Brazilian Marine Corps

Brazilian Marine Corps
Corpo de Fuzileiros Navais
The seal of the Brazilian Marine Corps
Founded	March 7, 1808 (1808-03-07)
Country	Brazil
Branch	Brazilian Navy
Size	16,000 (2024)
Part of	Navy Command (administrative sector), Naval Operations Command (operational sector)
General-Command HQ	Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Nickname(s)	CFN
Motto(s)	Adsumus (English: Here we are)
Commanders
Commander-in-Chief	President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva
Commander of the Navy	Admiral Marcos Sampaio Olsen
Commandant General of the Marine Corps	Admiral Carlos Chagas Vianna Braga
Insignia
Flag
Emblem

The Brazilian Marine Corps (CFN; Portuguese: Corpo de Fuzileiros Navais, lit. 'Corps of Naval Fusiliers' or 'Corps of Naval Riflemen') is the Brazilian Navy's naval infantry component. It relies on the Fleet and Naval Aviation and fields its own artillery, amphibious and land armor, special operations forces and other support elements. Its operational components are the Fleet Marine Force (For�a de Fuzileiros da Esquadra, FFE) under the Naval Operations Command, in Rio de Janeiro state, and Marine Groups and Riverine Operations Battalions under the Naval Districts in the coast and the Amazon and Platine basins. The FFE, with a core of three infantry battalions, is its seagoing component.

Tracking their roots to the Portuguese Navy's Royal Brigade of the Navy, Brazilian marines served across the 19th century aboard and landed from the Imperial Navy's ships. By the next century, they were consigned to guard duty and largely influenced by the Brazilian Army. In political struggles, they were usually loyalists. Only after 1950 did the CFN acquire a true amphibious warfare capability, under long-lasting inspiration from the United States Marine Corps.

The CFN's amphibious capability varies historically according to the Fleet's available ships and attention given to other priorities, such as counterinsurgency during the military dictatorship and law and order in the current political order. Participation in United Nations peacekeeping is frequent and the 2008 National Defense Strategy established that the Marine Corps must be a high-readiness expeditionary force for power projection by the Navy. In Brazil's strategic surroundings, this means a capability for urban operations, from humanitarian aid to war, in crisis-ridden countries.

As a cadre of personnel, the Marine Corps is one of the Navy's three main components, alongside the Fleet and Logistics Corps, and its ranks are named almost the same as the others. As officers, they may rise to the highest peacetime rank. Marines are a professional, all-volunteer cadre which undergoes a cycle of military exercises with amphibious assaults (Operation Dragão) and live ammunition on land (Operation Formosa). They revere esprit de corps and tradition and are distinguished by symbols such as their bold red parade uniforms.

History

Origins

Capture of Cayenne by the Royal Brigade of the Navy (1809)

The CFN's official history begins upon the transfer of the Portuguese court to Brazil on March 7, 1808, making it the oldest naval infantry organization in Latin America. As the Portuguese royal family fled from the French invasion of their country and resettled in their colony in Brazil, they brought along the Royal Brigade of the Navy (Brigada Real de Marinha). This was a corps of naval artillerymen, infantrymen and craftsmen, founded in 1797 and a predecessor to the Portuguese Navy's modern-day marine corps, the Corpo de Fuzileiros. Historical precedents for naval infantry and amphibious warfare in Brazil run deeper: as early as 1625, the Terço da Armada (Regiment of the Navy) conducted landings against Dutch occupiers in the recapture of Bahia.

Portugal's conquest of French Guiana in 1809 is considered the CFN's baptism of fire, with the caveat that its participants were recently-arrived Portuguese soldiers. Brought aboard the fleet which sailed from Rio de Janeiro, naval infantrymen landed on the beaches of Cayenne, capital of the French colony, after the elimination of small forts on the coast. The Royal Brigade of the Navy fought on land until Portuguese victory. Upon return to Rio de Janeiro, it was headquartered at the Fortress of São José at Cobras Island, which is the CFN's headquarters to this day. Campaigning with the fleet, it fought in the following years in the first Cisplatina campaign, the war against Artigas and the Pernambucan Revolution.

When John VI of Portugal returned to Lisbon in 1821, he left a detachment of the Royal Naval Brigade, the Battalion of Fusilier-Sailors (Batalhão de Fuzileiros-Marinheiros), in Rio de Janeiro. In service to Prince Regent Pedro, this unit fought in the Brazilian side of the War of Independence, carrying out landings and artillery bombardments against remaining Portuguese loyalists.

Imperial Brazil

1808–1862 uniforms

Shortly after independence, in 1822, the unit was renamed Batalhão de Artilharia da Marinha do Rio de Janeiro ('Rio de Janeiro Artillery Battalion of the Navy'). In this early phase, the CFN was a naval artillery corps, later named Imperial Navy Artillery Brigade (Imperial Brigada de Artilharia de Marinha, 1826) and Navy Artillery Corps (Corpo de Artilharia de Marinha, 1827). This was one of the Imperial Brazilian Navy's cadres of personnel, alongside the Fleet Corps (Corpo da Armada), and the only properly militarized cadre. Its commander was an Army artillery officer, who was also given command of the Fortress of São José. Military campaigns were largely maritime, owing to the difficulty of transport by land. Through the stormy regency period (1831–1840) the Navy Artillery Corps was deployed against internal revolts and was itself behind one of them, in October 6, 1831, leading to the bombing of Cobras Island by the fleet and its occupation by the Army and National Guard.

The force was renamed Corps of Naval Fusiliers (Corpo de Fuzileiros Navais, 1847), later Naval Battalion (Batalhão Naval, 1852), and converted into naval infantry. Its personnel was drawn from the Artillery Corps and officers of the Fleet Corps in commission. In 1852 it comprised 64 officers and 1,216 enlisted personnel in eight companies of riflemen and two artillery batteries. Total strength was small compared to the Army.

Battle of the Riachuelo in 1865. Marines served aboard the Fleet's ships

Internal stability in Pedro II's reign, from 1840 onward, directed military operations towards interstate conflict in the Platine basin. Marines enforced crew discipline, captured and garrisoned forts and patrolled rivers in small boats during the Platine War, Uruguayan War and War of the Triple Alliance. In the Battle of the Riachuelo (1865), they fought enemy boarding parties in close combat. Two years later, they built a five mile long accross the Paraguayan Chaco. The CFN's current three infantry battalions are named after battles in this period (Riachuelo, Humaitá and Paissandu battalions), aswell as the Special Operations Battalion (Tonelero battalion).

