time, and it is difficult to differentiate between these two groups, but the general hypothesis is that Green party voters will have a quite similar location on economic left–right values as the Social Democrats.

On the rightist side and at the centre of the economic left–right scale, I expect to find voters from all “bourgeois” party families, first and foremost voters for the Liberal, Conservative and Christian Democratic parties, but also Radical Right and Agrarian parties.

*The Christian Democratic parties* underscored class integration and have attempted to be broad-based catch-all and centre parties, and they have emphasised moderate state intervention and redistribution. In the Scandinavian countries, Christian People’s Parties have also placed themselves to the left of the Conservative parties. The German CDU/CSU absorbed Conservative forces and parties and is essentially a Conservative–Christian Party (or parties) with a more distinct economic rightist profile (Irving 1979: 67).

Although Old Conservatism generally opposed modern economic Liberalism, Modern Conservatism is not associated with this position and has in many cases overtaken Liberalism as the prevailing attitude on economic values. The strongest change in party programmes of Conservative parties has been in regard to the economic system where Conservative parties have become the standard-bearer of the concept of a free market economy, with a hostility towards economic intervention and a large welfare state (Von Beyme 1985: 50, 52).

It is somewhat difficult to place the *Liberal* parties in relation to the Conservative and Christian Democratic parties as regards economic left–right value orientations in respective party systems. Liberals emphasise *economic Liberalism* by supporting the concepts of a free market economy and private property. However, in the post-war period, many Liberal parties have changed their programme in the direction of emphasising *social Liberalism* and by accepting the welfare state and moderate economic redistribution (Von Beyme 1985: 37, 39). A possible way of solving the problem of grouping the Liberal parties is to split the parties into a *Liberal-Conservative* group and a *Liberal-Radical* group as was suggested by Gordon Smith and Klaus von Beyme (see Section 2.4). This split is, however, not followed in the present work.

Basically, I expect that there will be a difference between the Anglo-Scandinavian and the Continental Liberal parties. In the former countries, the Liberal parties will occupy a centrist position between the Conservative and Social Democratic parties, while the Continental pattern – according to Steed and Humphreys (1988: 416–417) – is characterised by overlapping positions along the economic left–right division between Liberal and Christian Democratic parties. From our discussion above concerning the placement of the Christian Democratic parties, I am even inclined to expect that the Liberal parties in the Continental countries will be placed to the right of the Christian Democratic parties.

Some of the early literature on the Radical Rightist parties considered them as being placed in an extremist position on the economic left–right scale, because these parties appeal to “advocacy of individual achievement, a free marketplace, and drastic restrictions of the role of the state; their reduction of individual freedom and social equality” (Betz 1993: 664). These parties combine classic Liberalist interpretations of the role of the individual and the economy with strong opposition to social integration of marginalized groups. This is also considered as a “winning formula” by Kitschelt (1995: 275). The successful parties combine market-Liberal stance on economic issues and an authoritarian stance on non-economic issues. More recent works have argued that the Radical Rightist parties have abandoned their very pronounced rightist position on the economic left–right dimension and shifted closer to the centre (Kitschelt 2013: 241–248; De Lange 2007) or that these parties have consciously blurred or avoided taking precise position on this dimension (Rovny 2013).<sup>4</sup>



On the basis of the review and discussion above, the following hypotheses are formulated:

H2: Voters of the leftist party families (Communist, Left Socialist and Social Democrats) will be located closest to the economic leftist pole. Communist and Left Socialist voters will be located further to the left of the Social Democrats.

H3: Green Party voters will be located about at the same position as the Social Democrats.

H4: Christian and Agrarian party voters will be located close to the centre of the economic left–right scale.

H5: Liberal party voters will be located further to the right in Central Western countries.

H6: Liberal party voters will be located to the left of Conservative party voters in Britain and the Nordic countries.

H7: Conservative party voters will be located closest to the right on the Island, in the Nordic and Southern countries.

H8: The Radical Rightist parties will have voters that are centre-right on the economic left–right scale.

### 5.3.3 *Empirical Analysis*

#### 5.3.3.1 *The Comparative Strength of the Correlations*

The correlations between the *economic left–right index* and party choice is the largest in the five Nordic countries, followed by France, the Netherlands and Switzerland and weakest in Ireland and Portugal and then Luxembourg, Spain and Greece (see [Table 5.1B](#)). The ranking of the four regions according to the average correlations shows that the strength of the associations is outstanding in the Nordic countries. H1 is then clearly supported.

#### 5.3.3.2 *Location of Party Voters*

The ranking of the countries according to the mean scores of the various party families follows a conventional left–right location in accordance with our expectations (see [Appendix Table 5.2](#)). The Social Democrats and the Greens have a fairly similar location, the Radical Rightist parties are located close to the centre (nearly exactly the means for all party voters) and the Conservative and the Liberal parties close to the rightist pole. All

the general hypotheses that do not involve any regional differences are then supported (H2–H4, H8). These patterns are fairly consistent across the various regions and countries within the regions.

In *the Nordic countries* – where we have seen that the economic left–right dimension is the most important both within these countries (see below) and in a comparative setting, the Left Socialist parties and the small Communist parties in Denmark and Norway are closest to the leftist pole, followed by the Social Democrats. The Liberal, Agrarian and Christian parties are considered as centrist parties in the Nordic countries, and this is reflected in the data. All these parties, with the exception of the Danish Agrarian Liberal party, are located in the centre at the voter level, while the rightist pole – consistently and with a firm distance to the centrist parties – is occupied by Conservative parties. The Liberal parties are located clearly to the left of the Conservative parties in accordance with H6. The Danish Agrarian Liberal Party, which can be considered as a deviant case within the Agrarian party family – is located close to the Conservative party in Denmark. The Radical Rightist parties have a somewhat different location in the three relevant countries: The Finnish party is located to the moderate left, the Danish to the moderate right, while the Norwegian party is located closer to the Conservative Party and the rightist pole. The Green Party in Sweden is located at the same moderate rightist level as the Social Democrats, while the Finnish party is located more to the centre.

In the *Central Western region*, we find a very similar ranking of the party families. A major exception is the Liberal parties that clearly are located closest to the rightist pole in accordance with our expectations. The location of the Liberal parties closest to the rightist pole is consistent across the six countries in accordance with H5. The Christian Democrats are located in the centre in Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland, but closer to the Liberal parties and the rightist pole in Austria, Germany and Luxembourg. Moreover, in the Central Western region, the location of the Radical Rightist voters varies significantly: they are located to the left in Belgium and Germany, in the centre in Luxembourg and the Netherlands and more to the right in Austria and Switzerland. The Green parties are located close to the Social Democrats in Austria, Germany and Switzerland,<sup>5</sup> to the right of these parties in Belgium and Luxembourg and to the left in the Netherlands. A significant deviation for the Social Democratic parties is that the German party voters are fairly centrist with an average score

equal to that of all party voters in Germany and with both the PSD and the Radical Right to the left.

In *Britain*, the major division regarding the economic left–right dimension is between the Conservative party voter and all other parties, including the Liberal Democrats in accordance with H6. The difference with the Labour Party which is located to the most leftist position is 0.3, while the distance to the Conservative party is 0.8. The nationalist and the Green parties have a very similar location as the Labour Party with a moderate leftist location. The economic left–right dimension has only a small impact on the *Irish* party system, and the location of the parties follows a conventional left–right pattern with the Labour and the Green parties to the left and the Fiánna Fail and Fine Gael more to the right.

In the *Southern region*, the economic left–right orientations have a large impact in France, moderate impact in Italy, Greece and Spain and small impact in Portugal. The locations of the party families are fairly consistent across the countries. In all countries, there is a significant difference between the Communist, Left Socialist and Social Democratic party families and the major non-socialist party families comprising Conservatives and Liberals. In all countries, the parties that are grouped as Conservative parties are those which are closest to the rightist pole. The Green parties have a fairly similar location to the Social Democrats in France, while being located to the right of the Social Democrats in Italy. The Radical Right in Italy is located close to the Conservative People of Freedom but is more centrist located in France and Greece.

H7, concerning the location of the Conservative parties closest to the rightist pole in the Nordic and the Island countries and in the South, is then confirmed although the two Liberal parties have about the same location as the Conservative parties in the Southern region.

#### 5.4 NEW POLITICS ORIENTATIONS

Given the rich data material regarding personal, social and political values in the European Values Survey, we have found three New Politics value orientations. It is demanding to formulate different hypotheses for each of these orientations and party choice when compared to the approaches with only one New Politics dimension as in the approach based on the materialist/post-materialist orientations and the GALTAN approach briefly discussed in [Chapter 3](#).

The basic expectations from the literature is that the impact of New Politics orientations on party choice will be the largest in the most advanced industrial societies, and that the New Politics parties – the Greens and the Left Socialists versus the Radical Right – will have voters who are closest to the opposite poles on these orientations. However, this can be differentiated. Given that we have found that the three New Politics orientations comprise separate dimensions in factor analyses, it is not likely that party voters for the various parties will be located in the same way on the various dimensions.

These differences are not easy to elaborate theoretically, and in the discussion and generation of hypotheses below, several sources are used for such purposes, but an expert survey conducted by Benoit and Laver (2006) is central. In this survey, experts were asked to place political parties in several policy areas. Two of these areas were the core of New Politics: the trade-off between environmental protection and economic growth and a liberal versus a restrictive immigration policy. The more general personal libertarian–authoritarian dimension is not included in this expert survey, but it was asked to locate the parties on a scale on social policy, where the experts are asked to locate the parties on a scale favouring liberal versus restrictive policies regarding “matters such as abortion, homosexuality and euthanasia.” This is, however, more a moral dimension closely related to religious values, although also relevant for general libertarian–authoritarian values.

The hypotheses that are generated partly on the basis of the expert survey are based on the assumption that the parties appeal to voters on the basis of their location on the policy dimension according to the experts.

The scales in Benoit and Laver’s expert surveys range from 1 to 20. Parties are grouped in the same party families as for the survey data, and average scores are calculated for each party family. Only the averages (not the location of parties in the various countries) for the party families are referred to below.

## 5.5 ENVIRONMENTAL VALUE ORIENTATIONS

### 5.5.1 *Introduction and Hypotheses*

Environmental values versus various trade-offs was probably the first aspect of New Politics that emerged as a political conflict in the 1970s. In the Nordic countries, for example, support for environmental issues was the strongest among the political centre forces (Agrarian, Christian and Liberal parties) and among the Left Socialists, while the main

antagonists along the economic left–right dimension, the Conservatives and the Social Democrats were the growth parties focussing less on environmental issues than the other parties (Knutsen 1997). Generally, the Radical Right emerged or transformed into Radical Rightist parties *after* environmental issues became important, but such issues were not central for these parties in most West European countries.

This is reflected to some extent in Benoit and Laver’s expert survey. According to the average location of the scale, the experts locate the Greens (2.5) and the Left Socialist (6.1) parties, and then the Communist parties (6.9) are closest to the environmental pole, while the Conservative parties (15.1) and then the Radical Right (14.7) are closest to the anti-environmental (economic growth) pole, followed by all the (other) Old Politics party families with scores ranging from 11.9 for the Liberals to 10.0 for the Social Democrats.

It is expected that these patterns will have consequences for the location at the voter level. If there is congruence between the party and the voter party space, we expect that in countries where the Radical Right is *not* the party closest to the anti-environmental pole

H1: The New Left parties (Greens and Left Socialists) will have those voters who most strongly support green/environmental values.

H2: The Old Politics party families will be located more to the anti-environmental pole.

H3: The Radical Rightist parties will have a similar location as the Old Politics parties and will *not* clearly represent the parties as the opposite pole to the Greens and Left Socialists.

## 5.5.2 *Empirical Analysis*

### 5.5.2.1 *The Impact in a Comparative Perspective*

The strongest correlations between environmental values and party choice are found in Belgium, Switzerland and in the Nordic countries, while the weakest correlations are found in the South European countries, Ireland and somewhat surprisingly, Germany (Table 5.1C). The correlations are particularly weak in Greece, Germany, Spain and Portugal. There are smaller differences regarding the mean correlations for the regions for

environmental values than for the two first value orientations, but the mean is largest in the Nordic countries and smallest on the Islands and in the South.

#### 5.5.2.2 *Location of Party Voters*

The Greens, the Left Socialist and the Communists are located closest to the environmental pole, while the major Old Politics parties (Liberals, Social Democrats, Conservatives, Christians and Agrarians) are located closest to the opposite anti-green pole (see [Appendix Table 5.3](#)). The Radical Rightist parties are located in the centre, close to the Liberals and the Social Democrats. Hypotheses H1–H3 are then strongly supported. The Radical Rightist voters are much more centrist on environmental values than the location of the parties' programmatic profile according to the experts.

It is evident that the location of parties on this New Politics dimension cuts across the economic left–right axis. This is particularly evident for the Social Democratic party family which is located close to the centre on these orientations, close to the Conservative and Christian parties. The Radical Rightist parties are located in the centre and are not located towards the opposite pole as expected from the idea of a single New Politics party conflict dimension.

In the *Nordic countries*, there is a considerable competition for the environmentalists' vote between Left Socialists and Green parties in Finland and Sweden. The Liberal parties, particularly in Denmark and Norway, also have voters who are quite close to the green pole. The two parties that we have included in the Communist party family also have voters who strongly support green values. The Radical Right in Norway (the Progress Party) has the most anti-green location, in contrast to Denmark and Finland, where the Radical Rightist voters are more centrist. The location of the Conservative and Agrarian parties close to the anti-green pole and the Social Democrats more to the centre is consistent across the Nordic countries.

In the *Central Western* region, we find some of the countries where environmental voting is the strongest according to the data (Belgium and Switzerland). Apart from the small Communist parties which have very green voters, there is a large difference between the Green parties and the others according to the mean scores. This pattern is found in all countries quite consistently, although the Left Socialist parties in Germany and the Netherlands also have voters quite close to the green pole. The Social Democrats are located close to the centre, much closer to the other party families than to the Greens and Communists. The centrist location is found

in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. In Austria and Luxembourg, the Social Democrats are closer to the anti-green pole, while in Switzerland, the party is moderately green, closer to the two Green parties than the other major parties that are located closer to the anti-green pole.

At the opposite pole, we find the Christian, Liberal and Radical Rightist parties according to the average scores. This applies fairly consistently across the various countries although the Liberal parties in Luxembourg and the Netherlands are located more to the centre. The Radical Rightist parties in Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg are those parties with the most anti-green voters in their respective party systems, while the Radical Right in the other three countries are located somewhat more to the centre.

