

Violent Right-Wing
Extremism and Terrorism –
Transnational Connectivity,
Definitions, Incidents,
Structures and
Countermeasures

November
2020



About this study

This study titled “**Violent Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism – Transnational Connectivity, Definitions, Incidents, Structures and Countermeasures**” focuses on the transnational connections of the violent extreme right-wing milieus in six countries: Finland, France, Germany, Sweden, United Kingdom and the United States. It was commissioned by the **German Federal Foreign Office**, Division “International Cooperation against Terrorism, Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime and Corruption”, in 2020. CEP is grateful for the constructive support and critical feedback received throughout the process by the Federal Foreign Office. We would also like to thank the renowned external project experts engaged in the production of this study, without whom this work could not have been as comprehensive. **The positions presented in this study only reflect the views of the authors and do not necessarily correspond with the positions of the German Federal Foreign Office.**

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Table of Contents:

Executive Summary	5	4. Online dimension integral to the movement	28
1. Introduction	7	5. Member State responses	32
2. A transnational movement	10	5.1. Legal definitions and administrative practices.....	32
2.1. United by narratives	10	5.2. Development of countermeasures and strategic approaches.....	33
2.2. United by variety	11	5.2.1. Scandinavian P/CVE approach.....	34
2.3. United by (national) inspirations.....	12	5.2.2. Multifaceted approaches	34
2.3.1. Anglo-Saxon	12	5.2.3. Counterintelligence/counter-crime approach.....	35
2.3.2. Eastern European	13	6. Summary and conclusions	36
2.3.2.1. Azov and RID	13	ANNEXES	60
2.3.2.2. Other Eastern Inspirations.....	16	FINLAND	60
2.3.4 Exceptional inspirations	17	FRANCE.....	74
2.4. Connected through travel.....	18	GERMANY	87
2.5. Connected through attempts to take advantage of the COVID-19 situation.....	19	SWEDEN	107
3. Music, violent sports, money, violence: the drivers of the movement	20	UNITED KINGDOM	126
3.1. Fuelled by music	20	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.....	141
3.2. Fuelled by violent sports	21		
3.3. Fuelled by money.....	22		
3.4. Organised for violence	24		
3.4.1. Trends.....	24		
3.4.3.1. Lone actor phenomenon ..	26		
3.4.3.2. Gender dimension.....	27		

Violent Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism – Transnational Connectivity, Definitions, Incidents, Structures and Countermeasures

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The 21st century, and the period after 2014 in particular, saw the emergence of a new leaderless, transnational and apocalyptic violent extreme right-wing (XRW) movement. Nowadays, **national violent XRW scenes** are transnationally linked through apocalyptic narratives such as the “great replacement,” “white genocide” and “Day X”. Transnationally oriented violent XRW propagandists argue that the “white race” can only be saved if all violent XRW abandon parochial national differences and divisions and work and fight together.

The movement is not structurally unified in one hierarchical structure but embraces a “**divided we stand**” approach. Its members include individuals, groups, organisations, and networks, as well as political parties.

The transnational violent XRW movement is driven by **music, violent sport, money, and violence**. **Music and violent sport events are a common feature of many violent XRW scenes transnationally**. They aim to **provide the movement with finances to sustain its existence and attract previously unconnected individuals as potential recruits to its ranks**.

Between 2015 and 2020, **violence emanating from the violent XRW milieu has been steadily increasing and has become multi-faceted**, yet it often does not fall under national legal definitions of terrorism. **Attacks are regularly committed by violent XRW militants who do not belong to the movement’s most well-known organisational outlets**. **Nonetheless, some of these organisations also tried to stage spectacular terrorist attacks but their efforts so far have largely failed or were foiled by the security services**.

The violence of the transnational movement is always justified as “**defensive**” or “**reactive**” to that of the movement’s ideological enemies and is planned and executed locally. However, its **inspirations or wider justifications are often transnational in nature**, for example, drawing on an online manifesto of a successful violent XRW terrorist attacker from another country.

The transnational violent XRW movement is male-dominated, but there have been cases of female terrorist plotters or attackers emerging from that milieu. The membership of some of the national violent XRW scenes are reportedly up to 15% female.

The transnational violent XRW movement features a strong online component that at times outpaces its offline counterpart and effectively takes on a life of its own. **Consequently, the former is often unable to operationally boost the latter**. **However, violent XRW virtual structures continue to closely embrace and utilise currently available technologies and, similar to other extremist and terrorist milieus, are early adopters of these technologies**. Nonetheless, the volume of violent XRW online communication should not be mistaken for a robust transnational operational online space.

The overall movement draws on a range of national inspirations:

- a. **Anglo-Saxon** – ideological via tracts published in the USA or practical with certain British and American violent XRW entities attempting either to lead coalitions of like-minded international actors or directly branch out to other countries;

- b. **Germanic** – ideological via national-socialist symbolism and imagery, and practical. German violent XRW entities are amongst the most internationally networked, with almost all other violent XRW actors attempting to make connections in the country. This also includes organisations that fought on different sides of the war in Ukraine;
- c. **Nordic** – the transnational Nordic Resistance Movement, an all-Scandinavia violent XRW organisation, is often held up as a role model by other members of the movement;
- d. **Eastern European** – as newer members of the transnational XRW movement from Russia and Ukraine rush to compete with each other while recruiting allies in the West.

The movement also is connected via international travel to common destinations:

- a. **political marches, rallies**, for example, the Lukov March in Sofia, Bulgaria, or the Day of Honour in Budapest, Hungary;
- b. **violent sports**, especially related to Mixed Martial Arts (MMA);
- c. **music events** (festivals).

Common attendance at these events allows the violent XRW participants to interconnect, further strengthen their personal ties, and exchange experiences. These events, like some bigger MMA events, are also a significant source of funding.

Actors within the transnational violent XRW movement generally follow a common approach to the COVID-19 crisis. They largely see the pandemic as a chance to spread their ideology more widely and an opportunity to reach a broader recruitment base. However, its offline operations are constrained by the current restrictions and it is currently too early to assess what the medium to long-term effects of this will be on the movement as a whole.

The six countries at the centre of this study all define “terrorism” in their national legislation but often rely

only on administrative practice or working definitions of “extremism” or “right wing extremism.” On one hand, this state of affairs necessitates a certain degree of improvisation while countering the threat and, simultaneously, reduces the availability of counterterrorism tools to address the threat emanating from the transnational violent XRW movement. As a result, the six countries deploy a variety of countermeasures to stem the threat emanating from the violent XRW movement. **These can be grouped into three types: a) Scandinavian, b) multifaceted, and c) counterintelligence and counter-crime approaches.**

The research for this study demonstrated three general challenges governments encounter when designing counter-measures for the transnational violent XRW movement. First, multilateral consensus concerning the definition of the transnational violent XRW movement and its actors has not yet developed. Second, officially available data concerning various grouplets, groups, organisations and networks of the transnational violent XRW movement is not yet readily available in several of the countries at the centre of this study. Third, many of the grouped actors, including significant ones, in the transnational violent XRW movement have not been designated as terrorism organisations by governments.

Consequently, using and strengthening domestic and multilateral dialogue and cooperation mechanisms are crucial to work towards multilateral consensus. Existing legal and administrative measures could be adapted to tackle the threat posed by the transnational violent XRW movement and its actors, including administrative measures on a local level. Finally, civil-society stakeholders have developed considerable expertise on the transnational violent XRW movement. These are useful resources for the adaptation of existing government capabilities.

1. INTRODUCTION

This report focuses on the rise and metastasis of the violent extreme right-wing (XRW) threat and analyses its growing **transnational connectivity (i.e., extending or going beyond national boundaries)**¹ in the 2015-2020 period. It argues that the transnational violent XRW movement is growing and strengthening via its connections beyond national borders. These allow it to morph into a fully-fledged **transnational entity fuelled by common ideologies as well as inspirations, and is maintained via different hubs** that are visited by the movement's actors. The emergence of such an amorphous movement, in the words of Catherine de Bolle, Executive Director of Europol, enabled **"a wave of [extreme] right-wing violent incidents that included the terrible attacks in Christchurch (New Zealand) and others in the USA [and ...] also reached Europe."**² De Bolle's remarks from June 2020 were followed up little more than two weeks later by the German Federal Interior Minister, Horst Seehofer, who declared **"right-wing extremism [...] the biggest threat to security in Germany."**³ Such assertions and warnings echoed those of the American Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), which assessed that 2019 had been **"the deadliest year for domestic violent extremism since [...]1995,"**⁴ and in early 2020 elevated the threat posed by far-right extremism and "racially motivated violent extremism," placing it at the same threat level as foreign terrorist organisations such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)⁵. On the level of the European Union, the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), a network of more than 6000 P/CVE practitioners,⁶ highlighted in its plenary session in October 2019 that **"far-right extremism"** was to be the **top "cross-cutting issue"** to be addressed in 2020.⁷

This perception of an elevated threat is also reflected in the number of serious violence perpetrated

ed by members of the violent extreme right-wing (XRW) milieu. As documented by the "Right Wing Terrorism and Violence" (RTV) reports published by the University of Oslo's Centre for Research on Extremism (C-Rex), during the period **between 1990 and 2018, 18 Western European countries alone saw at least 757 fatal or non-fatal "most severe forms of violent attacks and plots" whose target selection was based on right-wing beliefs.**⁸

This statistic includes "all events with fatal or near fatal outcomes; events in which potentially lethal weapons have been used offensively [...]; severe beatings [...]; terrorist attack plots; and discoveries of large weapons caches belonging to right-wing extremists."⁹ In this context, 2019, which was the focus of Director de Bolle's comment, clearly stood out with **"four fatal and 112 severe, but non-fatal, right-wing violent events." This marked 2019 as the second deadliest year for violent XRW action in the last six years.** In terms of violence, 2019 was only surpassed by 2016—it could have, however, been much worse as two attacks in 2019 (one in Germany and one in Norway) that were intended to have been mass-casualty attacks largely failed to accomplish this goal. Such attacks on behalf of the right-wing extremists, as C-Rex claimed, have been rare "in Western Europe since 1980."¹⁰ Therefore, **the threat, albeit not new, has been metastasising and is clearly rising.**

As will become clear, **the violent XRW scene is no longer nationalist nor parochial in a traditional sense.** Its members also are no longer, as often commonly assumed, unable to effectively and regularly cooperate with their foreign colleagues. In the past, the hyper-nationalist attitudes of violent XRW individuals, shaped by memories of inter-state conflicts and the long list of grievances accompanying them, were assumed to render any chance for transnational cooperation largely moot. Therefore, rather

than developing multilateral countermeasures, the emphasis of UN Member States was on tackling the issue primarily at the national level.

Unfortunately, such a reading of this scene undervalued the fact that **violent XRW individuals and organisations have a long history of transnational cooperation**. As early as the mid-1930s, leaders of the European fascist parties held congresses, and the early 1940s saw a distinct internationalisation of the German national-socialist messaging, indicating a shift towards a pan-European struggle against the communist Soviet Union. In the aftermath of World War II, some post-fascist or post-national socialist political entities also attempted to coalesce into a movement opposing the respective American and/or Soviet influence over Europe.¹¹

Even more troublingly, the violent XRW scene not only has a history of transnational cooperation but during the last two decades has been undergoing a **significant process of internationalisation, if not globalisation, during which new, unifying and binding ideological narratives emerged. These resulted in a downgrading of ultra-nationalist ideological ideas and perceived inter-state rivalries amongst Western or European nationalistic violent XRW scenes and simultaneously pushed to the fore the idea of uniting “white people” against their enemies (feminists, democrats, liberals, Jews, Muslims, or anyone not white). This paved the way for forging of transnational connections between various national violent XRW scenes and more intensified and sometimes strategic cooperation between them.**

This report describes the elements of these transnational violent XRW interconnections in detail. Research for this report was conducted between July and September 2020 specifically focusing on data and developments during the period between 2015 and 2020. **Its findings are based on research conducted by the CEP project team analysing the violent XRW scene in six countries:**

Finland, France, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK), and the United States of America (USA). Detailed national chapters outlining the state of violent XRW scenes are included in the annexes to this report.

As will be outlined in this report, the choice to focus on these six countries in particular reflects the influential national inspirations on the transnational violent XRW scene emerging from **the Anglo-Saxon (UK, USA), Germanic (Germany) and Nordic (Finland, Sweden) scenes**, narratives and imagery. The report also discusses the newly **emerging Eastern European influences**, which since the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine in 2014 have gained traction amongst violent XRW individuals. The report also highlights **a French violent XRW case** that has its own transnational connections to francophone regions in Europe and North America. Furthermore, this scene provided some key ideological narratives, in particular through Renaud Camus’ highly influential “great replacement” theory,¹² which represents the basis for one of the core unifying narratives of the transnational XRW movement. In practice, the French violent XRW scene, albeit of high historical relevance and seemingly high potential for connectivity, is constrained in its transnational capacities and capabilities by some of its national peculiarities (language, religious focus of the broader XRW scene). Nonetheless, a scene of this importance and size forms a relevant backdrop to any discussion on the scale and success of violent XRW transnational connectivity in Europe and North America.

The report comprises six sections, including the current introduction.

Section 2 discusses the key uniting elements that enable the development of a transnational violent XRW movement. These are common narratives, a common approach towards organisational structures amongst the movement’s actors, common influences or inspirations (Anglo-Saxon, Germanic, Nordic, and to a growing extent, Eastern European),

and common travel patterns of the movement's members—to physical hubs where they are able to strengthen existing ties with like-minded comrades from different countries.

Section 3 presents further features that enable the transnational XRW movement to expand, namely music, violent sport, and money. These elements are all needed to recruit outsiders into its ranks and replenish its coffers. They are used by the movement to work towards achieving its goals. As the movement eschews democratic politics, violence, the next discussed feature, often becomes the main outlet of its politics: the perpetration of violence. The report discusses trends in the movement's violence between 2015 and 2020, its character, perpetrators and targets, while also discussing the gender aspect.

Section 4 focuses on the online dimension of the movement. This is a significant arena for its development. However, in comparison to other extremist and terrorist movements, such as the global terror network ISIL, the online dimension of the transnational violent XRW movement is not yet as developed and sophisticated. The online sphere of the transnational violent XRW movement remains currently less connected to the offline operational activities of the movement's actors.

Section 5 features a brief discussion and analysis of how the six countries at the centre of this study have addressed the threat emanating from the transnational violent XRW movement. In this section, the report focuses first on the legal definitions and administrative practices concerning the terms "terrorism" and "extremism," demonstrating the various approaches and their current limitations. Second, this section briefly outlines the strategic focus that the governments in the six countries at the centre of this report have utilised when developing counter measures, ranging from an emphasis on prevention and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) approaches to addressing the issue primarily via executive counterterrorism instruments.

Section 6 consists of a summary of the report, followed by the annexes.

The annexes to this report include detailed analyses of the national violent XRW scenes in the six countries at the centre of this report. Each report analyses the situation in the respective country while looking at the history of the respective violent XRW milieu, emerging trends, finances, online development, and transnational connections.

2. A TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENT

2.1. United by narratives

The violent XRW scenes are transnationally linked through apocalyptic narratives such as the “great replacement,”¹³ “white genocide,”¹⁴ and “Day X.”¹⁵ The first two narratives are based on the idea that the influx of non-white foreigners, immigrants or refugees, will lead to an emergence of a new “brown” race, which needs to be avoided at all cost. In addition, feminism is considered a major threat.

It is alleged to be responsible for shrinking birth rates amongst “whites” and seen as an attack on male supremacy. It is crucial to highlight that immigration and feminism are mostly considered as being part of an imagined worldwide Jewish conspiracy, termed the “Zionist Occupied Government (ZOG)”¹⁶ or the “New World Order (NWO),” which supposedly aims at exterminating the white race.¹⁷

The “Day X” narrative refers to the beginning of civil wars between “whites” and their enemies, particularly political opponents, Jews, Muslims, feminists, and LGBTQIA (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender/transsexual, queer/questioning, intersex, and allied/asexual/aromantic/agender). Many violent XRW individuals prepare for that day, and several attacks—against Muslims in particular—were explained by the perpetrators as targeted provocations with the aim to provoke a violent reaction of Muslims so a civil war would start.¹⁸

Those narratives do not explicitly focus on nations but on an imagined construct termed the “white race.” Transnationally oriented violent XRW individuals say openly that the attacks against the “white race” can only be countered if “white nationalists” cooperate. Or put differently: the “white race” can only be saved if all violent XRW actors work and fight together.

Violent XRW individuals can generally be put in two camps. The “root causes” camp aims at killing Jews and political opponents, since they are



in the imagination of these actors supposedly responsible for the problem itself, be it immigration, multi-culturalism, or feminism. The “accelerationist” camp claims that democracies are already dying and aims at attacking non-whites, particularly Muslim immigrants, to provoke and facilitate a race war. In all cases, **violence is “justified” as self-defence due to the perceived deadly threats to the “white race.”**

It is not only groups like the Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM) or the Soldiers of Odin (SOO), or the Atomwaffen Division (AWD), all discussed in this report, who promote these or similar narratives and conspiracy myths. Also, most of the violent XRW so-called “lone actors,” who carried out attacks, for example, in Pittsburgh (USA, target: synagogue, 2018), Christchurch (New Zealand, target: mosques, 2019), Poway (USA, target: synagogue, 2019), El Paso (USA, target: migrants/supermarket, 2019), Oslo (Norway, target: mosque, 2019), and Halle (Germany, target: synagogue/migrants, 2019), all discussed in this report, reference them to some degree in their writings or statements.¹⁹

Those violent individuals imitate each other, publish “manifestos” and call for others to stage follow-up attacks. Anders Behring Breivik (Norway, target: government building/political youth camp, 2011) is considered the reference point or at times the role model of this “copycat movement.”²⁰ Breivik himself referred to Timothy McVeigh (USA, target: government building that included a day care centre, 1995). In their manifestos, both terrorists reference the right-wing extremist apocalyptic *Turner Diaries*, a novel (1978) describing a post-nuclear race war.²¹ Another key violent XRW publication is *Siege* (1992), which is also mentioned by many “lone actors,” and which calls for independent terror cells or “lone wolves” to ignite a race war.²² At the same time, narratives of traditional European violent XRW are largely based on “Viking”/Nordic sagas and on national-socialist or fascist ideology or imagery. **Those old narratives, fused with anti-feminism and the exploitation of the so-called “refugee crisis” in recent years, have created a new leaderless transnational apocalyptic violent XRW movement that shares a sense of alleged victimhood and a perceived obligation to defend the “white race.”**

2.2. United by variety

At first sight, **the predominantly ideologically united movement seems disunited organisationally and structurally.** Various national scenes, albeit sometimes dominated by a single entity (e.g., in Sweden or Scandinavia where the NRM is the key violent XRW actor)²³, are far from homogenous, with strings of groups, networks, parties, etc. active in a given country. Examples of this practice are plentiful—Germany has a multifaceted scene with “groups,”²⁴ parties,²⁵ and so-called “mixed scenes,”²⁶ as does the USA with the alt-right, neo-Nazi terrorist groups, and anti-government activists and networks. Numerous extra-parliamentary violent XRW parties and groups exist in France. The UK has recently seen a string of proscriptions aimed at violent XRW organisations

that exist alongside legal associations and parties. At the same time, NRM might be dominant in Sweden but is a child of a split in another violent XRW organisation and has already seen a splinter group emerge from its ranks.²⁷

Furthermore, **some of the violent XRW movement’s most well-known, dramatic and violent actions are regularly conducted by individuals and not by the aforementioned entities** (see: Section 3.4 “Organised for violence,” below). These individuals are often social loners but not “lone wolves” in the strict definition of this term. They are well-networked online, members or sympathisers of the given violent XRW scene, or even “rogue” members of some of the

aforementioned and seemingly dominant violent XRW organisations.

As outlined in Section 2.1. above, concepts such as “race” or “identity” act as unifying common concepts and predominate the need to establish uniformity and unity. In short, this **“divided we stand” attitude is the expression of a diversified organisational and structural approach and a feature that unites the violent XRW milieu across national borders.**

At the same time, members of this leaderless movement still look up to a number of organisations as points of reference. For example, in several countries at the centre of this study, violent XRW groups perceived the Greek party Golden Dawn, whose leaders were convicted of running a criminal organisation in October 2020,²⁸ to be a role model, especially in its successful outreach beyond the broader XRW milieu via its so-called “charity” work.²⁹ For example, the Finnish NRM also held support rallies for jailed members of Golden Dawn.³⁰

Similarly, several violent XRW groups analysed in this study modelled themselves on the NRM, itself a successful merger of violent XRW entities in all Scandinavian countries. In 2017, the transnational recognition of groups such as Golden Dawn and the NRM even earned them references in the discourse of leading white supremacists in the USA, such as Matthew Heimbach of the Traditionalist Workers Party (TWP), who called them “the vanguard of na-

tionalist organizing in the world.”³¹ NRM was also referred to as a “very good model” by the leader of the British National Action (NA), presumably for his organisation to follow.³² Consequently, in 2019, the NRM declared that one of its strategic five-year objectives is to exercise influence beyond the Nordic countries as its struggle is “global [...] and] concerns all the white peoples of the world.”³³ NRM’s global ambitions were manifested by the fact that between June 2016 and February 2019 the party’s presence at different events was in high demand by violent XRW actors around Europe, and its delegations made at least 17 documented visits to events or meetings hosted by their international counterparts.³⁴

Other organisations from the various national violent XRW scenes analysed for this study also have the potential to develop into “points of reference” for the wider violent XRW milieu due to their internationally networked character. They may not be role models for other violent XRW actors at the moment but their ability to ingratiate themselves with numerous peers from abroad indicates a certain degree of attractiveness for those that search for models of effective organisational structures within the transnational violent XRW milieu. Interestingly, such networked groups are either Anglo-Saxon (AWD) or German (Der III. Weg) and operate in countries or in languages specially valued by the violent XRW scenes internationally (see: Section 2.3. “United by (national) inspirations,” below).

2.3. United by (national) inspirations

2.3.1. Anglo-Saxon

Common ideological roots and the “divided we stand” approach are not the only uniting factors of the transnational violent XRW movement. It is also **united by a set of national inspirations, be it Anglo-Saxon or German, and a rising importance**

of external actors who in the past would not have had the chance to be accepted as a part of the movement (Eastern European dimension).

As discussed earlier, some US publications (such as the *Turner Diaries* and *Siege*) and glorified US terrorists (such as McVeigh),³⁵ play a key role as far

as the violent XRW ideological underpinnings are concerned. In transnational contacts, members of the violent XRW milieu mostly communicate in English and often not only consume but also produce propaganda and recruitment materials in this language.

The English language also has enabled **the British and American violent XRW actors** to maintain close links. Examples include a Finnish NRM member from Tampere who was the main moderator of the Iron March Forum (see below for more information on the forum), a key online hub for violent XRW transnational connectivity,³⁶ or the US group The Base's attempts to recruit internationally.³⁷ The common language also was a factor facilitating prolonged links between NA and the AWD,³⁸ or subsequently between the UK's Sonnenkrieg Division (SKD) and the AWD.³⁹

AWD was also the basis for their subsequent and ultimately unsuccessful **attempts on behalf of these Anglo-Saxon organisations to position themselves as prospective leaders of a transnational violent XRW movement and their efforts to integrate additional organisations** such as Central and South American groups,⁴⁰ or the AWD's attempt to organise and inspire a copycat group in Germany,⁴¹ or its alleged attempt to set up a cell in Ukraine in 2020.⁴² Even though these attempts failed, non-English speaking organisations, such as Finnish, French, German, or Swedish groups, made no similar overtures.

The British group NA was particularly keen to embed itself in the centre of an international network. It did so through a range of activities aimed at building solidarity with other groups. Its activists reportedly visited militants in other countries to develop personal and organisational bonds, and welcoming militants from other countries, particularly Poland,⁴³ to join its violent street activities.⁴⁴ It participated in a range of demonstrations aimed at expressing its transnational solidarity with other violent groups and individuals.⁴⁵ NA activists also reportedly took

part in marches in Germany,⁴⁶ Lithuania, and Latvia.⁴⁷ Other NA attempts to ingratiate itself with the transnational violent XRW milieu came in early 2015 as its leader spent several weeks in Finland, meeting activists in several cities, speaking at the NRM hub in Turku, and taking part in their activism in Lahti.⁴⁸ NA has also showed its support for jailed Finnish NRM members. For example, in 2015 members of the group wrote an appeal letter to the ambassador of Finland.⁴⁹

2.3.2. Eastern European

2.3.2.1. Azov and RID

The **Eastern European partners of the violent XRW milieu** described in this report, namely the Azov Movement (Ukrainian socio-political entity comprising not only the Azov Regiment, from which the movement originates, but also a political party, the National Corps, and a variety of other entities and organisations) and the Russian Imperial Movement (Russkoe Imperskoe Dvizhenie, RID) **advocate for their respective transnational "Intermarium"⁵⁰ and the "World National-Conservative Movement" (WNCM)⁵¹ in English for foreign audiences. This highlights the growing importance of Eastern European organisations since the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine in 2014 for Western European and, to a certain extent, also American violent XRW milieus.**

In the past, Russian-speaking and Eastern European groups such as **Azov Movement** (from thereon referred to as Azov; whenever needed, the Azov Regiment, as a fighting force, will be referred to separately) and **RID** would not have been able to enter the Western-dominated transnational violent XRW milieu.⁵² The conflict in Ukraine presented a turning point, giving Russian-speaking and Eastern European groups credibility as successful and ideologically minded fighting forces. Simultaneously, they considerably increased and improved their initially meagre and low-quality communication in English

and began to position themselves as **hubs for the violent XRW transnational milieu.**

As a result, members of the national violent XRW scenes studied for this report have, in recent years, come into contact with representatives of these Eastern European groups, as is the case with the German Der III. Weg or the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD). This further boosted the international standing of Azov and RID, which do not shy away from displaying their ambitions to coalesce their international violent XRW contacts into broad structures or coalitions. Examples of this development are the Azov-led Central-Eastern Europe-oriented “Intermarium” (literally “between the seas”, specifically the Adriatic, Baltic, and Black) as a counterweight to Russia and the liberal West, and the RID-led WNCM, an association of violent XRW political forces aimed at countering “liberalism, multiculturalism, and tolerance” and “supernational institutions.”