361 marines were killed in action through this period. After the War of the Triple Alliance, the 1870s and 1880s saw no combat and total strength fell to 900 personnel. Marines were consigned to guard duty in naval installations and internal order operations, such as the control of popular unrest in the Vintém Riots (1879–1880). Previously in 1864 they had already repressed striking port workers in Santos. On November 15, 1889, 400 marines joined with Army forces to proclaim the Republic.

First Republic

Naval Battalion machine gun in the aftermath of the 1910 revolt

The early republican crisis found the Naval Battalion aligned with the rest of the Navy against the government of Floriano Peixoto. Its participation in the second Naval Revolt (1893–1895) concluded with the destruction of the Fortress of São José destroyed by loyalist bombings and the battalion disbanded by the victorious government. Amnesty in 1895 allowed the Navy to reorganize the force with 216 well-behaved enlisted men from the former battalion and 184 Army soldiers. The new unit was named Navy Infantry Corps (Corpo de Infantaria de Marinha) until 1908, when it once again became the Naval Battalion. Os Fuzileiros Navais na história do Brasil (2008), a semi-official history of the Corps, by this period "the Battalion was deemed, by public consensus, the most correct and well-drilled of all battalions in the Rio de Janeiro garrison".

Sailors and marines had completely distinct roles, and the latter, when on ship duty, would be responsible for repressing the former. Social backgrounds and discipline regulations, on the other hand, were equivalent. Days after the sailors' 1910 Revolt of the Lash, a rumor spread among sailors that the abolition of corporal punishment achieved by the revolt would not apply to them. On December 9, part of the enlisted contingent took up arms and occupied their quarters. This uprising was isolated and easily crushed, leaving 26 marines dead, many expelled and serious damages to the Fortress of São José — "the near extinction of another generation of marines", according to CFN historian Manoel Caetano Silva. The Corps does not pay homage to any of the rebels, but has never gain used the lash to enforce discipline.

Traditionally, marines were loyal to their commanders-in-chief. The Artur Bernardes government, facing tenentist military revolts, converted the battalion into the Naval Regiment (Regimento Naval) in 1924, enlarging its strength from 600 to 1,500 men. Enlisted personnel were mostly from Northern and Northeastern Brazil. Recruits from Rio de Janeiro were blamed for high desertion rates and ceased to be the majority after 1910. The drought-stricken Northeast was a source of labor for Rio and other Southeastern states. The uniform, employment, housing and authority drew volunteers to the Corps, but many requested to leave when they found rigorous discipline and a demanding routine.

3.ª Bateria de Artilharia do Regimento Naval em 1929

There were no marine officers at the time. The Naval Battalion was commanded by officers of the Fleet Corps, instructed at the Naval Academu, and technical services were rendered by Fleet non-commissioned officers. The 1924 reform made possible, for the first time, the promotion of enlisted marines to officer rank. Lacking education at the Naval Academy and coming from lower social backgrounds, they were deemed second-rate officers by the Fleet. The Naval Regiment as a whole was seen as a guard force and not an elite.

During the Revolution of 1930 marines were attached to Army columns and once again defended the established government — at the moment, that of Washington Luís. After his overthrow by a military coup in the capital, marines previously taken prisoner in Santa Catarina made their way back integrated by the victorious revolutionary armies. On October 30 the Naval Regiment paraded in Rio de Janeiro showing its loyalty to the new government.

Vargas Era

Ceremony at Cobras Island in 1934

Among the Getúlio Vargas government's military reforms, on February 29, 1932 the Naval Regiment received its current designation (Corps of Naval Fusiliers), with an authorized strength of 2,524 men. Professionalization was sought in the Army's Officer Improvement School (EsAO) and Infantry Sergeant School (ESI); EsAO's course would be mandatory for CFN captain lieutenants until 1990. These officers, starting on 1937, began their careers in the Naval Academy just as their peers in the Fleet Corps. NCOs would only reach officer rank through the Marine Auxiliary Cadre (Quadro Auxiliar de Fuzileiros Navais).

In defense of the Vargas government, marines fought against the Constitutionalist Revolution of 1932 and the communist (1935) and integralist (1938) uprisings. In 1932, some landed in Parati to maneuver on the right flank of the constitutionalists, while others served aboard the blockade fleet in S�o Paulo's coastline. Marines were gaining political, strategic and even social prominence. Although seen as a reserved and focused soldiery, their military band was successful in public and in the radio in the 40s. In two paintings by Alberto da Veiga Guignard, Os noivos ('Bride and groom', 1937) and A fam�lia do fuzileiro naval ('The marine's family', 1938), the uniform was depicted as a point of pride for Afro-Brazilian families.

Defense of the presidential palace during the 1935 Communist uprising

The first CFN bases outside of Rio de Janeiro were installed in 1932: the 1st and 2nd Regional Companies, in Lad�rio and Bel�m. Additional companies were installed in Natal, Salvador and Recife for coast defense during World War II. A detachment was posted at Trindade Island and marines served on ship duty aboard the Northeastern Naval Force. When a need arose to garrison the archipelago of Fernando de Noronha, some officers proposed a detachment of marines, but the Navy had no condition to provide it.

Admiral Alberto Lemos Bastos complained in 1943 that "the marine must be a specialist in landing operations. Ours never practiced these things, nor have the means needed to do them and have not wanted to have them. They have no armament, nor tents, nor field kitchens". The 1932 Corps regulation had listed landing operations as the very first item in the CFN's roles. In reality, there was no dedicated equipment for amphibious operations, and the prevailing military doctrine came from the Army. Small boats were used to move ashore in some exercises, but the situation constrained marines to a focus on internal security. According to an official history, only in the second half of the century would the Corps cease to be a poorly armed guard and ceremonial force.

Fourth Republic

Operation Alvorada: a detachment attends the inauguration of Bras�lia in 1960

The CFN's 1950 regulation determined that it would have "primary responsibility on the development of doctrine, tactics and material for amphibious operations". It echoed the strong postwar American influence on the Navy and the impression made by amphibious assaults in the course of the war. The regulation may have been detached from reality in that year, but by 1958 the Corps held its first amphibious exercises, operations Aragem and Badejo. The material condition for this change was the purchase of transport ships (the Cust�dio de Mello class) and landing craft for the Fleet, from 1955 onward.