In *Britain*, environmental values place the Green Party and then the Liberal Democrats closest to the green pole, while the Labour Party and then the Conservative and nationalist parties are located at the opposite pole. In *Ireland*, there is a fairly large distance between the Green Party and the other parties. Fiánna Fail and then Fine Gael voters are located closest to the anti-green pole.

Environmental conflicts between the political parties at the voter level are weak in *Southern Europe* according to the data, and the location of party voters for given party families varies between the countries. For example, the Communist party in Greece is located closest to the green pole together with the Left Socialist SYRIZA; the PCF in France is the party closest to the anti-green pole, and the Communists in Italy and Portugal are located in the centre in these orientations. The Conservative and Christian (in Italy) parties are, however, firmly and consistently located close to the anti-green pole.

## 5.6 LIBERTARIAN–AUTHORITARIAN VALUE ORIENTATIONS

### 5.6.1 Introduction

The libertarian/authoritarian values included in the index are personal and social values to a large extent. These values might be considered basic for individuals and related to personality traits. They are somewhat different from more political libertarian–authoritarian values such as stronger sentences for crime, law and order and stronger defence forces (political authoritarian values) versus acceptance of unconventional forms of political participation and more participation (libertarian values).

### 5.6.2 *Hypotheses*

Apart from a short discussion in Flanagan's works on libertarian/authoritarian values, there are no theoretical arguments in the literature which formulate other expectations about the placement of voters for the various party families than those derived from Inglehart and other writers of New Politics. These writers generally present the same hypotheses and expectations about the placement of parties.

From New Politics theory I expect, then, that there is basically the same grouping of parties along the two indices and that these are similar to those obtained for materialist/post-materialist values. According to Flanagan's alternative conceptualisation of value change,<sup>6</sup> the new value conflict distinguishes New Left parties and New Right parties. Flanagan does not discuss exactly which parties he groups under these concepts; the only example he mentions as a New Right party is the National Front in France which he expects will have voters with predominantly authoritarian values (Flanagan 1987:1306–1308). Since he uses the notion New Left parties for those parties with the most libertarian programme and electorate, from his perspective, it might be natural to expect that parties that I have grouped into the Left Socialists party family, not the Green parties, will have the most libertarian electorate. According to the emphasis on New Right parties, I expect that the Radical Right parties will have voters closest to the authoritarian pole.

However, we might also differentiate between the voters of the Old Politics parties. Christian child-rearing practices are considered authoritarian, and the personal authoritarian values that are included on the index should reflect Christian Party voters' values. The same might be the case for Conservative party voters. Much research has shown the Christian and Conservative individuals support parenting values such as discipline, obedience and conformity (Mahoney et al. 2008: 80–85). However, some studies find that parents' endorsement of right-wing authoritarian beliefs is more strongly related to general values such as child obedience than their degree of religiosity (Danso, Hunsberge and Pratt 1997).

Given the general perspective in the literature about the authoritarianism of the Radical Rightist voters, Flanagan's perspective and the findings referred to above, I do not expect that Christian and Conservative party voters to be as authoritarian as voters of the Radical Rightist parties.

To the extent that libertarian–authoritarian values are similar to the social policy scale in Benoit and Laver's expert survey, the Radical Rightist



parties are located show the most extreme values (15.9), followed by the Christian parties (14.8) and the Conservatives (13.9). The most libertarian parties are the Greens (3.3), the Left Socialists (4.8), followed by the Communists (5.3) and the Social Democrats (5.9).

On the basis of these considerations, the following hypotheses are formulated:

H1: The New Left parties (Greens and Left Socialists) have voters that most strongly support libertarian values.

H2 a) Radical Rightist, Conservative and Christian parties have the most authoritarian party voters; b) The Radical Rightist parties are closest to the authoritarian pole.

H3: Voters of the other party families (first and foremost Social Democrats, Agrarian and Liberals) are located to the centre along the libertarian–authoritarian scale.

### 5.6.3 *Empirical Analysis*

#### 5.6.3.1 *The Impact in a Comparative Perspective*

The correlations between party choice and libertarian values are the largest in Austria, the Netherlands and Switzerland, followed by Greece and Denmark (see [Table 5.1D](#)). Among the countries where the correlations are the smallest, we find Portugal, Ireland, Britain and Luxembourg. The average regional correlations are the largest in the Central Western region and smallest on the Islands.

The advanced industrial New Politics hypothesis is not supported; the correlations between the indicators for advanced industrialism and the strength of the correlations between party choice and libertarian–authoritarian values are close to zero.

#### 5.6.3.2 *The Location of Party Voters*

The libertarian–authoritarian value orientations are personal values that are supposed to have a more personal base in the New Politics conflict according to the literature. Do these value orientations differentiate between the parties in the same way on environmental values? the Green and Left Socialist parties are located closest to the libertarian pole, followed by the Agrarian, Communist and Liberal party families, while the Conservative, Ethnic-Regional, Christian and Radical Right are closest to

the authoritarian pole (see [Appendix Table 5.4](#)). The Social Democrats are located in the centre. The location of the Agrarian parties must be seen in the light of the fact that the voters in the Nordic countries are the most libertarian in a comparative setting. As shown below, these party voters are among the most authoritarian within the Nordic setting.

H1 is the clearly supported. The same applies to H2a and H3, but not H2b. *The Conservative and Christian Party voters are more personal authoritarian than voters of the Radical Right.*

In the *Nordic countries*, it is the Communist and Green Party voters who are the most libertarian and then the Liberal and the Left Socialists. Closest to the authoritarian pole, we find voters for the Christian, Radical Right, and the Agrarian Conservative and Social Democratic parties. These patterns are fairly consistent across the five countries. The fact that there is a fairly large distance between the Left Socialist parties and Communists, and the Green parties is first and foremost due to the patterns in Denmark and Sweden, where the Left Socialists are significantly less libertarian than the Communists (in Denmark), the Greens (in Sweden) and the Liberals (in both countries). The Christian parties have the most authoritarian electorate in the three relevant countries. Only in Denmark are the Radical Rightist voters the most authoritarian, while in Finland and Norway, they are clearly less authoritarian than the Christian Party voters. The Conservative party voters are located in the centre in all countries apart from Iceland where they are most authoritarian. The Social Democratic party voters are located as somewhat more authoritarian than the average voter in four of the countries and the second most authoritarian after the Christian Democrats in Sweden.

In *the Central Western countries*, we find fairly similar patterns compared to those found in the Nordic countries. It is the Green and Communist party voters and then the Left Socialists and Liberals who are most libertarian and the Christian parties and then the Radical Rightist parties that are the most authoritarian. The Green parties exist in all six countries and have the most libertarian voters in all these countries. The Left Socialists in Germany and Switzerland are also close to the libertarian pole. The same applies to the Liberal parties in Austria, Germany and the Netherlands.

The Christian parties are closest to the authoritarian pole in Austria, Germany and the Netherlands,<sup>7</sup> while the Radical Rightist parties have the most authoritarian electorate in Belgium, Luxembourg and Switzerland. Generally, we find the party voters for these party families closest to the

authoritarian pole in all the Central Western countries but varies according to which parties are the most authoritarian.

In *Britain*, there is a three-level division regarding the libertarian–authoritarian value orientations: The Green Party voters are more libertarian followed by the Liberal Democrats and the Nationalist parties, while voters of the two major parties – the Conservatives and Labour – are the most authoritarian at exactly the same level according to the data. In *Ireland*, there is also a three-level division with Green Party voters as the most libertarian, the Fiánna Fail voters as the most authoritarian, with the other parties (Sinn Fain, Labour and Fine Gael) occupying a centrist position.

The population in *the Southern European* countries are fairly authoritarian in a comparative setting as we have seen above, but the strength of the correlations with party choice varies considerably. It is the Left Socialist and the Green parties that have the most libertarian voters, while the Conservative and the Christian parties are located closest to the authoritarian pole.

The Left Socialist parties have the most libertarian electorate in all five countries and the Green parties the second most libertarian in the two relevant countries (France and Italy). In all countries in the region, the Conservative parties are located close to the authoritarian pole. The French Radical Right has the most authoritarian voters, but the Radical Right in the other relevant countries (Greece and Italy) is fairly centrist on these value orientations. The Social Democratic voters are fairly centrist in all countries.

The large correlation coefficient between party choice and libertarian–authoritarian values in Greece is first and foremost the result of the polarisation between the Left Socialist SYRIZA and the Conservative New Democracy parties that are located fairly close to the libertarian and authoritarian poles, respectively

## 5.7 IMMIGRATION ORIENTATIONS

### 5.7.1 *Hypotheses*

Opposition to a liberal immigration policy and a multicultural society are core policy positions of the Radical Right, and one frequently finds the New Left parties as the main opponents regarding immigration policy. I have systematically examined the location on these two policy areas for the Radical Right and the Greens and Left Socialist parties. In

all of the relevant countries, the Radical Rightist parties are located closest to the restrictive pole on the immigration policy question. The Greens, Left Socialists, and in a few countries, the Communists are placed closest to the Liberal pole in all relevant countries. The average location of the Radical Rightist parties is much more extreme than on the other New Politics dimensions: 18.8 versus 13.6 for the Conservatives and 10.2–11.8 for the Christian, Agrarian and Ethnic-regional parties. On the liberal or least restrictive side, we find the Greens (3.4) the Communists (4.2) and the Left Socialists (4.9). The Old Politics parties (apart from the Communists) with the most liberal immigration policy are – according to the experts – the Social Democrats (7.3) and the Liberals (9.2).

We therefore expect that immigration orientations will clearly polarise between the New Left (Greens and Left Socialists) and the Radical Right. Of the other party families, the main non-socialist party families – first and foremost the Conservative and Christian parties – have generally – and in accordance with the general model for location of the parties in the New Politics party space – been closer to the restrictive pole than the Liberal and Social Democratic parties

H1: a) the Radical Rightist parties will have voters that are closest to the restrictive pole on immigration orientation, while b) the opposite applies for the New Left (Greens and Left Socialist) parties that will have voters that are located closest to the liberal pole.

H2: The other party families will have more centrist voters with the Liberal and Social Democrats more to the liberal pole than the Conservative, Christian and Agrarian party voters.

## 5.7.2 *Empirical Analysis*

### 5.7.2.1 *The Comparative Strength*

There is a considerable variation in how these orientations are important for individuals' party choice according to [Table 5.1E](#). The correlations are the strongest in Austria and Switzerland, followed by several of the Nordic countries and France and the weakest in Ireland and the Southern European countries, Portugal, Greece and Spain. The correlations are on average the largest in the Nordic countries and in the Central Western region.

### 5.7.2.2 *The Location of Party Voters*

How are the party families located on this dimension? Do we find that the Radical Rightist parties are located closest to the restricted immigration pole in some contrast to the patterns found for the two other New Politics orientations above?

Appendix Table 5.5 shows that in some contrast to the patterns found for the other New Politics orientations are the *New Politics parties* that occupy the opposing positions on immigration orientations. The Left Socialist and the Green Party voters are clearly the most Liberal followed by the Communist party voters, while the Radical Right is clearly located towards the opposite pole, with a significant distance to the ethnical regional party family and then to most other non-socialist party families. The Liberal party family is, however, located somewhat to the liberal pole compared to the Social Democrats. H1a, H1b and H2 are then confirmed.

*Immigration orientations are then the only New Politics dimension that supports the general perspective that are formulated in many works on the location of the New Politics party families on a “cultural” dimension.*

Apart from the deviant pattern for the Island countries (see below), these patterns are fairly consistent across the various regions. The Radical Rightist parties are located towards the restrictive pole, while the Left Socialists and the Greens are located towards the opposite Liberal pole. The Communist parties in the Nordic countries are, however, even more Liberal than the Left Socialists and the Greens. The location of the other party families is also fairly consistent across the various regions.

In *the Nordic countries*, the location of the Communist, Left Socialist, Green and Radical Rightist parties close to the poles are consistent across the five countries. The Liberal parties are in all relevant countries closest to the former parties to the Liberal pole, while the Agrarian centre parties are closest to the Radical Rightist parties at the restrictive pole, although the distance between the Radical Right and the Centre parties is quite large in all countries. In Iceland, which does not have a Radical Rightist parties, the two non-socialist parties are closest to the restrictive pole. Sweden is an exception regarding the Centre party as the most restrictive apart from the Radical Right. The Conservative and then the Social Democrats are closest to the restrictive pole and then the centre party.

In *the Central Western region*, we find some of the strongest correlations between party choice and immigration orientation (Austria and

Switzerland). The average location of the party families is very similar to the one in the Nordic countries, although the Communists are not outstanding Liberal and the Liberal parties have a fairly similar location as the Social Democrats, while they were clearly more Liberal than the Social Democrats in the Nordic countries. The outlined pattern based on the average scores for these countries is indeed what we find in most of the Central Western countries. The Radical Rightist parties are in all countries clearly more restrictive than voters for all other parties and the Greens and – with two exceptions – the Left Socialist parties are the most liberal. The two exceptions are the Left Socialist parties in Germany and the Netherlands, which are located a fairly large distance from the Greens and at the same level as the Social Democrats (the Netherlands) and even more centrist (Germany). The Christian parties are, in all countries, the parties that are located closest to the Radical Rightist parties although the distance to the Radical Right is quite large.<sup>8</sup> The Liberal and the Social Democratic parties have a somewhat different location on immigration orientations. The Liberal parties in Austria and Switzerland are located relatively more to the Liberal pole than the Liberal parties in Germany and Luxembourg, while the Liberal in Belgium are fairly restrictive. The VVD in the Netherlands also belong to the same group as the Belgian Liberals, and there is a large distance between VVD and the left-Liberal D66, which is the second most Liberal among the Dutch parties. The Socialist voters are fairly Liberal regarding immigration orientation in the Central Western countries apart from in Austria and Luxembourg where they are close to the centre.

In *Britain and Ireland*, the correlations between party choice and immigration orientations are modest in a comparative setting. In Britain, voters of the Conservative Party are most restrictive. At the opposing side, voters for the Labour, Green and Liberal Democrats are found, placing the nationalist party voters in a centrist position, but closer to the latter group. In Ireland, there are small differences between the Labour Party, Fine Gael and Fiánna Fail. The parties that are placed at the opposing poles are the Green Party (Liberal) and Sinn Fein (most restrictive).

In *Southern Europe*, there are large variations in the strength of the immigration orientation conflicts in the party system according to the data. The party conflict is comparatively strong in Italy and France and quite weak in Greece, Portugal and Spain. The average location of the party families on the scale is fairly similar to those found in the other regions. The Communists are, however, fairly centrist in clear contrast to,

for example, the Nordic countries. The voters of the Left Socialist parties are in all countries the most Liberal, while the voters of the Radical Rightist parties the most restrictive. The distances between these parties and the other are quite large in all countries. The Conservative parties in France, Italy and Spain are located firmly on the restrictive pole. In Spain, voters of the People's Party are the most restrictive, and in Italy, the People of Freedom and the Lega Nord are located closest to the Radical Rightist Fiamma Tricolore, contributing significantly to the high correlation between party choice and immigration orientations in Italy given the significant support for the two former parties.

