Paper 2020/1556

Honest Majority MPC with Abort with Minimal Online Communication

Daniel Escudero and Anders Dalskov

Abstract

In this work we focus on improving the communication complexity of the \emph{online phase} of honest majority MPC protocols. To this end, we present a general and simple method to compile arbitrary secret-sharing-based passively secure protocols defined over an arbitrary ring that are secure up to additive attacks in a malicious setting, to actively secure protocols with abort. The resulting protocol has a total communication complexity in the online phase of $1.5(n-1)$ shares, which amounts to $1.5$ shares per party asymptotically. An important aspect of our techniques is that they can be seen as generalization of ideas that have been used in other works in a rather \emph{ad-hoc} manner for different secret-sharing protocols. Thus, our work serves as a way of unifying key ideas in recent honest majority protocols, to understand better the core techniques and similarities among these works. Furthermore, for $n=3$, when instantiated with replicated secret-sharing-based protocols (Araki et al.~CCS 2016), the communication complexity in the online phase amounts to only $1$ ring element per party, matching the communication complexity of the BLAZE protocol (Patra \& Suresh, NDSS 2020), while having a much simpler design.

Note: Updated version after Latincrypt reviews

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Major revision. Latincrypt 2021
Keywords
secure multiparty computationprotocolcommunication efficienthonest-majority
Contact author(s)
daniel escudero @ protonmail com
anderspkd @ fastmail com
History
2021-10-05: revised
2020-12-13: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2020/1556
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/1556,
      author = {Daniel Escudero and Anders Dalskov},
      title = {Honest Majority {MPC} with Abort with Minimal Online Communication},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/1556},
      year = {2020},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1556}
}
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