1955 also brought a new personnel law authorizing a numerical expansion from 4,412 (the 1947 level) to 10 thousand men. Enlisted marines had minor rivalries with sailors and stewards, distinguished themselves in the Navy by their fitness and skill with the rifle and only embarked sporadically. In 1957 the Navy organized the Fleet Marine Force (For�a de Fuzileiros da Esquadra, FFE), which would reach its present complement of three infantry battalions by the end of the following decade.

Brazilian officers were sent to study at the United States Marine Corps (USMC) and returned as instructors at the Naval Academy and Naval War School. USMC landing doctrine and Brazilian Army influences were now the two major components of CFN thought, without either of them nullifying the other. The USMC model, battle-proven and embodied by well-equipped and qualified combatants, opened a gap between doctrine and capabilities when transposed to Brazilian conditions. For lack of experience and equipment, it was presumed that any war would be fought with the United States as an ally and provider of equipment. The CFN would ultimately have to be an USMC reserve.

Privates abandon their weapons and join mutinous marines at the Metalworkers' Union building in March 1964

Differences in economic development between the United States and Brazil meant differences in the concept of security. This can be seen in some peculiar tasks assigned to the 6th Regional Company, formed in Uruguaiana, at the riverine border with Argentina, in 1948: to patrol the Uruguay River, repress smuggling and oversee river traffic. The Bras�lia Marine Group, created in 1961, had cooperation with the FFE among its missions, but also territorial defense and internal security. The country's two main port cities, Rio de Janeiro and Santos, received marine groups in 1963, in the heat of the national political crisis.

When Navy minister S�lvio Heck attempted to veto Jo�o Goulart's accession to the Presidency in 1961, marines almost landed in coastal Santa Catarina as part of Operation Abelha. Marines in Bras�lia took arms in the August 1963 Sergeants' Revolt. In the spiral of radicalization until the 1964 coup d'�tat, president Goulart had on his side the "red admiral" C�ndido Arag�o, popular with the left and barely tolerated by the officer corps, aswell as corporals and privates in the Association of Sailors and Marines of Brazil (Associa��o dos Marinheiros e Fuzileiros Navais do Brasil, AMFNB), protagonists of the 1964 Sailors' Revolt. When other marines were sent to quell the mutiny, they dropped their weapons and defected.

Military dictatorship

Transhipment of personnel from their transport ship to landing craft in Operation Dragão I (1964)

The Sailors' revolt was an immediate factor to the coup d'état, in the course of which Aragão and the AMFNB offered the most significant loyalist resistance in Rio de Janeiro. Goulart fell and vice admiral Augusto Rademaker, chief of the "Navy Revolutionary Command", named rear admiral Heitor Lopes de Souza to the CFN's General Command in the course of the coup. This officer had been transferred from the Fleet Corps and served in his new post until 1971 as a politically reliable asset of the regime's military presidents. Marines associated with the fallen government were purged. Aragão became a taboo. The official gallery of general-commanders of the Corps, published at the 2008 bicentennial, excludes him from the list, leaving a gap between December 1963 and March 1964.

The first peacekeeping operation by the Corps was in 1965–1966, as a detachment within the US-led Inter-American Peace Force in the Dominican Republic. The Brazilian contribution was part of president Castelo Branco's pro-American foreign policy. Leading names in the operation had been oppositionist figures in the previous government.

In Brazil, presumed roles were set by the political situation: land operations would follow the Army's "revolutionary war" doctrine, while amphibious landings would be on national shores against territories held by guerrillas or rebel troops. The Corps established a specialized unconventional warfare unit, the Marine Special Operations Battalion, and took part in extinguishing the Araguaia Guerrilla War. The National Truth Commission identified the Flores Island Marine Base as a site of detention and torture of political prisoners between 1969 and 1971.

Public security operations during the protests of 1968

Although the "predominance of internal security issues and undesirable suspicions" hampered the "internal debate on the emphasis that should be given to amphibious exercises", by 1981 the amphibious doctrine was dominant, according to admiral Luiz Carlos da Silva Cantídio. Starting on 1964, amphibious exercises assumed greater proportions. The Fleet commissioned new amphibious assault ships, Naval Aviation helicopters were integrated to the landings and the Corps received its first armored vehicles. At an authorized strength of 15,803 men in 1972, a level which would remain stable until the 21st century, the Corps had 25% of the Navy's men. Expansion was gradual, for lack of resources, and in the following year real strength was at circa 650 officers and 12,350 enlisted.

Joint "Veritas" operations in Puerto Rico maintained ties with the USMC. In 1973 an American intelligence report assessed: "by U.S. standards, the marines are moderately well trained and are in a fair state of readiness. They could conduct an amphibious landing with up to two battalions, if the necessary sealift, air, naval gunfire, and logistic support were available". The Fleet Marine Force was "a regimental landing team of about 3,000 men which provides a mobile amphibious force in readiness and is the nucleus of a marine amphibious division".

Operations Aragem and Arrastão tested, from 1977 to 1979, the ability to occupy port areas against hypothetical guerrilla actions, sabotage and civil unrest. In March 1980 the 1st Naval District's marines deployed to the Port of Santos during a port workers' strike. There were no arrests or confrontations with these workers, but the military presence tightened the government's pressure against the strike. Beyond the economic consequences of the port's shutdown, a rebirth of independent organized labor was not in the military government's ongoing plans for redemocratization. New "port security" operations were carried out in the 1985–1987 strikes, shortly after the military left power.

Sixth Republic

Occupation of the Complexo do Alemão in 2008

By the end of the 20th century, the likelyhood of amphibious operations in interstate warfare diminished, but amphibious forces had to adapt to a high rate of low-intensity conflicts and new threats such as terrorism, climatic disasters and transnational crime. In Brazil, concerns over the Amazon manifested in the Corps with a new type of unit, the Riverine Operations Battalion, since 2002. Marine observers and troops have been sent to a number of United Nations peacekeeping missions since 1989, and other missions by the Organization of American States. Starting with the 1994 "Operation Rio", marines have reinforced law enforcement agencies in Brazilian territory.