Azov and the RID are not only ideologically on opposite sides of the conflict in Ukraine but are also competitors in building strong ties with German and other European right-wing extremists.⁵³

RID is also a religious movement that defines itself as superior in comparison with its “pagan” comrades from other nations. Nevertheless, they meet and cooperate, based on the ideological narrative that the “white race” in total is facing an existential threat and that only a unified front of “white warriors” will be victorious against its enemies at this juncture.⁵⁴

RID has had the most success in reaching out to some of the Nordic XRW milieu.

It has maintained relations with Swedish XRW actors going back at least a decade and previously had a Swedish branch.⁵⁵ Since at least 2012, RID maintained contacts with NRM.⁵⁶ In 2015, a time of consolidation and new leadership for the NRM, a high-level RID delegation reportedly visited Sweden,⁵⁷ allegedly making a donation for their Nordic comrades during the visit, and invited NRM to join the WNCM.⁵⁸ The 2015 meeting and NRM’s decision to host the RID delegation is considered a pivot point in the NRM’s position on the

conflict in Ukraine and on geopolitics more generally. Previously, NRM had sided with Ukrainian nationalists. After 2015 however, NRM reportedly switched sides and is now espousing a pro-Russian position in line with the RID.⁵⁹ This new position does not, however, completely extend to the NRM’s Finnish branch as Finland’s nationalists have traditionally been hostile to Russia.⁶⁰ Nonetheless, some Finnish XRW individuals, alongside their German counterparts, were said to have been involved in paramilitary training.⁶¹ Members of the German XRW party, Der III. Weg reportedly also participated in such training. However, the group subsequently dubbed reports of their presence during these training activities as “fake news.”⁶²

In 2019, RID reportedly made particular efforts to reach out to organisations in Western Europe, and its leader identified Germany as the “next most important country for the movement in Europe.”⁶³ However, RID has been more successful with the French XRW milieu as the Parti Nationaliste Français (French Nationalist Party, PNF) has been inviting its representatives for the annual “Day of Europe” taking place in Paris.⁶⁴ The French XRW is broadly pro-Russian as it perceives Moscow as a world power rival to what they term “the universalist USA,” and a country maintaining traditional values of the European Christian civilisation.⁶⁵ This pushed some of the French XRW to enlist in the Unité continentale (Continental Unity, UC) unit, which fought Ukrainian forces in Donbas.⁶⁶ Members of this unit were later seen acting as a security detail at the Yellow Vests protests in Paris in 2019.⁶⁷

Other, non-RID, associated connections to Russia include reported close contacts between the German XRW mixed martial arts (MMA) association “WARDON 21”⁶⁸ and Russia’s National Socialist Straight Edge group “PPDM” (“По программе Дедушки Мороза, The Program of Father Frost”). Their cooperation “serves as a role model for international networking between right-wing extremists, and for co-operations with leading right-wing-extremist clothing brands.”⁶⁹ Moreover, the former leader of the now disbanded

violent XRW American group The Base is reportedly now residing in Russia.⁷⁰

Contrary to a widely held opinion, not all violent XRW activists, however, look to Russia as a model, and some have taken the side of Ukraine. For these individuals, Ukraine is the underdog pursuing a sovereigntist strategy against the former USSR, personified by Russia, and for that reason Kyiv deserves a certain measure of support and respect.⁷¹ This does not automatically result in the automatic creation of a liaison between any nationalist abroad and Azov in Ukraine. However, different from nationalist groups in Ukraine, Azov has **an internationalist strategy (aforementioned “Intermarium”), promotes a conservative “reconquista” against the liberal West (with the slogan “Today Ukraine and the Rus, tomorrow the world”),⁷² and maintains a social media presence in English.** These elements facilitate the forging of such links.⁷³ Finnish,⁷⁴ French,⁷⁵ German, Swedish, and British nationals (amongst others) fought in the ranks of the Azov Regiment in the war in Ukraine.⁷⁶ Interestingly, the regiment was not able to attract Central-Eastern Europeans (CEE) into its ranks. No nationals of Ukraine’s western neighbours (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania) have joined the regiment. Nevertheless, Azov continued to liaise, on an organisational level, with like-minded groups and organisations in the Baltic States and Poland, among others.⁷⁷ This, to some degree, could be explained that violent XRW individuals in the CEE “still go on about territorial disputes—it is different in the West” and would consequently have problems with joining a Ukrainian nationalist or extremist fighting force, unlike some of their Western colleagues.⁷⁸ In addition, the war in Ukraine failed to mobilise the violent XRW milieu in the CEE for the war effort in general, not just for the Azov Regiment. The main regional contribution came from the Czech and Slovak nationalists, sometimes XRW, volunteers. These few “volunteers,” however, joined the pro-Russian “separatists.”⁷⁹

From 2017 onwards, **Azov also intensified its outreach activities around Europe under the aegis**

of the so-called “Intermarium Support Group.”

These efforts were mostly of a propagandistic character. For example, prominent XRW individuals visited Kyiv to take part in the Paneuropa Conference and Intermarium Support Group Conference organised by Azov. Azov members were sent as representatives to different nationalist or XRW events in Central or Western European countries.⁸⁰ Azov representatives spoke at the Finnish XRW “Awakening” conference, the Scandza forum in Sweden, Der III. Weg’s “The Youth Storms” in Thuringia in Germany, and conferences of the Junge Nationalisten (JN), the youth wing of the German XRW NPD party.⁸¹ Azov also cooperated with the German-Ukrainian-Norwegian Kraftquell (“Source of Power”), a neo-pagan and XRW support group “ostensibly helping war veterans fighting on the Ukrainian side on the eastern Ukrainian front.”⁸² Simultaneously, Azov reportedly received visits from key French XRW figures,⁸³ the British NA,⁸⁴ or the XRW Rise Above Movement (RAM) from the USA⁸⁵ to its centre in Kyiv, and allegedly attempted to recruit German XRW individuals into its ranks at events such as the “Rock gegen Überfremdung” (“Rock against foreign infiltration”) in Themar in 2017.⁸⁶ Ukrainian nationalists have also attempted to recruit Swedish NRM members to fight in Ukraine, but NRM’s leadership, maintaining a pro-Russian position at that time, reportedly did not allow its members to go.⁸⁷

Indirectly related to these developments is the broader phenomenon of foreign fighters from the wider violent XRW movement traveling to join groups on either side of the conflict in Ukraine, especially in 2014 and 2015. Earlier research supported by the Counter Extremism Project (CEP) demonstrated that around 1000 Westerners (in addition to 15,000 Russians and 1000 fighters from the former Soviet republics) took part in the fighting. These European fighters hailed from most countries in the European Union (EU). Even though they often fought on different sides of the war, these fighters had known each other from before the war as they belong to a “Western foreign fighter society.” This is a collection of like-minded individuals, often of XRW beliefs, who are ready to deploy to conflict zones.⁸⁸ Furthermore, nationals

of a number of countries also flocked to the conflict and performed other, non-combatant roles on either side of the divide as propagandists, humanitarian workers, trainers, or sympathetic activists.⁸⁹

Their return home has not (yet) been associated with terrorist violence; however, some alumni of the conflict were later found in the ranks of the Kurdish Peshmerga in northern Iraq.⁹⁰ Some Russian veterans allegedly participated in an ill-fated coup attempt in Montenegro⁹¹ and some former French foreign fighters on the pro-Russia separatist side took part in the Yellow Vest protests in Paris as members of the marchers' "security detail."⁹² Most interestingly, however, many of them wanted a post-war career in private military contracting (PMC) and some managed to gain employment with such companies in conflict zones, for example, in Libya, Somalia or Syria as military contractors.⁹³

2.3.2.2 Other Eastern Inspirations

To a certain extent, the presence of Eastern inspirations in the transnational violent XRW movement are also present in three other forms.

First is the importance of political events in Central-Eastern/Southern Europe, which act as meeting hubs for the transnational violent XRW movement.⁹⁴ These are, for example, the Lukov March in Bulgaria, March of the Nations in Kyiv,⁹⁵ Day of Honour in Hungary,⁹⁶ or the Independence March in Poland.⁹⁷

Second is the presence of Central-Eastern European individuals in the ranks of violent XRW groups in Western European countries, for example, reports indicate Polish supporters of the NA in the UK.⁹⁸

Third, Central-Eastern Europe is a paramilitary training hub for violent XRW militants, for example, reports indicate the Czech Republic is a hub for German violent XRW individuals.⁹⁹



2.3.3 Germany

Finally, key national inspiration for the transnational violent XRW movement is to be found in Germany, with the exception of the French scene, which mostly communicates in French. Most other **violent XRW actors make it a point of pride to build up relations with their relevant German peers**. This could be the result of a certain historical fondness of the milieu for the Third Reich and its self-confessed ideological successors, and to the alleged strength and vibrancy of the multifaceted German violent XRW scene composed of informal groups (Gruppe Freital (2017), the Oldschool Society (OSS) (2017), Revolution Chemnitz (2018), the Kameradschaft Aryans (2019) and Nordadler (2020)); parties (NPD, Der III. Weg, and Die Rechte); “mixed scenes” (in which violent XRW actors meet rockers/bikers, “Reich-citizens,” preppers, and so-called “enraged citizens.”); and, “unstructured individuals,”¹⁰⁰ meaning individuals unconnected/unaffiliated to any organisational framework.

As a result, some of the German violent XRW organisations, especially the political parties such as Der III. Weg, NPD, and Die Rechte, seem to have the broadest transnational networks of all of the entities covered by this report. Der III. Weg’s leader, Klaus Armstroff, spoke at a Finnish NRM event (organised under the cover of the Towards Freedom! Organisation, due to NRM’s ban in Finland, which - after two prior lower court decisions - was ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court in September 2020¹⁰¹) in December 2019, in Helsinki.¹⁰² Members of the Swedish arm of NRM reportedly came to visit Germany on at least nine separate occasions (mostly to liaise with Der III. Weg).¹⁰³ Interestingly, Der III. Weg’s transnational network also features connections to groups that espouse conflicting geopolitical positions in the context of the conflict in Ukraine, such as contacts with both the Ukrainian nationalist Azov Movement and the Russian RID.¹⁰⁴

The more established and widely known German NPD party, as well as its youth organisation, Junge Nationalisten (Young Nationalists) (JN) maintain close

contacts with foreign violence-oriented organisations such as the Greek neo-fascist party Golden Dawn.¹⁰⁵ The NPD is a member of the European Alliance for Peace and Freedom (APF), whose Europa Terra Nostra e.V. (ETN) foundation aims “to build an international network capable of helping nationalist organisations and militants.”¹⁰⁶ In 2018, the JN’s Europa-Congress hosted both the representatives of Azov and RID.¹⁰⁷ Finally, Die Rechte’s members appear as speakers at events organised by violent XRW groups held elsewhere in Europe. Members of Die Rechte attended events of their counterparts in Hungary (at the Day of Honour),¹⁰⁸ and reportedly also in Portugal and France.¹⁰⁹ At the same time, the German branch of the white supremacist Hammerskins is able to attract a wide network of international contacts to its events in Germany.¹¹⁰ The group is also reportedly connected to the internationally connected XRW entrepreneur Denis “Nikitin” Kapustin, founder of the fashion label “White Rex.” These links are maintained through the MMA scene and the mail-order business.¹¹¹

2.3.4 Exceptional inspirations

Other, **less successful and prolonged inspirations developed within the violent XRW and the broader XRW scene in Scandinavia and Finland in particular**. The vigilante SOO, founded in 2015 and organised as a franchise system, spread into nearly 30 countries during 2016. Although its international chapters were able to conduct their daily activities independently, they were supposed to follow the general rules laid out by the Finnish leadership of the franchise. Most of these transnational connections were maintained online. However, Finnish members of SOO also conducted occasional visits to the international chapters of the group and organised a number of so called anti-immigrant “patrols” in northern Sweden.¹¹² Due to conflicts related to membership fees, the international chapters were in most cases either closed or renamed by 2017,¹¹³ with only the Finnish and Swedish chapters still active.¹¹⁴ The idea of a vigilante movement, however, continuous to reverberate. Groups such as Balders Cruisers in

Sweden or the Patriots of Unity, both former chapters of the transnational SOO, reportedly continue to espouse this model.¹¹⁵

As far as Scandinavian inspirations are concerned, the NRM, a transnational organisation itself, is a special case in point as far as sources of violent XRW inspirations are concerned. It is headquartered in Sweden and maintains branches in Finland, and smaller ones in Norway, Denmark and Iceland.¹¹⁶ In the case of this group, the guidance and physical presence of Swedish NRM activists is reportedly crucial for the ability of their local counterparts to mobilise,¹¹⁷ or to bring their members to XRW events in Sweden.¹¹⁸ Such trips apparently directly enable XRW activism in the target countries where the branches of NRM usually lack numbers and resources, with the exception of the branch in Finland.¹¹⁹ These visits are also both intended to show strength and are a network of mechanisms to consolidate NRM influence and authority over their members and sympathisers in the Nordic countries. They confer prestige both on

the visitors and their hosts, raising the profiles of all actors involved, since the ability to organise international travel to ideological counterparts is allegedly viewed as a sign of importance among XRW actors.¹²⁰

The French XRW milieu to some extent remains an exception in the field of foreign inspiration. Notwithstanding Camus' aforementioned "great replacement" theory and the international success of "Pride France," "part extreme-right lifestyle brand, part neo-Nazi fight club,"¹²¹ it mostly liaises with international partners who share the French language, i.e., parts of the Belgian,¹²² Swiss, or Quebecois violent XRW milieus.¹²³ In addition, a significant portion of the milieu supports a Christian, if not Catholic, fundamentalist ideology. This is the case, for example, with the French PNF, which is also more prone to align with foreign groups such as the Italian Forza Nuova (New Force), the Greek Golden Dawn, the various factions of the Spanish Falange, and Eastern European parties that espouse a strong Christian (Orthodox) ideological outlook.¹²⁴

2.4. Connected through travel

As much as the movement communicates, and to a large extent even exists, online, its **members gravitate to certain physical hubs that perform a variety of functions. Apart from the obvious networking aspect, such hubs strengthen the camaraderie between violent XRW members and enable a potential build-up of capabilities and sharing of activities and strategies.** The research for this study identified the following functional travel hubs:

a. Political marches and rallies (see: Section 2.3, above) plus other, seemingly less-prominent examples, such as the Finnish Independence Day demonstration in 2019 that reportedly saw two leading violent XRW Finnish actors, SOO and its branch of the NRM, host representatives that included the leader and founder of the

German Der III. Weg.¹²⁵ In exchange, Finnish NRM personnel have taken part in German violent XRW demonstrations organised under the headline of the "Day of the German Future."¹²⁶ The Swedish Nordic Youth, which disbanded in 2019, not only reportedly sent delegations to the Polish Independence March but also saw its members travel to political gatherings in Italy, Lithuania, Germany, Hungary, and Ukraine.¹²⁷ Lithuania was also the destination for British NA members, who reportedly took part in the Lithuanian Freedom march in Vilnius before travelling onwards to Latvia to participate in Latvian Legion day, which commemorates the exploits of the 15th and 16th Grenadiers of the Waffen SS.¹²⁸

b. Music festivals (see: Section 3.1, below).

c. MMA tournaments (see: Section 3.2, below).

2.5. Connected through attempts to take advantage of the COVID-19 situation

The COVID-19 pandemic is widely seen as an opportunity as far as the “far right” (a broader milieu than the XRW or violent XRW) and the XRW milieus are concerned.¹²⁹ In their view, the disruption caused by the pandemic strengthens the influence of all those who perceived themselves as anti-mainstream prior to the arrival of the coronavirus. At the same time, however, successful efforts by different governments to limit the spread of the pandemic undermine the far right and the XRW movement’s messaging on COVID-19.¹³⁰ The medium- to long-term effects of the ongoing pandemic are currently difficult to foresee. Several studies have indicated a marked increase in the online activities of the violent XRW milieu, as well as the XRW in general.¹³¹ However, it remains to be seen how far the current increase in online activities will subsequently translate into an increase in the offline threat that the transnational violent XRW poses.

Others indicate that the pandemic allows the “far right” and the XRW milieu to strengthen its mobilisation around anti-government conspiratorial narratives, aimed at criticising the lockdown measures. These are interpreted as an introduction of a “police state.” Furthermore, far-right and XRW actors attempt to use the debate concerning the upcoming introduction of an anti-COVID vaccine to harness “anti-vaxx” sentiment for their purposes.¹³² This approach is not, however, uniform for all XRW actors. For example, some on the Swedish scene were initially perplexed by what they viewed as the Swedish government’s initially unsuccessful strategy of combating COVID-19 in the country.¹³³

At the same time, the current international travel restrictions, as well as the postponement of mass events and restrictions on large gatherings in all countries at the centre of this report, disrupt the operational activities of all violent XRW actors. For example, the Finish SOO was not able to organise its so-called “patrols” early in the pandemic.¹³⁴

In Germany, violent XRW actors have joined demonstrations in large numbers organised by various groups protesting against COVID-19 related restrictions and regulations.¹³⁵ Those protest groups consist of individuals with a wide range of ideological backgrounds. While most seem not to have any sympathy for XRW narratives, a significant minority advocates conspiracy myths like the “New World Order” or “QAnon” (“a convoluted conspiracy theory that contends that President Trump is waging a secret war against Satan-worshipping elite paedophiles”)¹³⁶ and might therefore be open to future cooperation against what they may perceive as “common enemies.”¹³⁷


3. MUSIC, VIOLENT SPORTS, MONEY, VIOLENCE: THE DRIVERS OF THE MOVEMENT

The movement is united by a set of values and practicalities. It also works towards readying itself for an upcoming outbreak of violence or wishes to accelerate developments towards such a situation (Day X narrative). For this, it requires broader cadres and financial means to sustain its war-like mentality and posture. Overall, its general financial structure is fed through three main pillars: income from events, sale of merchandise, and donations. **Music and violent sports, in particular their joint consumption or performance at certain events, provide the movement with both of these, i.e., recruits from outside the milieu and ample finances to sustain their “war.”** In short, the replenished ranks and

coffers are to fuel violence on the movement’s behalf. However, this chain of music-sport-money and violence is sometimes interrupted by individual members of the transnational violent XRW movement who, while conducting violent attacks, act independently of the plans prepared by more organised and larger actors.

3.1. Fuelled by music

Almost all major XRW actors are involved in the preparation of concerts or festivals, which offer their members a chance to disseminate propaganda, fundraise, network, and recruit, often in a transnational manner. Such activities are in some cases organised by prominent NPD members in Germany (e.g., the Ostritz festivals in 2018 and 2019).¹³⁸ Particularly in Germany, these events are often registered as “political meetings,” in an apparent attempt to hinder the ability of local administrations



to ban the event.¹³⁹ Terre et Peuple, a far-right and neo-pagan association in France, is heavily involved in the preparation of festivals,¹⁴⁰ so are the French Charlemagne Hammerskins, a branch of the US-based Hammerskin Nation Supremacist, whose target audience are French, German, but also Dutch and Belgian violent XRW individuals.¹⁴¹ The French branch of Blood and Honour set up such events (e.g., “Call of Terror” concert in Châtillon-la-Palud near Lyon),¹⁴² as does the Azov movement in Ukraine with its prominent Asgardsrei festival in Kyiv.¹⁴³

In Germany, the organisation of commercial concerts and festivals seems to constitute one of the main sources of income for the XRW scene. About 150 right-wing extremist music groups and about 60 songwriters and solo performers are involved in the violent XRW music scene.¹⁴⁴ According to media reports, proceeds from concerts also serve as financial support for “comrades” to cover the costs of legal proceedings and lawyers.¹⁴⁵ Estimates for nationwide festival revenues in 2018 range between 1.5 to 2 million euros. This is based on an estimated 35,000 visitors attending major music events with an assumed turnover of 50 euros each (admission or “donation”/drinks and food consumption/T-shirts/CDs).¹⁴⁶ Concerts and festivals are organised in a way that minimises operational costs and maximises hurdles against legal or administrative intervention. They often take place on private property belonging

to right-wing extremists or supporters, are registered as political events, and entrance fees are declared as donations.¹⁴⁷ Moreover, the extreme-right Kameradschaften or “Bands of Comrades/Brothers,” as well as security companies with ties to the scene, provide security services at these events. This is also reportedly the case at martial-arts event (analysed below, see: Section 3.2).¹⁴⁸ In 2018 and 2019 alone, individuals from the violent XRW milieu in Germany attended concerts in Italy, Poland, Finland, Ukraine, France, Sweden, Denmark, the Czech Republic, and Bulgaria.¹⁴⁹

Concerts and festivals are ideal venues for the dissemination of violent XRW ideology and recruitment into the transnational violent XRW milieu as they provide a venue for face-to-face interaction. Moreover, these also **offer cover for international meetings amongst violent XRW players from different national scenes**, e.g., the Asgardsrei festival in Kyiv, featuring both musical performances and MMA fights, which was regularly attended by guests from “all over Europe.”¹⁵⁰ According to media reports, in 2018 members of the German branch of AWD, Der III. Weg, Italy’s CasaPound, and Greece’s Golden Dawn, attended such events.¹⁵¹ A similar congregation of members of the transnational violent XRW milieu occurred during the German “Rock gegen Überfremdung” (“Rock against over-foreignisation”) festival, which reportedly attracted about 6000 international visitors in 2017.¹⁵²

3.2. Fuelled by violent sports

In addition to concerts and festivals, MMA events are another constant feature of violent XRW scenes in the countries that are the focus of this study. Due to the MMA’s general popularity, these events offer an ideal space for recruitment into the milieu and also serve as fundraising and propaganda dissemination opportunities. Regularly, as is the case with the aforementioned Asgardsrei Festival and “Call of Terror” concert, MMA is integrated into music festivals.

As standalone events, they can attract up to 1000 participants, like the white supremacist “Shield and Sword” MMA festival held in Ostritz, Germany, in April 2018 or the “Battle of the Nibelungs,” which took place in Saxony, Germany, and attracted about 850 participants.¹⁵³ If similar basic assumptions concerning the financial spending power per attendee of festivals are applied (circa 50 euros per participant), these two MMA events could have resulted in an overall turnover of 42,500 and 50,000 euros, respectively.

The “Battle of the Nibelungs” has been the most famous series of martial-arts events on the violent XRW scene since 2013. Event participants reportedly included neo-Nazis, right-wing extremists from several subcultures, and members of far-right parties, such as Die Rechte and Der III. Weg. In addition to attendees from Germany, violent XRW individuals from France, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, and Ukraine (Azov Movement) travelled to the event. There are also connections to the right-wing section of the hooligan scene.¹⁵⁴

The American Rise Above Movement, RAM, has reportedly developed a particular fondness for the European violent XRW MMA scene.¹⁵⁵ RAM members

attended MMA events in Germany and Ukraine and sought to imitate European extreme-right fighting clubs, such as the Kyiv-based Reconquista Club.¹⁵⁶ RAM’s media wing, “Media2Rise,” reportedly partners with the French MMA brand “Pride France,” and the Russian/Ukrainian “White Rex” brand.¹⁵⁷ “Media2Rise” features blogs and videos and advertises the writings of European groups such as the Russian and Ukrainian Wotan Jugend. It also seeks to create a transnational extreme-right MMA counterculture in which RAM aims to be the principal American conduit.¹⁵⁸ RAM’s clothing brand is sold by a store that carries several other extreme-right clothing labels linked to the European MMA scene, including the aforementioned supremacist brand “Pride France.”¹⁵⁹

3.3. Fuelled by money

As demonstrated above, **both sets of events, at times interlinked under one roof and held concurrently, are potentially significant generators of revenue for their organisers. A second important and recurrent revenue-generating instrument are online sales of merchandise by leading violent XRW actors from different national scenes.**

The Swedish Council for Preventing Violent Extremism (SCPVE) states that **“there has long been commercial activity in the [white power] scene and**

it is relatively extensive. The sale of propaganda material in the form of clothes, books, posters, music and stickers occurs both online and in connection to political meetings and manifestations.”¹⁶⁰ Notable sellers of such materials include Greenpilled, a web shop operated by NRM, whose profits allegedly “go directly to the struggle”; Nordic Wear, linked to Nordic Youth, which sold the violent XRW European Brotherhood and Thor Steinar brands of clothes; and Midgård. Greenpilled offers customers information in English as well as Swedish; Midgård has English, German,



Finnish, French, Italian, Polish, Portuguese and Russian versions of its website, as well as Swedish. Logik is a publisher selling the literature of historical as well as contemporary and active violent XRW activists.