### 5.8 THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN VALUE ORIENTATIONS AND PARTY CHOICE WITHIN THE VARIOUS COUNTRIES

Table 5.2 shows the relative importance of the various value orientations within each country. The eta coefficients are simply ranked within each country according to the magnitudes. The means for each region is also calculated and ranked in the same way.

In all *the Nordic countries*, economic left–right orientations are decisively correlated most strongly with party choice (Table 5.2A). The strength of these correlations is considerably larger than the correlations between party choice and the other value orientations.

The second highest correlation according to the average correlation for the five countries is immigration orientation, which also is the second strongest in Denmark and Norway and third strongest in the other three countries. The correlations in Finland, Norway and Sweden for immigration orientation and religious–secular values are, however, fairly similar.

The correlations between religious–secular orientations and party choice vary considerably between the Nordic countries, being the second strongest in Finland and Sweden, third strongest in Norway and least and of minor importance for party voting in Denmark and Iceland. Environmental values and libertarian-authoritarian values are not so strongly correlated to party choice as the other value orientations in Finland, Norway and Sweden but relatively more important in Denmark and Iceland. However, the absolute magnitude of these correlations is fairly large.

In the *Central Western region*, religion (religious variables) has played a dominant role in explaining party choice. Several studies

**Table 5.2** Correlation between party choice and value orientations. Ranked according to the strength of the correlations within each country.

A. The Nordic countries		C. The Island countries											
	eclr	immigr	libaut	environ	resec	Mean		eclr	immigr	environ	libaut	resec	Mean
Denmark	0.573	0.401	0.304	0.234	0.118	0.326	Britain	0.342	0.281	0.233	0.179	0.141	0.235
Finland	eclr	resec	immigr	environ	libaut	0.381	Ireland	resec	immigr	environ	libaut	eclr	0.188
	0.559	0.402	0.374	0.312	0.256			0.278	0.222	0.183	0.165	0.090	
Iceland	eclr	environ	immigr	libaut	resec	0.291	Mean	immigr	eclr	resec	environ	libaut	Mean
	0.502	0.302	0.294	0.243	0.112			0.251	0.216	0.210	0.208	0.172	0.211
Norway	eclr	immigr	resec	environ	libaut	0.380	D. Southern Europe						
	0.536	0.437	0.420	0.273	0.233		France	eclr	immigr	libaut	resec	environ	Mean
		resec	immigr	libaut	environ			0.452	0.386	0.263	0.198	0.192	0.298
Sweden	eclr	0.608	0.374	0.356	0.255	0.368	France	libaut	eclr	resec	immigr	environ	0.233
		eclr	immigr	resec	environ	Mean	Greece	0.324	0.278	0.270	0.191	0.104	
Mean		0.555	0.372	0.285	0.274	0.349		immigr	eclr	resec	libaut	environ	0.301
B. Central Western countries		immigr	libaut	eclr	resec	Mean	Italy	0.430	0.326	0.294	0.245	0.209	
Austria		0.489	0.378	0.332	0.291	0.336		resec	environ	eclr	libaut	immigr	0.141
	environ	0.346	0.345	0.327	0.327	0.323	Portugal	0.202	0.174	0.129	0.128	0.074	
Belgium								resec	environ	eclr	libaut	immigr	0.141
							Spain	0.397	0.263	0.244	0.228	0.196	0.266

(continued)





have documented that religious variables have had a more significant impact on (left–right) party choice compared to social class and, with regard to values, that religious–secular values have been more important than economic left–right values among the Old Politics political value orientations (Knutzen 1995a, b). This may have changed during the last decade but is not very likely given the tendency for the religious cleavage to be more resistant to change according to some of the literature referred to above.

According to the average correlation coefficients between value orientations and party choice in the data material (see Table 5.2B), immigration orientation and religious–secular values are most strongly correlated with party choice, followed by economic left–right values, while the correlations between the two other New Politics orientations and party choice are somewhat smaller. The difference between the impact of religious values and economic left–right values are then quite small in Central Western Europe in contrast to what one could expect from the literature. However, probably more interesting is that the impact of immigration orientations has approached the impact of Old Politics orientations. We do not find such a consistent pattern regarding the strongest correlation in the other countries as in the Nordic countries. Immigration orientation is most strongly correlated with party choice in Austria and Switzerland, while religious–secular values are most significant in Germany and the Netherlands. In Luxembourg and Belgium, the strength of the correlations with party choice are fairly similar for all value orientations apart from libertarian–authoritarian values.

*British* party politics has been characterised as uni-dimensional. The class conflict and the corresponding economic left–right values have been dominant in determining party support. In a basically two-party system, the conflict structure can only be one-dimensional, but with the rise of the Liberals and later its successor, the Liberal Democrats and the regional parties in Scotland and Wales, one might expect the conflict structure to become more multidimensional (Lynch 2007; Webb and Fisher 1999).

The data confirm the strong impact of economic left–right values which is the strongest correlated with party choice, followed by immigration orientation and environmental values, while religious–secular values and also libertarian–authoritarian values have weaker correlations with party choice (see Table 5.2C).

In *Ireland*, religious–secular orientations are the strongest correlated with party choice, followed by immigration orientations. The main

difference between the Island countries is the impact of economic left–right values, which is the largest in Britain and smallest in Ireland. Apart from that, the ranking of the countries is identical in the two countries.

The impact of the various value orientations varies considerably between the *Southern European countries* (Table 5.2D). On average, economic left–right values have a somewhat larger impact than religious–secular values and immigration orientations, while libertarian–authoritarian values, particularly environmental values, have a lesser impact. Economic left–right values are most strongly correlated with party choice in France, immigration orientation in Italy, libertarian–authoritarian values in Greece and religious–secular values in Spain and Portugal.

Finally, the average correlations based on *all countries* are shown (Table 5.2E). Economic left–right orientations are the strongest correlated with party choice according to the average figures, followed by immigration orientations and religious–secular values. Generally, the Old Politics orientations are still most significantly correlated with party choice, but New Politics orientations have approached Olds Politics, and immigration orientations in particular have become a major determinant of party choice according to these bivariate figures. These orientations are most highly correlated with party choice in four countries, the second highest in five and third highest in four countries. This is a clear illustration of how a central component of New Politics is shaping the party choice of West European voters.

## 5.9 THE IMPACT OF OLD POLITICS AND NEW POLITICS VALUE ORIENTATIONS

### 5.9.1 *Testing Macro-Level Hypotheses for the Impact of Single Value Orientations*

The comparative impact of the various value orientations is shown in Table 5.1 and has been commented on in the various earlier sections. Here we will examine the comparative strength of these correlations against the macro-level variables. Then we will focus on the total impact of the Old Politics and New Politics orientations and test various aspects of the impact of these orientations on party choice against the macro-level variables

*The New Politics advanced industrial hypothesis* assumes that the impact of New Politics orientations will be the largest in the most advanced industrial societies. In the most advanced industrial democracies, the shifting preferences of voters and the changing

focus on the political elites have increasingly been upon the New Politics dimensions. This is reflected in the larger impact of these dimensions on party choice (Inglehart 1997: chap. 8; Kitschelt and Rehm 2015: 180–192).

It is therefore expected that:

H1: All New Politics orientations will have the largest impact on party choice in the most advanced industrial societies.

We do not expect that the Old Politics orientations will have largest impact in the most advanced industrial societies and do not formulate an expectation about the opposite either.

From the discussion in [Section 1.6](#), it is expected that:

H2: All value orientations will have the largest impact in the more (a) fragmented and (b) polarised party systems.

H2 is based on the premise that the left–right polarisation measure is a catch-all measure that captures party polarisation along all value orientations.

The empirical correlation analysis shows that:

The impact of religious–secular values is only significantly *positively* correlated with party system fragmentations (0.37).

The impact of economic left–right values is significantly correlated with GDP per capita (0.35) and the size of the service sector (0.40) and also with party system fragmentation (0.46) and polarisation (0.25).

The impact of environmental values is correlated with GDP per capita (0.42) and the size of the service sector (0.37) and also with party system fragmentation (0.41) and polarisation (0.25).

The impact of libertarian–authoritarian values is not significantly correlated with GDP per capita and the size of the service sector, but it is significantly correlated with party system fragmentation (0.52) and polarisation (0.50). An examination of the scatterplot for the impact of libertarian–authoritarian values and GDP per capita indicates that Greece and Norway are bivariate outliers. Greece has a low GDP per capita and a high correlation between libertarian–authoritarian values and party choice, while the opposite is the case for Norway. When these outliers are removed from the analysis, the correlation increases to 0.38. However, the same does not apply to size of the service sector.

The impact of immigration orientations is correlated with GDP per capita (0.47) and the size of the service sector (0.27) and also with party system fragmentation (0.59) and polarisation (0.59).

H1 is supported apart from libertarian–authoritarian values.

H2a and b are supported apart from H2b for polarisation for the impact of religious–secular values.

### 5.9.2 *The Total Impact of Old and New Politics Value Orientations*

The hypotheses that can be formulated for this analysis follow closely from those formulated above. We expect that:

H3: New Politics value orientations will have the largest effects in the most advanced industrialised democracies.

H4: The impact of New Politics orientations will have the largest impact in the most advanced industrial societies relative to Old Politics orientation.

H5: Both Old Politics and New Politics orientations will have the largest impact in (a) fragmented and (b) polarised party systems.

Table 5.3 shows the explanatory power of the two Old Politics and the three New Politics orientations based on Nagelkerke's  $R^2$ .

The first two parts (5.3A and B) simply show the total explanatory power of the two Old Politics and the three New Politics orientations, respectively. Table 5.3C shows the explanatory power of the New Politics orientations when these orientations are included after the Old Political orientations. This is not based on conventional causal logic but on the logic that Old Politics orientation has traditionally influenced party choice and then New Politics orientations have emerged and added additional explanatory power to the model. Tables 5.8D and E simply show the ratio between the explanatory powers of New Politics in relation to Old Politics for the two ways of measuring the explanatory power of New Politics. Table 5.8D is based on the explanatory power in Tables A and B, while Table E is based on Tables A and C.

According to Table 5.3A, Old Politics orientations have the strongest impact on party choice in the Nordic countries, the Netherlands and Germany. In the former countries, it is first and foremost the strong correlation of economic left–right values that contributes to this, while religious–secular values play the most significant role for Germany and the

**Table 5.3** The explanatory power of Old Politics and New Politics value orientations on party choice measured by Nagelkerke's pseudo- $R^2$

<i>A. Old Politics</i>	<i>B. New Politics</i>	<i>C. New Politics in addition</i>	<i>D. New Politics/Old Politics</i>	<i>E. New Politics in addition/Old Politics</i>			
Sweden	0.457	Austria	0.254	Austria	1.81	Austria	1.32
Finland	0.451	Switzerland	0.225	Luxemb.	1.41	Luxemb.	1.28
Netherlands	0.442	Norway	0.263	Switzerland	1.39	Ireland	0.98
Norway	0.424	Netherlands	0.256	Ireland	1.28	Switzerland	0.92
Denmark	0.346	Denmark	0.253	Italy	1.25	Belgium	0.90
Iceland	0.278	Belgium	0.252	Denmark	1.18	Italy	0.87
Germany	0.275	Finland	0.251	France	1.07	Britain	0.81
Switzerland	0.244	Italy	0.238	Netherlands	0.90	Portugal	0.70
France	0.230	Sweden	0.213	Finland	0.87	France	0.55
Spain	0.220	France	0.200	Britain	0.87	Greece	0.51
Belgium	0.213	Iceland	0.196	Norway	0.73	Denmark	0.37
Austria	0.193	Germany	0.163	Sweden	0.71	Iceland	0.36
Italy	0.191	Britain	0.152	Iceland	0.62	Germany	0.32
Greece	0.148	Luxemb.	0.140	Germany	0.59	Netherlands	0.28
Britain	0.142	Greece	0.133	Ireland	0.58	Finland	0.27
Luxemb.	0.099	Spain	0.128	Greece	0.58	Spain	0.27
Ireland	0.083	Ireland	0.106	Spain	0.56	Norway	0.25
Portugal	0.060	Portugal	0.052	Portugal	0.47	Sweden	0.22
<b>Means</b>		<b>Means</b>		<b>Means</b>		<b>Means</b>	
Nordic	0.391	Central West	0.250	Islands	1.174	Islands	0.895
Central West	0.244	Nordic	0.235	Central West	1.162	Central West	0.837
South	0.170	South	0.150	South	0.893	South	0.580
Islands	0.113	Islands	0.129	Nordic	0.616	Nordic	0.294
All	0.250	All	0.205	All	0.937	All	0.621

Netherlands as we seen in [Tables 5.1A](#) and B. The explanatory power of Old Politics values is the lowest in Portugal, Ireland and Luxembourg. On average, Old Politics orientations have decisively the strongest impact in the Nordic countries and weakest impact in the Islands and in the South.

Regarding the total impact of the three New Politics orientations, [Table 5.3B](#) shows that New Politics orientations have the strongest explanatory power in Austria and Switzerland, while the lowest explanatory power is found in Ireland and some of the South European countries (Portugal, Spain and Greece). Regarding the region of countries, there is again a major division in explanatory power between the central European countries and the Nordic countries on the one hand and the Islands and the Southern countries on the other.

We note from [Table 5.3A](#) and B that the impact of New Politics orientations (0.250) is somewhat lower on average than the impact of Old Politics (0.205), but the difference is not large.

[Table 5.3C](#) shows that the absolute additional impact of New Politics orientations is the largest in many of the central European countries, and the figures are the strongest in Austria and Switzerland. The averages for the various regions place the central regions significantly ahead of the other regions.

[Table 5.3D](#) shows the relative impact of New to Old Politics. The explanatory power of New Politics is simply divided by Old Politics. In several central European countries, New Politics orientations have stronger explanatory power on party choice than Old Politics orientations. Ireland and Britain are also among these countries, but this must be seen against the fact that the explanatory power of Old Politics is relatively low in these countries. The relative impact of New Politics according to this measure is the smallest in the Nordic countries due to the large impact of Old Politics orientations. From [Table 5.3B](#), it is evident that the absolute explanatory power of New Politics orientations is not particularly low in these countries.