Comparisons may be drawn between the 2006–2007 offensives against gangs by the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti and the "pacification" of Brazilian favelas controlled by organized crime, starting in 2008. Marine and Army troops were in both. In early stages, marine armored vehicles overcame obstacles dug by armed groups in the narrow alleys of Rio de Janeiro and Port-au-Prince. In later stages, the military's presence is transferred to permanent garrisons, in Rio's case, the Pacifying Police Units. In the 1988 Constitution's legal order, the Armed Forces may be employed in police-type law and order operations at the request of civil authorities.

Contribution to UN forces in Haiti

Frequent law and order operations and subsidiary actions such as humanitarian aid tended to divert the focus away from amphibious operations. Around the turn of the century, budget restraints and ship decommissionings reduced the size and frequency of the Navy's amphibious exercises. The 2008 National Defense Strategy (Estrat�gia Nacional de Defesa, END) defined the CFN's objectives: "to ensure its power projection capability, the Navy will possess marine assets in permanent readiness". The Marine Corps was to consolidate its role as "the premier expeditionary force", potentially deployed "anywhere in the world" . Expeditionary missions, likely in developing states under political and social crisis in Brazil's strategic surroundings, mean the Corps must be ready for amphibious operations in urbanized coastlines.

The END oriented the Brazilian Navy's 2009 and 2013 Articulation and Equipment Plans (Planos de Articula��o e Equipamento da Marinha do Brasil, PAEMB), which set targets for the CFN's expansion and re-equipment. One of them was a 2nd Fleet Marine Force headquartered in the Northern or Northeastern Region, alongside a 2nd Fleet, with a priority on defense of the mouth of the Amazon River. An expansion in size to 20,666 marines until 2031 was approved in 2010, and a full execution of the PAEMB would require an even greater number (28,925). By the late 2030s, the Corps would be larger than the Uruguayan and Paraguayan armies. The mid-decade economic crisis and ensuing fiscal adjustments delayed these projects. The 2nd Fleet/2nd Fleet Marine Force were pushed to long-term planning (2030s or 2040s).

JLTV and infantry in Operation Lais de Guia, a law and order mission in port areas, in 2023

Amphibious exercises gradually recovered after the Bahia and Atl�ntico were commissioned in 2016 and 2018. By 2023, deliveries for the military's modernization programmes, including the CFN's, continued at a slow pace. One of these acquisitions, of twelve American Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JTLV) for the Corps, was noted in the media for its aptitude in urban environments and therefore, law and order operations. According to a commentator in Le Monde diplomatique, this suggested the Navy's eyes were set on guerrillas, militias, cartels, gangs and other irregular enemies in the cities, and not the coastline, Amazon or Pantanal. Expansion plans for marine armor are broader and even include main battle tanks.

Roles

Amphibious operation exercise (Operation Aderex 2022)

Naval patrol in the Port of Santos (Operation �gata 2022)

Technical advisory for the Namibian Marine Corps (2024)

The Marine Corps exists so that the Navy can project power over land, if needed by the conquest of a hostile shore, the most complex, intense and high-risk operation it may attempt. Territories held by marines may deny use of the sea to the enemy and/or ease naval and air operations for sea control. Through pre-positioning and maneuvers during crises, marines can be an instrument of deterrence.

Power projection over land, sea control, sea denial and deterrence are the four basic tasks of naval power within Brazilian Navy doctrine. Naval power has three components, naval, aeronaval and amphibious, and can be used in three forms, naval warfare, limited use of force and benign activities. Marines are the core of the amphibious component. A naval force carrying marines and aircraft is termed an "amphibious combination" (conjugado anfíbio), a similar concept to an US Amphibious Ready Group. This force may receive a variety of missions in all three usages of naval power.

The National Defense Strategy designates the Marine Corps as essential to the defense of archipelagos, oceanic islands and naval and port installations, to peacekeeping, humanitarian and foreign policy support operations and to the control of river banks during riverine operations. Law and order and naval patrol operations may include marine boarding parties entering civilian ships. Marines abroad may connect to to other navies for exercises and advisory roles, evacuate non-combatants from conflict zones and provide security for Brazilian diplomatic missions. As of 2008, Brazilian embassies in Bolivia, Paraguay and Haiti were under marine security.

An amphibious operation proper has four classic types, all of which presume a hostile or potentially hostile shore and are thus naval warfare operations. An amphibious assault is the conquest of a beachhead in a stretch of coastal land. An amphibious raid (incursão anfíbia, lit. amphibious incursion) is a short-term insertion and retrieval of ground forces. An amphibious demonstration is a feint by an amphibious combination, which approaches shore without landing. An amphibious withdrawal is the extraction of a ground force to the sea. A fifth type, included in the 2014 doctrine, is amphibious projection (projeção anfíbia), which admits the possibility of a friendly shore and the usage of limited force or benign operations. In this new concept, an amphibious operation is defined by the projection of military power over land, regardless of its purpose or the shore's hostility.

Capabilities

Infantry landing from the LCU Marambaia

Light vehicle towed aboard the offshore patrol vessel Apa (2023)

The CFN's size and availability of armor, artillery, landing ships and helicopters turn Brazil into "one of the very few countries in Latin American that may project an integral maritime war action", according to a Spanish report by the Edefa group. Brazilian marines may organize a light brigade-sized intervention force. Equipment and combat organization are largely American-sourced, although the CFN's size and investment capacity cannot be compared to the USMC's. Notable differences include the limited shock capacity of Brazilian armor and the absence of an organic marine aviation, which must rely on the Aeronaval Force (Naval Aviation)'s helicopters.

Officially, the Marine Corps is distinguished from other regular troops by its "readiness, expeditionary capacity and amphibious character". A part of the Fleet Marine Force and ships, selected in rotation, is kept as a Rapid Employment Force (Força de Emprego Rápido, FER) to embark within 72 hours of any order. As of 2017, the FER was Amphibious Unit-sized (800 to 2,200 marines). As a professional, high-readiness and strategically mobile force, the Fleet Marine Force is comparable to the Brazilian Army's strategic reaction brigades and commands, such as the Parachute Infantry Brigade.

Inherent characteristics of naval power — mobility, wide cargo capacity and the possibility of direct logistical support from ships (seabasing) — are the source of expeditionary capacity. As defined in doctrine, expeditionary operations happen far from bases, in another country, with a self-sustaining force and limited objectives and timetables. They must be versatile: a humanitarian operation may turn to limited use of force or even naval warfare as security conditions degrade.