A 2017 data breach revealed that from 2012 to 2016, NRM's web shop (since replaced by Greenpilled) took orders from hundreds of shipping addresses in Sweden's neighbouring countries, as well as France, Germany, the UK, the USA, Australia, Estonia, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Russia, and Switzerland. These orders constituted around 12 percent of the overall sales of the website.¹⁶¹

In Finland, funding for the violent XRW activities partly comes from selling merchandise such as hoodies, stickers, and books. Besides sales during concerts and other events, the merchandise is sold at online stores and in a few brick-and-mortar shops, and previously also at the web shop of the NRM. The NRM in Finland has had significant difficulties in the operation of its online shop, which has been hacked, and banks have cancelled their payment services.¹⁶² Leaked web shop orders from 2015 to 2016 show that within six months, 275 individual orders were made, with a typical order being around 30 euros.¹⁶³ SOO, one of the two leading Finnish violent XRW groups, the other being NRM, was originally able to control sufficient funding as it collected donations from a growing body of members and reportedly demanded several thousand euros from some of its national chapters.¹⁶⁴

The French violent XRW scene's merchandise outlets seem less developed. However, even in this country there are dedicated clothes manufacturers, such as the aforementioned brand Pride France.¹⁶⁵

Germany has a network of right-wing extremist music labels and mail-order companies, Turnover from the sale of right-wing extremist music and merchandising (clothes/accessories) in Saxony alone was estimated at around 3.5 million euros already in 2012.¹⁶⁶ Individual music labels have "a high reputation on the right-wing extremist scene at home and

abroad"¹⁶⁷ with sales of several hundred thousand euros per year. The profits were used to buy or rent real estate (reportedly around 140 properties across Germany) that are used as venues for XRW activities¹⁶⁸ and to financially support activities of the violent XRW scene.¹⁶⁹

The American AWD sold t-shirts, and individuals have sold stickers with the group's logo on the website Teespring. By doing business with a third party such as Teespring, individuals associated with extremist groups can avoid doing business directly with payment processors, which might refuse to process payments. RAM operates a clothing brand, The Right Brand, which is sold in partnership via the California-based store Our Fight Clothing Co.¹⁷⁰ The latter also sells several European brands and is the official US sales point for the white supremacist Pride France MMA brand and merchandise from the Italian national-socialist hardcore band Green Arrows.¹⁷¹ The store also reportedly sells brands from the European Brotherhood brand and the Ukrainian Walknvt brand.¹⁷²

Cryptocurrencies do not yet play a significant role in the financial activities of the violent XRW movement analysed for this study; however, several groups have begun to use this new technology. Some American extreme-right websites have requested and received donations in cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, or Monero. The Daily Stormer, a violent XRW online bulletin board, has made frequent requests for readership funding to remain accessible and online. According to media reports, the website received a sizable bitcoin donation, approximately \$60,000 at the time, following the 2017 Unite the Right rally.¹⁷³ The Fascist Forge web forum reportedly requested cryptocurrency donations in either Bitcoin, Ethereum, or Monero.¹⁷⁴ The NRM through its outlet Nordfront asks supporters to donate to the group using cryptocurrencies, particularly Bitcoin, as well as Cardano, Dash, Ethereum, Litecoin, Monero, Nem, Neo, and Stellar, and Brave Rewards through the Brave web browser. Its Finnish branch has also urged their supporters to use Bitcoin ATMs for anonymous donations.¹⁷⁵

Reports indicate that violent XRW groups in the UK have traditionally raised money through cash donations and bequests,¹⁷⁶ but also crime. The North West Infidels (NWI) for instance were reportedly engaged in selling illegal drugs, though whether the individuals in question channelled these revenues into their political activities is unknown.¹⁷⁷ Some members of the German violent XRW scene are also involved in organised crime: according to media reports, in 2014 Leipzig police found drugs with a market value of 150,000 euros with a member of the violent neo-Nazi scene,¹⁷⁸ and in 2017, a right-wing-extremist drug-dealing ring was uncovered in Aachen.¹⁷⁹

The transnational violent XRW movement, despite bans and fines regularly imposed on organisers of some of music or sporting events (see Sections 3.1 and 3.2 above), is not sufficiently interrupted by authorities and in particular online platform providers through which the merchandise is sold. This situation is very different compared to the extremist Islamist milieu, whose financial activ-

ities have been far more scrutinised, as well as exposed and therefore are better understood.

More research is needed to further analyse the various online and offline financial activities of the transnational violent XRW movement and to adequately account for the sums circulating in the milieu, including potential financial irregularities, such as potential tax evasion. This lack of analysis can be attributed to **the erroneous impression that violent XRW groups are mainly fuelled by contributions or donations from their members and therefore do not necessitate further financial scrutiny. This assumption is only correct as far as individual perpetrators of attacks are concerned. These regularly self-finance their preparations and attacks.** The financial background of such violent events is normally better understood due to subsequent police investigations following an attack. However, **it would be incorrect to generalise this situation as representing a typology for the overall financial operations of the wider transnational violent XRW movement.**

3.4. Organised for violence

3.4.1. Trends

Between 2015 and 2020, the six countries at the centre of this study experienced an overall rise in the violent activities of different XRW actors. Most of these incidents might not have been terrorist in nature. However, both loners as well as organisations from the violent XRW milieu planned terror attacks, which fortunately were largely either unsuccessful or interdicted.

The notable rise in forms of violent XRW violence included incidents such as attacks on refugee shelters, street violence against perceived migrants or leftists, etc. The latter was especially true in Finland, with 40 arson attacks against refugee centres in 2015 and 2016¹⁸⁰ (the last such attack took place in February 2016),¹⁸¹ and in Sweden (in 2015 and 2018).¹⁸² Such attacks also occurred in Germany,

the so-called “anti-asylum riots,” a series of attacks on migrants and asylum-seekers, especially in the form of arson, assaults, and (attempted) murder. These involved mostly individuals from outside established violent XRW entities.¹⁸³

In fact, the period between 2015 and 2020 saw a major increase of the threat posed by violent in Germany. While the number of individuals considered by national authorities to belong to the XRW milieu had grown steadily from 21,000 to 24,100 between 2014 and 2018,¹⁸⁴ there was a particularly significant increase of 33.11 percent between 2018 and 2019, now standing at 32,080.¹⁸⁵ This marked increase is primarily due to the inclusion of members of “der Flügel” and “Junge Alternative” (JA in the statistic. Both organisations were officially classified as “suspected cases” by the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV), the federal domestic intelligence service of Germany.

In total, more than half of all right-wing extremists in Germany were classified as “violence-oriented” each year between 2014 and 2018.¹⁸⁶ In 2019, that figure stood at 13,000.¹⁸⁷ Germany also saw a string of spectacular terrorist attacks—Munich (2016),¹⁸⁸ Halle (2019)¹⁸⁹ and Hanau (2020)¹⁹⁰—and the murder of a high-profile regional official, Walter Lübcke (2019).¹⁹¹

Sweden also witnessed at least four major violent incidents motivated by violent XRW ideology; however, none of these were prosecuted as terrorist offences. In October 2015, a 22-year-old now considered to have been radicalised in part by online XRW propaganda attacked a school, where he used a blade to kill three individuals, including a minor. He was killed by police while violently resisting arrest.¹⁹² In 2016 and 2017, three further acts were perpetrated by what reportedly had been a “rogue” NRM cell¹⁹³ whose members had received combat training in a RID camp outside St. Petersburg.¹⁹⁴ The NRM reportedly remains in contact with RID.¹⁹⁵ However, NRM claims that the subsequent series of terror bombings targeting leftists and refugees in western Sweden were perpetrated by “rogue” members and were not authorised by it.¹⁹⁶ All of these incidents could have been prosecuted as terrorism offences according to the newly proposed Swedish anti-terrorism legislation.¹⁹⁷

The United Kingdom witnessed two successful violent XRW terrorist attacks, including a murder of a member of parliament (Jo Cox, 2016) by a white supremacist with a history of purchasing extreme-right propaganda from a US-based neo-Nazi group called National Alliance;¹⁹⁸ and five vehicular attacks, including the high-profile event outside the Finsbury Park mosque on 19 June 2017¹⁹⁹ and four racially motivated attacks in June 2017²⁰⁰ and October 2018 in London,²⁰¹ in September 2017 in Leicester,²⁰² and in July 2020 in Bristol.²⁰³ The British security services also disrupted a further eight terrorist XRW plots, including one to murder another member of parliament.²⁰⁴ Since January 2015, the UK also made 90 terrorism or terrorism-related arrests of violent XRW-affiliated individuals.²⁰⁵

Whilst lone actors had previously been characteristic of XRW terrorism, National Action (NA) came to represent a networked threat, with police arresting numerous individuals who were either directly involved with the group, or self-identified with it, on a range of terrorism-related offences.²⁰⁶ These arrests were largely for the offence of “membership” of a proscribed group, which following the designation of NA by the British government became a criminal offence, rather than representing a rise in violent activity *per se*.²⁰⁷ Nonetheless, these measures seemed to have worked as far as dismantling of the NA was concerned, demonstrating the significant impact terrorism designations can have on the ability to disrupt the operational capabilities of a proscribed group.

A similar approach had earlier been tested in France with the ban on the leading violent XRW organisations Troisième Voie (TV) and Jeunesses nationalistes révolutionnaires (JNR), and the neo-fascist Œuvre française and Jeunesses nationalistes.²⁰⁸ Those groups, however, re-formed quickly, putting the efficiency of the ban into question, the more so since several cases of violence aimed at political opponents in which TV and JNR members are suspected to have been involved, remain unresolved.²⁰⁹ Moreover, a significant number of former violent XRW individuals flocked to the PNF, a dormant and ageing far-right party, and subsequently radicalised it through their involvement in low-level violence, such as street fighting and participation in brawls with political opponents.²¹⁰ In 2018, new bans were decided against Blood and Honour Hexagone²¹¹ and Bastion Social, a national-revolutionary group whose extreme members were suspected of planning armed attacks.²¹²

From 2015 to 2020, France saw a range of serious violent XRW plots, the first ones of this calibre since 2002.²¹³ These included conspiracies to assassinate high-profile politicians, such as the president of France in 2018²¹⁴ by a group of men aged between 32 and 62 and fascinated by the military,²¹⁵ or plans to kill the interior minister and a leftist presidential candidate in 2017 by an individual frustrated with the inaction of the French violent XRW milieu and wishing to see more

terrorist action.²¹⁶ Finally, the third major plot (that of the so-called Action des Forces Opérationnelles, or AFO) reportedly involved former gendarmes, policemen and soldiers²¹⁷ who had prepared to stage terrorist attacks and justified their plans by what they perceived to be the growing Islamisation of France.²¹⁸ In the eyes of the AFO members, the state was allegedly neither willing nor able to effectively shield France against Islam and that self-proclaimed “patriots,” especially those with experience in the military or other security forces, have a duty to replace the “failing” security apparatus.²¹⁹

Between 2015 and 2020, the United States witnessed 68 violent incidents in which the perpetrator was motivated by extreme right-wing ideology, or the perpetrator was known to subscribe to extreme-right ideology or was affiliated with an extreme right-wing group and plotted or perpetrated an attack resulting in hate-crimes charges. The attacks peaked in 2017. Sixty people were killed in 66 incidents, and 96 were injured. Overall, 97 people were arrested for right-wing violent extremist or ideologically motivated criminal offenses.²²⁰

3.4.2. Character

As outlined in Section 2.1 above, **the transnational violent XRW movement defines itself as being under existential attack from hostile ideological forces. Thus, its members justify violence as “reactive” or “defensive” in nature.** This is evident when analysing the reported motivations behind the aforementioned French assassination plots (organised to stem the perceived Islamisation of France), or NRM terrorist violence against leftist and refugee targets in Sweden, as well as some of the NRM street violence in Finland. There, NRM members would confront, reportedly on their own initiative,²²¹ alleged political opponents, for example, a group assault at a shopping centre in Jyväskylä in 2015 and an aggravated assault in Helsinki in 2016.²²² Similar motivations were reported in the cases of the murder of Jo Cox, an MP in the UK (described as a “liberal traitor” by the murderer),²²³ and the Hanau attack in Germany (the perpetrator

reportedly was motivated by hatred of migrants).²²⁴

Despite being perpetrated by members of a transnational movement, the violence currently remains national in character, both in the planning as well as the execution stages. It is organised locally, without the assistance of foreign violent XRW actors. However, as demonstrated in the “United by narratives” section (Section 2.1. above), the motivation for an attack and operational role models can come from abroad (for example, McVeigh or Brenton Tarrant, the Australian who perpetrated the 2019 massacre in Christchurch, New Zealand) as was likely the case in the attempted copycat attack in Luton in December 2019 when police arrested an individual with a 2kg bag of sulphur powder and other bomb-making components. The suspect reportedly possessed a copy of Tarrant’s manifesto on his computer.²²⁵ The Poway²²⁶ and El Paso²²⁷ shooters from the U.S. were also said to have been inspired by Tarrant.²²⁸

However, this transnational inspiration and motivation does not (yet) extend to operational support from outside the respective national milieu. **Exceptions are the 2016 to 2017 bombings in Sweden, which were staged by a “rogue” NRM cell after its members received paramilitary training in a RID camp in Russia. Another potential exception are the series of acts of vandalism in different Scandinavian countries against synagogues and other Jewish facilities to “commemorate” Kristallnacht in 2019,²²⁹ as well as the distribution of anti-Semitic posters during the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur in Denmark and Norway in 2020.²³⁰**

3.4.3. Perpetrators of violence

3.4.3.1. Lone actor phenomenon

A significant amount of XRW violence is conducted not by members of the leading organisations in a given country but rather their sympathisers or individuals adapting violent XRW narratives. For example, both deadly violent XRW terrorist attacks in the UK, the attacks in Munich, Halle,

and Hanau in Germany, the Trollhättan school attack in Sweden,²³¹ and the Charleston,²³² Pittsburgh,²³³ Poway,²³⁴ and El Paso shootings in the U.S. fall into this category.²³⁵

The perpetrators of such attacks are sometimes offline loners but very well-networked online, functioning in the broader violent XRW world, and not so-called “lone wolves” by the strict definition of the term. Alternatively, violence can also be perpetrated by “rogue” members (e.g., the bombings in Sweden in 2016 to 2017, see more above), apparently going outside the instructions of the leaders of their organisation, or informal grouplets, such as the German “Gruppe Freital,” which carried out several attacks in 2015.

Consequently, **successful violent XRW terrorism plots so far are not the domain of established organisations. However, this does not mean that attempts have not been made.** For example, former members of the British NA were reportedly involved in a plot to murder a Labour Party MP²³⁶ and another attempted murder.²³⁷ Furthermore, another NA member, a Finnish national (and simultaneously a British soldier) had been stockpiling legally held weaponry for a supposedly imminent “race war.” He reportedly had also sought to recruit other active-duty soldiers and attempted to assist NA members to join the armed forces.²³⁸

US groups such as The Base or AWD were also involved in the preparation of terrorist plots that were later disrupted. The US saw at least 11 plots by either violent XRW groups or members of anti-government or militia groups between 2015 and 2020.²³⁹ Notably, individuals connected to one such militia, the so-called Wolverine Watchmen, allegedly plotted to kidnap the governor of Michigan, Gretchen Whitmore in Autumn of 2020. This plot was foiled by the security forces, which arrested the members of the group in early October 2020.²⁴⁰

As outlined above, the NRM is suspected to have coordinated simultaneous acts of low-level violence in different countries, and the French AFO, albeit

loosely organised, was readying itself for a civil war in France and was preparing acts of political violence similar to some of the German groups, like Nordadler or Revolution Chemnitz.²⁴¹

3.4.3.2. Gender dimension

The violent XRW as well as the broader XRW milieu have traditionally been overwhelmingly male-dominated. An example of this is the situation in the US where the leading violent XRW groups were exclusively male. This is particularly the case at the violent end of the spectrum, which is saturated with images of heroic masculinity and ideological broadsides against feminism.

This is not, however, to suggest that no women were involved in the preparation or execution of violent XRW terrorist attacks. For example, the US attacks outlined in this report involved two female perpetrators. German reports on women acting as perpetrators in politically motivated XRW violent offences estimate that between 10%²⁴² and 15%²⁴³ of the perpetrators are female. Two female NA activists in the UK were recently convicted of terrorism-related offences.²⁴⁴ Moreover, women played other roles in the non-violent activities of the groups discussed in this report. Of the NRM's members, 19% are said to be female,²⁴⁵ and women allegedly constitute up to 10% of the XRW scene in Sweden.²⁴⁶

Women also lead a separate national-socialist organisation in Finland (with a little more than 100 members on their private Facebook group),²⁴⁷ or have led local chapters of the SOO in Finland and reportedly represented the organisation abroad.²⁴⁸ Typically, although not without exceptions, reports indicate that female activists had joined the NRM via their husbands or boyfriends, as the role of women in NRM ideology is to focus on home and childcare and social activism, leaving the operational roles mostly to male members.²⁴⁹ Female activists have, however, participated in propaganda work, e.g., by translating and proofreading articles published by the NRM and sometimes also by distributing leaflets.²⁵⁰

4. ONLINE DIMENSION INTEGRAL TO THE MOVEMENT

The various national violent XRW scenes analysed for this study and, to a large extent, their international connections and dimensions, are not only offline phenomena. They contain a significant online element, itself a feature consistently present in all socio-political movements, including violent ones such as the global extremist Islamist terrorist networks of al-Qaida and ISIL. In this sense, the seemingly strong online presence of the violent XRW world is not necessarily a sign of the elevated capabilities of its members, or its automatic growing prominence, but **more an indication of their embrace and early adoption of available modern technologies**. An example of this could be NRM's podcasting in English (Nordic Frontier) and simultaneous development of English and Russian sites on Facebook and VKontakte,²⁵¹ and the documentation of the organisation's activism on platforms such as YouTube or Telegram, for example via livestreams.²⁵² According to Heléne Löw, a Swedish authority on the extreme right, **the violent XRW online and offline domains are in fact "in constant symbiosis and so integrated with one another that they can hardly exist without one another. [...] This in turn creates complex and complicated virtual structures where it is difficult to determine what is organized or unorganized [...]."**²⁵³ As such, the online component of the violent XRW repeats the "divided we stand" approach of its offline equivalent. This fragmentation, however, should not be equalled with success.

The seeming ascendancy of the online in the violent XRW world only intensified with the growing availability of social media and video-sharing platforms, as well as messenger services. These bring the milieu's actors together, allowing them to **spread propaganda more widely, recruit, coordinate, and mobilise supporters**. Such activities were on full display with **SOO**, the Finnish organisation



that **successfully grew into a national and then a global brand due to its growing online outreach.** Although initially some of its chapters were built around previously known offline contacts, most of the local leaders were known by the national leaders only via Facebook. As an international network, SOO was created solely within the virtual community, although on a few occasions, contacts were maintained also by face-to-face meetings.²⁵⁴ Interestingly, once the so-called European migrant “crisis” receded from the headlines, the SOO lost significant influence; for example, reports indicate that the membership of its Finnish chapter shrank from 600 to 200 members.²⁵⁵

There are other examples indicating how crucial the online component is for the violent XRW—**many of its leading groups were “born digital.”** For example, those involved in **AWD or the NRM met through forums like the now defunct Iron March** (at its apex, the forum had around 1200 consistent users)²⁵⁶ or its successor forum, **Fascist Forge**²⁵⁷. After initially operating online, AWD moved its activities offline, evolving to become “real” groups.²⁵⁸

Through graphics, suggested reading (especially the aforementioned James Mason’s *Siege*), and user interaction, Iron March developed a violent fascist culture reflected in AWD, the British NA, and others. One former forum member asserted that **community sentiment encouraged radicalisation by rewarding the most extreme views.** Following Iron March’s removal, Fascist Forge emerged to take its place in spring 2018. Fascist Forge, which had around 1300 registered users in November 2019, sought to become the new online meeting place for the fascist extreme right and glorified and encouraged terrorism.²⁵⁹ A high-ranking member of The Base created the forum, and the group used the site for recruitment until its organisers reportedly decided to remove it in early 2020 due to increased scrutiny by media and law enforcement.²⁶⁰

In recent years, due to pressure from civil society and policymakers, Instagram and its parent company Facebook,²⁶¹ along with YouTube²⁶² and Twitter²⁶³

have started to remove violence-oriented right-wing extremist actors and their content from their platforms.²⁶⁴ However, media reports indicate these efforts are less stringent than for extremist Islamist material.²⁶⁵ Research shows that this “de-platforming” has led to a migration of these actors to smaller or alternative platforms like VKontakte, BitChute, meme/message-boards like 4Chan and 8Chan, and messenger services like WhatsApp or Telegram. **The new accounts on those smaller platforms often have significantly fewer followers.**²⁶⁶ This demonstrates the significant operational disruption and limitation of reach that can be achieved by removing violent XRW groups from global platforms. Migration to services such as VKontakte often also allows for a more unrestricted or racist discussion amongst the members/followers (such is reportedly the case with the SOO in Finland).²⁶⁷ VKontakte is in fact a place where “right-wing rock collections, neo-Nazi violence videos, and Nazi texts are shared as PDFs, where extreme-right and alt-right parties (NPD, Der Dritte Weg, Die Rechte [...]), right-wing-extremist mail-order businesses, right-wing rock bands, Holocaust deniers, militant neo-Nazis, Reich citizens and conspiracy theorists gather. Neo-Nazi terrorist organisations, such as Blood & Honour, Combat 18 [...] are promoted openly.”²⁶⁸

Similarly, videos by the now banned British NA are still accessible on the UK-based BitChute platform, which hosts material that may violate the terms of service of mainstream sites like YouTube.²⁶⁹ When XRW terrorist videos are deleted off YouTube,²⁷⁰ they often are uploaded to BitChute and then advertised on YouTube. Furthermore, a recent study conducted by CEP has found that illegal right-wing-extremist content also continues to be posted on major global platforms.²⁷¹

The “politically incorrect” (/pol) sections of bulletin boards, such as 8chan, have glorified and encouraged violence among lone actors. Before his 2019 Christchurch attack, the perpetrator Brenton Tarrant posted links to his manifesto and livestream on 8chan. John Earnest, the admitted Poway, California, synagogue shooter, as well as the alleged El Paso mass

shooter, Patrick Crusius, each posted their manifestos on 8chan/pol before their attacks. In all three cases, **board users continued to spread manifestos, memes, and other content praising the shooters.**²⁷²

It is significant that copycats of Tarrant have also used 8chan and posted their manifestos on the site, showing their allegiance to the forum and its users and hoping to radicalise others and inspire further acts of white supremacist violence. After 8chan's removal, similar behaviour has reportedly continued on the successor bulletin boards of 8chan.²⁷³

The research conducted for this report indicates that the significance of these non-mainstream bulletin boards and chatrooms to the violent XRW movement and its propaganda purposes is not, however, matched by the violent XRW activities on the darknet. The research did not indicate any greater significance of the darknet to the operations of the transnational violent XRW movement. However, reports indicate some migration of the online presence of several violent XRW actors has occurred, especially in the USA.²⁷⁴ Furthermore, the darknet was used for operational purposes by perpetrators of attacks. The perpetrator of the Munich attacks (2016) purchased his gun there. The alleged perpetrator of the Halle attack in Germany (2019) admitted he had received the equivalent of about 1000 euros in Bitcoin from someone on a darknet weapons-building platform after telling the individual that he "wanted to shoot Muslims."²⁷⁵

Similar to other terror phenomena, encrypted communications tools, especially Telegram, have reportedly been integral to recruitment, the spread of propaganda and violent how-to manuals, and encouraging acts of terrorism.²⁷⁶

Reports also indicate that Telegram has been the preferred medium for several violent groups due to its wide reach and the ability to engage in the dissemination of propaganda, group chats, and encrypted person-to-person communication.²⁷⁷ Moreover, Feuerkrieg Division, now a banned terrorist entity in the UK, used its Telegram channel, according to media reports, to issue a death threat against the Chief Constable of

West Midlands Police in September 2019 in response to the arrest of one of their members on suspicion of the commission, preparation, and instigation of acts of terrorism.²⁷⁸

Regularly, conversations are started on Telegram and subsequently switched to gaming chat platforms like Discord or Steam, encrypted chat apps like Wire, or secure email services like Tutanota or Protonmail in apparent attempts to maintain tight communications security. The app Wire has reportedly been used by the American violent XRW group The Base to establish secure communications networks, share information, and encourage acts of violence.²⁷⁹

The resulting larger digital ecosystem that acts as a wider support base for the offline realm might to a large extent be characterised as a **"blind network" since the identities of those involved in the on-line sphere often are unknown to one another and geographically dispersed. Whilst lack of real-world contacts may limit personal trust and group loyalty, it has clearly enhanced transnational connectivity between militants.** These looser digital networks seek to promote violence (constantly trumpeting its necessity and urgency) as a means of accelerating the collapse of "the System" whilst as an environment they exhibit none of the "internal brakes" on violence that real-world organisations—even violent ones—contain.²⁸⁰

Whilst much of the interaction between individuals within these blind networks remains virtual (and its violent talk often "performative"),²⁸¹ there is some evidence of militants seeking to operationalise their digital contacts for terroristic ends. In January 2020, a Durham teenager became the youngest person convicted of planning a terror attack in the United Kingdom as he tried to put together an explosive device. In order to purchase the necessary components for this device, he had reportedly turned to his contacts on Fascist Forge.²⁸²

Despite the broad and often impressive scale of online activities of the transnational violent XRW movement,

its success in utilisation of this domain must be critically assessed. In fact, **it often seems that the offline is unable to catch up with the seemingly well-developed online world, which takes on a life of its own. Thus, online sometimes is unable to act as a booster for offline. This is very different from the skilful use of online tools by extremist Islamist actors.** These do not only recruit and communicate online, demonstrating very advanced production skills in their videos and online magazines, but such actors have also effectively led some attacks in real time via encrypted internet communications services. At the same time, the violent XRW milieu plans, prepares, and fantasizes online for a war that is not coming. In short, **the volume of communication should not be mistaken for a robust transnational operational online space that would be a game-changer as far as conducting political violence is concerned.**

The individuals and groups of the transnational violent XRW movement analysed in this study have been early adopters of internet services and communication tools. These are an integral part of their operational structure and provide them the ability to maintain transnational connections and communication channels. In some cases, online tools provided the original meeting space, which led to the subsequent establishment of the respective offline structure of the respective group (see AWD). In this, the transnational violent XRW movement is not significantly different from other terrorism-related networks.