Concerning the ratio of the explanatory power of New Politics in addition to Old Politics ([Table 5.3E](#)), the additional impact of New Politics is considerably smaller than the impact of Old Politics, in moderate contrast to the pattern based on a comparison of [Tables 5.3A](#) and [5.3BB](#). Only in Austria and Luxembourg is the additional impact larger than the impact of Old Politics orientation, but in several countries, New Politics approaches Old Politics even when the relative impact is measured in this rather restrictive way regarding the influence of New Politics. This is particularly relevant for those countries where the ratio is 0.70–0.98. A

possible problematic aspect of this approach to examining the impact of New Politics value orientation is that, in some countries where value orientations in general (both Old and New Politics) have relatively small explanatory power, the ratios become high. Such is the case in Britain, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal.

We consider the results from [Table 5.3A](#) and B relevant for testing H3 and H5, while [Table 5.3C–E](#) for testing H4.

H3 is supported: The correlations between the impact of New Politics and the measures for advanced industrialism are 0.53 and 0.25 for GDP per capita and the size of the service sector, respectively. However, Old Politics orientations are also significantly correlated with these measures, 0.51 and 0.41, respectively.

H4 is generally not supported. Of the three measures from [Tables 5.3C–E](#), only GDP per capita is significantly correlated with the additional explanatory power of New Politics orientations ([Table 5.3C](#)). Some of the relevant correlations are even significantly *negative*, indicating that the relative impact of Old Politics orientations is the largest in the most advanced industrial countries. The reason for these patterns can easily be seen from [Table 5.3D](#) and [E](#). Some of the most advanced industrial countries, such as the Netherlands and the Nordic countries, have a low score on the measure for the impact of Old Politics relative to Old Politics. These negative correlations are not found for the correlations based on [Table 5.3C](#) because the additional *absolute* explanatory power is somewhat larger in the advanced societies.

H5 is generally confirmed. The impact of Old Politics orientations and the impact of New Politics orientations are both strongly correlated with party system fragmentation (0.59 and 0.65, respectively). Party system polarisation is strongly correlated with the impact of New Politics orientations (0.49) but not with the impact of Old Politics.

I did not formulate any hypotheses about the relative impact of New and Old Politics orientations and party system fragmentation and polarisation because the mechanisms for the relationship are assumed to be similar for both Old and New Politics orientations. The empirical analysis shows that only two of six relevant correlations are significant, namely those for the additional absolute impact of New Politics (from [Table 5.3C](#)), which are correlated with effective number of parties and party system polarisation with 0.46 and 0.50, respectively. These findings seem to be reasonable. The party system characteristics are relevant for the *absolute* impact of value orientations on party choice, not the *relative*



impact of different value orientations. This is reflected in [Table 5.3C](#) (and A and B) but not in [Table 5.3D](#) and E.

## 5.10 THE EXPLANATORY POWER OF THE WHOLE MODEL

### 5.10.1 *Introduction*

In accordance with the discussion of the influence of the macro-level variables on value orientations in [Section 1.6](#), we expect that the explanatory power of value orientations will be found in the most advanced industrial societies according to structural variables and in the more fragmented and polarised party systems. These expectations follow quite directly from the discussion which was mostly related to the value model.

### 5.10.2 *Empirical Analysis*

Returning to [Table 5.1F](#), the last column shows the average correlations between party choice and the five sets of value orientations in the different countries. This is, of course, not a multivariate analysis, but the table can be used as an introduction to the examination of the impact of the value model in a comparative perspective. As we have seen above, there is a considerable variation in the correlations between party choice and value orientations, and when the average correlations are examined, we find systematic differences between the countries. There is a main difference between the Nordic and the central European countries on the one hand and the two countries in the Island region and the Southern European countries on the other, although we find Luxembourg, Iceland and Germany among the eight countries with the lowest correlations.

[Table 5.4](#) shows the total explanatory power of all five value orientations on party choice according to Nagelkerke's pseudo- $R^2$  from multinomial logistic regressions.


We find very similar comparative differences for the mean correlations commented upon above. The explanatory power is the largest in the Nordic countries (apart from Iceland), The Netherlands and Switzerland, and smallest in Luxembourg, Greece, Ireland and Portugal. The regional averages follow the same pattern as for the mean correlation with a large difference between the Nordic and Central Western countries on the one hand and the South and Island regions on the other. Indeed the coefficients

in the two tables (Tables 5.1F and 5.4) are so strongly correlated ( $r = 0.98$ ) that the comparative patterns can be considered nearly identical.

The comparative coefficients are the strongest correlated with both indicators for advanced industrialism (0.49 and 0.42 for GNP and size of the service sector, respectively), highest correlated with the fragmentation of the party system ( $r = 0.65$ ) and significantly lower correlated with general left-right polarisation ( $r = 0.35$ ). As for the total impact of the socio-structural variable, there are again strong correlations between the macro-level variables and the total impact of central variables from the surveys. For value orientation, the correlation with party system polarisation is also significant in contrast to the socio-structural model. We note that the correlation for party system fragmentation is again the largest (0.65), but somewhat smaller than for the socio-structural model (0.77).

**Table 5.4** Total explanatory power of value orientations on party choice

<i>Nagelkerke's</i>	R <sup>2</sup>
Finland	0.567
Netherlands	0.566
Sweden	0.559
Norway	0.531
Denmark	0.473
Switzerland	0.469
Austria	0.447
Belgium	0.402
Iceland	0.378
Germany	0.362
Italy	0.360
France	0.358
Spain	0.279
Britain	0.257
Luxemb.	0.226
Greece	0.224
Ireland	0.164
Portugal	0.102
<b>Means</b>	
Nordic	0.502
Central West	0.412
South	0.265
Islands	0.211
All	0.374



**Fig. 5.1** Scatterplot for the explanatory power (Nagelkerke's pseudo- $R^2$ ) of all value orientations and the effective number of parties

Figure 5.1 shows the scatter plot indicating the relationship between the total impact of value orientations and the effective number of parties. The relationship is strong, but several countries are somewhat further from the regression line than in Fig. 4.2.

## 5.11 CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, the relationship between party choice and value orientations has been examined. First the bivariate relationships between each of the five value orientations and party choice have been analysed. Then the relative importance of the five value orientations for explaining party choice was focussed upon. In the last subchapters, the total impact of Old and New Politics value orientations and the total explanatory power of the value model (all five value orientations) have been addressed.

Religious–secular values are clearly the strongest correlated with party choice in the Central Western region. Religious–secular values locate the Christian and then Conservative party voters closest to the religious pole, while the Left Socialist, Communist and Greens are located closest to the secular pole. The Liberal and Radical Right parties also have fairly secular voters.

Economic left–right values are clearly the strongest correlated with party choice in the Nordic countries, and the analysis of party families shows that party voters are ranked according to a conventional economic left–right location of parties, with the Communists, Left Socialists and Social Democrats to the left and the Conservatives and Liberals closest to the rightist pole. The Radical Rightist parties are located close to the centre along this dimension, not close to the rightist pole as could have been expected.

The analysis of the three New Politics orientations showed interesting and nuanced patterns. The strength of the impact of all three value orientations is the strongest in the Nordic and Central Western countries. The idea of one New Politics conflict dimension that polarises the Radical Right versus the New Left is seriously challenged from the analysis. The New Left (Greens and Left Socialists), also the Communists, are located close to the environmental, libertarian and liberal immigration pole on these orientations in accordance with expectations, but the Radical Rightist voters are only clearly located closest to the opposite pole for immigration orientations. Another finding that challenges the idea of the difference between Old and New Politics party families is the location of the small Communist parties that seem to be strongly anchored in New Politics at nearly the same level as the Left Socialists and the Greens. Of the major party families, it is the Conservative and Christian Party families that have the most anti-environmental and authoritarian voters, while the Radical Rightist parties have more centrist voters.

The comparison of the strength of the correlations between party choice and value orientations within the various countries showed a large cross-national variation, but on an average, economic left–right values are the strongest correlated with party choice, followed by immigration orientations and religious–secular values. The central role of immigration orientations for prediction party choice is important. It is a major determinant of party choice and has approached the Old Politics orientations in this respect.

The comparison of the explanatory power of Old Politics and New Politics value orientations showed that the Old Politics orientations are still more important but the differences are not large. However, in several countries, New Politics orientations are more important. A somewhat deviant pattern is

the Nordic countries, where the large impact of economic left–right orientations contributes to the relative dominance of Old Politics orientations.

Both the impact of Old Politics and New Politics orientations are the strongest in the more advanced industrial countries and in fragmented and polarised party systems. Expectations about the relative impact of New Politics compared to Old Politics according to structural and party system variables are generally not confirmed.

Finally, there is large variation in the explanatory power of the total value model on party choice. The largest explanatory power is found in the most advanced industrial countries and in polarised, first and foremost fragmented, party systems.

## APPENDIX TABLES

**Appendix Table 5.1** Party choice and religious–secular values. Means scores for the various party families

<i>A. All party families</i>							
Christian	6.90						
Conservative	5.10						
Ethnic-regional	4.67						
Social Democrats	4.48						
Agrarian	4.43						
Radical right	4.04						
Liberal	3.84						
Greens	3.63						
Communists	3.51						
Left Socialists	3.47						
Mean all	4.65						
<b>B. Party families within the various regions</b>							
<b>Nordic</b>		<b>Central West</b>		<b>Island Countries</b>		<b>South</b>	
Christian	8.63	Christian	5.91	Christian	6.77	Christian	7.81
Agrarian	4.43	Social Democrats	4.10	Left Socialists	6.07	Conservative	6.29
Ethnic-regional	3.96	Liberal	3.64	Conservative	6.04	Radical right	5.81
Social Democrats	3.68	Greens	3.64	Social Democrats	5.67	Liberal	5.21
Radical right	3.58	Radical right	3.38	Ethnic-regional	5.42	Ethnic-regional	5.36
Conservative	3.54	Ethnic-regional	3.28	Liberal	4.80	Social Democrats	5.25
Left Socialists	3.13	Communists	3.25	Greens	4.20	Communists	4.58
Liberal	3.01	Left Socialists	2.79			Greens	3.93
Greens	2.71					Left Socialists	3.68
Communists	1.76						
Other p.	3.11	Other p.	4.75	Other p.	4.71	Other p.	4.98
Mean all	3.74	Mean all	4.42	Mean all	5.67	Mean all	5.41

**Appendix Table 5.2** Party choice and economic left–right values. Means scores for the various party families

<i>A. All party families</i>	<i>Mean all</i>
Communists	5.68
Left Socialists	5.23
Social Democrats	4.78
Greens	4.63
Ethnic-regional	4.31
Radical right	4.26
Christian	4.11
Agrarian	3.79
Liberal	3.74
Conservative	3.49
Mean all	4.32
<b>B. Party families within the various regions</b>	
<b>Nordic</b>	
Communists	6.45
Left Socialists	5.55
Greens	4.91
Social Democrats	4.83
Christian	4.18
Ethnic-regional	4.14
Radical right	3.90
Liberal	3.83
Agrarian	3.79
Conservative	2.87
Other p.	4.45
Mean all	4.12
<b>Central West</b>	
Communists	5.53
Left Socialists	4.80
Social Democrats	4.71
Greens	4.65
Radical right	4.36
Christian	4.09
Ethnic-regional	3.94
Liberal	3.55
Other p.	4.24
Mean all	4.28
<b>Island Countries</b>	
Social Democrats	4.28
Greens	4.22
Ethnic-regional	4.14
Left Socialists	4.01
Liberal	3.96
Christian	3.85
Conservative	3.63
Radical right	0.00
Other p.	3.99
Mean all	3.92
<b>South</b>	
Left Socialists	5.41
Communists	5.40
Social Democrats	5.02
Greens	4.73
Ethnic-regional	4.66
Radical right	4.41
Christian	4.29
Conservative	4.06
Liberal	4.05
Other p.	4.82
Mean all	4.74

**Appendix Table 5.3** Party choice and environmental values. Means scores for the various party families

<i>A. All party families</i>				
Greens	6.91			
Communists	6.86			
Left Socialists	6.58			
Ethnic-regional	6.37			
Radical right	6.25			
Liberal	6.20			
Social Democrats	6.19			
Conservative	5.93			
Christian	5.87			
Agrarian	5.81			
Mean all	6.22			
<b>B. Party families within the various regions</b>				
<b>Nordic</b>				
Communists	7.42	Communists	7.00	<b>South</b>
Greens	7.23	Greens	6.86	Greens
Ethnic-regional	7.08	Social Democrats	6.24	Left Socialists
Left Socialists	6.69	Left Socialists	6.15	Radical right
Liberal	6.31	Ethnic-regional	6.07	Social Democrats
Radical right	6.28	Liberal	6.06	Communists
Social Democrats	6.05	Radical right	5.98	Liberal
Christian	5.86	Christian	5.95	Ethnic-regional
Agrarian	5.81			Conservative
Conservative	5.75			Christian
Other p.	6.02	Other p.	6.41	Other p.
Mean all	6.07	Mean all	6.25	Mean all
				6.66
				6.24
				5.92
				5.88
				5.63
				5.55
				5.29
				6.41
				6.24
				5.96
				6.79
				6.54

**Appendix Table 5.4** Party choice and libertarian-authoritarian values. Means scores for the various party families

<i>A. All party families</i>	
Greens	5.53
Left Socialists	5.33
Agrarian	5.27
Communists	5.20
Liberal	5.04
Social Democrats	4.62
Radical right	4.47
Christian	4.37
Ethnic-regional	4.36
Conservative	4.33
Mean all	4.63
<b>B. Party families within the various regions</b>	
<b>Nordic</b>	
<b>Central West</b>	
Communists	7.02
Greens	6.72
Liberal	6.44
Left Socialists	6.16
Ethnic-regional	5.54
Social Democrats	5.38
Conservative	5.37
Agrarian	5.27
Radical right	5.16
Christian	5.09
Other p.	5.60
Mean all	5.53
<b>Island Countries</b>	
Greens	5.70
Left Socialists	5.53
Christian	5.19
Liberal	4.91
Ethnic-regional	4.76
Social Democrats	4.50
Conservative	4.41
Radical right	4.18
Christian	4.18
Other p.	4.76
Mean all	4.72
<b>South</b>	
Left Socialists	4.93
Greens	4.46
Communists	4.23
Social Democrats	4.16
Radical right	4.15
Ethnic-regional	4.06
Liberal	3.81
Christian	3.76
Conservative	3.54
Other p.	4.10
Mean all	3.86



