Jun 30, 2016 · We find that both inefficiencies are more severe with competition than they are when the third party allocates capacity in an FCFS manner.

Sep 20, 2014 · In this article we develop models to assess the value created by coordinating the manufacturers' subcontracting decisions by comparing two types of centralized ...

We present optimal and/or approximate algorithms to quantify the third party underutilization and the manufacturers' decentralization cost. We find that both ...

Benchmark Schedules for Subcontracted Operations: Decentralization Inefficiencies that Arise from Competition and First-Come-First-Served Processing.

We find that both inefficiencies are more severe with competition than they are when the third party allocates capacity in an FCFS manner. However, in a ...

Found: 13 · Benchmark Schedules for Subcontracted Operations: Decentralization Inefficiencies that Arise from Competition and First-Come-First-Served Processing.

We find that both inefficiencies are more severe with competition than they are when the third-party allocates capacity in a FCFS manner. However, without ...

在本文中，我们通过比较两种类型的集中控制与FCFS和纳什均衡计划，开发模型来评估协调制造商分包决策所创造的价值。我们提出了最优和/或近似算法来量化第三方利用率不足和 ...

Apr 25, 2024 · ... Schedules for Subcontracted Operations: Decentralization Inefficiencies that Arise from Competition and First-Come-First-Served Processing.

Benchmark Schedules for Subcontracted Operations: Decentralization Inefficiencies that Arise from Competition and First‐Come‐First‐Served Processing*. 30 ...