Two USMC concepts, Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) and its tactical application, the Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM), translate maneuver warfare into amphibious operations. Brazilian Marine doctrine prioritizes maneuver over attrition warfare. OMFTS means the sea is used to reach a position of advantage on land, and STOM excludes the operational pause after the conquest of a beach. Maneuver warfare doctrine entered manuals in 2003. Ten years later, an analyst at Âncoras e Fuzis, a CFN Doctrinary Development Command periodical, noted that the principles of maneuver warfare were still routinely ignored in exercises and operations. This philosophy of combat has no fixed formula and would take time to be internalized.

Naval support

SK-105 light tank boarding LST Garcia D'Ávila

LCU Guarapari in the well deck of LSD Ceará

The transport of troops and material ashore and command and control over actions on land rely on amphibious ships. The Brazilian Navy's first in this role were the Custódio de Mello class, first commissioned in 1955. They were comparable to cargo ships, with an average capacity for 500 marines. Transshipment was difficult, as it could only happen through nets or cranes. By the early 1960s, merchant ships were also used as troop transports. The Custódio de Mello class was decommissioned from 1995 to 2009.

The next category was that of the LST or Tank Landing Ship (Navio de Desembarque de Carros de Combate, NDCC), which can beach and project a ramp from its bow for direct landing. This is a practical model, but exposes a large ship to a potentially hostile shore. The first two ships in this category were the Garcia D'Ávila (1971–1989) and Duque de Caxias (1973–2000), followed by the Mattoso Maia (1994–2023). The Garcia D'Ávila (2007–2019) and Almirante Saboia (2009–present) originally classified as Landing Ship Logistics (LSL), were commissioned as LSTs in Brazil.

A safe distance from the shore may be achieved with a LSD or Dock Landing Ship (Navio de Desembarque de Doca, NDD). This ship can flood its lower deck, or well deck, and open a door at its stern for landing craft and amphibious vehicles. Two were commissioned, the Ceará (1989–2016) and Rio de Janeiro (1990–2012).

A LPD, Landing Platform Dock or Multipurpose Dock Ship (Navio Doca Multipropósito, NDM) in Brazilian terminology, combines a well deck with room for helicopters and more advanced command and control instruments. One ship in this category, the Bahia, was commissioned in 2016. The Multipurpose Helicopter Carrier (PHM)/Multipurpose Aircraft Carrier (NAM) Atlântico, commissioned in 2018, lacks a well deck but offers wide aviation and command and control capacities. From the 1960s to 1990s, the light aircraft carrier Minas Gerais routinely landed marines with its helicopters, even though this was not its primary role.

For transport from larger ships to the beach, in 2014 the Brazilian Navy possessed 3 Landing Craft Utility or LCUs (Embarcação de Desembarque de Carga Geral, EDCG), 8 LCVPs or Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel (Embarcação de Desembarque de Viaturas e Pessoal, EDVP) and 16 LCMs or Landing Craft Mechanized (Embarcação de Desembarque de Viaturas Militares, EDVM).

Air support

Infantry boarding an UH-15 helicopter on the flight deck of LPD Bahia

The Aeronaval Force's helicopters operate with the Marine Corps, but have to divide their attentions with their other roles. The idea of an organic marine aviation has never received the blessing of naval authorities. Naval Aviation helicopters provide marines with fire support their its missiles and machine guns, personnel and cargo transport, visual reconnaissance, personnel evacuation and search and rescue missions. Transport missions are usually given to the 2nd Utility Helicopter Squadron (HU-2)'s UH-15 Super Cougar aircraft. This model can haul up to 29 personnel and is one the Navy's largest and heaviest, and therefore, can only board an helicopter carrier, LPD or LSD. Nine were in service with the HU-2 in 2023. Other missions are handled by the 1st Utility Helicopter Squadron's UH-12 and UH-13 Esquilo and UH-17 aircraft.

Personnel

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) specifies a total strength of 16 thousand marines in 2024. Brazilian legislation provided for 11 admirals and 797 other officers in service in 2024. Enlisted personnel were at a total of 15,988 in 2023. 14,926 were in the Marine Enlisted Cadre (Quadro de Praças de Fuzileiros Navais, QPFN) and the remainder in the Musicians' Cadre, Special Cadre and Complementary Cadre. Out of this total, 1,183 were suboficiais (chief petty officers), 6,628 sergeants, 3,343 corporals and 4,834 soldiers (privates). Rank terminology is the same as in the Navy as a whole, with the exception of the lowest rank, that of seaman/sailor (marinheiro) in the Fleet.

Recruitment

Apprentice marines at CIAMPA

Marines are a professional and volunteer cadre, selected in entrance examinations and inducted with a career plan. The Corps has no "recruits" in the sense of the Army's yearly levies of conscripts. Unlike the Army, the Navy does not assume for itself the missions of nationwide presence and civic education through conscription, focusing on national defense proper. An individual inducted into the Army is trained at combat units, while his counterpart in the Marine Corps must first pass through a dedicated training center.

The media sometimes names marines as the Navy's "elite force". In academia, a qualitative distinction between the Army and Marine Corps is sometimes made comparing conscripts with professional soldiers. In the professional model, combat units are relieved of the burdens of early training, which absorbs all of the Army's structure. Soldiers spend longer in service and are trained in more complex subjects. Defenders of training in combat units argue that it fosters closer connections between commanders and inferiors. The choice is between more specific training or tighter unity of command.

The main entrance route for enlisted ranks is the Marine Soldier Training Course (Curso de Forma��o de Soldados Fuzileiros Navais, C-FSD-FN) held at the Admiral Milc�ades P. Alves Instruction Center (CIAMPA), in Rio de Janeiro, and the Bras�lia Instruction and Training Center (CIAB). Entrants are titled "apprentices" and undergo 17 weeks of training. In 2024, 720 entrants reached the course's adaptation period, including the first 120 women admitted into the C-FSD-FN. Further courses are held at the Admiral Sylvio de Camargo Instruction Center (CIASC), in Rio, and training in a realistic waterborne operations environment uses the Restinga da Marambaia Training Center (CADIM). The Almirante Adalberto Nunes Physical Education Center (CEFAN) is used for physical preparation.