**Appendix Table 5.5** Party choice and immigration orientation. Means scores for the various party families

<i>A. All party families</i>	
Left Socialists	5.61
Greens	5.60
Communists	5.25
Liberal	4.96
Social Democrats	4.84
Agrarian	4.56
Christian	4.37
Conservative	4.29
Ethnic-regional	3.91
Radical right	2.85
Mean all	4.56
<b>B. Party families within the various regions</b>	
<b>Nordic</b>	
Communists	6.52
Greens	6.38
Left Socialists	6.05
Liberal	5.55
Social Democrats	5.08
Christian	4.92
Conservative	4.68
Agrarian	4.56
Ethnic-regional	4.43
Radical right	3.11
Other p.	4.38
Mean all	4.90
<b>Central West</b>	
Greens	5.55
Left Socialists	5.28
Communists	4.65
Social Democrats	4.64
Liberal	4.61
Christian	4.11
Ethnic-regional	3.75
Radical right	2.66
Other p.	4.23
Mean all	4.35
<b>Island Countries</b>	
Greens	4.70
Social Democrats	4.23
Liberal	4.16
Christian	3.92
Ethnic-regional	3.67
Conservative	3.46
Left Socialists	3.07
Other p.	3.35
Mean all	3.80
<b>South</b>	
Left Socialists	5.87
Greens	5.84
Liberal	5.57
Social Democrats	5.08
Communists	5.07
Christian	4.70
Conservative	4.24
Ethnic-regional	3.86
Radical right	3.00
Other p.	4.74
Mean all	4.78

## NOTES

1. Britain is included here in the group of Protestant countries.
2. The parties that are mentioned by names or abbreviations further in this chapter are outlined in [Section 2.4](#) and also in [Table 2.3](#).
3. The average score of the CDA voters on the religious-secular index is 5.6, while the scores for the SGP and Christian Union are 9.6 and 9.1, respectively.
4. In the Benoit and Laver (2006) expert survey that is discussed in details below for the New Politics orientations, there is one issue that measures economic left-right location of the parties, namely taxes versus spending. Based on the average for the various party families on scales from 1 to 20, the Conservative parties (15.2) and the Liberal parties (13.4) are located most to the right, followed by the Radical Right (12.8) and the Christian and Agrarian parties both 10.8). The Radical Rightist parties are then less rightist on this scale compared to the central economist rightist parties among the Old Politics parties.
5. The Swiss Green party is located somewhat to the left of the Social Democrats and the Green Liberal party to the right of the Social Democrats.
6. See [Section 3.3](#). The operationalisation of the libertarian–authoritarian values is based on Flanagan, except that religious–secular indicators are dropped.
7. In the Netherlands, the Calvinist Fundamentalist parties have an even more authoritarian electorate.
8. In Belgium, the location of the Liberals, Christian and ethnic regional parties is fairly similar.

# The Impact of Social Structure and Value Orientations Compared

## 6.1 INTRODUCTION

Which of the two models, the socio-structural or the value models, has the largest explanatory power on party choice given that socio-structural variables can be considered prior in a causal perspective? What is the relationship between the impact of social structure and value orientation with regard to explaining party choice? We have seen that value orientations have a fairly large explanatory power on party choice. How much of this explanatory power is reduced when prior structural variables are controlled for and how much remains? Given that the socio-structural model is considered prior to value orientations in a causal perspective, how much of the impact of social structure is transmitted via value orientations and how much is not transmitted?

Inglehart's two key hypotheses (issue polarisation and group polarisation), which we discussed in [Chapter 1](#), indicated a dynamic relationship between social structure and value orientations with regard to explaining identities and political behaviour. In this chapter, the total causal model will be examined by exploring how much of the impact of social structure is transmitted via value orientation and how much which is not, and how much of the "bivariate" or uncontrolled impact of value orientation that is spurious when controlling for the prior structural variables. This chapter is then central for answering the second and third main research problems.

This chapter is organised as follows: First, the total explanatory power of both social structural and value orientations are examined (Section 6.2), the explanatory power of the socio-structural model and the value model are then compared by focussing on the relative importance of these models for explaining party choice according to different ways of comparing the impacts (Section 6.3). The causal model with value orientations as intermediate variables between social structure and party choice is focussed upon in greater detail. This is done by decomposing the total explained pseudo-variance of the whole model into unique components explained the socio-structural variables and the value orientations, respectively, and a compounded component explained by both the socioeconomic and the value variables (Section 6.4). In Section 6.5 the unique and compounded components for the structural model and Old Politics and New Politics values are examined separately. Section 6.4 and 6.5 are then central for examining the second and third main research questions. The conclusions are outlined in Section 6.6.

## 6.2 THE TOTAL IMPACT OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND VALUE ORIENTATIONS

We expect that the explanatory power of the full conflict model to be largest in advanced industrial societies and in fragmented and polarised party systems in accordance with previous hypotheses for the separate analyses of the impact of social structure and value orientations on party choice.

Table 6.1 shows the total explanatory power of social structure and value orientations.

Given that the pseudo- $R^2$  measure that we employ in this work, Nagelkerke's  $R^2$ , frequently shows similar results to  $R^2$  in OLS regressions when these measures can be compared (Knutsen 2014), the explanatory power of the full model is fairly impressive. Contrary to many perspectives in comparative electoral research, social structure and value orientations are very important for explaining voting choice in Western democracies. On average, the full model has an explanatory power of 51.1%. The explanatory power of the whole model is then considerable, more than 60% in six of the countries and more than 40% in a further four countries. The variation between the countries is also considerable, from 70% in the Netherlands and Finland to 31–33% in Portugal and Spain.

**Table 6.1 Total explanatory power social structure and value orientations. Nagelkerke's  $R^2$** 

Netherland	0.704
Finland	0.704
Sweden	0.660
Norway	0.629
Switzerland	0.608
Austria	0.601
Belgium	0.572
Denmark	0.562
France	0.522
Germany	0.507
Iceland	0.493
Italy	0.452
Ireland	0.407
Luxembourg	0.399
Britain	0.374
Greece	0.364
Spain	0.330
Portugal	0.306
<b>Means</b>	
Nordic	0.610
Central west	0.565
South	0.395
Islands	0.391
All	0.511

The explanatory power of the whole model is considerably larger in the Nordic countries and the Central Western region than in the two other regions.

The explanatory power of the whole model is strongly correlated with the macro-level variables. The strongest correlation is again found for fragmentation in the party system (0.76). This strong correlation indicates that socio-structural positions and value orientations are best expressed in party systems where the voters can choose between many parties with different policy profiles that appeal to many interests and values.

There are also strong correlations with GDP per capita (0.57), size of the service sector (0.49) and weaker correlation with polarisation in the party system (0.33). All the hypotheses that we formulated above are then strongly supported.




Fig. 6.1 Scatterplot for the explanatory power (Nagelkerke's pseudo- $R^2$ ) of social structure and value orientations, and the effective number of parties

Figure 6.1 shows the scatterplot between the macro-level variable that is the strongest correlation – party system fragmentation – and the total explanatory power. All countries are located fairly close to the regression line.

### 6.3 THE RELATIVE IMPACT OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND VALUE ORIENTATIONS ON PARTY CHOICE

In this section, the impact of the socio-structural and the value model for explaining party choice will be compared, first without taking into consideration the causal relationship between the socio-structural and value model. Then the impact of the two types of variables will be examined when the socio-structural variables are considered causally prior to value orientations.

The basic hypotheses are that value orientations have the largest relative impact on party choice compared to the social structure in advanced industrial societies and in fragmented party systems. This follows from the enlargement of Inglehart's perspective of a change from a class-based to a value-based pattern of political polarisation discussed in the first chapter.

Somewhat surprisingly, we found that social structural variables also have the largest explanatory power on party choice in the most advanced industrial societies, and in fragmented and polarised party systems. This casts some doubt about the hypotheses.

In [Table 6.2](#), the impact of the socio-structural variables and the value orientations are compared. The table is built upon the same logic as explained in the previous chapter illustrated in [Table 5.9](#). The impact of value orientations in addition to the impact of social structure ([Table 6.2C](#) and [E](#)) can, however, be considered to be based on a causal argument that was not so evident for the relationship between Old Politics and New Politics value orientations in [Table 5.9](#).

[Table 6.2A](#) and [B](#) repeats and compares the explanatory power of the socio-structural variables and value orientations from the previous chapters. The ranking of the explanatory power of the various countries shows fairly close similarity as can be seen from [Table 6.2A](#) and [B](#), and the explanatory powers of social structure and value orientations are strongly correlated for the 18 countries ( $r = 0.67$ ).

On average, the value orientations have 19% larger explanatory power than the socio-structural variables (see [Table 6.1D](#)). This applies to most of the countries. There are only five countries where the social structure has the largest explanatory power (Portugal, Ireland, Luxembourg, Greece and – as a borderline case – Germany). Value orientations have largest relative explanatory power (compared to social structure) in the Nordic countries and then in the Southern region. Only in the Island region, do social structural variables have the largest explanatory power due to the small relative impact in Ireland. In the Nordic region, the reason for why value orientations have the largest relative explanatory power is mainly that the absolute explanatory power for value orientations are so large. In the Southern region, both social structure and value orientations have comparatively small explanatory power.

**Table 6.2** The impact of social structure and value orientations on party choice compared

<i>A. Social structure</i>	<i>B. Value orientations</i>	<i>C. Value orientations in addition to social structure</i>	<i>D. Proportion value orientations/social structure</i>	<i>E. Value orientations in addition to social structure: Proportions</i>			
Netherlands	0.522	Sweden	0.315	Denmark	1.723	Iceland	1.098
Finland	0.444	Netherlands	0.566	Italy	1.633	Italy	1.064
Belgium	0.388	Sweden	0.559	Sweden	1.624	Denmark	1.046
Norway	0.373	Norway	0.531	Iceland	1.605	Sweden	0.915
Germany	0.367	Denmark	0.473	Spain	1.561	Spain	0.847
Switzerland	0.365	Switzerland	0.469	Norway	1.423	Britain	0.734
Austria	0.360	Austria	0.447	Finland	1.288	Norway	0.686
Sweden	0.345	Belgium	0.404	Switzerland	1.283	Austria	0.668
Ireland	0.325	Iceland	0.378	Austria	1.243	Switzerland	0.662
France	0.320	Germany	0.363	Britain	1.192	France	0.631
Luxembourg	0.275	Italy	0.358	France	1.114	Finland	0.586
Denmark	0.274	France	0.357	Netherlands	1.084	Greece	0.494
Portugal	0.252	Spain	0.279	Belgium	1.042	Belgium	0.474
Greece	0.244	Britain	0.257	Germany	0.990	Luxembourg	0.448
Iceland	0.235	Luxembourg	0.226	Greece	0.918	Germany	0.382
Italy	0.219	Greece	0.224	Luxembourg	0.820	Netherlands	0.348
Britain	0.216	Ireland	0.164	Ireland	0.506	Ireland	0.254
Spain	0.179	Portugal	0.102	Portugal	0.405	Portugal	0.214
<b>Means</b>		<b>Means</b>		<b>Means</b>		<b>Means</b>	
Central west	0.380	Nordic	0.502	Nordic	1.533	Nordic	0.866
Nordic	0.334	Central west	0.413	South	1.126	South	0.650
Islands	0.270	South	0.264	Central west	1.077	Central west	0.497
South	0.243	Islands	0.211	Islands	0.849	Islands	0.494
All	0.317	All	0.374	All	1.192	All	0.642



This pattern changes considerably when value orientations are included *after* the social structural variables in [Table 6.1C](#) and [E](#). The sociostructural variables now have considerably larger explanatory power; value orientations' explanatory power is 64% of the explanatory power to social structure or 36% less. Only in Iceland, Italy and Denmark, do value orientations now have larger explanatory power. Value orientations' additional explanatory power, relatively to the socio-structural model, is the largest in the Nordic countries and then in the Southern region, while there are considerably smaller portions in the remaining regions.

Regarding the hypotheses, these can be tested on the basis of the data in [C](#), [D](#) and [E](#) in [Table 6.2](#). As to the additional absolute explanatory power from [Table 6.2C](#), all three hypotheses are supported. The correlations between the additional explanatory powers are 0.60 for GDP per capita, 0.49 for the size of the service sector, 0.76 for the party system fragmentation and 0.33 for polarisation.

However, when the relative impact of values is examined on the basis of the data in [Table 6.1D](#) and [E](#), only party system polarisation is significantly correlated with the proportions from [Table 6.2D](#) (0.33), and marginally so from [Table 6.2E](#) (0.25).

These findings are reasonable based on the correlations with macro-level variables in [Chapter 4](#) for social structure and [Chapter 5](#) for value orientations. The correlations between GDP per capita and the impact of the socio-structural model (0.57) are somewhat *larger* than for value orientations (0.49); the same applies to party system fragmentation (0.77 versus 0.65). Only party system polarisation was considerably highly correlated with the impact of value orientations (0.35) than for the impact of the socio-structural variables (not above the limit 0.25).

The main conclusions from these analyses then are that the absolute explanatory power of value orientations when included in the model after the socio-structural variables is the largest in advanced industrial societies and fragmented and polarised party systems. However, the same is the case for the impact of the socio-structural model. When the relative importance of the value model is compared to the socio-structural model, we only find that party system polarisation has a significant, but rather small, impact on the relative importance of the value model to the socio-structural model.

## 6.4 “PURE STRUCTURAL VOTING”, “PURE VALUE VOTING” AND “CLEAVAGE” VOTING

### 6.4.1 *The Cleavage Concept*

The cleavage concept has for a long time, and in many works, been considered as the relationship between social structure and party choice. Cleavages are – according to this approach – considered as deep-seated socio-structural conflicts with political significance, in particular, related to voting choice. A cleavage basically reflects broadly based and long-standing social and economic divisions within society, and the political cleavage structure is thought of in terms of social groups, the loyalties of individuals to their social group and how these loyalties influence party choice and political action (Franklin et al. 1992 5). Some authors, however, consider voting on the basis of value orientation and issues as “cleavages” without discussing the cleavage concept.

Inspired by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and Bartoloni and Mair’s seminal work (1990), which include a discussion of the cleavage concept, Knutsen and Scarbrough (1995) developed a cleavage concept that includes both social structure and value orientations and the section below is based in this work to a large degree.

First, a cleavage is rooted in a relatively persistent social division, which gives rise to “objectively” identifiable groups within a community such as class, religion and the other socio-structural variables that were examined in Chapter 4. Second, a cleavage engages some set of values that are common to members of the group; members of the group recognise one another, by virtue of sharing the same value orientation. Third, a cleavage is institutionalised in some form of organisation – most commonly a political party, but also in churches, unions and other associational groups. To some extent, it is the political party that transforms social divisions into cleavages by giving coherence and organised political expression to what are otherwise inchoate and fragmentary beliefs and values among members of some social group. The concept of cleavage is then more extensive than the notion of social division and more exclusive than the notion of political division. Cleavages are more than simply social conflicts, and cleavages constitute a particular form, rather than any form, of political division. Indeed, if the term “cleavage” is used for any and every kind of social or political division, the concept loses its analytic power; we are left with being unable to distinguish between “cleavage politics” and any other kinds of politics.