However, while some initial—although not complete—success has been achieved in stemming the misuse of these services and tools by extremist Islamist actors, the transnational violent XRW movement faces considerably lower hurdles and weaker defences. This demonstrates that the tech industry as a whole has not yet sufficiently focused on the misuse of their services by the violent XRW. Therefore, greater industry emphasis and effective regulations addressing the phenomenon of terrorism in a strategic manner, and not only particular ideological variations of the phenomenon, are urgently needed to begin the work on effective

disruption of the online activities of the wider violent XRW transnational movement.

Currently, a European Union-wide regulatory framework is emerging that can be brought to bear to hinder the online activities of the transnational violent XRW framework, including its financial activities. The framework still has significant transparency issues, structural weakness of the “Notice and Take Down” approach, and continuing wide-ranging exemption from liability for tech companies concerning third-party content and moderation.²⁸³ At the same time, EU Member States and the UK are also contributing to the framework’s emergence. In 2017, Germany passed ground-breaking legislation with the Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG),²⁸⁴ and augmented it in July 2020 with the new Law Against Right-Wing Extremism and Hate Crime, which focuses on violent XRW activities online.²⁸⁵ In 2019, the United Kingdom passed legislation focusing on terrorism content distributed online.²⁸⁶ In May 2020, France amended earlier legislation from 2015, focusing on terrorism-related content online.²⁸⁷ Within the EU, the negotiations concerning the Terrorism Content Online Regulation (TCO) are in their final stages²⁸⁸ while the first round of public consultations concerning the Digital Services Act (DSA), which will update the 2000 e-Commerce Directive,²⁸⁹ has just concluded.²⁹⁰

The first sections of this report focused on the three thematic pillars emerging from the study of the six countries with violent XRW scenes. It demonstrated that in addition to the continuation of the national violent XRW milieus, a transnational violent XRW movement has emerged. The movement grew more violent between 2015 and 2020 and uses music and sports as sources of funding and recruitment for its violent activities. The movement indeed possesses a vibrant online ecosystem that enthusiastically enjoys and employs the latest technologies. It often fails, however, to translate this vibrancy into the offline sphere. Due to a growing awareness of the threat that the transnational violent XRW movement poses, governments in the six countries at the centre of this study have taken a range of countermeasures to mitigate this threat.

5. MEMBER STATE RESPONSES

5.1. Legal definitions and administrative practices

Amongst the six countries at the centre of this study, clear-cut trends are emerging as far as the legal side of countering violent XRW is concerned. While terrorism is clearly defined in the legal framework of all of these countries, extremism is mostly defined by administrative practice. This highlights the importance of designating violent XRW stakeholders as terrorism-related in order to be able to prosecute their actions using existing counterterrorism provisions.

“Terrorism” is defined in the legal order of these countries as:

- an individual or collective attempt at “severely disturbing public order by threat or terror,”²⁹¹ with a special provision concerning “fighting groups” (*groupes de combat*), i.e., those that “have access to weapons, have a hierarchical structure and may disrupt public order”²⁹² (France);
- forming an organisation the objectives of which are directed at “seriously intimidating the population” or “destroying or significantly impairing” an authority or international organisation,²⁹³ “when three or more persons band together, are prepared to commit acts of violence, and start executing these plans”²⁹⁴ (Germany);
- “an extreme form of violence-promoting extremism”²⁹⁵ where three anti-terror laws provide further elaboration on sanctions, the central one aimed against “terrorist offences,” with the other two covering funding, incitement, recruitment, and training related to terror²⁹⁶ (Sweden);
- as the use or threat of action designed to influence government, international governmental organisations, the public or a section of the public, for a “political, religious, racial, or ideological cause”²⁹⁷ (United Kingdom).

The US and Finland are the two outliers as far as defining terrorism is concerned. The US defines “international terrorism” as crimes that are meant to coerce or intimidate the civilian population or influence government policy with a connection to a foreign terrorist group designated by the US State Department.²⁹⁸ The US has a separate definition for “domestic terrorism,” which is described as illegal acts meant to intimidate, coerce, or impact government policy. However, the second definition is not accompanied by prosecutable penalties. Consequently, prosecutors work around this state of affairs by seeking convictions for the likes of possession of explosives, murder, attempted murder, etc.²⁹⁹

The Finnish penal code definition focuses “only” on a deed that “[causes] serious harm to a state or an international organisation” but not explicitly to the public, unlike the UK definition, for example.³⁰⁰ Consequently, only one person in Finland’s history, an Islamist terrorist who perpetrated an attack in Turku in 2017,³⁰¹ has been convicted for terrorism.³⁰² As the burden of proof for such a conviction is high, and since the penal code does not sanction membership of a terrorist organisation, a Ministry of Justice task force has recently proposed a new piece of legislation that would allow for a less-restricted application of the “terrorism” category when attempting to secure convictions.³⁰³

Unlike the term “terrorism,” the term “extremism” is not specifically defined in the law and is established mainly in administrative practice. Therefore, it simultaneously allows for a degree of flexibility while addressing the threat but also constrains the availability of counterterrorism instruments to stem

the threat emanating from individuals and entities that fall into this category.

Consequently, with no definition of XRW or “right-wing terrorism” in the British legal system (comprising the jurisdictions of England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland), or particular legislation targeting XRW groups,³⁰⁴ the UK utilises a counterterrorism approach under the Terrorism Act (2000). It defines belonging to a proscribed terrorist organisation as an “offence,” and this clause was used to enable the majority of the 90 XRW terrorism arrests since 2015 of individuals accused of belonging to proscribed groups.³⁰⁵

Sweden, lacking a legal definition of extremism, and not utilising the counterterrorism approach in its fight with the violent XRW, is nonetheless allowing its security service to engage in “counter-subversion” operations, which monitor extremist scenes,³⁰⁶ including “violence-promoting right-wing extremism.”³⁰⁷

The U.S. government, when referring to domestic violent actors, uses the terms “terrorist” and “extremist” interchangeably, as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Justice have their own working definitions that pertain to intelligence and investigations.³⁰⁸ At the same time, however, the fact that neither membership in extreme right-wing groups nor hate speech is illegal in the U.S., constrains some of the anti-violent XRW efforts in the country.

In Finland, where the term “violent extremism” refers to anti-democratic, extra-parliamentary and potentially violent groups, including right-wing extremists but not radical-right ones.³⁰⁹ The Finnish Security In-

telligence Service (Supo) differentiates more explicitly between domestic extremism and terrorism, of which the latter refers typically to an external threat in the form of radical Islamism.³¹⁰ Consequently, counterterrorism tools, as will be shown, are used rarely and not while addressing the threat from the violent XRW.

In France, where, as will be shown, a counterintelligence-led approach permeates the process of addressing the violent XRW, the terms “far-right” (*extrême-droite*) and “radical-right” (*droite radicale*) are often used as synonyms in the public domain. At the same time, most extremist groups refer to themselves as national right (*droite nationale*). Since 2015, a new, non-legal category, delineating the most dangerous and extreme elements of the XRW, has emerged: the “ultra-right” (*ultra-droite*). It was introduced to the public when the head of the General Direction of Internal Security (DGSI; *Direction générale de la sécurité intérieure*) predicted the “ultra-right” would engage in “clashes between communities,” using the Islamist terror attacks as an excuse to, in their view, “defend” the “white” Frenchmen.³¹¹

In Germany, the term “extremism” is not defined by constitutional or criminal law. It is instead a conceptual tool that German domestic intelligence agencies have been using since 1974. In this respect, “extremism” denotes an assumed or proven “anti-constitutionalism,” and is aimed at any effort opposing the “principles of the free democratic basic order.”³¹² Consequently, “(right-wing) extremism” is perceived as a concept that violates human dignity under Section 1 of the German Constitution (“Basic Law”) as it denies the existence of universal human rights.³¹³

5.2. Development of countermeasures and strategic approaches

In all six countries that are the focus of this study, structural changes in countermeasures to terrorism evolved particularly quickly following major terrorist

incidents. This is also the case with measures developed to mitigate the threat posed by violent XRW. Throughout the last decade, and particularly since

2015, the threat posed by violent XRW has been attracting more attention and resources from the security establishments in the countries covered in this report.

Overall, the period saw the development of three counter-violent extremism trends amongst the six countries examined: the Scandinavian P/CVE approach, multifaceted approaches, and an approach focusing on counterintelligence/counter-crime.

5.2.1. Scandinavian P/CVE approach

The “Scandinavian” P/CVE approach is mostly influenced by the successes of the so-called Aarhus model in Denmark, which sees the municipality cooperate with the police via community engagement/empowerment and family support to help prevent radicalisation.³¹⁴ This influence led to the introduction of what are called “Anchor teams” in Finland, which work at the local level on the basis of multi-professional collaboration, including the police, and professionals in youth, health, and social work. The aim of the Anchor-model is early intervention in juvenile delinquency.³¹⁵ Sweden also utilised the Danish influences, namely Denmark’s Centre for Prevention of Extremism,³¹⁶ in establishing the Swedish Centre for Preventing Violent Extremism (SCPVE, named as such in 2018).³¹⁷ SCPVE, a part of the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention, is tasked with coordinating and supporting municipalities, national agencies and civil society in PVE work.

The U.S. saw its Department of Homeland Security (DHS) release a strategy document in September 2019 that called for public-private partnerships with tech companies, and the development of counter-messaging by tech companies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and civil society organisations (CSOs).³¹⁸ The DHS strategy built on the creation in April 2019 of the Office of Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention (OTVTP), which provides funding streams for local groups working on P/CVE issues such as training, interventions, and resilience.³¹⁹

5.2.2. Multifaceted approaches

Multifaceted approaches are best demonstrated by the British counterterrorism efforts. As an integral part, these include a focus on prevention. In its countermeasures against violent XRW actions, the UK utilises counterterrorism tools such as proscribing organisations and jailing violent XRW individuals on the basis of their involvement with these organisations. The civilian security service, MI5, became the lead agency for detecting and countering XRW terrorism.³²⁰ The UK also imposes an obligation on a range of public institutions, including councils, schools, colleges, universities, and the health service, which are obliged to have “due regard” towards people being drawn into terrorism, including the XRW (the “Prevent Duty”).³²¹

To some extent, the last decade saw Germany arrive at the multifaceted approach. After a string of violent XRW attacks predating 2015, Germany focused on countermeasures related to the security apparatus. It established the Joint Centre for Countering Extremism and Terrorism (GETZ), which serves as a communication platform for the 30 federal and state police and intelligence services, and one of its aims is to combat right-wing extremism/terrorism.³²² Following high-profile violent XRW attacks in 2019, the phenomenon was deemed the most significant current threat to Germany by the authorities. And subsequently, new and additional administrative capabilities focusing on this threat were created within the federal criminal police (BKA), the domestic intelligence service (BfV), and the military counterintelligence agency (MAD). Furthermore, the German federal foreign intelligence agency (BND) established a new focus on this issue by restructuring the existing counterterrorism department.³²³

In December 2019, the state (*Länder*) Interior Ministers Conference agreed on, among other things, expanding protective measures for synagogues, increasing staff at the authorities responsible for handling right-wing extremism, improving risk-analysis software analogous to the case of Islamist terrorism,

and being more consistent in declaring bans on associations and events.³²⁴ Accordingly, the “Kampf der Nibelungen” (Battle of the Nibelungs) MMA event was banned in 2019 and 2020 due to being a “threat to public safety.”³²⁵

Finally, Germany also plans to ramp up its P/CVE effort, as its Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth earmarked 460 million euros with the priority of tackling right-wing extremism and anti-Semitism in the funding period 2020 to 2023.³²⁶

5.2.3. Counterintelligence/counter-crime approach

The counterintelligence or counter-crime approach is best demonstrated by the French strategy. France still perceives the threat of Islamist terrorism as more salient than that of the violent XRW. Nonetheless, it utilises the same forums to address both threats, namely the work of the National Coordination of Intelligence and the Fight Against Terrorism (*Coordination nationale du renseignement et de la lutte contre le terrorisme*, CNRLT), founded in 2017. CNRLT coordinates the French security multiagency approach to all terrorist threats and directly reports to the President of the Republic. Since 2019, violent XRW groups also

receive more scrutiny at the political level in France, for example, from relevant parliamentary bodies.³²⁷

This approach has also been adopted by the US, which saw the FBI elevate the threat posed by far-right extremism and “racially motivated violent extremism,” in particular, in 2020, placing it at the same threat level as foreign terrorist organisations such as ISIL. Already in spring 2019, the FBI created the Domestic Terrorism-Hate Crimes Fusion Cell to increase information-sharing between FBI agents working in the Counterterrorism Division and the Criminal Investigative Division.³²⁸

The primacy of counterintelligence services in CVE and CT work related to the violent XRW is also present in Sweden where the Swedish Security Service (SSS), the police and other security agencies collaborate at the Counter-Terrorism Cooperation Council.³²⁹ In 2018, the Swedish National Audit Office, however, criticized inconsistent intelligence-sharing between the SSS and the Swedish Police Authority, prompting those agencies to launch a new collaborative effort, Redex, to “reduce” violent-promoting extremist scenes.³³⁰

6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A new leaderless transnational, apocalyptic, and violent XRW movement has emerged and continued to evolve between 2015 and 2020. National violent XRW scenes are transnationally linked through apocalyptic narratives such as the “great replacement” theory, “white genocide,” and “Day X.” Transnationally oriented violent XRW propagandists argue that the “white race” can only be saved if all violent XRW work and fight together. These narratives originate in different parts of the Western world but often obtain international significance, contributing to the transformation of the movement.

Whilst the national violent XRW milieus in the six countries at the centre of this report continue to exist and be active, the development of this transnational violent XRW movement is also facilitated by the emulation and integration of common inspirations by the violent XRW movement globally. These mostly emanate from four major sources: the Anglo-Saxon world, mostly represented by the U.S. and to a lesser extent by the UK, influences from Germany, the Nordic countries, and increasingly, influences from Eastern Europe, mostly via the rivalry between violent XRW entities from Russia and Ukraine. These inspirations are ideological, related to communications or imagery, but also have a more practical function with different violent XRW groups choosing contacts, friends, peers from particular countries with a view to strengthening ties with a given entity and increasing its prestige in the violent XRW world as a result.

This transformation, however, does not result in the transnational violent XRW movement morphing into a hierarchical and unified structure. The various actors within the movement embrace the “divided we stand” approach. Diversified forms of (dis)organisation are tolerated and even encouraged. The movement consists of networked individuals,

groups, organisations, networks, political parties, etc. with each national contingent dominated by different types of violent XRW actors. Moreover, certain violent XRW actors, regardless of their organisational form, are often internationally revered by their peers in the violent XRW movement who nonetheless might themselves not copy their (dis)organisational structures.

The movement largely sees the COVID-19 pandemic as a chance to spread its ideology more widely and recruit more individuals, especially online. However, the pandemic also constrains its offline activities and as a result, it is still too early to judge its medium- to long-term impact on the violent XRW movement with a degree of certainty.

The development of the transnational movement is further strengthened by common travel patterns of violent XRW individuals who converge on the same political events (such as marches and rallies), music festivals and sporting events (especially MMA fights or tournaments) internationally. Such convergence allows for strengthening or the development of ties between different violent XRW individuals, groups, organisations, and networks. These events enable these violent XRW actors to attempt to lure new recruits from amongst non-XRW individuals into their ranks who might have visited them because of their interest in music or violent sport, and who do not (yet) adhere to the violent XRW ideology.

The transnational violent XRW movement is organised for violence. In its view, the nature of its violence is always justified as “defensive,” i.e., reactive to ideologically defined and perceived threats, allegedly emanating from a wide variety of the movement’s enemies. Furthermore, events enable multiple fundraising opportunities for the transnational violent XRW movement, from receiving donations to sell-

ing different sorts of merchandise. The financial operations of the transnational violent XRW movement remain under-researched, and too often the movement continues to be erroneously viewed as a self-financing entity in poor financial shape.

Different entities that comprise the transnational violent XRW movement perpetrate this violence. However, attacks are often also perpetrated by lone actors. These are in fact quite often well-networked violent XRW individuals, who are responsible for the most spectacular attacks. The more organised entities also attempt to stage terrorist attacks, but these have largely failed or been foiled by the security services of different countries. At the same time, various XRW groups, organisations, and networks perpetrate continuously other, non-terrorist forms of violence. The movement's terrorist attacks are organised locally, but the perpetrators are often inspired, and leave physical evidence of this, by ideologues or other attackers from other countries or even continents. This copycat phenomenon is a growing concern. The violent XRW movement is largely male-dominated, but women have also been involved in attack plots and in certain countries are said to constitute between 10% and 15% of a given national scene.

The violent XRW movement possesses a multifaceted online presence. Its vibrancy is often mistakenly regarded as a sign that the offline element of the movement is equally robust. In reality, however, the offline structures sometimes lag the connections, discussions, and networking happening online. The large-scale online presence does not necessarily support the operational domain of the movement as far as its terrorism violence is concerned. It encourages and inspires, but the transnational violent XRW movement is not (yet) able to organise an ISIL-style conveyor belt linking the online operations, such as an amplified social media presence, and attractive and straightforward packaging of the ideological and operational content to offline actions that may be directly controlling, not just inspiring, certain real-life attack plots via modern technologies.

The six countries at the centre of this study all define "terrorism" in their national legislations but often rely only on administrative practice or working definitions employed, for example, in intelligence collection, to tackle the threat posed by "extremism," including the XRW. The six countries deploy different countermeasures to stem the rise of the transnational violent XRW movement in general and its terrorism in particular. Three general approaches are adopted: the Scandinavian approach, centred on P/CVE measures, a multifaceted approach combining security-related measures, a preventative approach, and finally, an approach that centres on counter-intelligence/counter-crime measures. Some of the countries discussed in this study display elements of more than one approach in their strategies of countering the threat from the transnational violent XRW movement.

The research for this study demonstrated that officially available data concerning the various groups, groups, organisations, and networks of the transnational violent XRW movement is not yet publicly available in a comparable format in several of the countries at the centre of this study. This is also because of the significant variety of legal and administrative definitions of violent XRW activities employed by these six governments. Although the continuing lack of an agreed common definition will mean that statistical data from individual Member States remains difficult to compare, the lack of distinct data points even with the respective domestic contexts presents a challenge for the design of adequate prevention and countermeasures.

For almost 20 years now, the attention of many policymakers in the European Union and beyond has focused on Islamist extremism and terrorism. Legal and administrative provisions have been passed to tackle this specific threat, significant resources have been allocated, and new initiatives and interventions have been implemented. There are some similarities and lessons to be learned from the efforts to prevent and combat violent Islamist extremism.

Many of the individuals, groups, and organisations highlighted in this study are not yet designated as terrorism-related by Member States or the EU, reducing the toolbox of counterterrorism-related administrative and legislative instruments that can be brought to bear against the transnational violent XRW movement. However, some of the operational weaknesses displayed by the violent XRW movement, such as frequent international travel to functional travel hubs to attend, for example, marches, rallies, festivals, and MMA events (location and timing predictable), could be exploited by utilising existing administrative instruments from related areas.

The analysis of the response mechanism within the countries at the centre of this study demonstrated that monitoring and analysing violent XRW activities within these Member States continues to fall mainly within the responsibilities of the police as well as domestic intelligence structures. This emphasis on the domestic security capabilities may be due to the overall perception that violent XRW activities present primarily an internal domestic threat and a reduced awareness of the transnational character of the wider violent XRW movement. The central objective of all foreign intelligence structures is to gather information and intelligence concerning foreign threats to domestic security and stability. Therefore, these structures are ideally placed to develop a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the emerging threats emanating from the transnational violent XRW movement at the centre of this study.

Multilateral information exchange has proven to be an effective tool to quickly increase capacity concerning emerging terrorism threats. However, currently, the various multilateral structures set up for this purpose are primarily geared towards countering the threat emanating from extremist Islamist terrorism. In addition to government stakeholders in all countries at the centre of this report, civil society stakeholders, such as research institutes, think tanks, and advocacy organisations, have developed significant expertise and research capacities focus-

ing on violent XRW activities, including operational level monitoring of violent XRW activities. This represents an often-untapped resource and its more effective utilisation could be used as a boosting mechanism to quickly increase existing government capacities to tackle the issue of the transnational violent XRW movement.

The study demonstrated the lack of available raw data concerning the financial activities of violent XRW actors. In cases where such raw data was available (mostly provided by civil society stakeholders), an analytical gap exists between this data and a structural understanding of the overall financial structure overlaying these activities. Since many of the actors within the transnational violent XRW movement have not been designated as terrorism-related, countering their financial activities requires the utilisation of a broader range of instruments, including administrative measures on a local level, than the “classic” combatting the financing of terrorism (CFT) structure usually employs. Apart from regulatory and legal risks, an increasing concern of the financial industry are reputational issues. In some cases, reputational issues have caused the first disruptions. For example, a payment service provider refused services to several online stores linked to violent XRW actors due to reputational concerns.³³¹

As outlined in this study, the misuse of online tools and services is prevalent, and such tools are integral to the movement’s operations and significantly facilitate its transnational character. The study also highlighted that violent XRW actors continue to face no or only weak defensive mechanisms from internet service providers, social media, content-hosting and gaming-platforms, as well as messenger services, against the misuse of these services. However, an EU-wide regulatory framework is emerging that can be brought to bear to hinder the online activities of the transnational violent XRW movement, including its financial activities.

Studies indicate that the “de-platforming” of XRW online actors significantly reduces their ability to

spread propaganda and recruit followers. In this regard, Internet Referral Units (IRUs) within the Member States and Europol play a significant role, highlighting extremist and terrorist content to social media, content-hosting and gaming-platforms, as well as messenger services and providing ground for the removal of such content and in extreme cases, “de-platforming” of extremist and terrorist individuals and entities.

The analysis of the online activities of the transnational violent XRW movement emphasised that important online operations of the movement are conducted in closed and encrypted chat forms and content-hosting platforms. Therefore, electronic penetration of these operations remains a challenge and in some cases is technically impossible. The research for this study demonstrated that a multitude of civil society stakeholders that have developed significant expertise in this regard exist in the six countries at the centre of this study.

ABBREVIATIONS

AFO	Action des Forces Opérationnelles (Operational Forces Action)	MAD	Military Counterintelligence Service
APF	Alliance for Peace and Freedom	NA	National Action
AWD	Atomwaffen Division	NetzDG	Network Enforcement Act
BfV	Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Germany	NGO	non-governmental organisation
BKA	Federal Criminal Police Office, Germany	NPD	Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (National Democratic Party of Germany)
BND	Federal Intelligence Service, Germany	NRM	Nordic Resistance Movement
CEE	Central-Eastern Europe	NWI	North West Infidels
CEP	Counter Extremism Project	NWO	New World Order
CFT	combatting/countering the financing of terrorism	OSS	Old School Society
CNRLT	National Coordination of Intelligence and the Fight Against Terrorism (Coordination nationale du renseignement et de la lutte contre le terrorisme), France	P/CVE	preventing and countering violent extremism
C-Rex	Center for Research on Extremism	PNF	Parti Nationaliste Français (French Nationalist Party)
CSO	civil society organisation	PMC	private military contractor
DHS	Department of Homeland Security, USA	PPDM	Program of Father Frost
DGSI	General Direction of Internal Security (Direction générale de la sécurité intérieure), France	RAM	Rise Above Movement
DSA	Digital Services Act	RAN	Radicalisation Awareness Network
ETN	Europa Terra Nostra	RID	Russkoe Imperskoe Dvizhenie (Russian Imperial Movement)
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation, USA	SKD	Sonnenkrieg Division
GETZ	Centre for Countering Extremism and Terrorism, Germany	SOO	Soldiers of Odin
IRU	Internet Referral Unit	SCPVE	Swedish Council for Preventing Violent Extremism
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant	TCO	Terrorism Content Online Regulation
JA	Junge Alternative für Deutschland (Young Alternative for Germany)	TV	Troisième Voie (Third Way)
JN	Junge Nationalisten (Young Nationalists)	TWP	Traditionalist Workers Party
JNR	Jeunesses nationalistes révolutionnaires (Young Revolutionary Nationalists)	UC	Unité Continentale (Continental Unity)
		XRW	Extreme Right Wing
		ZOG	Zionist Occupation Government

ENDNOTES

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ANNEXES

FINLAND

Tommi Kotonen, PhD

Legal situation

The Finnish Ministry of the Interior uses the term “violent extremism” when referring to anti-democratic, extra-parliamentary and potentially violent groups, which also includes right-wing extremism. Here, the Finnish differentiate between extremism and radicalism.¹ The focus is on the use of violence or threat of violence, and the authorities point out that extremism, unlike radicalism, is anti-democratic by definition. The Finnish Security Intelligence Service (Supo) differentiates more explicitly between domestic extremism and terrorism, of which the latter refers typically to an external threat in the form of radical Islamism.² Supo focuses on cases that threaten the national security and has explicitly stated domestic extremist groups do not comprise such a threat in their current form.³ Recently, XRW terrorism was included in their terrorism threat assessment with reference to international trends.⁴

Section 24 of the Finnish penal code defines terrorism as an act “that is conducive to causing serious harm to a State or an international organisation.”⁵ The definition requires the act to reach a certain level of seriousness, and this is one of the reasons the terrorism clause has been rarely used. The Islamist terrorist attack in Turku in 2017 in which a Moroccan asylum-seeker stabbed 10 people, killing two of them, is the only case in Finland in which the perpetrator has been convicted based on terrorism laws.⁶ According to the Finnish security police, the

burden of proof for terrorism cases is too high,⁷ e.g., membership of a terrorist organisation is not an offence itself in Finland. A task force at the Ministry of Justice has recently proposed new legislation that would make possible a charge of incitement for joining a terrorist group.⁸

Legislative tools tackling XRW extend, however, beyond terrorism clauses. The Finnish Associations Act regulates the conduct of both registered and unregistered associations. As the registration gives the organisation a legal status, often even XRW groups seek the status of a registered association. Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM), which has been the most militant XRW organisation in Finland for the past 10 years, was banned in 2017 in Finland based on the Associations Act for acting substantially against “good practice.”⁹ NRM managed to take the case all the way to the Supreme Court, which, however, confirmed the ban in September 2020, making it permanent.