Officers enter the Corps through the Naval Academy, where aspirantes (students) opt for one of three Corps to serve in the remainder of their careers: Armada (Fleet), Fuzileiros Navais (Marines) or Intend�ncia (Logistics). Within the second option, they choose between specializations in Electronics, Weapons Systems or Machines. The choice of Corps and specialization happens at the end of the 2nd years when embarked in the "Aspirantex" exercise. The Marine and Logistics Corps have less vacancies (about 16% of the total each in 2014). By the end of the fourth year, aspirantes receive the rank of guarda-marinha, with which they remain for one year until their full acceptance into the officer corps.

Career

Ceremony at CIASC's sergeant promotion course

As of 2017, a marine soldier (private) begins his career in a military unit with a commitment to remain in the Corps for two years. If accepted on internal examinations, he may be promoted to corporal in his fourth to seventh year of service, specializing in Artillery, Infantry, Writing, Engines and Machines, Engineering, Naval Communications, Drum and Bugle, Aviation, Electronics, Combat Medicine or Armor. Internal examinations and courses continue, with a promotion to 3rd sergeant in the tenth to fourteenth career year. After six years in this rank, he may be promoted to 2nd sergeant and then five more years to 1st sergeant and another five to suboficial. In 2023 a sergeant driving an Assault Amphibious Vehicle, whose value may exceed 15 million reais, had a net income of about R$ 6,000.00, less than what a civilian truck driver working with hazardous cargo would receive.

For officers, career steps are the same in the Fleet and Marines. They'll spend about eleven years in the lower and middle ranks (1st and 2nd lieutenant and captain lieutenant), in which promotion is by seniority. Another eighteen years are spent as higher officers (capit�o de corveta, capit�o de fragata and capit�o de mar e guerra), with promotions by seniority and merit. Improvement and specialization courses are taken across the career. For the few promoted to general ranks (rear admiral, vice admiral and almirante de esquadra), selection is the additional criterion. The four-star position of almirante de esquadra, highest in the peacetime Navy, was opened to marines in 1980. Only a single active-duty marine may hold this rank.

Traditions

The Naval Battalion's Police Company parades in red uniform and historical helmet, carrying the standards of the CFN and Navy and the national flag

In its more than two centuries of history, the Marine Corps has gathered traditions representative of Brazilian geography, society and culture. Its terminology is not identical to the USMC's and translating it can be complex. The Navy prizes its tradition and venerates heroes of the past, usually admirals and higher officers. In the case of the marines, those are admirals Milc�ades Portela Alves and Sylvio de Camargo; the latter is recognized as the CFN's patron. Esprit de corps (esp�rito de corpo), officially defined as a "mode of thought and a belief which polarize men in the search of common objectives", is deemed a sentiment of utmost importance.

The Navy's official page presents as "symbols and costumes of the marines" their coat of arms, standard, emblem (rifles crossed under an anchor) in unit badges and uniforms, Scottish-style garrison cap, Rubia-colored parade uniform, Prussian-style historical helmet and "Adsumus" (Latin for "here we are") motto. Their bold red parade uniforms stand out from the Navy's usually discreet aesthetic. The Marine Corps Band is known for its bagpipes. Historical items are conserved at the Marine Corps museum within the Fortress of S�o Jos�.

Organization

Platoons and vehicles of a peacekeeping Marine Operational Group

The Corps can be split in two sectors, a technical-administrative, management and doctrinary branch centered on the Marine Corps General Command (Comando-Geral do Corpo de Fuzileiros Navais, CGCFN), and an operational branch, which consists of the Fleet Marine Force (For�a de Fuzileiros da Esquadra, FFE) and district Groups and Battalions. Operational units are not assigned to the CGCFN, which is a sector direction department under the Navy Command, while those units are either directly under the Naval Operations Command (Comando de Opera��es Navais, CON) or under Naval Districts (Distritos Navais, DN), for other units. DNs are subordinated to CON. Marine bases are concentrated in the state of Rio de Janeiro, where the Fleet is also headquartered.

At the operational and tactical levels, the Corps acts through the Marine Operational Group (Grupamento Operativo de Fuzileiros Navais, GptOpFuzNav). Inspired on the USMC's Marine Air-Ground Task Force, this is a task-based organization created for a specific mission. Its personnel and materiel are mobilized from several units. Depending on its size, it is classified as an Amphibious Element (300 marines), Amphibious Unit (2,000 marines) or Amphibious Brigade (7,000 marines); the latter two are comparable to the USMC's Marine Expeditionary Unit and Marine Expeditionary Brigade. An Operational Group consists of a Command Component (Componente de Comando, CteC), Ground Combat Component (Componente de Combate Terrestre, CCT), Air Combat Component (Componente de Combate Aéreo, CteCA) and Combat Service Support Component (Componente de Apoio de Serviços ao Combate, CASC). The CCT is its core and fields most of its strength.

Specialized examples of GptOpFuzNav include Civil Defense Support and Peacekeeping Quick Reaction Force (QRF) groups. The latter, composed of 220 marines, was certified in 2022 as a level 3 QRF in the UN's Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System. This is the highest level in the system and the only Brazilian unit to have reached it by then.

General Command

Ceremony at the Fortress of São José, CGCFN headquarters

The Marine Corps General Command is headquartered at the São José Fortress, Cobras Island, and manages human resources, material, research and doctrine for the CFN's operational sector. Since 1981 its commander has no direct involvement in the FFE's deployment. This reorganization introduced the General Commander to the Admiralty, where he partakes in the Navy's high-level decisionmaking.

The General Command controls the Navy Sports Commission, the CEFAN, the Navy Chemical, Biological, Nuclear and Radiolocial Defense Center, the Marine Corps Train

Ele tem subordinados a Comissão de Desportos da Marinha, o CEFAN, o Centro de Defesa Nuclear, Biológica, Química e Radiológica da MB, the Marine Corps Training and Doctrinary Development Command, the Marine Personnel Command and Marine Materiel Command. All instruction centers are in this structure. The Materiel Command is responsible for the Naval Battalion, a financial administration, personnel, security and general services support unit for the General Command, Personnel Command and Materiel Command.

This unit commands the Police Company of the Naval Battalion, a military police in the generic sense — an internal Armed Forces police, unrelated to the Polícia Militar state police forces. This is not the only military police in the Navy: the FFE has another company within its Reinforcement Troop, and other companies or platoons service Marine Groups and Battalions. Marine policemen can be identified by brassards with "SP" (Serviço de Polícia, Police Service) lettering.