The concept of cleavage thus takes in three dimensions: social structure, value orientations and institutional organisation. This renders “cleavage politics” a particular kind of politics; its distinctiveness follows not only from the relatively stable relationship between some social group(s) and a particular party but also from the way in which value orientations mediate the voter–party axis. Thus, cleavage politics is not captured only in the socio-structural accounts of voting; value orientations are also an integrated part that informs about the relationship between parties and voters. Similarly, voting for a party out of shared values without being a member of the associated social group does not constitute cleavage politics. Structural variables and value orientations may yield intelligible accounts of voting, but they do not amount to accounts of “cleavage politics” according to this conceptualisation.

Knutsen and Scarbrough (1995) developed a model that differentiated between three types of voting: pure structural voting, pure value voting and cleavage voting. A point of departure for understanding these three types of voting is the causal model outlined in Figure 1.2.

The direct path from social structure to party choice represents a “pure structure” type,<sup>1</sup> derived from socio-structural accounts of voting. The explanation for voting along this path is that electors are members of some social group with long-standing ties to a party, but they do not actually share the values that mediate that tie. Nominal Catholics who vote for a Christian Democratic party are a case in point. Working class people who vote for Social Democratic parties without sharing the economic leftist values could be another example.

The indirect effect of the social structure via value orientations represents “cleavage voting”: that is, members of a structurally defined social group adhere to the value orientation associated with the group and support the party giving political voice to those values. In this case, the voting path originates in structural position and runs through value orientations to party choice. Voting of this kind is typified in working class supporters of Social Democratic parties who support economic leftist values or members of a religious community who at church worshippers, having religious values and vote for a Christian party. This type of voting represents the voting indicated by the second main research problem.

The direct effect of value orientations on party choice represents “pure value” voting; party choice in this instance is accounted for largely by the value orientations of voters, with structural variables having little explanatory power.<sup>2</sup> We might expect voting of this type for example among green or libertarian voters supporting green or left socialist parties while

receiving fairly equal support from all social groups. This type of voting represents the voting indicated by the third main research problem.

Thus, the independent variables – social structure and value orientations – play a different role in the three voting paths. Social structure has a direct effect on party choice in Path 1, but also an indirect effect via value orientations. Likewise, value orientations have mediating and reinforcing effects as part of the indirect effect from social structure to party choice but also a direct effect. This latter type constitutes a radical departure from conventional accounts of voting as party choice, which in this instance cannot be inferred from structural variables. Almost without saying all three voting “types” are at some distance from the realities of electoral politics, but using ideal types in this way enables us to get some grip on the changing dynamics of electoral choice.

The model can be considered simple with two direct effects and one indirect effect, but it is rather complicated given that both the socio-structural and value orientation variable groups contain several separate variables. Given the complexity of the independent variables, a fruitful strategy is to decompose the (pseudo)-variance into three components. How this is done is outlined in some detail in the introduction to the empirical analysis.

The unique components that are explained exclusively by the socio-structural variables or by value orientation variables, respectively, and the compounded component that is explained by both variable groups, together sum up to the total explanatory power of social structure and value orientations from [Table 6.1](#). These components are equivalent to direct and indirect effects from causal analyses, respectively.

The impact of social structure is, then, the direct effect of the socio-structural variables when the value orientations are controlled for and the indirect effect via value orientations.

### 6.4.2 *Hypotheses*

Below hypotheses about the relationship between these three types of voting and the macro variables are formulated.

*Pure structural voting.* This type of voting is anchored in the social structure but does not have a value component as indicated. The explanation for voting along this path is that electors are members of some social group with long-standing ties to a party, but they do not actually share the values that mediate that tie. This type of voting can be expected to be found in societies with a low level of cognitive mobilisation. It is uncertain whether party system characteristics will have any impact on this type of

voting. One obvious factor that is not covered by the approach in this work is less programmatic orientation among the political parties; it is difficult to see the differences between the political parties because of lack of policy differences between them. Lack of party system polarisation is another somewhat related cause, because in such party systems, the policy differences are blurred. It is notably obvious that the same applies to party system fragmentation, so no hypotheses are formulated.

H1: Pure structural voting to be the largest in the less advanced industrial societies.

H2: Pure structural voting will be the largest in depolarised party systems.

*Pure value voting.* In many ways, this is the opposite of pure structural voting. This type of voting requires a high degree of political sophistication found in advanced industrial societies; independent of socio-structural position, the pure value voter has knowledge about the position of the various parties in central policy areas and lets her or his values determine the vote. For the cognitively mobilised voter, fragmented and polarised party systems will create a supply side opportunity for sophisticated voters to make nuanced choices on the basis of their varied values along different dimensions.

H3: Pure value voting will be the largest in advanced industrial societies.

H4: Pure value voting will be largest in (a) fragmented and (b) polarised party systems.

*Cleavage voting.* This type of voting is probably the most difficult to formulate hypotheses for. On the one hand, cleavage voting can be associated with the party conflicts in industrial societies as formulated by Lipset and Rokkan in their seminal work<sup>3</sup>; on the other hand, Inglehart's perspective of the close link between his issue and social group polarisation hypotheses is also a case of cleavage voting, although of a new type. The rise of post-materialist values is coupled to the higher educated strata and the new middle class who vote for the New Left. According to this perspective, there is a new type of cleavage voting that is based on both social class and value orientations. Cognitive mobilisation hypothesis might then be coupled to both pure value and cleavage voting.

Based on these somewhat contradictory perspectives, two alternative hypotheses are formulated:

H5a: Cleavage voting will be the largest in the most advanced industrial societies.

H5b: Cleavage voting will be the smallest in the most advanced industrial societies.

As to the party system characteristics, we expect that cleavage voting will be the largest in fragmented and polarised party systems. In these environments, voters with different socio-structural locations will be able to activate different types of value orientations for their voting choices.

H6: Cleavage voting will be the largest in (a) fragmented and (b) polarised party systems.


Some West European countries (and elsewhere) have been characterised by “segmented pluralism”, giving rise to a particular type of “pillarised” form of cleavage politics (Lorwin 1971). In these countries, social positions – in terms of class, religion and language – have been coupled to particular value orientations via various educational and communication systems together with voluntary and welfare organisations, which gave rise to a particularly robust form of cleavage politics. In these countries, the influence of such “pillarised” politics might be expected to live on for longer after the blurring of class and religious boundaries than in other societies. Thus, we expect “cleavage voting” to be at its strongest in countries that have a history of “segmented pluralism”. Lijphart (1999: 55–59) discusses the degree to which religious, ethnic and other groups have organised themselves into more or less separate sub-societies with their own political, socioeconomic, cultural, educational and recreational associations. He differentiates between *plural*, *semi-plural* and *non-plural societies*, and groups – among the countries in this study – Spain, Belgium and Switzerland in the plural society group; Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland and Luxembourg in the semi-plural group; while the remaining countries are non-plural.

H7: Cleavage voting will be larger in plural and then semi-plural societies and smaller in non-plural societies.


### 6.4.3 *Empirical Analysis*

The problem with MNR, associated with the fact that the method does not have a coefficient for each of the independent variables, was mentioned in [Chapter 1](#). Like many other multivariate methods, MLR does not provide any overall measures of the impact of several independent variables. In order to examine the importance of the two types of variables – social structural variables and value orientations – analysis of pseudo-variance is used. Since Nagelkerke’s  $R^2$  is a standardised measure that goes from 0.00 to 1.00, it is equivalent to analysis of variance in OLS regression and ANOVA. The total explained pseudo-variance in party choice can be decomposed into three components: one unique for social structure, one unique for value orientations and one compounded component of the two types of variables. This latter component represents the pseudo-variance; they explain jointly in party choice because social structure and value orientations are correlated with each other and explain the shared pseudo-variance in party choice. This is illustrated in [Fig. 6.2A](#) wherein the unique explained pseudo-variance alone is ascribed to each of the two types of variables, and the compounded variance is considered as a separate component. The analysis based on this model is sometimes called mediation analysis because the intervening variable (here value orientation) implies a causal process that connects the prior variable by modelling how an intervening or mediator variable transmits the influence of an independent variable (here social structure) into a dependent variable (party choice; Fairchild et al. 2009). In this section and the next section, such mediation or decomposition analyses will be performed to examine the research problems.

In [Fig. 6.2B](#), all pseudo-variance explained by the socio-structural variables in party choice is ascribed to the socio-structural variables because these variables are considered prior to value orientations in a causal sense. The variance ascribed to value orientations comprises only the variance that value orientations explain in addition to socio-structural variables. These two principles for decomposition of variance are called classical experimental design and hierarchical decomposition, respectively. The two figures are important for illustrating how the analyses in this section are different from the analyses in [Section 6.3](#) (and [Table 6.2](#)). [Table 6.2C](#) and [E](#) is based on the model in [Fig. 6.2B](#), while [Table 6.2D](#) is based on inclusion of the compounded component of both the socio-structural model and the value model.<sup>4</sup>



A. Decomposition based on the unique and compounded components (classical experimental design)



B. Decomposition based on that value orientations are causally prior to sociostructural variables (the structural component) (hierarchical decomposition)

**Fig. 6.2** Decomposition of pseudo-variance in the dependent party choice variable according to two different principles



Table 6.3A shows the decomposition of the explanatory power into the unique components explained by social structure and by value orientations, respectively, and the compounded component explained by both social structure and value orientations. The sum of the three components is identical to the explanatory power of social structure, and value orientation from Table 6.1.<sup>5</sup> Table 6.3A shows the absolute explanatory power for each of the three components, while Table 6.3B shows the relative size of the components, which then sum up to 1.00 for each country.

When we first examine the averages for the three components, it is evident that pure value voting is most significant (0.194), followed by cleavage voting (0.180) and pure structural voting is the least significant component (0.137).

In a cross-national perspective, pure value voting is largest in the Island region due first and foremost to the Irish case, and then in the Central Western region and the South, and smallest in the Nordic countries. Pure value voting is decisively largest in the Nordic countries and smallest in the South and the Island region, while cleavage voting is the largest in the Central Western region and the Nordic countries and considerably smaller in the other regions.

The strength of the various components can also be compared with the various regions. Pure value voting is the largest in the Nordic countries followed by cleavage voting, while pure structural voting is decisively smallest. In the Southern region, pure value voting is also the most important, followed by pure structural voting and cleavage voting is less decisive. The differences between the three types of voting are much smaller than in the Nordic region. In the Central Western region, cleavage voting is most decisive, followed by pure value voting and pure structural voting is the least important. Again, due to the Irish case, pure structural voting is most important in the Island region, while pure value voting and cleavage voting are much less important.

We find Ireland and Portugal at the top of the list regarding the absolute size of the unique structural component, but there is no significant correlation between the measure of advanced industrialism and the size of the pure structural voting. The same applies to the party system variables. H1 and H2 are then not supported.

As to the size of the unique value component, this is correlated with GDP per capita (0.35), the size of the service sector (0.41), effective number of parties (0.40) and polarisation (0.38). H3, H4a and H4b are then supported.



Regarding the compounded component, this is also positively correlated with both GDP (0.49) and the size of the service sector (0.34). This component is extremely highly correlated with the effective number of parties (0.72) and moderately correlated with polarisation (0.27). There is then strong support for H5a and for H6a and b, but not for H5b.

As can be seen from [Table 6.3A](#), the compounded component is stronger in plural and semi-plural societies, although somewhat stronger in the latter. H7 is then supported; the compounded component is the largest in plural and semi-plural societies, but not larger in plural than in semi-plural societies.

One could argue that the decomposition in [Table 6.3A](#) is problematic because it does not take into account the fact that the explanatory power of the model varies considerably between the countries (see [Table 6.1](#)). The likelihood for a country with a high-explanatory power on the full model comprising social structure and value orientations to have large values on each of the components is larger than for a country with a small total explanatory power.

In [Table 6.3B](#), the decomposed figures from [Table 6.3A](#) are therefore calculated as percentages of the total explanatory power in [Table 6.1](#). The table shows very similar results in the ranking of countries and regions. This is reflected in the correlations between the data for the 18 countries for each of the three components, which are highly correlated for the 18 units (0.78–0.93).

The main difference is that the differences between the countries and the regions are much larger for the pure structural component when the relative components are examined. This is reflected in the standard deviations that are much larger for the relative components. This does, however, not apply to the two other components.<sup>6</sup> The pure structural component comprises 60–66% in Portugal and Ireland, while only 15–20% in the Netherlands, Spain and four of the Nordic countries.

As to the correlations with the macro-level variables, we find very similar correlations as for the absolute components reported above. Spain seems, however, to be a bivariate outlier because it now has low scores on the advanced industrial variables but at the same time, a comparatively low level of pure structural voting and a high level of pure value and cleavage voting. When the Spanish case is dropped from the calculation of the correlations with advanced industrialism, there are quite strong negative correlations between advanced industrialism and pure structural

voting ( $-0.32$ ) for GDP per capita and  $-0.42$  for size of the service sector). H1 is then supported.

Pure structural voting is now also significantly negatively correlated with the party system characteristics,  $-0.39$  for party system polarisation and  $-0.49$  for an effective number of parties. When the relative components are examined, H2 is then also supported. The pure structural component is largest in depolarised democracies and is also the smallest in party systems where fragmentation is low. All hypotheses, apart from the alternative hypothesis H5b about high-cleavage voting in less advanced societies, are then supported.

## 6.5 THE INTERMEDIATE ROLE OF OLD POLITICS AND NEW POLITICS VALUE ORIENTATIONS

The purpose of this section is to examine the role of Old and New Politics value orientations in explaining the impact of the socio-structural model on party choice. Are Old Politics or New Politics values the most important in this respect?

According to Lipset and Rokkan, value orientations were central components of the traditional cleavages in Western democracies although they did not present any explicit definition of cleavages (see Knutsen and Scarbrough 1995: 493–495). According to Inglehart's group polarisation hypothesis, New Politics value orientations should play a central intermediate role in the new structural group polarisations in advanced industrial societies as we have outlined in the previous chapters.

From these perspectives, two competing hypotheses are formulated:

- H1a: Cleavage voting will be the most prevalent for Old Politics values.
- H1b: Cleavage voting will be the most prevalent for New Politics values.

In order to test these hypotheses, the Old and New Politics value orientations have been added to the structural model in the same way as for all values as in the previous section, and the unique components and the compounded component have been calculated. This procedure implies that the pure structural component becomes larger because fewer value orientations are controlled for, while the two other components become relatively smaller due to the fact that fewer value

orientations are included in the models. The various components can, nevertheless, be compared for Old and New Politics orientations.