According to the Penal Code (6 §5), a racist or hate motivation in committing other offences may also be considered an aggravating circumstance when imposing a penalty. This clause was used, e.g., when sentencing perpetrators for the attacks against refugee reception centres in 2015, and in the broadly publicised case when an NRM member was convicted of a brutal assault in Helsinki in 2016.¹⁰ The Prosecutor General has also charged NRM for the use of Nazi flags at the Independence Day demonstration in 2018 as an incitement.¹¹

History and key players of the XRW scene

Although typically considered a peaceful country with no XRW terrorism, Finland has seen certain waves of XRW violence throughout its history. The latest wave came in 2015 in the wake of the refugee crisis and spontaneous anti-refugee mobilisation, when a series of arson attacks and other violence targeted especially refugee reception centres.¹² The attacks were at least partly inspired by the similar waves in Germany and Sweden. From autumn 2015 onwards, several vigilante-type groups were organised, claiming to counter the threat caused by the refugees.¹³ Out of these groups, only the Soldiers of Odin (SOO), which collaborates with the NRM, has survived until today, and it used to have a broad international network as well. At the peak of its popularity in 2016, SOO had around 600 members in Finland. That has dropped to about one-third, with its demise caused by several factors, including internal fighting and splintering, and the gradual end of the refugee crisis also led some members to leave the group.¹⁴

The Finnish chapter of the NRM was founded in 2008 and has since been involved in several acts of violence, especially targeting their political opponents. The group openly despised the constitutional system of Finland and sought to form a Nordic national-socialist state.¹⁵ The Finnish chapter was relatively independent of the other Nordic organisations, although they too had representative at the joint Nordic leadership group. In their relations, e.g., with Russia, the Finns were more critical than the Swedish chapter, largely for historical reasons, and the Finnish chapter has not appeared as violent as the Swedish one,¹⁶ e.g., there has not been a deadly attack, unlike in Sweden.¹⁷ In some cases, homemade guns and knives were confiscated from the activists.¹⁸ Finnish NRM members, which number about 100, differ somewhat from typical skinheads and are more middle class, although many have a subculture background.¹⁹

NRM was banned in Finland in 2017 and a court order in 2019 required the group to cease its activity.²⁰ The activists have, however, continued to operate under a new label, Towards Freedom! (Kohti Vapautta!), and new groups have been established for NS youth and women. The ban did not apply to their charity organisation, Finn Aid (Suomalaisapu), which was inspired by the Italian CasaPound and Greek party Golden Dawn. The police have investigated whether Towards Freedom! is breaching the law by continuing the activities of the NRM, and currently the prosecutor is considering charges.²¹ Some of the former NRM activists have also appeared at so-called accelerationist groups, such as The Base and Feuerkrieg Division.²²

Of the other notable groups, Ukonvasama acts as a link between subculture activism and political endeavours. Founded by a former NRM activist in 2015, the group supports leaderless resistance. Rather eclectic by nature, it has propagated, e.g., for National Action and has contacted a North American XRW ideologue promoting accelerationist terrorism. Ukonvasama is not an entity with a membership list but more an outfit that focuses on organising events and sharing propaganda through a handful of activists.²³

Trends

XRW political violence peaked in Finland in 2015 in the wake of the refugee crisis. The most alarming form of political violence was arson attacks against refugee reception centres. The perpetrators acted either alone or in small groups, with several of them intoxicated by alcohol. According to hate crime statistics, and based on cases reported to the police, more than 40 attacks were conducted in Finland in 2015 and 2016,²⁴ although less than half were later solved by the police. Out of the solved cases, more than 20 perpetrators are known. Their profiles show that none had direct links to organised XRW groups, although some of them claimed open allegiance to XRW ideology or admitted a racist motive.

Many of them were, however, consumers of XRW social media and shared similar content, such as Facebook posts by anti-refugee group Close the Borders. Most of the attacks were not judged to be serious, none of them were investigated as terrorism, and many of them failed entirely due to the intoxication of the perpetrator or other circumstances. In three cases in which a racist and political motive was present, however, the courts ruled that the danger was very significant and gave relatively heavy sentences on attempts of aggravated criminal mischief. The attacks ceased almost entirely by 2016 when the number of arriving refugees also dropped. The last attack that can be counted as part of the wave happened in February 2016.²⁵

SOO, which was formed at the later stage of the anti-refugee mobilisation cycle, represented potentially violent, anti-Muslim sentiment, although in practice the group appeared relatively peaceful and most of the cases of physical violence appeared in internal conflicts, as SOO members fought each other at their own clubs.²⁶ There are, however, a few cases in which SOO members attacked migrants,²⁷ and in one failed attack, it included a Molotov cocktail thrown at a tent with asylum-seekers. In the latter case, explosives were also found in the apartment of the perpetrator.²⁸

NRM turned to violence especially after 2012 when it started more visible street activism, attacking typically their political opponents at demonstrations or at other events.²⁹ The most notable of these include the stabbing case at the library in Jyväskylä in 2013, a group assault at the shopping centre in Jyväskylä in 2015, and an aggravated assault in Helsinki in 2016.³⁰ Although typically the attacks were reactive in nature following some sort of provocation, they formed a continuous pattern and reflect the flexible understanding of self-defence by the NRM—members are urged to take the initiative when even a minor threat is noticed.³¹ In several cases, some of the activists were armed with knives at demonstrations.³² Since the ban on the NRM in 2017 and founding of the new organisation, Towards Freedom!, NRM activists

have not resorted to physical violence beyond minor clashes at demonstrations.

It is noteworthy that since 2015 the XRW in general has engaged in violence only on rare occasions. This has not changed even since the Islamist terrorist attack in Turku in 2017. The hate crime statistics show only a short outbreak in 2017, and most of the cases were not related to physical violence but verbal abuse and incitement, which in most cases happened online.³³ Lone-actor type terrorism has also been absent, although in 2018 police arrested a Latvian neo-Nazi who was charged with plotting to attack Muslim targets in Helsinki with a home-made bomb. He was later acquitted of the charges as he had no detailed plan or means to conduct the attack.³⁴

According to reports on violent extremism by the Ministry of the Interior, the most typical form of XRW violence continues to be spontaneous street violence in which the perpetrator is typically connected to the skinhead subculture.³⁵ There are, however, no publicly available statistics regarding trends or figures of this type of violence, although it may be estimated that the level of this type of violence is substantially lower than in the 1990s, reflecting a general trend in West-European right-wing political violence.³⁶

Finances

Funding of the Finnish XRW scene is typically based on legal sources, of which most important are the membership fees and sales of merchandise such as hoodies, stickers, and books. NRM activists paid either a fixed monthly fee, or, if they had a job, a share of their incomes. NRM has also had a category of supporting members without the duties of a full member. These paid, depending on the supporter level they chose, 50-150 euros annually.³⁷ Besides concerts and other events, the merchandise is sold through online stores, in a few brick-and-mortar shops that support the cause, and previously also at the web shop of the NRM. Leaked web shop or-

ders from 2015–2016 show that within six months 275 individual orders were made, typically around 30 euros.³⁸ The NRM in Finland has had lots of difficulties with its web shop, as it has been hacked, and banks have cancelled their payment services.³⁹ Payments happened either via bank transfer or by using Bitcoin.⁴⁰ NRM has also urged its supporters to use Bitcoin ATMs for anonymous donations.⁴¹ Finn Aid, an NRM charity organisation, bases its operation also on donations by the public.

According to one estimate, the annual budget of the Finnish NRM chapter was a few thousand euros per year,⁴² although their former leader has stated the web store alone produced around 8000 euros of annual profit.⁴³ The funds were used, e.g., to cover the costs of the speaking trips abroad. Funds were channelled through a registered association, Northern Heritage (*Pohjoinen Perinne*), which was also banned in 2017.⁴⁴ NRM also published in print and online the newspaper *Magneettimedia*, which was, at least for one issue, financially supported by retail chain owner Juha Kärkkäinen.⁴⁵ Kärkkäinen allegedly also hired the Finnish NRM leader as a writer for *Magneettimedia*, which he owned before handing the publishing rights to NRM.⁴⁶ After NRM was banned in Finland in 2017, their web shop was closed and assets frozen. Therefore, the successor organisations did not have many funds at their disposal, which also shows in their activism. Possibly also, international contacts have been almost non-existent due to the lack of funds after the ban.

When a member of the NRM was arrested and charged with aggravated assault in 2016, a support event was organised⁴⁷ and some supporters claimed that fines caused by activism are paid collectively.⁴⁸ To help imprisoned comrades, the NRM web shop also sold a support shirt.⁴⁹ According to prison authorities there are tens of radicalised inmates leaning towards XRW ideology;⁵⁰ the number of NRM members among them is, however, unknown. Indirect means of support is created also via subculture activism, with several of the NRM members also members of RAC (Rock against Communism,

a skinhead music movement) or NSBM (National Socialist Black Metal) bands. In some cases, proceeds from album sales are directed to the jailed members of the movement.⁵¹ Finnish bands, some of which are closely connected with the NRM, have also taken part in joint international recording projects supporting, e.g., Golden Dawn.⁵²

Ukonvasama has collected funds for its activism also by selling records, books, shirts and hoodies, and zines.⁵³ The clothing store Ferus Finum, closely associated with the NRM, was founded in 2013 and sold well-known international far-right clothing brands at events organized by the group.⁵⁴ The shop marketed itself also to international customers.⁵⁵ Although not formally a movement member, one of the owners of Ferus Finum was also involved in violent activities of the NRM.⁵⁶ The store was closed in 2016.⁵⁷ The NRM web store also sold products by international labels such as Ansgar Aryan.

Of the most notable Finnish XRW groups with transnational connections, SOO has found itself in the best financial shape. SOO collected relatively large funds from membership fees and the sale of support merchandise, demanding, e.g., several thousand euros from some national chapters.⁵⁸ Their collaboration with the NRM and its successor organisation, Towards Freedom!, has potentially also benefitted the latter ones. With the funds, SOO rented several clubhouses, and, as was claimed by the international chapters, renovated its headquarters in Kemi. SOO also claimed funds were needed for large, international gatherings, which never happened though.⁵⁹ Funds have also made possible visits abroad to meet foreign chapters. Finnish members of their international leadership board have visited, e.g., Malta, Sweden, and Estonia.⁶⁰ Besides two Finns, one of the international board members is a Maltese activist. In the end, however, the funds from the membership fees were to some extent counter-productive, as the organization did not know what to do with all the money, and several international chapters refused to pay the membership fees and chose instead to abandon the SOO franchise.⁶¹

Online activities

Since 2015, the Finnish extreme-right scene has become more of a social media phenomenon. The NRM already had its roots in online communities, especially discussion groups and forums, and was started by members who only partly had previously acted together offline. However, especially with the SOO, online recruitment and mobilisation showed its full force. Although initially some chapters were built around previously known offline contacts, most of the local leaders were known by the national leaders only via Facebook. As an international network, SOO was created solely within the virtual community,⁶² although the contacts were maintained on a few occasions by face-to-face meetings.

In 2019, SOO Facebook pages were taken down, which has harmed its visibility.⁶³ After being banned from Facebook, SOO propaganda has been shared mostly via its public Vkontakte and Telegram channels, which may reach members and supporters, but not so much potential new members. The group's public Telegram channel and chat were launched in December 2019, although the platform had been used already since 2016 for internal communication and for planning activities and was initially selected as the communication channel due to leaks in Messenger.⁶⁴

As acknowledged also by its members, the offline presence, especially patrolling, is often done only for show,⁶⁵ for sharing reports through social media, and possibly also for provoking their opponents and getting the attention of mainstream media. The recruiting via social media may have caused a low level of commitment, and in some cities there were no original members left after a year or two. The lack of visibility harms its offline activism and recruiting, and therefore SOO occasionally laments the scarcity of mainstream media reports, although media also boosted their growth, especially in 2015 and 2016.⁶⁶

Migration to new platforms like Vkontakte has ostensibly radicalised the SOO members, although

the process started well before Facebook banned them.⁶⁷ The radicalisation is partly because many moderate people have left the group and their current networks tend to include NRM members. The departures might have been fuelled by the concern that SOO, just like NRM, will be banned by the authorities. Discussion at Vkontakte is also more openly racist, as the platform does not moderate racist content as effectively as Facebook.⁶⁸

The NRM and its members have been less visibly active within social media, as they try to control their public image, although the NRM in Finland has seen a lot of marketing potential in it.⁶⁹ For security reasons, the most important discussions, concerning, e.g., planning of activities, were held face-to-face. Their Facebook page was opened in December 2013, and movement members or supporters have been active also on bulletin boards, Telegram, Discord, Twitter, and YouTube.⁷⁰ In 2016, a Finnish NRM community page was created on the Steam gaming platform, asking people to get their like-minded friends to join the community.⁷¹ Steam community is known for hosting several extremist groups.⁷² Between 2015 and 2017, NRM had its own subsection at the MV-lehti discussion forum, which the group also administered. Unlike SOO, for NRM the bans and censoring has not had that much effect because a lot of the recruiting happens via face-to-face interaction, and often the contact is created within subculture events, such as white-power music events.⁷³ These events bring together activists while international events such as the annual Asgardsrei festival in Kyiv are organised alongside political events; one of the regular performers at the festival is Finnish NSBM band Goatmoon,⁷⁴ which has links also to the NRM.⁷⁵

Certain suspicion of online media is also notable among the older members of the movement. A particular example of this was the founding of a printed zine by the Ukonvasama collective in 2015, amidst the boom of social media. Besides other reasons, the founder has mentioned the alt-right are net-people and as such already suspicious, and that

the printed format prevents the message from being drowned out by the flood of online information. They also claim the printed format also prevents the leak of information more effectively.⁷⁶ Despite this, the collective also has an account on V Kontakte and a radio show broadcast on Spreker.⁷⁷

Response

The Finnish approach to violent extremism is coordinated by the Ministry of the Interior, which also draws up plans for Internal Security. It covers all forms of extremism independent of ideology or religion. The same approach also has been used by the Finnish Exit project. The comprehensive approach was outlined in 2012 in a National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism in Finland.⁷⁸ The action plan, which was updated last year, was drafted in collaboration with several relevant parties, including religious communities and researchers.

Already in 2004, when the first internal security programme was published, a broad definition of security was used that identified racism and extremist movements as a threat and tackling them as one subfield of internal security. The programme maintained that the rise of the far-right was a potential threat caused by, e.g., a lack of outlets for citizen participation and by immigration. An annual report on violent extremism focusing on trends and current threats has been published since 2012, and statistics on hate crimes have been compiled by the Police College and published annually since 2009.⁷⁹ Before that, more limited statistics on racist crimes were reported by the Ministry of the Interior and by the Police College. Both are based on an analysis of crimes reported to the police, but do not differentiate between perpetrator ideologies. Statistics on crimes perpetrated by the extreme right are not collected nationwide, and only the Helsinki Police Department publishes such statistics every now and then.

Besides the Exit programme, which was discontinued in 2018 due to a lack of funding for the NGO responsible for its development, government measures include preventive police units and so-called anchor teams, which work locally on the basis of multi-professional collaboration, including the police, and professionals in youth, health and social work. The aim of the anchor model is early intervention in juvenile delinquency. These measures have also been under external evaluation. The Finnish PVE plans have been influenced especially by the Aarhus model.⁸⁰

Transnational connectivity

SOO, founded in 2015, spread into nearly 30 countries in 2016 and was organized as a franchise: international chapters conducted their daily activities independently, although they were supposed to follow the general rules laid out by the Finns. Although most of the connections were maintained online, the Finnish members of SOO have made occasional visits to the international chapters and also organised few patrols in northern Sweden, especially in Haparanda.⁸¹ Estonians living in Helsinki have taken part in patrols there. Due to the schism, e.g., over membership fees, the international chapters were in most cases either closed or renamed by 2017.⁸² Currently, there are chapters only in Finland and Sweden.⁸³ There still exists, however, several former SOO chapters worldwide, which in most cases do not use the original name anymore.⁸⁴ For example, in Sweden, four local chapters broke away to form a group called Balders Cruisers, and in Canada, Saskatchewan chapters broke off from SOO to constitute the Patriots of Unity.⁸⁵

Some German chapters of SOO were renamed in 2018 as Wodans Erben and Vikings Security, apparently in agreement with the SOO HQ in Finland, to avoid unwanted attention from the authorities.⁸⁶ A few Finnish SOO members remained in their social media networks after the renaming, although these links seem to have disappeared by now. In 2020, it

was revealed that a group that included members from the former German SOO chapters had planned attacks, e.g. on a mosque, to precipitate a civil war in Germany.⁸⁷ These plans seemed, however, not to have a link to Finland.⁸⁸

In December 2019, the SOO organised a Finnish Independence Day demonstration in Helsinki, acting as cover for the NRM successor organisation Towards Freedom! after its demonstration was banned by the police. Among the invited speakers at the event were members of the German extreme right party Der III. Weg, their leader and founder Klaus Armstroff leading the delegation, and the leader of the NRM, Simon Lindberg from Sweden, who also addressed the crowds. After the demonstration, Lindberg and Armstroff had a private meeting.⁸⁹

The Finnish chapter of the NRM has maintained close contact, besides other chapters, also with several international XRW organisations, which in most cases involves inspiration and support for groups with a similar ideological orientation within networks built over several years. Support consists mostly of non-material elements, such as borrowing organisation models and drawing lessons from the experience of the other groups.⁹⁰ Finnish NRM members have taken part, e.g., in a May Day rally by the Freien Netz Süd, and the Tag der Deutschen Zukunft demonstration in Dresden, which both were meant to bring together several nationalist groups and were organised by the loose networks of autonomous nationalists.⁹¹ The representatives of JN and Der III. Weg have also taken part in events in Finland organised by the NRM, and Jugend für Pinneberg toured Finland in 2014, giving a lecture in Turku. Collaboration with the German groups has continued till today.

As recently as in March 2020, the NRM charity Finn Aid was invited to a congress organised by the JN,⁹² although the event was later cancelled due to the pandemic. NRM members also took part in a demonstration by Golden Dawn in 2015 in Greece, alongside Der III. Weg,⁹³ and has held support rallies for

the jailed members of Golden Dawn.⁹⁴ Golden Dawn has been seen as an exemplary movement and has inspired, e.g., the NRM's charity work, although Golden Dawn's cooperation with Russia divided NRM supporters.⁹⁵ For Finnish nationalists, contacts with the Russians have, for historical reasons, been a difficult issue, and historically most of the groups have seen Russia as their primary enemy.⁹⁶

In 2011, a joint seminar was organised in Helsinki with Freie Nationale Strukturen (Germany) and CasaPound. Links with CasaPound date to before the founding of the Finnish NRM chapter,⁹⁷ and for some Finnish XRW activists, CasaPound has provided a model. Unlike their Swedish comrades, who tend to stress more the ideological purity, Finnish NRM members have held links with groups such as CasaPound and Freie Nationale Strukturen, which draw inspiration also from left-wing radicalism.⁹⁸ Other transnational connections by the Finnish NRM include the Solidarity Front for Syria, supporting the Assad regime and with ties to Hezbollah.⁹⁹ It was founded in 2013 by several international activists and is led by Matteo Caponetti, who is half Finnish.¹⁰⁰ Finnish NRM activists belonged to the founders of the group,¹⁰¹ which partners closely with CasaPound, and the Finns have actively participated in other similar CasaPound-influenced actions with, e.g., NPD members, such as charity missions in Kosovo.¹⁰²

The Finnish NRM chapter held close contacts with the UK organisation National Action (NA), which was classified as a terrorist organisation in 2016; NRM members have seen NA as heroes and martyrs, and as pioneers in, e.g., fascist aesthetics and propaganda production.¹⁰³ The actual collaboration has consisted mostly of mutual manifestations of solidarity, but probably also sharing ideas regarding the post-ban activism. After the ban of the NA, the NRM organised a few support stunts in Finland by posing with NA logos and torches, with some SOO members also joining their ranks.¹⁰⁴ Propaganda for the NA has also been shared by the Ukonvasama collective.¹⁰⁵ In January-February 2015, the leader of the NA, Benjamin Raymond, spent several

weeks in Finland, meeting activists in several cities, speaking at the NRM HQ in Turku, and taking part in their activism in Lahti.¹⁰⁶ In 2018, a former member of the Finnish NRM chapter and a veteran of the war in Afghanistan was convicted in the UK of being a member of NA. He also tried to recruit members of the British army to join the NA.¹⁰⁷ NA has also showed its support for the jailed Finnish NRM members, e.g., writing in 2015 an appeal to the ambassador of Finland.¹⁰⁸

After the ban of the NRM, the new organisation Towards Freedom! has not had many public contacts with their comrades abroad, and their events and demos, other than the aforementioned Independence Day demonstration, have not brought foreign activists to Finland. However, a certain level of coordination may still exist, as exemplified by the simultaneous attacks—mostly vandalism—taking place in all countries where NRM was active, Finland included, against synagogues and other Jewish facilities in 2019 on the anniversary of Kristallnacht.¹⁰⁹ The Finnish NRM members also have taken part in a few demonstrations abroad since the ban, most recently at Gedenkmarsch in Dresden in 2020.¹¹⁰

Some Finnish members of the NRM have been active within so-called accelerationist terrorism online networks, including Feuerkrieg Division and The Base, with one of them suggesting mass shootings are less effective than “destroying buildings like Timonty MacVeight” [sic!].¹¹¹ There is no information whether the Finnish members of these groups have conducted activism beyond online chatter. Several NRM activists were previously also members of now-defunct online forums such as Iron March and Fascist Forge, which served as networking sites, among others, for accelerationist groups.¹¹² A Finnish NRM member from Tampere acted as the main moderator of the Iron March Forum (IM)¹¹³ and a Finnish translation of a book by IM founder Alexander Slavros, celebrating lone-wolf terrorists like Breivik and McVeigh, has been published by one NRM activist.¹¹⁴ Additionally, members of the Turku-based neo-Nazi collective Ukonvasama visited

author James Mason in the USA in 2019.¹¹⁵ Mason’s book *The Siege* is the key source of inspiration for accelerationist groups, and an English edition was sold via the NRM web shop in Finland.

Since 2018, several leading international white nationalists, such as Jared Taylor and Greg Johnson, have been invited to Finland for conferences organised under the label “Awakening.”¹¹⁶ The Awakening events are organised by a loose collective that has also taken part in events abroad, such as Etnofutur conferences in Estonia organised by the Youth league of the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia and an alt-right event with Jared Taylor in 2017 in Amsterdam.¹¹⁷ Several of them belong to Suomen Sisu, a nationalist organisation founded in 1998 and closely associated with the Finns Party. In 2019, a Ukrainian activist and speaker of the political branch of the Azov Movement¹¹⁸, the National Corps, Olena Semenyaka, was invited to Turku as a speaker at the Awakening conference.¹¹⁹

According to a Finnish military expert, at least three, perhaps even six Finns have taken part in combat in Ukraine in the ranks of the Azov Regiment, the military arm of the Azov Movement.¹²⁰ At the early stage of the conflict, NRM in Finland showed its support of Ukrainian far-right groups, interviewing, e.g., the leader of Pravyi Sektor (Right Sector).¹²¹ The national-socialist group Misanthropic Division, which has recruited volunteers for the Azov Regiment, has claimed to have a chapter in Finland.¹²² Notably also, a neo-Nazi from Latvia, who was accused of plotting to detonate a bomb at New Year celebrations in 2018 in Helsinki, had planned to join the troops in Ukraine via Misanthropic Division.¹²³

Statistical snapshot of the XRW threat in Finland¹²⁴

As the table below shows, the previous decade saw an overall decline in hate crimes reported to the Finnish police and related to ethnic and national background but a rise in such crimes related to

religion or belief and sexual orientation. As was argued above and in the main report, people of different ethnicity, religious, or sexual background constitute, in the eyes of the transnational violent XRW movement, some of its most pronounced enemies. Therefore, it can be assumed that it is likely that a significant number of the crimes in the table

below had actually been perpetrated by individuals belonging to or on the fringes of the discussed transnational violent XRW movement. At the same time, it is notable that the years 2015-17, i.e., during and in the aftermath of the so-called “migrant crisis,” saw a spike in such incidents, which abated in 2018.