Fleet Marine Force

Entrance to the Rio Meriti Marine Base

The FFE is the landing force in amphibious operations, summarized by the Seaforth World Naval Review as "the seagoing component of the naval infantry". It commands infantry, artillery, engineering, command and control, amphibious and land armor, special operations and military logistics assets, for a total of six thousand marines in service in 2017. There is no rigid distinction between arms, cadres and services as in the Army. The infantry is usually the only ground combat arm, with the other elements classified in planning and employment as combat support (e.g. armor and artillery) or combat service support.

With an expeditionary nature, its structure seeks to hasten the transition between an administrative and combat organization. The FFE's command is headquartered at the Caxias Meriti Naval Complex, where its command, control and administration needs are handled by one of its subordinate units, the Rio Meriti Naval Base. Its other components are the Amphibious Division, which comprises most combat units, the Reinforcement Troop, Air Combat Battalion, Marine Special Operations Battalion and Landing Troop Command. The latter has no units assigned and provides Command Components to Marine Operational Groups.

Amphibious Division

The Amphibious Division is headquartered at Governador Island. It controls the Governador Island Marine Base and the following battalions: 1st, 2nd and 3rd Marine Infantry (Batalhão de Infantaria de Fuzileiros Navais, BtlInfFuzNav), Marine Artillery (Batalhão de Artilharia de Fuzileiros Navais, BtlArtFuzNav), Command and Control (Batalhão de Comando e Controle, BtlCmdoCt) and Marine Armor (Batalhão de Blindados de Fuzileiros, BtlBldFuzNav). Expansion plans would provide for a 4th infantry battalion in Rio de Janeiro and a 5th and 6th in the 2nd Fleet Marine Force.

The standard infantry weapons in 2014 were the M16A2 rifle, FN Minimi, FN MAG and Browning M2HB machine guns, 60 and 81-milimeter mortars, AT4 recoilless weapons and RBS 56 BILL anti-tank guided missiles. Artillery was listed at 18 L118 105 mm howitzers, six M114 155 mm howitzers and six Soltam K6A3 120 mm mortars in the 2012 National Defense White Paper. The M114 was already deemed old and in need of replacement in 2010. These items were complemented in 2014 by a battery of six ASTROS 2020 multiple rocket launchers. The Command and Control Battalion has communications and electronic warfare assets.

The Armor Battalion fields the CFN's main armored vehicles, with the important exception of the Amphibious Assault Vehicle, which is assigned to the Reinforcement Troop. Its inventory consists of 17 SK-105 light tanks, one 4KH7FA Greif armored recovery vehicle, 30 M113 family tracked armored personnel carriers (APCs), 30 Piranha III family wheeled APCs and 12 JLTV light armored vehicles. The SK-105s were already at the end of their service life in 2021, as admitted by the FFE's commander. The 2009 PAEMB called for the acquisition of 26 tanks until 2019, 72 wheeled APCs until 2022 and 72 tracked APCs until 2029.

• Components of the Amphibious Division
• 
  Command and Control
• 
  Infantry
• 
  Artillery
• 
  Armor

Reinforcement Troop

The Reinforcement Troop is headquartered at Flores Island. It focuses on support assets for Operational Groups, commanding the Flores Island Marine Base, several battalions — Marine Engineering (Batalhão de Engenharia de Fuzileiros Navais, BtlEngFuzNav), Marine Logistics (Batalhão Logístico de Fuzileiros Navais, BtlLogFuzNav), Amphibious Vehicles (Batalhão de Viaturas Anfíbias, BtlVtrAnf) and Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense (Batalhão de Defesa Nuclear, Química, Biológica e Radiológica, BtlDefNQBR) — the Police Company (CiaPol) and Navy Expeditionary Medical Unit (Unidade Médica Expedicionária da Marinha, UMEM). The Amphibious Vehicles Battalion operates the American-made Assault Amphibious Vehicle, locally designated Carro sobre Lagarta Anfíbio (CLAnf), which is responsible for ship to shore movement of the assault elements of an amphibious operation. Its 49 AAVs are the largest inventory of this vehicle on the Southern Hemisphere.

• Components of the Amphibious Troop
• 
  Amphibious Vehicles
• 
  Engineering
• 
  Logistics
• 
  Medical Unit
• 
  CBRN Defense

Air Combat Battalion

Anti-aircraft artillery firing a Mistral MANPADS

The Air Combat Battalion (Batalhão de Combate Aéreo, BtlCmbAe) is the usual core of an Operational Group's Air Combat Component. It coordinates any Naval Aviation aircraft assigned to its Component and may operate from its ship or deploy on land. It is equipped with anti-aircraft artillery — Bofors L/70 BOFI-R 40 mm guns and Mistral man-portable air defense missiles — and unmanned aerial vehicles for reconnaissance. Its strength was 217 marines, out of a nominal total of 280, in 2016.

Special Operations Battalion

Amphibious Commands on installation recapture training

Main article: COMANF

Marines prepared for high-risk, high-value operations, known as Amphibious Commandos, are part of the Marine Special Operations Battalion (Batalhão de Operações Especiais de Fuzileiros Navais, BtlOpEspFuzNav), or Tonelero Battalion. It has a special operations company for each of three roles: reconnaissance, commando actions and counterterrorism. Its equipment is diverse and specialized, and its recruitment and training criteria are more demanding. An Amphibious Commando's full training may take two years or more. They exercise annually in several Brazilian biomes and attend courses in the Army, such as the airborne, jungle warfare and mountain operations courses, and even abroad. The battalion is one of two special forces units in the Navy, the other being the Fleet Corps Combat Divers Group (GRUMEC). Amphibious Commandos primarily operate on land, while combat divers focus on aquatic environments.

District units

Natal Marine Group in the caatinga environment

The headquarters of each Naval District (DN) has a unit of marines. There are Marine Groups (Grupamentos de Fuzileiros Navais, GptFN) in Rio de Janeiro (1st DN), Salvador (2nd DN), Natal (3rd DN), Rio Grande (5th DN), Brasília (7th DN) and Santos (8th DN), and three Riverine Operations Battalions (Batalhões de Operações Ribeirinhas, BtlOpRib), the 1st in the 9th DN, Manaus, the 2nd in the 4th DN, Belém, and the 3rd in the 6th DN, Ladário.