Table 6.4 shows the relative size of the compounded components for Old and New Politics value orientations. The compounded component comprise a larger portion of the total impact of socio-structural variables and the respective value orientations for Old Politics values (0.276) than for New Politics values (0.220).<sup>7</sup> This also applies for the absolute components (0.129 versus 0.097). We can then conclude that both value orientations are important for explaining the impact of social structure on party choice, but Old Politics values are somewhat more important than New Politics orientations, and H1a is then supported. *Inglehart's group polarisation hypothesis is then supported for explaining some New*

**Table 6.4** Decomposition of the explanatory power of social structure and Old Politics and New Politics value orientations separately on party choice. The proportion of the compounded component.

<i>A. Old Political values</i>		<i>B. New Politics values</i>	
Netherlands	0.516	Italy	0.313
Finland	0.423	Switzerland	0.312
Germany	0.368	Austria	0.305
Spain	0.361	Denmark	0.277
Norway	0.344	Norway	0.275
Sweden	0.325	Greece	0.272
Belgium	0.309	Netherlands	0.263
Britain	0.269	Finland	0.248
Denmark	0.264	Belgium	0.238
Switzerland	0.262	Spain	0.227
France	0.251	Sweden	0.212
Austria	0.202	Iceland	0.191
Italy	0.202	Germany	0.190
Iceland	0.193	Luxembourg	0.167
Greece	0.180	France	0.156
Ireland	0.175	Britain	0.143
Luxembourg	0.166	Ireland	0.098
Portugal	0.156	Portugal	0.067
<b>Means</b>		<b>Means</b>	
Nordic	0.310	Central West	0.246
Central West	0.304	Nordic	0.241
South	0.230	South	0.207
Islands	0.222	Islands	0.121
All countries	0.276	All countries	0.220

*Politics structural polarisation patterns, but the group polarisation hypothesis is even more important for Old Politics values.*

The compounded component for Old Politics values is the largest in the Nordic countries and the Central Western countries, and considerably smaller in the other regions. The same applies for New Politics orientations.

We find many similar correlations between the various components for the decomposition for Old Politics and New Politics orientations as for the decomposition based on all values in the previous section (based on Table 6.3), and there are only small differences between Old Politics and New Politics orientations in this respect. Old and New Politics cleavage voting are, for example, most prevalent both in plural and semi-plural societies. One difference, however, is that party system polarisation is more strongly correlated with the various components based on New Politics: The unique structural component is the strongest negatively correlated with party system polarisation for New Politics orientations ( $-0.50$  versus  $-0.31$  for Old Politics), and the compounded component is only significantly correlated with party system polarisation for New Politics orientations ( $0.49$ ). The unique value components are, however, fairly similarly correlated ( $0.38$  and  $0.34$  for New Politics and Old Politics orientations, respectively).

## 6.6 CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, the impact of the entire conflict model comprising both social structure and value orientations and the relationship between their impacts on party choice have been examined. Central in the empirical analysis has been the degree to which value orientations mediate the relationship between social structure and party choice, and consequently explain why socio-structural variables have an impact on party choice.

A major finding is that the entire conflict model has a large explanatory power on party choice. On average for the 18 countries, 51.1% of the pseudo-variance can be explained by the model. To the extent that the measure we use for explanatory power, Nagelkerke's  $R^2$  can be compared to  $R^2$  in OLS or analysis of variance; this implies that fairly traditional variables have a large explanatory power on party choice. There is a large variation in the explanatory power of the whole model, and this variation is strongly correlated with the fragmentation of the party system, degree of

advanced industrialism and also significantly correlated with party system polarisation.

In [Section 6.3](#), the explanatory powers of social structure and value orientations were compared. Without any controls, value orientations have larger explanatory power than social structure. The average explanatory power is 0.374 for value orientations and 0.317 for social structure, and the most influential role for value orientations applies to the most countries in Western Europe.

This changes significantly when the socio-structural variables are considered prior to value orientations in a causal sense. While the explanatory power of social structure on average is 31.7%, the additional explanatory power of value orientations is 19.4%, and in only three countries are the value orientations more influential than the social structure in explaining party choice.

The relative explanatory power of value orientations to social structure is not correlated significantly with most of the macro-level variables. Only party system polarisation is moderately correlated with the relative impact of value orientations to social structure. The reason for the lack of correlations with the macro-level variables is that both the indicators of advanced industrialism and party system fragmentation are strongly correlated with both the impact of the socio-structural model and the value model. In advanced industrial societies and fragmented party systems, voters express their socio-structural positions and value orientations better than in less advanced societies and a less fragmented party system. There is only a significant difference in the correlations between the macro-level variables and the impact of social structure and value orientations indicating that value orientations are stronger correlated, namely for party system polarisation. This is reflected in the correlations with the relative impact in [Table 6.2](#): value orientations have a larger impact in polarised party systems.

In [Section 6.4](#), the relatively recently developed cleavage concept and three different types of voting were the points of departure for the empirical analysis. The cleavage concept that was the point of departure includes three dimensions – social structure, value orientations and institutional organisation – which were simply considered to be voting for a specific party at the voter (micro) level. Cleavage voting is then considered as the indirect impact of social structure that is mediated via value orientations to party choice. The other voting types are pure structural voting that is the direct effect of social structure on party choice, while pure value voting is the impact of value

orientations controlled for the socio-structural variables. The empirical analyses were performed by examining the prevalence of the three types of voting based on the decomposition of Nagelkerke's pseudo- $R^2$ .

All three types of voting are relatively frequently found in 18 democracies but on average pure value voting is most prevalent followed by cleavage voting and finally pure structural voting.

Several hypotheses were formulated for the cross-national strength of these types of voting patterns. These hypotheses were to a large degree supported.

- Pure structural voting is most frequently found in less advanced industrial societies and party systems that are characterised by a low degree of polarisation and fragmentation.
- Pure value voting (the voting type emphasised in the third main hypothesis) is the strongest in advanced industrial societies and fragmented and polarised party systems.
- Cleavage voting (the voting type emphasised in the second main hypothesis) is found in advanced industrial societies and fragmented and polarised party systems. Cleavage voting is also more frequently found in plural and semi-plural societies.

In [Section 6.5](#), the same type of decomposition of voting types that was performed for Old Politics and New Politics values in order to examine whether cleavage voting is the strongest for Old Politics values as can be derived from Lipset and Rokkan's work, or for New Politics values as can be derived from Inglehart's works. The empirical analysis showed fairly small differences in this respect, but cleavage voting was somewhat stronger for Old Politics values than for New Politics values.

## NOTES

1. "Pure structure" voting is similar to that of Parisi and Pasquino's three ideal types of voting behaviour; the so-called "vote of *appartenenza*" in Italy, based on "an organic liaison with the social group to which the voter belongs" which is "manifested by the exclusion of any assessment of the programmatic position of parties." (1979: 14–18)
2. Pure value voting is identical to the impact of value orientations in addition to social structure in [Table 6.2C](#) but is treated here in another context and it is therefore not referred to in the table below.



3. See Knutsen and Scarbrough (1995: 493–495) for a discussion of the role of value orientations in the discussion of cleavages in Lipset and Rokkan’s work.
4. For general principles for decomposing variance, see Cohen et al. (2003: chapter 5). For an analysis of decomposition of variance of two types of independent variable in the left–right self-placement scale based on the two models in Fig. 6.2, see Knutsen (1997).

Fig. 6.2 is based on Venn diagrams for decomposition of variance in the dependent variable. Frequently, circles for the whole variance of the independent variables (in addition to the dependent variable) are included in figures for illustrating decomposition or mediation, but I find focussing of the explained pseudo-variance in the dependent variable more pedagogic and illustrative.

5. Equations for the unique and compounded components can be found in Cohen et al. (2003: chapter 5) and Fairchild et al. (2009). In practice, the components are calculated in the following way:
  - a) The unique socio-structural component is the total explanatory power of the whole model minus the total explanatory power of value orientations.
  - b) The unique value orientation component is the total explanatory power of the whole model minus the total explanatory power of social structural variables.
  - c) The compounded component is then the explanatory power of the whole model minus a plus b.
6. The standard deviations of the absolute explanatory power for the pure structural component for the 18 countries (Table 6.3A) and for the regions are 0.044 and 0.027, respectively. The corresponding standard deviations for the relative components in Table 6.3B are 0.144 and 0.101, and while the variation in the size of the coefficients was smallest compared to the two other voting types in Table 6.3A, the variation becomes larger than the other components in Table 6.3B for the relative components.
7. The portions of the pseudo- $R^2$  measure for the pure structural and pure value orientation components are 0.458 and 0.266 for Old Politics, respectively, and 0.525 and 0.255 for New Politics orientations.

## Conclusions

### 7.1 INTRODUCTION

The main research questions in this book formulated in [Chapter 1](#) were:

- How do social structure and value orientations influence party choice in advanced industrial democracies?
- To what extent is the impact of social structure transmitted via value orientations?
- To what extent is the impact of value orientations on party choice a *causal effect* when controlling for prior structural variables?

The approach in this book has been to consider all significant parties as separate categories in the party choice variable. The correlations between the socio-structural variables and party choice, and the comparisons have been made on the basis of party families. This is not a longitudinal study, and since many of the old studies used a dichotomised party choice variable, it is difficult to compare the findings with much earlier research.<sup>1</sup> This has not been the purpose of this work, but changes over time are highly relevant for the central concepts of stable alignment, dealignment and realignment which were discussed in [Section 1.2](#). This implies that there is some uncertainty related to the discussion of these concepts in

relation to the main findings below, but there is enough evidence for specific conclusions to be made. This discussion of the impact of the socio-structural variables, in particular, relates to these concepts.

I commence by discussing the findings concerning the impact of social structure (Section 7.2) and value orientations (Section 7.3) on party choice and putting these findings into perspective. The dynamic relationship of the combined impact of social structure and value orientations on party choice are then examined (Section 7.4). Finally, the findings concerning the impact of the macro-level variables are outlined (Section 7.5).

## 7.2 PARTY CHOICE AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE

Social structure has a considerable impact on party choice, partly in the same way as in the old cleavage literature from the 1960s and 1970s, and partly in new ways which deviate largely from the old patterns. It is evident that stable alignments, realignments and dealignments are present. “Cleavage politics” (meaning the impact of social structure on party choice) has clearly declined as Franklin et al. (1992) indicated, but the decline is much smaller when all parties are included as separate categories in the analyses than when the party choice variable is dichotomised into the traditional left and right categories (Knutsen 2004a, 2006a). It can also be that the trend towards dealignment even when all parties are included as separate categories, has faded away and new structural variables or new ways of conceptualising and measuring social class, for example, can show stronger correlations in advanced industrial societies.

Following Kitschelt and Rehm (2015), I find the realignment perspective most accurate and fruitful. There are clearly important changes in the impact of socio-structural variables compared to findings of 30–50 years ago and the ways these variables influence party choice indicate considerable cross-national diversity.

Social class and religion (religious denomination) are still the most important structural cleavages for explaining party choice in Western Europe. However, for social class, in particular, this is caused by the way in which the dependent variable is treated. Significant parts of the strength of the correlations are caused by New Politics parties that have partly turned the old left-right class voting upside down.

There is clear evidence of a modern gender gap where women are more inclined to support the leftist parties. However, the modern gender gap is relatively small, and gender is on average the weakest predictor of party

choice compared to the other socio-structural variables. The modern gender gap is clearly an example of realignment. The traditional gender gap is firmly anchored in the literature based on empirical findings from the 1960s and 1970s.

The cross-national studies of age and party choice are not very pronounced in the literature, and the analysis in this work shows a nuanced pattern. Given that longitudinal data is not used in this work, it was not possible to examine whether the age differences are life-cycle or cohort effects.<sup>2</sup> Of the major party families, the Christian and Conservative and then the Social Democratic parties receive the strongest support from the older age groups, while the Green and Left Socialists received the strongest support among the younger age groups. Polarisation – as defined in this work – takes place, first and foremost, between the Christian and Conservative versus the Greens and Left Socialists. The Radical Rightist parties also receive the strongest support from the younger age groups, but the age differences are small, and they vary considerably between countries. Parties within this party family seem to appeal to all age groups to a larger degree than many other party families, in particular, the other New Politics party families.

The impact of the religions cleavage (religious denomination) is still strong, particularly in the Central Western region. While Old Politics parties contribute most to the polarisation closest to the religious pole, it is first and foremost the New Politics parties, Greens and Left Socialist that contribute along the other pole. The emergence and increased support of these parties have possibly contributed to strengthening, or at least not weakening the religious cleavage more significantly. In the literature, there is considerable focus on the idea that religious issues have faded in Western democracies and consequently that the religious cleavage has declined or even become insignificant. Given that the Greens and Left Socialists at the party level do not have secular issues as their main focus and identities, and given Smith's (1989: 20) observation that to a large degree the religious cleavage is a passive rather than an active force in shaping political behaviour, the findings related to the continuing importance of the religious cleavage is important. The idea that the impact of religious structure (and religious–secular values or issues) have faded away and are not important for voting choice is simply not supported by relevant survey data.

Urban–rural contrasts in voting choice can be the result of many factors such as economic interests and religious affiliations. Differences in voting

behaviour are largest in the Nordic countries with specific Agrarian parties that focus upon the economic interests of the farmers in particular, and in the Central Western countries where the rural areas vote largely for the Christian Democrats. The impact of urban–rural location on party choice is, however, one of the weakest structural predictors of party choice. The portion of the population that live in the countryside has declined considerably, and the decline in support for the Christian Democrats and the Agrarian parties in the Nordic countries is partly the result of this ecological realignment.

Regarding education, we find strong support for the idea that both Old Politics and New Politics processes contribute to polarisation between the lower and higher educated strata. The Green, Liberal and Left Socialist parties receive the strongest support from the higher educated strata, while the Radical Right, the Agrarian and then the Social Democrats receive the strongest support from the lower educated strata. Over time, there is clear evidence from different sources of realignment in the sense that the New Politics pattern is increasing.

Perhaps the most interesting finding is that total class voting still is considerable in many West European countries, although traditional and overall left–right class voting has declined considerably. One way of illustrating how irrelevant the traditional left–right class voting is are the findings that class voting is largest for the Radical Rightist parties (which receive the greatest support from the working class), and the Green parties (who receive greatest support from the service class), while class differences (when taking the size of the parties into consideration) are smaller for the traditional class parties (Social Democrats, Liberals and Conservatives). The New Politics parties also play a central role in polarisation. Polarisation between the main classes – workers and the service class – is greatest for Conservatives, and then the Greens and Liberals among the parties that receive strongest support from the service class, and for the Social Democrats and the Radical Right among the parties that receive the strongest support from workers. We find, then, a mix of Old and New polarisation patterns for education and social class, and clear evidence of both dealignment and realignment.