Number of suspected hate crimes in 2011-2018

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Ethnic or national background	788	641	710	678	991	831	813	634
Religion or belief	61	45	73	68	133	149	235	155
Sexual orientation, gender identity or gender expression	45	30	39	47	61	57	60	73
Disability	24	16	11	29	65	42	57	48
Total	918	732	833	822	1250	1079	1165	910

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FRANCE

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Legal situation

The French penal code contains a broad definition of terrorism, whether it be an individual or collective attempt at “severely disturbing public order by threat or terror.”¹ One specific provision is aimed at dealing with “fighting groups” (*groupes de combat*), i.e., those that “have access to weapons, have a hierarchical structure and may disrupt public order.”² In practice, any of those, regardless of their ideology, can be banned based on art. L.212-1 of the Internal Security Code, which is an update of a 1936 law aimed at dismantling the fascist-leaning *ligues* (Leagues).³ Between 2015 and 2020, 19 groups have been banned, eight of which belong to the extreme right.⁴ A further five notable groups were banned in July 2013, among them *Troisième voie* (Third way), *Jeunesses nationalistes révolutionnaires* (JNR, National-Revolutionary Youth), *Œuvre française* (The French Work), and *Jeunesses nationalistes* (Nationalist Youth). The ban had a strong impact on the re-organisation of the XRW scene, which according to the 2019 report of the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry on Extreme-Right groups, is estimated at around 3,000 activists.⁵

There is no legally binding definition of right-wing extremism in France: far-right (*extrême-droite*) and radical-right (*droite radicale*) are often used as synonyms, even in academic literature. Most groups refer to themselves as “national right” (*droite nationale*). Since 2015, a new, non-legal category has emerged: the ultra-right (*ultra-droite*). It became public when the head of the General Directorate for Internal Security (DGSI; *Direction générale de la sécurité intérieure*) predicted the “ultra-right” would engage in “clashes between communities,” using Islamist terror attacks as an excuse.⁶

French legislation forbids wearing and displaying symbols of national-socialism.⁷ A 1990 law forbids any kind of discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, nationality, race or religion, as well as Holocaust-denial.⁸ Since 2003, crimes and offenses committed with the aggravating circumstance of racism, anti-Semitism, or prejudice on the grounds of sexual orientation can lead to harsher sentences.⁹

History and key players of the XRW scene

Starting in 2011 with the election of Marine Le Pen as the chair of *Front national* (National Front), renamed *Rassemblement national* (National Rally, RN) in 2018, the far-right party embarked on a new course, seeking to distance itself from overtly extremist groups, banning dual membership with them and sometimes excluding militants with a record of racism, anti-Semitism, and/or violence.¹⁰ As a result, many disgruntled former members and newcomers to the XRW scene see RN as a renegade party and think that the parliamentary option will not bring any real break with the “system.” Many have switched allegiance to extra-parliamentary radical groups such as *Parti de la France* (Party of France) and *Dissidence française* (French Dissidence),¹¹ with *Synthèse nationale* (National Synthesis) acting as an umbrella organisation whose annual forum is a key transnational event. In 2019, the forum featured speakers from the Greek Golden Dawn, Flemish Vlaams Belang, and Italian Centro Studi Polaris.¹² Although such groups do not advocate for terrorism, individuals associated with them have drifted to violence and are part of a broader scene that is prone to violence against political opponents and minorities. A relatively new player on the violent (but not terrorist) XRW

scene is *Les Zouaves*, a loose group of young people who formerly belonged to *Bastion Social* or the Neo-Fascist *Groupe Union Défense*. They engage in street violence against political opponents from the Antifa movement and also took part in the Yellow Vests protests.¹³

In 2013, following the murder of anti-fascist activist Clément Méric by members of *Troisième Voie* (TV) and JNR, those organisations were outlawed, together with the neo-fascist *Œuvre française* and *Jeunesses nationalistes*.¹⁴ Those latter groups, however, re-formed quickly, putting the efficiency of the ban into question, the more so that several cases of violence aimed at political opponents in which TV and JNR members are suspected, remain unsolved.¹⁵ The most prominent case is that of “*les noyés de la Deûle*” (those drowned in the Deûle river)—five people found dead in a small river near Lille in 2010-2011, and at least one of whom, an anti-fascist militant, might have been killed by neo-Nazis close to JNR.¹⁶ In 2018, new bans were decided against Blood and Honour Hexagone¹⁷ and *Bastion Social*, a national-revolutionary group whose model is the Italian CasaPound and whose extreme members were suspected of planning armed attacks.¹⁸

If the skinhead neo-Nazi scene remains marginal, offspring of Bastion Social emerged after the ban and remain active. With regard to how *Œuvre française* and *Jeunesses nationalistes* survived the ban, one should note that a significant proportion of its members, including leader Yvan Benedetti, found a new home in *Parti Nationaliste Français* (PNF), founded in 1983, and the monthly publication *Militant*, founded in 1967. Both the PNF and the publication had become quite inactive, being left with an ageing leadership that included veterans from collaborationist parties from the Second World War and former soldiers of the Legion of French Volunteers Against Bolshevism (*Légion des Volontaires français contre le Bolchevisme*, LVF) or the French Waffen SS Division Charlemagne.¹⁹ The nearly-defunct PNF served as a legal home for those activists who wanted to keep up the fight,

so much so that former *Œuvre française* chairman Benedetti became the spokesman of PNF. Since then, he has been sentenced for continuing *Œuvre française* despite the 2013 ban and still claims to be its leader.²⁰ Benedetti, and other PNF members sustained the organisation by involving it in seemingly low-level violence such as street fighting and brawls. They have proven that banned movements can be revived by taking over a dwindling, but legal, like-minded group.

The main terrorist threat seems to come from small cells of “super-patriots,” that is, people often with a professional background in the police or the armed forces who believe that the state is complacent vis-a-vis “Islamism.” Consequently, even while in retirement they still feel bound by their pledge of duty and strive to replace the security forces so that France is not “Islamised” by mean of the so-called “great replacement,” i.e., the demographic replacement of indigenous French by French citizens of Muslim origin or by foreigners of the Muslim faith. The *Action des Forces Opérationnelles* (AFO) and *Barjols* groups discussed below belong to this category.

Trends

As explained in the 2018 Report of the National Consultative Commission for Human Rights (*Commission nationale consultative des droits de l'homme*, CNCDH), statistics from the Ministry of Interior about acts of racism and anti-Semitism are very difficult to use for research purposes or for an accurate picture of the situation in France as one cannot glean the motivation for violence from the raw numbers. Moreover, they only reflect incidents that were reported to the police by the victims. The figures show reported acts decreased by at least 50% between 2015 and 2017 and then increased by 19.7% in 2017-2018. There were 100 anti-Muslim incidents in 2018 while anti-Semitic incidents rose sharply from 311 in 2017 to 541 in 2018.²¹

What is certain, however, is that since 2015, three plots by XRW affiliates to kill political officials, including President Emmanuel Macron, were disrupted before any harm was caused, a significant increase compared to the previous period when the only such case was an attempt to kill President Jacques Chirac on 14 July 2002, i.e., more than a decade earlier.²² In June 2017 near Marseille, Logan Alexandre Nisin, aged 21, was arrested for having planned to kill then Interior Minister Christophe Castaner and radical left MP Jean-Luc Mélenchon. Nisin started a Facebook page in praise of Anders Behring Breivik, set up a self-styled *Organisation armée secrète* (OAS, Secret Army Organisation, a 1960s terrorist group fighting for “French Algeria”), which aimed at forcing Muslim re-migration to North Africa through a campaign of intimidation and terror in France.²³ Nisin is a former sympathiser of such XRW groups as *Jeunesses nationalistes*, *Action française*, and the Marseille-based *Mouvement populaire nouvelle aurore* (Popular Movement New Dawn, MPNA), whose name imitates that of the Greek Golden Dawn. Nisin was frustrated by those movements’ lack of ability or willingness to move forward to terrorist action, and decided to act on his own.²⁴

The AFO plot, in 2018, established many new trends:²⁵ it involved activists aged between 32 and 69, with several people well over 50, who had served in the police, army, or gendarmerie. They included an engineer, a lawyer, and a diplomat.²⁶ They met through a website,²⁷ an online forum that was the first step to real-life, survivalist-like meet-ups and training for a “civil war” against the alleged Islamisation of France. They plotted to poison halal meat in supermarkets and target Islamist radicals who had been released from jail, imams, and hijab-wearing women selected at random. AFO itself was a splinter from *Volontaires pour la France* (Volunteers for France), a legal patriotic group.²⁸

Finally, of the three major plots, the so-called *Barjols* plot (2018),²⁹ whose goal was to kill Macron with a ceramic knife that would not be intercepted by a metal detector, again was the work of older men

(those arrested were aged between 32 and 62) who had connections to the radical right³⁰ and were fascinated by the army.³¹ The rationale behind the three plots was that the state was allegedly neither willing nor able to effectively shield France from Islam and that self-proclaimed “patriots,” especially those with experience in the army or other security forces, have a duty to replace the “failing” security apparatus.³² So far, no transnational connections between the alleged “super patriots” and the XRW scenes abroad have been established.

Apart from these three major conspiracies, one more post-2015 seemingly XRW plot merits a mention here—an attempt at killing worshippers in a mosque in Bayonne on 28 October 2019 in which two people were seriously injured. It was not considered an act of terrorism, as the 84-year-old author Claude Sinké was found responsible for his actions but determined to be partially insane by psychiatrists who examined him after he was arrested.³³ This former candidate for RN in local elections said his act was motivated by revenge for what he believed was the setting on fire of Notre Dame cathedral by “Muslims.”³⁴

Finances

XRW fringe political parties do not receive public funding because their showing in the polls are too poor. Their budget is small: *Civitas*, a legal non-violent XRW party, had in 2017 an overall budget of 75,848 euros. Another one, *Parti de la France*, had a budget of 130,854 euros.³⁵ Although we do not have official data, other violent XRW parties and groups certainly have a smaller budget. Those groups, which are not registered political parties, theoretically have an obligation to keep a balance sheet of their finances if they are an “association” registered under the law,³⁶ but many such groups are not registered. The 2017 ban on *Bastion Social* and its six local branches has put an end to the movement’s tactic—imitating CasaPound—of opening meeting places where militants could gather,

train in martial arts, hold conferences, and thus raise some money.³⁷

Clothing sales is a small business for the XRW in France compared to other countries, but there are a few brands and online retail shops run by people in the skinhead neo-Nazi scene, such as Pride France.³⁸ Other means of raising money is through concerts, which tend to take place in Alsace, Lorraine, and areas adjacent to Switzerland, in order to attract as wide an international following as possible. The Charlemagne Hammerskins, a branch of the U.S.-based Hammerskin Nation, a white supremacist group founded in 1988, opened their own place, *La Taverne de Thor* (Meuse département)³⁹ and regularly holds concerts at private places in small rural villages in eastern France aimed at a French and predominantly German audience, with participants from the Benelux countries as well.⁴⁰

Even after the ban, Blood and Honour also continues to stage concerts catering to National-Socialist Black Metal (NSBM) fans. These concerts mostly take place in the vicinity of Lyon.⁴¹ For example, the Call of Terror concert, which last took place in February 2020 in Châtillon-la-Palud near Lyon, attracted around 300 people. It is an example of how the XRW scene can raise money through concerts. The concerts always feature foreign bands from different parts of Europe and mixed martial arts (MMA) fights, which, though legally banned in France, are a growing source of income for the XRW scene.

Online activities

The main use of the internet and social media by the XRW is for propaganda purposes. *Génération identitaire* (Generation Identity, GI), as well as its German and Austrian sister-movements, have proven to be very skilled in producing videos that attract a youthful audience to their anti-immigration rhetoric.⁴² GI does not advocate terrorism, but their activists have been sued for various offenses, such as usurpation

of police powers⁴³ and illegally trespassing onto the Marseille premises of the NGO *SOS-Méditerranée*, which seeks to rescue migrants.⁴⁴ As such, the GI attempted to pose as a self-proclaimed alternative to border patrols and intimidated a humanitarian NGO but still advocates a by-the-book approach to political activism and deliberately steers clear of outright political violence.

Online activity is also the main propaganda medium for a few individuals like Alain Soral, leader of the *Egalité et Réconciliation*⁴⁵ (Equality and Reconciliation) movement, now living in Switzerland; Daniel Conversano, leader of the movement *Les Braves* (The Brave), living in Romania; Hervé Ryssen, a self-publisher of antisemitic books who has a past with *Œuvre française* and lives in the Paris area;⁴⁶ Boris Le Lay, an anti-Semitic blogger living in Japan; and Florian Rouanet (living near Limoges), a Catholic integralist who contends that the doctrine of national-socialism is compatible with the teachings of the Catholic Church.⁴⁷ All of them are spreading white supremacist ideas and anti-Semitic conspiracy theories. Some of them have moved outside France to avoid French anti-racist legislation, and because YouTube, Twitter, and other companies are closing XRW-associated accounts, prompting them and other very radical militants to migrate either to the Russian *Vkontakte* or to the American *Parler*, network.⁴⁸

XRW online activity also consists of making content available to the general public that may incite hatred or violent action, sometimes including semi-classified documents from the armed forces related to urban warfare, as was the case with the *AFO* network.⁴⁹ Such offensive material is also sold online by online-only publishing houses, which opt for the niche market of survivalists and white supremacists keen to prepare for a civil war against immigrants/Muslims. An example is *Diffusion du Lore*, which in 2016 published *Reconquête*, whose content is similar to that of the *Turner Diaries*.⁵⁰ Moreover, the French XRW also utilises the online sphere to communicate—the *Barjols* plotters, whose motto

was “action is the solution,” chatted through an encrypted forum, as AFO members sometimes did.⁵¹

Consequently, in both cases this online chatter led to in-person meetings, and for some *Barjols* plotters, participation in Yellow Vests demonstrations and joint training.⁵² At the present time, the most radical forum is that of *Europe Ecologie les Bruns*, which enables those registered to get access to a “Racial guide of French cities” (which are evaluated as to “how white” each of them is) or download Nazi books such as *Mein Kampf*, or get tips about how to go undetected online.⁵³ From available testimony, it becomes clear that entry to various sub-forums is filtered: no one is admitted as a member unless he/she has been vetted at an in-person meeting. As a result, the forum can effectively turn the virtual into the real. The fact that it is difficult to access and is not run by an established group may give the impression that if members become terrorists, then they would appear to be lone actors.

Response

XRW extremism is acknowledged to be a major political issue, insofar as it undermines social cohesion and raise the prospect of ethnic strife becoming a serious concern.⁵⁴

Although XRW groups have been under scrutiny from a 2019 parliamentary investigation commission,⁵⁵ counter-terrorism services see the various forms of threats from the XRW, including “super patriots,” as a lesser threat than radical Islam, as is shown by the testimonies of the heads of the various intelligence agencies before the 2016 Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry on Responses to the Terrorist threat after 7 January 2015.⁵⁶ However, XRW groups are constantly monitored by a number of agencies whose fields of competence complement each other. The Central Service for Territorial Intelligence (*Service central du renseignement territorial*, SCRT) and the Direction of Intelligence at the Préfecture de Police de Paris (*Direction du*

renseignement de la préfecture de police, DRPP) and the Department of Operational Foresight (*Sous-Direction de l'Anticipation Opérationnelle*, SDAO) at the Gendarmerie nationale are in charge of preventing violent actions that the XRW may stage during demonstrations or other militant activities.

The DGSI is in charge of preventing actions that may harm the institutions and the security of the state. The infiltration of neo-Nazi and other extremists into the armed forces is dealt with by the Department for Intelligence and Security in the Defence (*Direction du renseignement et de la sécurité de la Défense*, DRSD). In July 2020, the left-wing online daily *Mediapart* published an inquiry regarding 10 neo-Nazis who were either in active service or in the reserve.⁵⁷ Official figures on this topic are not made public. Moreover, the TRACFIN service at the Ministry of Finance, which aims to fight the “dark economy” and the financing of terrorism, can track any suspected illegal financing of XRW groups.⁵⁸ Unofficial sources estimate that, as of September 2020, between 35 and 40 XRW activists are currently in jail.

Coordination of the French multi-agency approach is performed by the National Coordination of Intelligence and the Fight Against Terrorism (*Coordination nationale du renseignement et de la lutte contre le terrorisme*, CNRLT), founded in 2017, it directly reports to the president of the Republic. Its focus is on all terrorist threats, whether these emanate from radical Islamist extremism, the XRW, or the extreme left. From the work of the aforementioned 2016 parliamentary commission, it seems that the two major problems that CT must face are the ever-rising need for more highly-skilled staff and financing as well as closing the loopholes in the French Code of Penal Procedure (*Code de Procédure Pénale*), which limit the capability of CT agencies to effectively monitor suspects.⁵⁹

Transnational connectivity

Connections between the French XRW and its international partners mainly consist of French activists demonstrating with foreign militants in France and abroad, staging roundtables, get-togethers, and meetings that are part of the usual and legal political activity. One distinctive feature of the French XRW is that the wannabe terrorists of this milieu have no international connections and apply the “France to the French” political motto of their ideological family to their own behaviour: they act, and eventually plot, through national-only cells.

International contacts have traditionally been established along linguistic lines. There is a long history of cooperation between French radicals and those in the French-speaking part of Belgium, e.g., the chairman of *Civitas*, Alain Escada, is a Belgium national,⁶⁰ and militants from the *Mouvement Nation*, led by Hervé Van Laethem,⁶¹ often take part in demonstrations in France, especially those of *Parti Nationaliste Français* (PNF).⁶² Links also exist with the French-speaking part of Switzerland as the Swiss *Résistance helvétique* (Helvetic Resistance) holds meetings with French *völkisch* groups such as *Autour du lac* (Annecy) and *Edelweiss Pays de Savoie* (Chambéry).⁶³ The language bond extends to the French-speaking province of Québec, Canada, where the heavily anti-Semitic, conspiracy-theory-laden magazine *Le Harfang*, published by the *Fédération des Québécois de Souche*, published interviews with French activists such as Pierre Vial from *Terre et Peuple* and Christian Bouchet from the former *Unité radicale*.⁶⁴

The second peculiarity of the transnational aspect of the French XRW is that France is a predominantly Catholic country. Several XRW support a Catholic fundamentalist ideology, such as PNF, and thus are more prone to ally with foreign groups such as the Italian FN, the Greek Golden Dawn, the various factions of the Spanish Phalange, and Eastern European parties with a strong Christian (Orthodox) outlook. PNF regularly visits what remains of the

former Romanian Iron Guard and *Noua Dreaptă* and takes part in the Lukov March in Sofia.⁶⁵ Those activities, **from what we can observe from open sources**, can be interpreted as a mere means to “keep the flame alive,” pay tribute to fascist figures of the past, and set up elaborate plans of building a pan-European network of like-minded movements. However, the EU and Bulgarian authorities have long expressed concerns about the incitement to hatred that the Lukov March represents, thus confirming that the event itself presents a threat.⁶⁶ Similarly, *Noua Dreaptă* has been described by scholars as an extremist movement that “is considered violent and organises paramilitary training for its members.”⁶⁷

The PNF is also inviting representatives from the RID, designated as a terrorist organisation in the United States for its annual “Day of Europe” in Paris.⁶⁸ The PNF is part of the Alliance for Peace and Freedom (APF),⁶⁹ an extreme-right European political party led by Roberto Fiore and founded in 2015. The Alliance is registered with the Authority for European Political Parties and Foundations. The PNF also belongs to the Berlin-based Europa Terra Nostra Foundation,⁷⁰ of which the far-right National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) is a member.⁷¹ The NPD is described by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution as an extreme-right party that threatens the constitutional order, although it remains legal.⁷²

Believing that Europe and “the West” are decadent and that Russia is a world power that maintains the traditional values of the European Christian civilisation is one reason why XRW have pro-Russian sentiments. The authoritarian nature of the regime is held in high esteem, but the love for the so-called “eternal Russia” is also a factor.⁷³ This idea was a driving force in pushing dozens of neo-fascists to enlist in the *Unité continentale* unit that fought Ukrainian forces in Donbas.⁷⁴ The core of this unit, led by Victor Lenta, a former French paratrooper, is still politically active and was last seen taking part in the Yellow Vests protests.⁷⁵ There is a “soldier

of fortune” aspect to those volunteers serving in Ukraine, but the fact that some of them are also involved in supporting the Serbs of Kosovo and that others fought ISIS in Syria/Iraq⁷⁶ shows their commitment to the “clash of civilisations” theory and their belief that the war against Islam is to be fought both in France and abroad.⁷⁷

Contrary to the widely held opinion, not all XRW activists, however, look to Russia as a model, and some have taken the side of Ukraine in the Donbas region. A small group of French volunteers joined the Azov Regiment⁷⁸ and both GUD and Bastion Social have constantly supported the Svoboda party as well as *Pravyi Sektor* (Right Sector).⁷⁹ Those belonging to these groups were involved in violent incidents during the Yellow Vests protests.⁸⁰ Moreover, in December 2019, Marc de Cacqueray, leader of the aforementioned Les Zouaves, had a meeting in Kyiv with Helena Semenyaka from Azov’s political wing, the National Corps (*Natsyionalnyi Korpous*).⁸¹ Of particular interest is the connection to Ukraine of XRW militants who are active in MMA. In 2020, the Asgardsrei festival in Kyiv, featuring both MMA and NSBM music, was attended by the Les Zouaves leader.⁸² The reason for this link with the Ukrainian XRW is ideological: across Europe, a segment of the XRW is fascinated with the quest for independence that Ukraine pursued against the former USSR.⁸³

The French-Ukrainian connection was also active in the quite mysterious arrest at the Poland-Ukraine border in 2016 of a French activist from the now defunct neo-fascist *Renouveau Français*, on suspicion of arms trafficking and planning a terror attack.⁸⁴ As shown by the arrest and conviction of former Identitarian leader Claude Hermant in 2019 on suspicion of arms trafficking and planning a terror attack,⁸⁵ XRW activism and arms trafficking for purely criminal purposes (in this case, buying weapons in Belgium) sometimes overlap.

The French XRW has consistently opposed the United States, which they think embodies materialistic values and the “melting pot” society and egalitarian-

ism they hate. As a consequence, American white supremacists are not a primary reference for the French XRW, except in neo-Nazi circles. The two main connections with the United States are to be found in the “great replacement” concept coined by French novelist Renaud Camus, and the legacy of the late Guillaume Faye (1949-2019), whose last book, *Guerre civile raciale* (Racial Civil War, 2019),⁸⁶ has been translated into English and was published in French with a foreword by Jared Taylor of *American Renaissance*.⁸⁷

Links with Germany are scant except for the cooperation between the PNF and *Die Rechte*, the two parties taking part in the annual commemoration of the Dresden bombing.⁸⁸ Finally, Pierre Krebs, leader of Thule-seminar, maintains close personal bonds with *Terre et Peuple*,⁸⁹ the former French branch of the seemingly defunct Europäische Aktion,⁹⁰ a neo-Nazi movement. In 2017 13 locations belonging to the movement’s activists were raided in Thüringen and Niedersachsen which resulted in weapons seizures.⁹¹ During these raids, a significant number of weapons were seized. Although not involved directly in violence, these groups convey an ideology that borders on neo-Nazism combined with paganism and historical revisionism.⁹² *Terre et Peuple* has branches in Wallonia, Spain, and Portugal, and claims to have German members working with its branch in Alsace.⁹³ Those branches, like the French local ones, organise roundtables and other pagan festivals and visits to sites of significance to *völkisch* militants.⁹⁴

Statistical snapshot of the violent XRW threat

As shown above, the overall XRW milieu in France is assumed to number 3000 individuals. Experts estimate that currently around 35 to 40 of the members are reportedly in prison.⁹⁵ On 4 October 2020, Laurent Nunez, France’s national coordinator for intelligence and the fight against terrorism, mentioned in an interview that the number of individuals

who are monitored by the security services stands at 8500, but that includes radical Islamists, the violent XRW and extreme-left activists. According to Nunez, since 2017 France has dismantled five violent XRW plots—it would be safe to assume that the three discussed in this chapter are in that number.⁹⁶

One indication of the vibrancy of the milieu, although imperfect, is the number of racist attacks

perpetrated in France, with the proviso that some of these attacks might have also been conducted by, for example, members of the radical Islamist milieu (this relates also to anti-Semitic or anti-Christian attacks on cemeteries or churches). All such attacks peaked, unsurprisingly, in 2015 at more than 2000, but declined to 950 in 2017, then rose by about 20% in 2018 (to 1137).⁹⁷

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
No. of "racist acts"	1841	1352	1256	1542	1274	1662	2034	1128	950	1137

Endnotes

- 1 French Penal code, art. 421-1. See: https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/8539/file/France_CPC_am022020_fr.pdf.
- 2 *Ibid.*
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- 4 See the list of organisations banned in France since 1936: https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_des_organisations_dissoutes_en_application_de_la_loi_du_10_janvier_1936.
- 5 *Assemblée Nationale*, "RAPPORT FAIT AU NOM DE LA COMMISSION D'ENQUÊTE (1) sur la lutte contre les groupuscules d'extrême droite en France," 6 June 2019, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/15/rapports/cel-groued/15b2006_rapport-enquete#.
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- 8 The Law of 13 July 1990, known as "Loi Gayssot" from the name of the MP who introduced it, former Minister Jean-Claude Gayssot, can be found here in its updated version: <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000532990&dateTexte=20200810>.
- 9 "LOI n° 2003-88 du 3 février 2003 visant à aggraver les peines punissant les infractions à caractère raciste, antisémite ou xenophobe (1)," <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000781920&categorieLien=id>.
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- [sch-exclu-du-fn-pour-deux-ans_748369](#).
- 11 Renamed *Mouvement National-Democrate* (National-Democratic Movement) on 4 August 2020.
 - 12 All speeches are available on YouTube, see: <https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL6MN-3R-wrEh0RcDFgq0Z-ewaGJV1RZJd1>.
 - 13 See, Mathieu Dejean, “Le Saint-Sauveur, QG des antifas de Paris, attaqué par des militants d’extrême-droite,” *Les Inrocks*, 5 June 2020, <https://www.lesinrocks.com/2020/06/05/actualite/societe/le-saint-sauveur-qq-des-antifas-de-paris-attaque-par-des-militants-dextreme-droite/>.
 - 14 Cf. *Libération*, “La dissolution de trois associations d’extrême-droite entérinée”, 10 July 2013, https://www.liberation.fr/societe/2013/07/10/affaire-meric-la-dissolution-de-trois-structures-d-extreme-droite-enterinee_917295.
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 - 18 Pierre Plotu, “Le mouvement néofasciste Bastion social renaît de ses cendres,” *Slate.fr*, 29 October 2019, <http://www.slate.fr/story/183429/bastion-social-gud-extreme-droite-radicale-ultradroite>.
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- 42 See their “Declaration of War”: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Vnss7y9TNA>.
- 43 As in the case of the April 2018 “border patrol” launched by the movement in the Alps in order to block immigrants from illegally crossing into France from Italy, this case is pending appeal.
- 44 The activists have only been indicted and the trial is still pending, thus they are deemed not guilty of any charge until they stand trial and are convicted. See: *Le Point*, “22 identitaires mis en examen,” 8 October 2018, https://www.lepoint.fr/societe/sos-mediterranee-22-identitaires-mis-en-examen-07-10-2018-2261039_23.php.
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- 62 Cf.: Programme of the 2019 edition of *Forum de l’Europe* held in Paris: <https://www.les-nationalistes.com/paris-programme-detaille-du-ve-forum-de-leurope-11-05-2019/>.
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- 95 Expert estimate during a CEP workshop on the violent XRW movement, 9 September 2020.
- 96 See interview with Laurent Nunez: <https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x7wn353>.
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GERMANY