In coastal Districts, Marine Groups may defend ports and installations and provide ship security teams. Units in Brasília and Natal hold courses in their local terrain types, the Cerrado and Caatinga. Each unit may reinforce the FFE or be reinforced by it. They may not be enough to cover the entire coast and other areas of interest to the Navy, but this is compensated by the FFE's mobility.

2nd Riverine Operations Battalion moving on small boats

Riverine Operations Battalions were former Marine Groups. The 1st and 2nd are the Marine Corps presence in the Amazon, and the 3rd in the Paraguay River basin. A 4th battalion is planned for Tabatinga, Amazonas, aswell a Riverine Landing Troop Command, headquartered in the Amazon basin and commanded by a marine rear admiral.

In operation, this battalion may compose joint Army-Navy riverine task forces. Its basic organization is that of an infantry battalion, with added police, combat engineering, special operations and watercraft components for a certain degree of independence from Rio de Janeiro. On the other hand, its strength (about 900 men in 2003) is slightly lower than that of a traditional battalionl. Operations are decentralized and each squad has its own combat medic. 81 mm mortars, .50 machine guns and anti-tank weaponry are its nominal heavy armament. Some officers and sergeants attend the Army's jungle warfare course. The 3rd Battalion holds its own course for its terrain, the Pantanal.

A special case is the Aramar CBRN Defense Battalion, located in Iper�, S�o Paulo. It is responsible for security and emergency control at the Aramar Experimental Center, one of the Navy's nuclear program installations, and responds to the Navy Technological Center in S�o Paulo. An Itagua� CBRN Defense Battalion is planned for the future nuclear submarine base.

Military exercises

Moments of Operation Formosa:

Impact of an artillery strike

ASTROS 2020 firing

Amphibious training in the Brazilian Navy culminates in Operation Drag�o, held anually since 1964, with a gap between 2001 and 2016. In this period, due to lack of funding and ships, it was replaced by the smaller-scale "UANFEX". Operation Drag�o presumes a fictional conflict, centered on land, for which the FFE is moved across the sea and simulates an amphibious assault to conquer enemy territory. This combines the Navy's naval, air and marine elements, with further contributions from the Army and Air Force. Its beaches have included Ilh�us and Porto Seguro in Bahia, Ponta da Fruta, Marata�zes, Mea�pe, Itaoca and Guarapari, in Esp�rito Santo, Maca�, in Rio de Janeiro, S�o Sebasti�o, in S�o Paulo, aswell as Imbituba and Itaja�, in Santa Catarina. At its peak in the early period, in 1995, 23 ships, 11 helicopters, six Air Force aircraft, eight AAVs and 2,388 personnel participated.

Fleet Corps assets in Operation Drag�o form into the "Amphibious Task Force", to which a marine Landing Force is subordinated. In Operation Drag�o XXXVIII, in 2018, ten ships were deployed. Marines boarded two capital ships in Rio de Janeiro, the Bahia and Almirante Saboia, and were escorted by two Niter�i-class frigates. In preparation, minesweepers cleared the landing zone and combat divers and Amphibious Commandos, carried aboard patrol vessels, conducted reconnaissance and commando raids. At "D-Day", 750 infantrymen landed in Itaoca with 13 AAVs and several LCUs and LCMs, which brought four Piranha APCs and other vehicles. While these troops advanced, a logistical structure was built at the beachhead. Once objectives were taken, marines took defensive positions until the order to board again, when the simulation presumes other troops would take over the frontline. A unit of the FFE usually represents the enemy.

Paratroopers jump in Operation Drag�o

When Operation Drag�o could not be held, the annual exercise to top off training cycles was Operation Formosa, which still represents a landing, but excludes the Fleet. The emphasis is on live ammunition and fire coordination, covering land and air combat with infantry, paratroopers, armor, artillery and aviation. It is held annually since 1988 at the Formosa Instruction Camp, in Goi�s, a 114,000-hectare area under Army administration and the only training field in the country with enough room to fire rockets from ASTROS launchers. The Army and Air Force also participate since 2021. The 2024 edition included over three thousand personnel, American and Chinese troops and observers from eight other countries.

Riverine operations training by the FFE takes place at the Furnas Reservoir in Minas Gerais, one of the largest river reservoirs in the world, with the additional advantages of mountainous terrain in the surroundings and a deactivated airport which was converted into a Naval Aviation base. Operation Furnas I/2023 mobilized over 1,300 marines.

See also

• List of equipment of the Brazilian Marine Corps

References and notes

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• Schmidt, Luna Daniela Damo (2014). Polícia Militar no Brasil: possibilidade de desmilitarização da estrutura policial ostensiva (PDF) (Monograph). Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul.
• Silva, Augusto Marques Sampaio da (2016). O Componente de Combate Aéreo em uma Operação Anfíbia (PDF) (Monograph). Escola de Artilharia de Costa e Antiaérea (Exército Brasileiro).
• Silva, Luís Felippe Valentini da (2021). "Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS) e o Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM): conceitos e aplicações para os GptOpFuzNav". Âncoras e Fuzis. No. 52. Mangaratiba: Comando do Desenvolvimento Doutrinário do Corpo de Fuzileiros Navais.
• Teixeira, Esley Rodrigues de Jesus (2023). "Os Fuzileiros Navais no Segundo Reinado". Revista do Clube Naval. Vol. 3, no. 407.
• Vallim, Jose Domingos Araujo (2017). "Operações Expedicionárias: a garantia dos interesses nacionais além-mar". Âncoras e Fuzis. No. 48. Mangaratiba: Comando do Desenvolvimento Doutrinário do Corpo de Fuzileiros Navais.
• Vellame, Jorge Nerie (2006). "Forma��o dos oficiais para os primeiros postos da carreira". O Anf�bio. Vol. 35. Rio de Janeiro: Associa��o Cultural e Hist�rica do Corpo de Fuzileiros Navais. ISSN 2358-4394.
• Vellame, Jorge Nerie (2014). Opera��o anf�bia: � v�lido a Marinha do Brasil manter a capacidade de realiz�-la no s�culo XXI? (PDF) (Monograph). Escola Superior de Guerra.

External links

• Official website (in Portuguese only)
• Fleet Marine Force website (in Portuguese only)