An important finding from the analysis of the location of the party families and of polarisation is that the New Politics parties play a central role for various socio-structural variables. These parties receive still less overall support than many of other party families, and in particular, for polarisation, the strength of support is central; it is easier for a large party

than for a small party to contribute to polarisation. Nevertheless, the New Politics parties are among those party families that contribute most to polarisation along all structural variables. This is most pronounced for the Green parties which contribute along all structural variables, and least for the Radical Right which contributes most significantly along the gender and social class cleavage. The Left Socialists contribute significantly along all structural variables apart from gender and social class. *These findings are firm evidence of the major role played by the New Politics parties for new polarisation patterns related to social structure. Structural processes and new party formations have created new polarisation patterns that question the dealignment perspective on social cleavages.*

### 7.3 PARTY CHOICE AND VALUE ORIENTATIONS

There are several aspects in the analyses of the relationship between party choice and value orientations that deviate from the traditional focus on issue and value voting. This is underscored and supported by theoretical and empirical analysis that both Old Politics and New Politics issues and values are multidimensional. Religious–secular values is a distinct Old Politics dimension, in addition to the economic left–right dimension, and has *not* been absorbed by a New Politics value dimension. New Politics orientations comprise three dimensions: environmental values, libertarian–authoritarian values and immigration orientations.

The two Old Politics dimensions still have a large impact on party choice and locate party voters in different ways, indicating that these value conflicts are cross-cutting at the voter level. While the economic left–right values place the Communist, Left Socialist and Social Democrats closest to the leftist pole, and the Liberal and Conservative parties closest to the rightist pole, the location of party voters on the religious–secular dimension places the Christian and then the Conservative parties closest to the religion pole, while the Social Democratic voters are located in the centre and the Liberals closer to the secular pole.

Religious–secular values have the strongest impact on party choice in the Central Western region, while economic left–right values have the largest impact in the Nordic countries. The distinctiveness of each of the three New Politics dimensions (in addition to the results from the factor analyses) is also prevalent when the relationship between party choice and each of the dimensions are examined. The New Left (Left Socialists and Greens) have a consistent location close to the expected poles on all three

New Politics orientations, but this does *not* apply to the Radical Right parties. Party voters for these parties are only located closest to the restrictive pole on immigration orientations, while it is the Conservative and Christian party voters who are the most anti-environmental and authoritarian. These New Politics dimensions show a nuanced pattern that also indicates considerable cross-national variation in the location of party voters in accordance with a general realignment perspective.

As to the strength of the correlations with party choice, the impact of immigration orientations is most pronounced in the New Politics orientations. Given that this dimension locates all the New Politics parties closest to the expected poles, it is evident that this dimension is the most significant and has approached the Old Politics dimensions regarding the impact on party choice.

The findings regarding the location of the parties and party families on the five value orientations, first and foremost, indicate that the conflicts that the value orientations induce concerning the party systems are multi-dimensional; there is a two-dimensional Old Politics structure and certainly not only one New Politics conflict dimension.

Much of the literature on the impact of value orientations on party choice has focussed on the materialist/post-materialist value orientation or an equivalent New Politics dimension. These value orientations have been compared with the impact of social class and religion. However, when the impacts of Old Politics and New Politics *value orientations* are compared, Old Politics still has the largest impact on party choice although the difference is not large. Surprisingly, both Old Politics and New Politics orientations have the largest impact in the most advanced industrial societies and in fragmented and polarised party systems. The cross-national differences between the countries in this respect cannot be explained by any of the macro-level variables. Inglehart's issue of the polarisation hypothesis is strongly confirmed by the large explanatory power of issues and values on party choice, but the enlargement of this hypothesis to include Old Politics values is decisively justified on the basis of the empirical analyses. The impact of Old Politics values is generally larger than the impact of New Politics values in Western Europe, and the impact of Old Politics values on party choice will surely not wane in advanced industrial societies.

The findings render considerable support for the perspective that in advanced industrial societies with a multiparty system, there is party competition in a multidimensional space where values and issues play a central

role. Bold Old Politics and New Politics orientations are central in defining such spaces, and it is the dynamic relationship between these issues and value dimensions which will be central for party politics in advanced industrial societies.

#### 7.4 THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND VALUE ORIENTATIONS COMPARED

There is a dynamic relationship between social structure and value orientations regarding explaining party choice. Altogether, these variables have a large explanatory power, but this varies considerably cross-nationally. If these independent variables are considered as basic explanations for explaining party choice, much explanatory power for voting choice can be traced back to such profound variables. Value orientations have a larger explanatory power than social structure when the explanatory power is examined without taking into consideration the causal relationship between these independent variables. When the social structure is considered prior to value orientations, it is still more significant. This implies that although issue and value voting is large, as Inglehart and Kitschelt expect in their major works, it is still the structural cleavages that Franklin et al. (1992) considered to represent the decline of cleavage politics, and which have a major impact on voting choice. A major explanation for the different conclusions can be traced back to how the dependent party choice variable is dealt with.

The decomposition of voting into “pure structural”, “pure value” and “cleavage” voting indicated the dynamic relationship between the impact of social structure, value orientations and party choice in depth, and is directly relevant for the main research problems 2 and 3. Cleavage voting is the voting that is transmitted from social structure via value orientations to party choice (main research problem 2). Pure value voting is the impact of value orientations when controlling for social structure (main research problem 3).

The main findings are that pure value voting is most prevalent in the Western democracies, followed by cleavage voting, while pure structural voting is least prevalent. Somewhat surprisingly, cleavage voting is more frequently found in the most advanced industrial democracies, and not in more traditional industrial societies as could be expected from Lipset and Rokkan’s works. Deep-seated cleavages and then cleavage politics can be expected to form a significant part of voting behaviour in advanced



industrial societies; cleavage voting can be expected to increase over time in advanced industrial societies in accordance with Inglehart's group polarisation hypothesis. On the other hand, cleavage voting is somewhat more associated with the Old Politics value orientations than with the New Politics orientations. Pure structural voting which lacks the programmatic component that political values represent can, on the other hand, be expected to decline in advanced industrial societies.

### 7.5 THE ROLE OF THE MACRO-LEVEL EXPLANATIONS

Major findings of this study are that the impact of social structure, value orientations and the total model is largest in advanced industrial societies in Western Europe. Sometimes dealignment is coupled to advanced industrialism. In this work, we do not have data over time, but given the cross-sectional approach, it is evident that the explanatory power of both social structure and value orientations are strongest in the most advanced industrial societies. This can be coupled with the advanced industrial realignment perspective. In advanced industrial settings, preference formation is more diversified and traditional values less widespread. The impact of values on party choice reflects this to a large degree.

The grouping of countries into four categories was carried out to capture differences in party systems and welfare states. The main findings are that the explanatory power of both social structure and value orientations is largest in the generous welfare states in the Nordic and Central Western countries. Particularly for value orientations and the total explanatory model, the differences between these two regions of countries and the Island and Southern regions are substantial. Advanced industrialism and generous welfare states do not imply that social structure and values and issues have faded away as explanatory variables for voting behaviour. In particular, the findings regarding the large impact of social structure in this context are contrary to much conventional wisdom.

The large impact of party system fragmentation on the explanatory power of both social structure and value orientations is – if not an entirely new insight – something that has not been focussed in the literature. Party competition in Western Europe is dominated by programmatic policies, and the importance of fragmentation is probably first and foremost an expression of this. In a fragmented party system, it is easier for citizens to find a party that represents their interests and values. The large impact of party system fragmentations (correlations 0.65–0.77) is surprising and

deserves further investigation in research with even more countries where it is possible to control for the prior structural variables, such as indicators of advanced industrialism and welfare state generosity.

Party system polarisation also correlates significantly with the impact of value orientations and the total explanatory model, but the correlations are substantively smaller than for fragmentation. It is difficult to be certain, but even though “left” and “right” have a large absorptive capacity when the experts locate the parties on a general left–right scale, there are limitations in the absorptive capacity that can be included in one variable. It is, therefore, argued here that the reason why fragmentation is stronger correlated with the impact of social structure and value orientations is that the former captures more programmatic positions than a general “left”–“right” scale is able to do.

## NOTES

1. Exceptions to this among comparative studies are Knutsen (2004a, 2006a).
2. The detections of life cycle, cohort and period effects are difficult also with longitudinal data.

# APPENDIX I

## CONSTRUCTION OF INDICES FOR THE VALUE ORIENTATIONS – EVS 2008

### *Religious/Secular Values*

(Q30) Which, if any, of the following do you believe in?

a) God, b) Life after death, c) Hell, d) Heaven, e) Sin (V119–V123)

An index from 0–5 is constructed based on the number of beliefs the respondents believe in.

V129 (Q36) How important is God in your life? (1–10)

This scale is transformed (not collapsed) to a scale with values from 0 to 5, and then added to the scale for religious beliefs. The final index is then an equal-weighted additive index between the two components, religious beliefs and importance of God with values from 0 to 10. A high score on the index indicates a religious orientation; a low score indicates a secular orientation.

### *Economic Left–Right Values*

The index is based on the following variables in the dataset and the question number in the questionnaire:

V194 (Q58A): Individual/state responsibility

V196 (Q58C): Competition good/harmful

V197 (Q58D): Economic freedom/control

V198 (Q58E): Income equality/incentives

V199 (Q58F): Private/public ownership

The variables were tapped by a question battery where the respondents were shown a card with two opposite statements located to the endpoints of a scale from 1 to 10. The question was formulated as follows:

On this card you see a number of opposite views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale?

V194 (Q58A): Individual/state responsibility

Individuals should take more responsibility for providing for themselves

The state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for

V197 (Q58D): Economic freedom/control

The state should give more freedom to firms

The state should control firms more effectively

V198 (Q58E): Income equality/incentives

Incomes should be made more equal

There should be greater incentives for individual effort

V199 (Q58F): Private/public ownership

Private ownership of business and industry should be increased

Government ownership of business and industry should be increased

V196 (Q58C): Competition good/harmful

Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas

Competition is harmful, it brings out the worst in people

### *Environmental Values*

The index is based on the questions in Q85 (V295–301).

I am now going to read out some statements about the environment. For each one read out, can you tell me whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?

- V295: I would give part of my income if I were certain that the money would be used to prevent environmental pollution
- V296: We are approaching the limit of the number of people the earth can support
- V297: When humans interfere with nature it often produces disastrous consequences
- V298: Human ingenuity will insure that the earth remains fit to live in
- V299: The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern industrial nations
- V300: Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature
- V301: If things continue on their present course, we will soon experience a major ecological catastrophe

All items are then based on four-point Likert item (“Agree strongly”, “Agree”, “Disagree” and “Disagree strongly”. The neutral alternative “Neither agree nor disagree” was not included.

The index is an equal-weighted additive index (0-10) where support for environmental values has the highest values.

### *Libertarian–Authoritarian Values*

These orientations are tapped by several personal values that are found in different questions and value batteries. Below the questions for the various items are outlined. The values or response alternatives that tap libertarian and authoritarian values are indicated with (*lib.*) or (*auth.*), respectively

#### *V101 (Q20) Follow Instructions*

People have different ideas about following instructions at work. Some say that one should follow instructions of one’s superiors even when one does not fully agree with them. Others say that one should follow one’s

superiors' instructions only when one is convinced that they are right. Which of these two opinions do you agree with?

1. Should follow instructions (*auth.*)
2. Must be convinced first (*lib.*)
3. Depends
  - a. Don't know (spontaneous)
  - b. No answer (spontaneous)

**V167 (Q49) Love Parents**

Which of these two statements do you tend to agree with?

- A: Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one's parents are, one must always love and respect them;
- B: One does not have the duty to respect and love parents who have not earned it by their behaviour and attitudes
- a. Tend to agree with statement A (*auth.*)
  - b. Tend to agree with statement B (*lib.*)
  - a. Don't know (spontaneous)
  - b. No answer (spontaneous)

**V204 (Q62) Greater Respect for Authority**

Q62 Here are two changes in our way of life that might take place in the near future. Please tell me for each one, if it were to happen whether you think it would be a good thing, a bad thing, or don't you mind?

	<i>good</i>	<i>bad</i>	<i>don't mind</i>	<i>DK</i>	<i>NA</i>
v204 Greater respect for authority ( <i>auth.</i> )	1	2	3	8	9

*Qualities Which Children Should Be Encouraged to Learn at Home*

Q52 Here is a list of qualities which children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five!

INTERVIEWER: CODE NOT MORE THAN FIVE!

	<i>mentioned</i>	<i>not mentioned</i>	<i>DK</i>	<i>NA</i>
V170 A <i>Good manners (auth.)</i>	1	2	8	9
V171 B <i>Independence (lib.)</i>	1	2	8	9
V172 C <i>Hard work (auth.)</i>	1	2	8	9
V173 D Feeling of responsibility	1	2	8	9
V174 E <i>Imagination (lib.)</i>	1	2	8	9
V175 F Tolerance and respect for other people 1	2	8	9	
V176 G Thrift, saving money and things	1	2	8	9
V177 H Determination, perseverance	1	2	8	9
V178 I Religious faith	1	2	8	9
V179 J Unselfishness	1	2	8	9
V180 K <i>Obedience (auth.)</i>	1	2	8	9
V181 None (spontaneous)	1	2	8	9

The index was constructed as an equal-weighted index with value from 0 to 10. A high score on the index indicates a libertarian orientation.

*Attitudes Towards Immigration and Immigrants*

These orientations are tapped by six questions which are asked in a battery where the respondents were shown a card with two opposite statements located at the endpoints of a scale from 1 to 10. The question for formulated as follows:

Q78 Please look at the following statements and indicate where you would place your views on this scale? (from 1 to 10)

An equal-weighted additive index was constructed on the basis of these six items. The index has values from 0 to 10, and a high score indicates a non-restrictive view on immigration and a positive view on immigrants.

A. (V268)

Immigrants take jobs away from natives in a country

Immigrants do not take jobs away from natives in a country

B. (V269)

A country's cultural life is undermined by immigrants

A country's cultural life is not undermined by immigrants

C. (V270)

Immigrants make crime problems worse

Immigrants do not make crime problems worse

D. (V271)

Immigrants are a strain on a country's welfare system

Immigrants are not a strain on a country's welfare system

E. (V272)

In the future the proportion of immigrants will become a threat to society

In the future the proportion of immigrants will not become a threat to society

F. (V273)

For the greater good of society it is better if immigrants maintain their distinct customs and traditions

For the greater good of society it is better if immigrants do not maintain their distinct customs and traditions but adopt the customs of the country



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