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LEGAL SITUATION

In Germany, the term “extremism” is not defined by constitutional or criminal law. It is instead a conceptual tool that German domestic intelligence agencies (Offices for the Protection of the Constitution) have been using since 1974. In this respect, “extremism” denotes an assumed or proven “anti-constitutionalism,” and is aimed at any effort opposing the “principles of the free democratic basic order.”¹

The official definition of “right-wing extremism” has been further developed since 2015, having been adapted to structural changes in the spectrum of right-wing extremism and in terms of the criticism that has long been levelled by civil society and scholars.² First, it is no longer just about traditional, ideological themes, such as that of the national-socialist *Volksgemeinschaft* or “people’s community.” It instead more explicitly covers transnational categories, such as ethnicity, race, or “belong to the European culture.” Second, right-wing extremists are now seen more as a heterogeneous, largely unbounded spectrum rather than a cohesive scene with strict ideological boundaries. Third, there is a shift in focus from explicit “right-wing extremist agitation” to an effectively misanthropic “world view” and anti-democratic “values concept.”³ Based on a 2017 ruling of the *Bundesverfassungsgericht*, Germany’s highest constitutional court, the denial of universal human rights, which conflicts with the inviolability of human dignity under Section 1 of the German Constitution (“Basic Law”), has become a key concept in modern-day interpretations of “right-wing extremism.”⁴

In the last five years, German authorities have also made significant adjustments to the ever advancing “dissolution of boundaries” in traditional right-wing extremism at an operational level.⁵ Since 2014, for

example, the potential for extreme-right violence has ceased to be limited solely to the actual persons prepared to use violence, but instead also extends to anyone who is “violence-oriented.” As such, it no longer only implies the execution or preparation of violent acts (violence) but also the legitimisation of violent acts as political means (propensity towards violence), the promotion of violent acts by others (supporting of violence), and the (implicit) call for or (implicit) incitement to violence (endorsement of violence).⁶

In the German Criminal Code, terrorism is defined as the forming of an organisation with the objective or directed at “seriously intimidating the population” or “destroying or significantly impairing” an authority or international organisation (Section 129a of the German Criminal Code). Germany’s Public Prosecutor General of the Federal Court of Justice (*Generalbundesanwaltschaft*, GBA) and Federal Criminal Police Office (*Bundeskriminalamt*, BKA) refer to terrorism⁷ or a terrorist organisation in the context of serious seditious acts of violence (Sections 89a, b, c, 91 of the German Criminal Code) “when three or more persons band together, are prepared to commit acts of violence, and start executing these plans.”⁸

The German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (*Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz*, BfV) now also uses a “broader”⁹ working definition, describing terrorism as “[1.] a political motivation in conjunction with concrete political objectives, [2.] a lasting, i.e. not just spontaneous, impulsive or one-off action, [and 3.] the committing of particularly serious criminal offences, particularly large-scale acts of violence.”¹⁰ As such, the BfV does “not necessarily require there to be a group” or subversion; it also explicitly focuses on so-called “unstructured” (not-affiliated) individuals who have increasingly

been responsible for violent acts and terrorist attacks in Germany in recent years.¹¹

HISTORY AND KEY PLAYERS OF THE XRW SCENE

Extreme-right violence is multi-faceted. The racist, right-wing-extremist assassinations in Hünxe (1991), Mölln (1992), and Solingen (1993) in the 1990s, the pogrom-like events in Hoyerswerda (1991), Rostock-Lichtenhagen (1992), Magdeburg (1994), and Guben (1999), the serial murders committed by the National Socialist Underground (NSU) (2000-2007), the attacks on asylum-seekers in the 2010s, the attacks in Munich (2016), Halle (2019), and Hanau (2019), and the murder of Walter Lübcke (2019) are the products of various historic framework conditions, social milieus, and organisational backgrounds. Four categories can be established here:

1) Groups: The so-called “free scene,” comprising loose and largely unstructured networks of around 5-20 members, has existed since at least the early 1990s. Between 20 percent and 30 percent of the extreme right-wing spectrum of people are attributed to it today.¹²

Successful ban-orders have been issued or criminal proceedings have been started against such groups in recent years due to the formation or membership of criminal or terrorist organisations, including the groups Gruppe Freital (2017), Oldschool Society (OSS) (2017), Revolution Chemnitz (2018), Kameradschaft Aryans (2019), and Nordadler (2020).¹³ The German sections of transnational militant organisations founded abroad, e.g., Combat 18, also fall into this category.¹⁴

2) Parties: In addition to the NPD (National Democratic Party of Germany), there are two newer anti-constitutional minor parties in the form of Der III. Weg and Die Rechte. Both largely emerged from the cadres of the prohibited *Kameradschaften* (Band of Comrades) on the “free” scene.¹⁵ The *Parteienprivileg*

(the privileged status of political parties) protected under constitutional law means their founding as parties makes them highly “ban-proof”¹⁶ and enables them to organise concerts, martial-arts events, and other festivals that are declared political events, making them more difficult to prohibit.¹⁷ Around one-fifth of the persons on the right-wing-extremist spectrum belong to parties.

3) Individuals: Right-wing-extremist violence and “new right-wing terrorism approaches” also arise “completely outside the right-wing-extremist scene”¹⁸ on the spectrum of so-called “unstructured” persons (i.e., not connected to organisations). In 2018, these persons made up around 13,240 of the 24,100 right-wing extremists recorded by the BfV (54.94%).¹⁹ Hate crimes, such as the murder of Marwa El-Sherbini (2009) in Dresden, and right-wing-extremist/racially motivated “lone-wolf” attacks in Munich (2016) and Halle (2019), are among these.

4) Mixed scenes: The trend over the last five years has been characterised by the formation of right-leaning “mixed scenes” and nationwide subcultures. Mixed scenes primarily consist of cooperation between right-wing extremists, rockers, “Reich-citizens,” preppers, hooligans, and so-called *Wutbürger* or “enraged citizens.”²⁰ The spectrum of right-wing extremism forges nationwide or transnational networks, often through major subculture events on the music and martial-arts scenes. This includes violent right-wing-extremist to right-wing-terrorist structures such as the Hammerskins or the Weisse Wölfe Terrorcrew, the latter being banned in 2016.

As in the early 1990s, the period between 2013 and 2017 in particular saw serious attacks on (supposed) migrants and asylum-seekers, especially in the form of arson, assaults, and (attempted) murder. These “anti-asylum riots” recruited most of their participants from right-wing-extremist individuals and outsiders not previously belonging to any particular group.²¹ Militia-like vigilante organisations were also established,²² including branches of the transnational Soldiers of Odin.²³ The attacks

on politicians Henriette Reker (2015) and Andreas Hollstein (2017), which sit in a grey area somewhere between hate crimes, right-wing terrorism, mixed scenes and lone wolves, can also be attributed to the “anti-asylum riots.”

All four categories are interconnected by right-wing-extremist narratives like the “great replacement”, “white genocide”, and “Day X”, aligning to a leaderless, transnational, violent, extreme-right apocalyptic movement at an ideological, strategic, and even operational level.

TRENDS

Potential extremists:

According to the BfV, the number of persons categorised as potentially being “right-wing extremists” in 2019 was 32,080.²⁴ While the number of right-wing extremists had constantly grown from 21,000 to 24,100 between 2014 and 2018,²⁵ there was a particularly significant jump of 33.11% between 2018 and 2019. This is primarily due to the AfD (a right-wing populist party in Germany) organisations “Flügel” and Junge Alternative (JA) being classified as “suspected cases.” In total, more than half of all right-wing extremists in Germany were classified as “violence-oriented” every year between 2014 and 2018.²⁶ In 2019, that figure was 13,000.²⁷

Following the discovery of the right-wing-extremist Hannibal Network, the Uniter association (a BfV “suspect case”) and other groups whose active members included dozens of current and former police officers and Bundeswehr (German Armed Forces) soldiers, the BfV was commissioned to compile an overview of the XRW situation among German security authorities. The first report, published in early October 2020, shows 1441 individual cases that lead to legal action by the authorities in the period between January 2017 and March 2020. The Bundeswehr has most of those cases (1064) in its ranks. An estimated 400,000 people serve in German security authorities in total.²⁸

Violent right-wing-extremist crimes:

The number of violent acts committed by right-wing extremists has risen from 802 (2012) to 925 cases (2019), primarily manifested in assaults, where cases rose from 690 in 2012 to 938 in 2018 and 781 in 2019. Every year between 2016 and 2019, nearly three quarters of all right-wing-extremist acts of violence in Germany were motivated by xenophobia.²⁹ Violence against political opponents constituted between 23.7% (2015) and 11.6% (2019).³⁰

During the “anti-asylum riots,” the number of violent crimes doubled compared to the years prior and thereafter (2015: 1408; 2016: 1600). As in the early 1990s, most of the crimes took the form of physical assaults and arson attacks.

The BKA has recorded a total of 109 people killed in right-wing-extremist homicides since 1990.³¹ Media and civil-society count report considerably higher deaths for the same period, namely between 180 and 208.³² This is largely due to the discrepancies in classifying right-wing-extremist views and motives as “accompanying the act” or “triggering” it. As such, the BKA’s figures can be seen as a minimum number of cases.

Right-wing terrorism:

Right-wing terrorism in Germany has historically been characterised less by large-scale, high-impact attacks but more by “long-term, low-intensity right-wing-terrorist warfare.”³³ One study has identified 108 right-wing-terrorist players (groups and individuals) who have been responsible for 19 abductions, 124 extortions, 238 armed assaults since 1963, and have committed at least 156 bombings, 2459 arson attacks and 348 murders since 1971.³⁴ It is striking to note here that, in nearly two thirds of cases, the acts were by small groups of individuals. Lone actors were responsible for 20% of offences.³⁵

In 2019, 892 right-wing extremists held gun licences;³⁶ as of 31 December 2018, this figure was 792 persons.³⁷ A special analysis conducted by the BKA for 2017 and 2018 found that, in 2018 alone, a total

of 1091 different types of weapons were linked to 563 right-wing politically motivated crimes (including 235 violent offences), corresponding to an increase of nearly 30% compared to 2017.³⁸

FINANCES

Violence-oriented right-wing-extremist organisations and players in Germany are financed through many different channels, though well-founded analyses of income sources are largely lacking. The available information is based on data from state (*Länder*) intelligence agencies, media research, and civil society. The spectrum ranges from income through blood donations, to mail-order business and international music or martial-arts events, which are estimated to have generated millions of euros in revenue.³⁹ This is also why leading transnationally networked violence-oriented right-wing extremists clearly state that “the only way of building structures is through commercial success.”⁴⁰ Below is a list of six relevant financing models.

1. Self-financing/donations/cryptocurrencies:

Right-wing extremists often pay for propaganda campaigns or trips to national gatherings out of their own pocket. The Brandenburg state intelligence agency (LfV) highlights the “inventiveness” in this respect. Right-wing extremists who are not financially well-off partly fund their activities through blood donations.⁴¹ In some cases, third parties donate money to perpetrators of extreme-right violence, such as in the case of the NSU.⁴² The alleged perpetrator of the Halle attack (2019) himself stated he had received the equivalent of approximately 1000 euros via Bitcoin from someone to whom, on a Darknet weapons-building platform, he had said he “wanted to shoot Muslims.”⁴³

2. Concerts and festivals:

Hosting commercial concerts and festivals appears to be one of the main income sources of

the right-wing-extremist scene with around 150 extreme-right music groups and about 60 song-writers and solo performers.⁴⁴ Concerts also help offer financial support for “comrades” to cover their legal costs.⁴⁵

Nationwide festival revenue for 2018 is estimated at around 1.5-2 million euros. This is based on an estimated 35,000 attendees of larger music events with an assumed revenue of 50 euros per person for ticket, food and drink, T-shirts, or CDs.⁴⁶

Many concerts and festivals are characterised by four key components, which significantly contribute to reducing costs and securing potentially much higher profit margins than conventional events:

- They are held on private property owned by right-wing extremists or supporters;
- They are registered as political events;
- Entry fees/tickets are tax-free because they are declared as donations;⁴⁷ and
- Extreme-right *Kameradschaften* or security-service companies with ties to the scene, serve as “security” at these events. This is also the case at the below-mentioned martial-arts events.⁴⁸

3. Mail-order business:

Germany has a network of right-wing-extremist music labels and mail-order businesses; Saxony and Thuringia alone had a total of 27 in 2018.⁴⁹ The revenue from the sale of right-wing-extremist music and merchandise (clothing/accessories) in Saxony was estimated at around 3.5 million euros as early as 2012.⁵⁰ Some music labels have “a high reputation in the right-wing-extremist scene within Germany and abroad,”⁵¹ with sales revenues of several hundred thousand euros per year. The profits are used to buy or rent properties, and to finance the activities of the right-wing-extremist scene.⁵²

4. Martial-arts events:

The relevance of martial-arts events organised by

right-wing extremists, particularly including those with a transnational focus, continues to grow. In 2018, for example, the Kampf der Nibelungen (Battle of the Nibelungs, KdN) in Saxony was attended by around 850 people.⁵³ Based on an estimated sales revenue of 50 euros per participant for this kind of major event, this event alone could well have generated about 42,000 euros in total sales revenue.

5. Real estate:

There are more than 140 properties across Germany that are used as venues for right-wing-extremist activities,⁵⁴ including restaurants.⁵⁵ Properties that are both legally and physically protected enable “sustainable added value,”⁵⁶ and make it easier to hold events.

6. Illegal activities:

Statistics on criminal activities are reported sporadically. In 2014, for example, Leipzig Police found drugs with a market value of 150,000 euros on a member of the violent neo-Nazi scene.⁵⁷ And in 2017, a right-wing-extremist drug-dealing ring was uncovered in Aachen.⁵⁸

ONLINE ACTIVITIES

The internet, especially social media, video-sharing platforms, and messenger services, makes it easier for violence-oriented XRW to spread propaganda and recruit, co-ordinate and mobilise supporters.

In recent years, due to pressure from civil society and policymakers, Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and Instagram have ramped up their efforts to remove violence-oriented XRW players and their content from their platforms. This de-platforming has led to a migration of these actors to smaller or alternative platforms like VKontakte, BitChute, meme/message-boards like 4Chan and 8Chan, and messenger services like WhatsApp or Telegram. The new accounts often have significantly fewer

followers.⁵⁹ But a current study conducted by the Counter Extremism Project (CEP) has found that illegal XRW content also continues to be posted on the major platforms.⁶⁰

A 2018 study comparing the Twitter content of the violence-oriented Autonome Nationalisten (AN), the right-wing-extremist Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland (IBD), and the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party shows that “the groups essentially articulate the same problem [...], similar solutions [...], as well as visuals, slogans and compelling images, in order to motivate potential supporters to take action.”⁶¹ In this sense, all three groups create a seemingly logical and consistent (conspiratorial) and apocalyptic narrative. The guiding theme is the supposedly imminent death of the German people (“white genocide”/“great replacement”), for which migrants, refugees, the left, Islam, Angela Merkel, the “elites,” and Jews are held responsible.⁶²

Of particular relevance to the violence-oriented XRW scene is VKontakte (VK), Russia’s largest social network, with 3.7 million active members from Germany (October 2019).⁶³ It is a place where “right-wing rock collections, neo-Nazi violence videos and Nazi texts are shared as PDFs, where extreme-right and alt-right parties (NPD, Der III. Weg, Die Rechte, AfD), right-wing-extremist mail-order businesses, right-wing rock bands, Holocaust deniers, militant neo-Nazis, Reich citizens and conspiracy theorists gather. Neo-Nazi terrorist organisations, such as Blood & Honour, Combat 18 and Misanthropic Division, are promoted openly.”⁶⁴

British video portal BitChute features extreme-right and right-wing-terrorist content, such as banned music by Oidoxie/Blood & Honour, which also can be accessed from Germany without the need for registration. When extreme-right or right-wing terrorist videos are deleted off YouTube, they are often uploaded to BitChute, and advertised on YouTube.⁶⁵ BitChute is estimated to have around 6000 users with German IP addresses.⁶⁶ Telegram, a largely unmoderated encrypted messenger service, is used

by transnational right-wing terrorist groups like the Atomwaffen Division for their communications, most of which occur unimpeded.⁶⁷

The darknet also appears to be gaining importance as an unregulated space, though using it effectively generally requires existing contacts and prior knowledge. It is where the perpetrator of the Munich attacks (2016) purchased his shotgun, and where the perpetrator of the Halle attack received around 1000 euros in Bitcoin.⁶⁸

When discussing the role of online gaming or community platforms such as Steam or Discord and (violence-oriented) right-wing extremism, it is important to note that Germany alone has 30 million gamers.⁶⁹ There is no scientific basis indicating a general causative link between gaming and (political) violence. Online-gaming/community platforms do, however, make it easier for extremists to access people, and especially young males. The platforms should therefore be included in the scope of the German Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG).

RESPONSE

After being accidentally uncovered in late 2011, the serial murders committed by the NSU were reviewed as part of several parliamentary investigation committees. The German Bundestag passed a resolution in 2013 stating that the “magnitude of the crimes was saddening and shocking. But had also sparked shame and bewilderment at the fact that the both the state and federal security authorities had been unable to timely discover or prevent the crimes that had been planned and committed over the course of years.”⁷⁰ This triggered fundamental debates about the competencies and role of security authorities in combating violence-oriented right-wing extremism and right-wing terrorism. The Joint Centre for Countering Extremism and Terrorism (GETZ) was established in 2012 as a communication platform for the 30 federal and state police and intelligence services, and one of its aims is to combat right-wing

extremism/terrorism.⁷¹ In addition, the relevant authorities received significantly more funding to hire staff.

Since the murder of the politician Walter Lübcke and the attack in Halle in 2019, right-wing extremism is officially considered the greatest threat to security in Germany. The “detection of small groups and lone wolves” in particular poses unique challenges to the security authorities.⁷²

The BKA, BAMAD, and BND consequently all created right-wing-extremism departments in the same year. The existing department at the BfV has been restructured,⁷³ and a “centre for the registration and investigation of right-wing-extremist activities in the public service” has been established there. In December 2019, the state (*Länder*) Interior Ministers’ Conference agreed on, among other things, expanding protective measures for synagogues, increasing staff at authorities responsible for handling right-wing extremism, improving the risk-analysis software analogous to the case of Islamism, and being more consistent in declaring bans on associations and events.⁷⁴

Three extreme-right associations have so far been banned in 2020.⁷⁵ The KdN martial-arts event organised by violence-oriented right-wing extremists was officially prohibited in 2019 and again in 2020.⁷⁶

The discovery of XRW networks in the *Kommando Spezialkräfte* (KSK) special forces military command in the German armed forces has led to a fundamental restructuring of the KSK.⁷⁷

Germany has had XRW prevention and Exit programmes in place for more than 20 years. According to a BKA report, 75% of the 721 extremism-prevention projects in Germany between January 2014 and May 2015 focused on right-wing extremism,⁷⁸ spread almost equally across governmental and civil-society actors. The proportion of projects concentrating on politically motivated violent XRW crime sat at 70%. The German Federal Ministry for Family

Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth, which is primarily responsible at the federal level for preventing political and religious extremism, spent a total of 431.5 million euros on governmental and civil-society organisations during the 2015-2019 funding period.⁷⁹ In the 2020-2023 funding period, 460 million euros are earmarked for tackling right-wing extremism and anti-Semitism.⁸⁰

The “cabinet committee for combating right-wing extremism and racism,” established by the German federal government in March 2020, highlights the transnational networking of violence-oriented right-wing extremism, and emphasises the fact that “effective combating and prevention cannot occur solely at a national level.”⁸¹

In June 2020, the German Bundestag passed a law on “combating right-wing extremism and hate crimes” that, among other things, expands on the scope of legal repercussions in the case of threats to politicians, and obliges social media to forward user data to the BKA in the event of specific suspected criminal acts.⁸²

Violence-oriented right-wing extremism and right-wing terrorism are also issues being tackled as part of Germany’s 2020 EU Council presidency, and are especially being addressed by the Council’s anti-terror workgroups and the Expert Meeting on Right-Wing Extremism (EMRE) held by police services. Operational workshops are also being held to improve the fight against the XRW music scene, such as events hosted by the likes of Blood & Honour and Combat 18 at the European level. The German Federal Ministry of the Interior is additionally supporting the expansion of Europol’s Internet Referral Units to include right-wing extremism.⁸³

TRANSNATIONAL CONNECTIVITY

The transnational networks of German violence-oriented XRW are not a new phenomenon.⁸⁴ Established cooperation with foreign players has instead contin-

ued, and is developing, both offline and online. Important transnational network hubs involving Germans, as well as their key players, are described below.

1. Transnational network hubs in Germany

Martial-arts events

German security authorities particularly consider the XRW martial-arts scene to be a major risk, claiming its potential threat comes “not from trained street fighters, but rather from the resulting transnational networks that communicate an acceptance of targeted physical violence against supposed enemies of the far right to vast sections of the scene.”⁸⁵ The KdN has been the most famous series of martial-arts events on the XRW scene since 2013. Event participants consist of neo-Nazis, right-wing extremists from subcultures, and members of far-right parties, such as Die Rechte and Der III. Weg, while attendees include people from all over Germany, as well as from France, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Czech Republic, and Ukraine (Azov Movement⁸⁶). There are also connections to the right-wing section of the hooligan scene. Parts of the neo-Nazi and extreme-right-hooligan scene have developed into semi-professional, transnational martial-arts networks.⁸⁷

The German XRW martial-arts association Wardon 21⁸⁸ maintains close contacts with Russia’s NS Straight Edge scene that has formed around the PPDM group (По программе Дедушки Мороза, The Program of Father Frost). This cooperation “serves as a role model for international networking between right-wing extremists, and for co-operation with leading right-wing-extremist clothing brands.”⁸⁹

Music festivals

Music and music festivals are a key factor when it comes to spreading XRW ideology, joining the scene and expanding transnational networking with other right-wing extremists. Events such as Rock gegen Überfremdung (rock against foreign infiltration), which was attended by about 6000 people in 2017, have much higher participant numbers than other extreme-right event formats.⁹⁰

Parties and party members play an important role in organising music events. For example, in 2018 and 2019, NPD federal committee member Thorsten Heise, who has 12 previous criminal convictions and whose garden reportedly contains a monument to the 1st SS Panzer Division, “Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler,”⁹¹ held four festivals in Ostritz (Saxony) that were the “result of a modified party strategy with an actionist focus on events and campaigns.”⁹² Heise is also in charge of the Freie Kameradschaften (band of unaffiliated comrades) division of the NPD.⁹³ Bands from the Blood & Honour network (B&H) are frequently performing there. German (violence-oriented) right-wing extremists attended concerts in countries such as Italy, Poland, Finland, Ukraine, France, Sweden, Denmark, Czech Republic and Bulgaria in 2018 and 2019.⁹⁴

2. German violence-oriented parties and groups operating transnationally

NPD and JN

The NPD, as well as its youth organisation JN, maintain close contact with foreign violence-oriented organisations such as the Greek neo-fascist party Golden Dawn.⁹⁵ The NPD is a member of the European Alliance for Peace and Freedom (APF), whose Europa Terra Nostra e.V. (ETN) foundation aims “to build an international network capable of helping nationalist organisations and militants.”⁹⁶ In 2018, the JN organised a transnational “Europa-Congress” with the participation of the Ukrainian National Corps (Azov Movement’s political organisation) as well as the Russian Imperial Movement (RID).⁹⁷

Die Rechte

Leading members of Die Rechte regularly appear as speakers at events held elsewhere in Europe with violence-oriented XRW groups. Examples include Tag der Ehre (Day of Honour) in Budapest (with supporters of B&H, Combat 18/Hammerskins, NRM, and paramilitary organisations attending) in 2018 and 2019,⁹⁸ a conference held by the XRW Nova Ordem Social (New Social Order) in Portugal in 2017, and with “openly violent right-wing-extrem-

ist groups” in Paris like Troisième Voie (Third Way) and JNR (Jeunesses nationalistes révolutionnaires, Revolutionary Nationalist Youth).⁹⁹

Der III. Weg

The Der III. Weg party has a strong transnational network¹⁰⁰ with ties both to Ukraine’s Azov Movement and the RID. It organises its own transnational music and martial-arts event, Jugend im Sturm (storming youth).¹⁰¹

Combat 18 Deutschland (C18)

C18 is considered one of the transnational identity-defining networks of violence-oriented right-wing extremism. The supposed leader of the German section, as well as another member, were convicted of illegally importing ammunition in 2018 after it was taken from a shooting-training session in the Czech Republic.¹⁰²

Hammerskins

The elitist organisation is present in Germany and several other EU nations, including France and Sweden. Hammerskins events and concerts in Germany are also attended by supporters from other European countries, and likewise, German Hammerskins attend group events elsewhere in Europe.¹⁰³ They maintain ties with Denis “Nikitin” Kapustin, founder of the fashion label White Rex, through the martial-arts scene and mail-order business.¹⁰⁴

Soldiers of Odin (SOO)

The SOO has been forming branches, including in Germany, since 2016.¹⁰⁵ These include the Wodans Erben Germanien and Vikings Security Germania.¹⁰⁶ Members of reputed terror cell *Gruppe S.* (2019), which is alleged to have planned attacks on Muslims and politicians and conducted shooting training in Czech Republic, are said to belong to German SOO groups.¹⁰⁷

Atomwaffen Division (AWD)

The founding of the German branch of AWD was announced on an American website on 1 June 2018.¹⁰⁸ The alleged German initiator was apparently in contact with the group NA (which had been banned

in the UK) and was convicted of possession of illegal armament at a neo-Nazi festival. He is also said to have participated in shooting training in Czech Republic and attended the Asgardsrei music festival in Ukraine connected to the Azov Movement.¹⁰⁹ In autumn 2019, two politicians from Germany's Green Party received death threats by email, signed "Atomwaffen Division." The organisation's flyers have also appeared in various major German cities.¹¹⁰

3. Transnational network hubs abroad

Political gatherings

The high and increasing participant numbers of German right-wing extremists at events such as Tag der Ehre in Budapest (Hungary),¹¹¹ the Lukov March in Sofia (Bulgaria), and the March of Nations in Kyiv (Ukraine)¹¹² in recent years attest to the importance of transnational political gatherings. They provide regular opportunities for attendees to make new contacts and strengthen existing network ties.¹¹³

Azov movement

The Azov Regiment, the military wing of the Azov Movement, fought against pro-Russian separatists during the Ukraine conflict. Its leadership includes individuals known for their ultra-nationalist and XRW views.¹¹⁴ Azov is said to have recruited right-wing extremists in Germany, such as at the Rock gegen Überfremdung in Themar 2017.¹¹⁵ Members of the Atomwaffen Division Deutschland and Der III. Weg party are listed as participants of events organized by the Azov Movement in Ukraine.¹¹⁶ A member of the right-wing-extremist JA (Junge Alternative) received training with automatic rifles from the Azov Regiment.¹¹⁷

Russian Imperial Movement (RID)

German right-wing extremists, including members of the JN and Der III. Weg party, are said to have received paramilitary training at a RID camp near St. Petersburg. Finns and Swedes are also said to have trained there before joining Russian militias in eastern Ukraine.¹¹⁸

Reportedly about 165 Germans, many with extreme right-wing backgrounds, have joined the two sides in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict between 2014 and 2019, where they have received military training and, in some cases, gathered battlefield experience.¹¹⁹

The Azov Movement and the RID are not only enemies in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict but are also competitors in building strong ties with German and other European right-wing extremists.¹²⁰ The RID is also a religious movement that looks down on its "pagan" comrades from other nations. Nevertheless, they meet and cooperate, based on the narrative that the "white race" in total is facing an existential threat and that only a unified front of white warriors will be victorious against its enemies.¹²¹

Czech Republic: Shooting training, weapons, ammunition, and explosives

Members or supporters of C18, OSS, Gruppe S., NSU, SOO, and AWD conducted shooting training and purchased ammunition and weapons in the Czech Republic, or intended to do so.¹²² This was also where Gruppe Freital and OSS purchased pyrotechnics with an explosive force comparable to military grade explosives.¹²³ The illegal gun used by the Munich attacker (2016) was purchased from a German weapons dealer who himself got it from a dealer in the Czech Republic.¹²⁴

4. "Lone actors" with transnational ties

The suspected perpetrator of the Halle attack (2019) streamed the incident live and in English via the gaming platform Twitch. He had announced it shortly beforehand in English on Meguca.org, an anonymous message board for fans of anime culture. He also wrote a manifesto in English.¹²⁵

The perpetrator of the Munich attacks (2016) chatted with a white supremacist in the USA through an "Anti-Refugee Club" chat group on the online gaming platform Steam.¹²⁶ This white supremacist later shot two fellow students of Hispanic origin, as well as himself, in 2017.¹²⁷

COVID-19 PANDEMIC

In Germany, violent XRW actors have joined demonstrations in large numbers organised by various groups protesting COVID-19-related restrictions and regulations.¹²⁸ These protest groups consist of individuals with a wide range of ideological backgrounds. While most seem not to have any sympathy for XRW narratives, a significant minority advocates anti-Semitic and “anti-elite” conspiracy myths, e.g., “New World Order” or “QAnon”, and might therefore be open for future cooperation against what they may perceive as “common enemies.”¹²⁹

GENDER

Statistics on the percentage of women acting as perpetrators in politically motivated right-wing-extremist violent offences in Germany are not available. Some estimates put it at below 10 percent,¹³⁰ and some at around 15 percent.¹³¹ One of the three members of the NSU is female, as is one of the seven OSS members and two of the 12 Gruppe Freital members.¹³² One of the two convicted leaders of the Aryans is female, as is one of the 13 Gruppe S. members.¹³³ In the cases of Revolution Chemnitz and Nordadler, only men were accused or convicted.¹³⁴

STATISTICAL SNAPSHOT OF THE VIOLENT XRW THREAT

Obtaining comprehensive and consolidated statistical data on the various aspects of the violent XRW threat in Germany is difficult. Due to the fed-

eral structure of Germany, data is compiled on the state as well as on the federal level according to the respective mandates for domestic security. The number of violent acts committed by XRW has risen from 802 (2012) to 925 cases (2019), primarily manifested in assaults, where cases rose from 690 in 2012 to 938 in 2018 and 781 in 2019. Every year between 2016 and 2019, nearly three quarters of all right-wing-extremist acts of violence in Germany were motivated by xenophobia.¹³⁵ Violence against political opponents constituted between 23.7% (2015) and 11.6% (2019).¹³⁶ As outlined above, 2019 also saw two deadly high-profile XRW attacks, the attack in Halle and the murder of Walther Lübcke, followed by the XRW attack in Hanau at the beginning of 2020.

Several violent XRW groups have been banned¹³⁷ and/or their members have been arrested as shown above. Not all fell under legal definition of “terrorism”, but the plots/attacks were often aimed to “terrorise” the victims. Many attacks were considered racially motivated violence, e.g., against refugees or Muslims.

The table below outlines the number of arrests of individuals that were charged with terrorism-related offenses in connection with violent XRW motivations and the number of convicted individuals. The relevant numbers for 2020 are not yet available. The numbers demonstrate, that particularly in 2018 and 2019, arrests and convictions for the most serious type of crime— XRW terrorism - has increased significantly compared to previous years.

	2015 ¹³⁸	2016 ¹³⁹	2017 ¹⁴⁰	2018 ¹⁴¹	2019 ¹⁴²	Total
ARRESTS (XRW terrorism arrests)	4	8	0	19	15	46
CONVICTIONS (for XRW terrorism offences)	0	0	12	11	9	32

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SWEDEN

Morgan Finnsjö

Legal situation

There is no legal definition of extremism in Sweden; rather, there is a legal basis for the Swedish Security Service's (SSS) "counter-subversion" operations, which monitor extremist scenes, derived from the statutory instrument of the SSS assigning it responsibility and police powers for preventing, investigating, and countering certain crimes deemed a threat to national or constitutional security.¹ For the past decade, Swedish agencies have tended to use the term "violence-promoting extremism" to designate the target of P/CVE and CT efforts.² Previously, it was called "violent political extremism", and historically referred to by various other bureaucratic designations, such as "crimes related to the internal security of the realm."^{3 4 5}

The general term "violence-promoting extremism" has been criticised by scholars, who remark on its vagueness, fluidity, and definitional problems, as well as its tendency to conflate right-wing with left-wing extremism and to some extent with Islamic extremism.^{6 7 8}

Most governmental bodies, deferring to the analysis of the security services, currently identify three violence-promoting scenes/milieus of concern, of which one is "violence-promoting right-wing extremism."⁹ Until very recently, the agencies tended to focus on what they termed "the white power/supremacist scene" [*vit makt-miljön*] as that subset of right-wing extremism, which, because of its relative prominence, and its capacity and willingness to use violence to achieve political ends, presented the actual XRW threat to Swedish security and merited the particular attention of state agencies.¹⁰ In this regard, the white-power scene has been identified as virtually synonymous with violence-promoting

right-wing extremism.¹¹ This estimation of the white-power scene and attendant use of that term has been the standard practice of governmental bodies since the late 1990s.

However, in 2019 and 2020, the SSS—the primary CVE agency—began moving away from this long-standing practice and started emphasizing the threat of violence-promoting right-wing extremism as such, describing it as growing beyond the confines of the white-power scene.^{12 13} Furthermore, in its 2020 assessment, the Swedish National Center for Terrorist Threat Assessment, a permanent working group of key CT agencies, including the SSS, for the first time dropped the term "white power" altogether and instead focused on the term violence-promoting right-wing extremism.¹⁴ The assessment noted transnational factors—far-right political advances in Western countries in recent years, XRW agitation in international social media, successful XRW terror attacks in Western countries in 2019—and linked them to the threat of violence-promoting XRW terror in Sweden.

Terrorism has been defined by officials as "an extreme form of violence-promoting extremism."¹⁵ Unlike extremism, the legal definition of "terror" is set out in the criminal code, mainly in three anti-terror laws, the central one being a 2003 law against "terrorist offences," with the other two covering funding, incitement, recruitment, and training related to terrorism.¹⁶ The 2003 law classifies various enumerated violent crimes as terrorist acts "if the act could seriously damage a state or an intergovernmental organisation" and if such an act "has a certain intent [...] for example, to seriously intimidate a population or a population group."¹⁷

History and key players of the XRW scene

In the past 35 years, at least 28 killings are attributable to XRW perpetrators in Sweden.¹⁸ Since the mid-1970s, XRW actors have perpetrated intimidation campaigns, vandalization, assaults, bombings, arson, and murder against ideologically motivated targets including refugees, ethnic and sexual minorities, leftists, anti-racists, journalists, politicians, and police officers, as well as bank robberies and firearm thefts to facilitate their activity.^{19 20}

A recurring pattern in the past 50 years is smaller networks radicalising and breaking away from larger groups. In 2005, the only XRW actors to date to be charged under terrorism laws was a cell of break-aways from the neo-Nazi party National Socialist Front, which had plotted to overthrow the democracy with a campaign of terror; they were convicted of crimes but acquitted of terrorism.^{21 22} Nordic Youth (NY), a neo-fascist group active from 2010 to 2019 whose members have engaged in politically motivated attacks, originally broke away from the far-right National Democrats party.²³ Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM), founded in 1997 as a small and closed neo-Nazi sect, grew in support and importance after the collapse of the neo-Nazi Party of the Swedes (SvP) in 2014. In 2018, the militant NRM, re-organised as a political party, contested the general election, fared poorly, and suffered a split the following year, giving rise to the smaller and more clandestine group Nordic Strength (NS).²⁴

Alternative XRW media, such as the podcast Motgift (Swedish for “Antidote”) which has glorified terror and praised the Third Reich, and which until 2017 operated out of Berlin, performs an important ideological and agitator function in the scene.²⁵ In 2017, the operators of Motgift established a new organisation, The Free Sweden (TFS), whose goal is to build XRW communities around community houses in strategic locations. Motgift continued as TFS’s media branch under the name *Svegot*.²⁶

A recent study at the Center for Asymmetric Threats and Terrorist Studies at the Swedish Defence University, undertaken on behalf of the Swedish Center for Preventing Violent Extremism with contributions from the SSS, considers the Swedish XRW within the broader “radical nationalist milieu” in which amorphous networks of “alternative right” actors exist adjacent to and interface with violent actors like the NRM. This alternative right, in which Swedish groups have a major role on the international level, disseminates narratives, particularly through online media, that largely overlap with the ideology of the NRM and, by sustaining “digital hate cultures,” can potentially radicalise individuals and inspire them to violence.²⁷

Trends

For the past several years, Swedish agencies have not published statistics on XRW violence. From 1997 to 2005, the counter-subversion branch of the SSS published annual statistics of crimes “related to the internal security of the realm,” among which were crimes motivated by white-power ideology and crimes that, in addition to such a motive, had a confirmed connection to the white-power scene.²⁸ In 2006, however, the SSS ceased publishing such statistics, and instead, the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (SNCCP) was tasked with publishing statistics of hate crimes.²⁹ In these reports, the SNCCP for years categorised some hate crimes as potentially connected to right-wing extremism and national-socialism, but in 2015, they declared they lacked the competence and resources to continue this practice, instead referring the public to NGO sources such as the Expo Foundation.³⁰

The Expo Foundation, conducting its own research, publishes statistics concerning the overall public activity of XRW actors, which indicate a large overall increase in such activity over the past 10 years.³¹ Instances of organised political activism in Sweden by XRW groups have increased from 1465 in 2010, to 2535 in 2019, with a peak of 3938 in 2018. The majority of these instances have been organised

propaganda-distribution events, but recent years have also seen an increase in the proportion of instances of combat-training sessions, demonstrations, and marches.³²

However, government data on XRW crime or on XRW activities deemed a threat to the Swedish public are either no longer compiled or simply not made public by agencies, something which has prompted criticism from leading XRW scholars.³³ The lack of public data risks creating the misleading impression that there have been no cases of XRW violence in Sweden in the past five years.

In fact, since 2015 there have been at least four major acts of XRW violence in Sweden. These acts are widely, and officially, recognised to have been motivated by XRW ideology, but they were not prosecuted as terrorism offences, something which has sparked public controversy, criticism from terrorism experts, and a comment from the Interior Minister that Swedish anti-terror laws may be in need of modification.^{34 35} In October 2015, a 22-year-old now considered to have been radicalised in part by online XRW propaganda attacked a school where he used a blade to kill three people, including a minor. He was killed by police while violently resisting arrest. Police, although stating the man had chosen his targets for their skin colour, deemed the incident not a terror attack but a hate crime.³⁶ Three further acts were perpetrated by what allegedly had been a “rogue” NRM cell whose members had received combat training in a RID camp outside St. Petersburg.³⁷

The organisation was said to have sanctioned this activity but the subsequent actions by its “rogue” members resulting in a series of terror bombings targeting leftists and refugees in western Sweden, allegedly were not authorised by it.³⁸ Subsequently, three men were charged with carrying out one failed and two successful bombing attacks in Västra Götaland county in the winter of 2016/2017. All three men were members of NRM, though evidence suggests they were frustrated with NRM’s supposed “moderation.”³⁹ The prosecutor declined to charge

the men with terrorism, though the indictment explicitly acknowledged that the attacks may well be considered acts of terror.⁴⁰ The U.S. Department of State has explicitly described these events as “a series of terror attacks.”⁴¹ A government inquiry currently proposing new anti-terror legislation highlights the Västra Götaland attacks as relevant examples of XRW violence.⁴² It is worth noting that under the proposed new anti-terror law, the cases discussed above would conceivably have been easier to prosecute as terrorism offences, given proposed modifications to those very criteria of the law that had been, at the time, emphasised by authorities as complicating or precluding the possibility to prosecute the said acts as terrorism offences.⁴³

Far-right political agitation and the diffusion of XRW ideology helped instigate waves of attacks on mosques and on refugee housing in recent years, and has inspired at least three separate lone actors without ties to organised groups to carry out multiple deadly attacks motivated by XRW ideology in 1991–1992, 2003–2010, and 2015.⁴⁴ An investigation found an average of one attack on a mosque per month in 2014, including arson attacks and swastikas spray-painted on walls.⁴⁵ In 2015, the number of attacks on refugee housing spiked from between four to 19 incidents in the preceding years to 50, coinciding with a surge of anti-refugee rhetoric from far-right politicians and violent and terror-promoting incitement from their sympathisers on social media and from XRW propaganda outlets agitating against refugee housing.^{46 47 48 49} Only a few arrests were made for these attacks, but at least one suspect had a background in the XRW scene.⁵⁰ The government inquiry on a new anti-terror law highlights the 2015–2016 attacks on refugee housing as a relevant example of XRW attacks that endangered the public.⁵¹ Another wave of seemingly premeditated attacks on refugee housing in 2018 prompted the Housing Minister to urge the government to consider such incidents as potential acts of terror and the security services to investigate them as such.^{52 53}

The Swedish Security Service considers that formal organisations have become less important for perpetrators of ideologically motivated crime, pointing to a resurgence of autonomous so-called “leaderless resistance” as a *modus operandi* for violent extremists.⁵⁴

Finances

The SCPVE states that:

*there has long been commercial activity in the [white power] scene and it is relatively extensive. The sale of propaganda material in the form of clothes, books, posters, music and stickers occurs both on-line and in connection to political meetings and manifestations.*⁵⁵

The precise extent and financial weight of XRW commerce, much of which takes place on the black market, is an under-researched question and remains unknown. Publicly declared financial data for the company of one prominent seller of XRW propaganda merchandise (Midgård) shows a steady increase in turnover since the year 2013 (with a net turnover of 820 000 SEK for 2019), but such data may not be wholly reliable.⁵⁶ Notable sellers of XRW merchandise include Greenpilled (greenpilled.com), a web shop operated by NRM, whose profits the neo-Nazi group claims “go directly to the struggle”; Nordic Wear, linked to NY and now inactive, which sold the XRW European Brotherhood and Thor Steinar brands of clothes; and Midgård (midgaardshop.com). Greenpilled offers customers information in English as well as Swedish; and Midgård has English, German, Finnish, French, Italian, Polish, Portuguese, and Russian versions of its website as well as Swedish. Logik (logik.se), originally tied to the neo-Nazi Party of the Swedes, is a publisher selling the literature of historical as well as contemporary and active XRW activists. In addition, XRW and hate literature is sold in major mainstream online book stores such as Adlibris and Bokus.^{57 58}

On the social media platform Telegram, the channel WHITE UNITED, which has ties to NRM and which frequently features illegal hate speech, sells XRW propaganda material. Norway’s XRW scene has a comparative lack of domestic ideological merchandise; instead, many import from Swedish sellers.⁵⁹ A 2017 data breach revealed that from 2012 to 2016, NRM’s web shop (since replaced by Greenpilled) took orders from hundreds of foreign shipping addresses in Sweden’s neighbouring countries, as well as France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, Estonia, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Russia, and Switzerland, constituting around 12 percent of orders.⁶⁰ It was also revealed that a number of politicians from parties in parliament were among NRM’s customers, including 14 politicians from the right-wing Sweden Democrats party, one of whom had paid for membership in the group.⁶¹

Sweden has historically had a thriving white power music scene, with some 40 events organised in the past 10 years.⁶² Such events, however, while they serve a strategic function for the scene, are not believed to yield a significant net financial profit for the organisers; rather, they generate just enough funds to cover their expenses.

In 2016, the European political party Alliance for Peace and Freedom (APF) and the foundation Europa Terra Nostra (ETN), affiliated with APF, obtained nearly 600,000 euros in grants from the European Parliament. ETN used some of the money to organise a major political meeting for Swedish XRW actors, including violent and violence-espousing groups like NY and Motgift.⁶³ There have been multiple attempts by APF and ETN to obtain EU grants.⁶⁴ APF’s president and chairman Roberto Fiore was convicted in 1985 for links to *Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari*, the XRW group behind the 1980 Bologna massacre.⁶⁵ APF’s Secretary-General Stefan Jacobsson is a key actor in the Swedish XRW. In the early 2000s he had a leading role in the NRM. He was the founder of the Swedish group Free the Order, a support group for the American XRW terror organisation The Order/Silent Brotherhood.⁶⁶ From 2013 until its dissolution

in 2015, Jacobsson was the leader of the Swedish neo-Nazi Party of the Swedes, during which time he took part in an armed attack on political opponents.⁶⁷

In the fall of 2015, NRM accepted a sum of money, believed to be around 30,000 SEK, from Stanislav Vorobyev, the leader of RID, a Russian XRW group.⁶⁸ RID and Vorobyev have since been designated as terrorists by the U.S. State Department.⁶⁹ The SCPVE has stated that “considering that Russian oligarchs support and establish contacts with international extreme right-wing actors, the possibility cannot be excluded that the donation to NRM originated from sources close to the Russian regime.”⁷⁰

Most persons in the XRW scene are thought to be low-income earners who use their own money to finance their political activity, with such money coming from “traditional wage-labour and government welfare” and from crime including “robbery and thefts” as well as “economic crime”.^{71 72 73} According to the SSS, the criminal activity associated with the violence-promoting XRW scene is of a type that does not require large quantities of money, thus, even relatively modest sums can have major importance for their ability to carry out plots.⁷⁴

In recent years, the financial activity of NRM and its propaganda outlet Nordfront have been under investigation by the Swedish Tax Agency for failing to properly record and declare its economic activity, thereby evading taxes. The extent of their commercial activity remains unknown.⁷⁵

As of 2018, the NRM through Nordfront asks supporters to donate to the group using cryptocurrencies, particularly Bitcoin. It also asks for donations in the following other currencies: Bitcoin Cash, Cardano, Dash, Ethereum, Litecoin, Monero, Nem, Neo, and Stellar, as well as Brave Rewards through the Brave web browser. Sums raised through such donations appear to have been relatively modest, though a single donor deposited around 25,000 SEK in April 2018.⁷⁶ The authors of a recent study at the Center for Asymmetric Threats and Terrorist Studies

at the Swedish Defence University, undertaken on behalf of the Swedish Center for Preventing Violent Extremism, claim to have identified 216 transactions associated with the NRM’s Bitcoin wallet from January 2018 to March 2020. According to the study, the amount of deposits has increased in the last year, with typical transaction values equivalent to a few hundred SEK, with and a few outlier transactions the equivalent of hundreds of thousands. Deposits to NRM’s account in total “have generated a value the equivalent of nearly one million Swedish crowns.”⁷⁷ However, it cannot be ruled out that part of these sums were deposited by NRM members themselves for administrative or practical purposes.

Online activities

The Swedish XRW scene has a long history of being early adopters and effective users of new and alternative forms of media, including online media, driven by the strategic necessity to overcome their peripheral position and lack of access to traditional media platforms.⁷⁸ Websites and social media are used to conduct indoctrination, agitation, recruitment, and fundraising. The online space functions as a strategic bastion in the social periphery where XRW actors can “dig trenches” and regroup when they fail to gain ground in the real world. It allows them to maintain geographically widespread communities over time and to develop and continuously disseminate propaganda at relatively low cost, regardless of their ability to mobilise followers in the physical world. Online activity has today become an indispensable dimension of the Swedish XRW scene. A leading expert on Sweden’s XRW observed in 2015 that:

during the '00s, the virtual worlds [of the white power scene] grew rapidly in extent and [we now see] two parallel worlds—one digital and one physical—which are in constant symbiosis and so integrated with one another that they can hardly exist without one another. [...] [This] digital development has also created movements without national borders, with contact networks that previous generations of activists could

only dream about. [...] [We now see] a sort of “network of networks”— where both organizations and individuals are in constant touch with one another— and where [actors] in separate networks, which [to varying degrees] share basic ideological notions, are constantly debating, exchanging ideas and copying successful campaigns and forms of action. This in turn creates complex and complicated virtual structures, where it is difficult to determine what is organized or unorganized, and where that to some extent no longer matters, whereas the belonging and sense of community with a scene [miljö] of likeminded is the central thing, and not necessarily membership in a specific organization.”⁷⁹

This development has only intensified in recent years, with social media bringing the scene’s various actors even closer together. Furthermore, in the view of the SSS, “[w]ith the help of social media, violence-promoting extremists can build narratives, spread propaganda and give a sense of community, but also lower thresholds for violence and raise abilities with regards to methods, manufacturing explosives and acquiring weapons.”⁸⁰

NRM is a transnational organisation with branches in multiple countries, making online communications important for the coherence of the organisation. In the words of one SSS analyst, “the [strategic] orientation of the top leadership [of the NRM] is communicated not just at meetings and social gatherings but also via the internet, social media [...] and podcasts.”⁸¹ XRW groups like NRM, TFS, and NS use podcasts to broadcast their message and to keep members and supporters engaged in their cause. Some XRW groups act primarily online, as media platforms. NRM has an English-language podcast, *Nordic Frontier*, for foreign audiences; they also have an English-language website and, on the social media platform VKontakte, a Russian-language one.⁸²

Key XRW actors in recent years like NRM and NY have systematically digitally documented and published their real-world activism on their own websites and foreign-based social media platforms like YouTube,

VKontakte, Facebook, and Telegram, in order to amplify and broadcast it for propaganda purposes. The NRM consistently livestreams key activist events like uniformed marches or mass gatherings. NRM branches in Sweden’s neighbouring countries also film and publish their activism in their own languages but, as these branches are smaller, their propaganda is less extensive than that of the main Swedish branch. NRM propaganda is overall predominantly in Swedish, which is mutually intelligible with Norwegian and Danish for many in these countries, as well as in English.⁸³

Propaganda also functions as a recruitment tool. At least one former ranking member of NRM attributed his original decision to join the organisation to being impressed with their propaganda videos depicting NRM street confrontations with police officers that were published on YouTube; at the time, he was a teenager with no prior connections to the XRW scene.⁸⁴

The XRW uses online media to glorify foreign XRW terrorists, encourage individuals to take violent action, and engage in conspiracy theories and dehumanisation to target groups and individuals and turn them into legitimate targets for violence in the physical world.⁸⁵ A 2019 investigation revealed that 11 Facebook groups with a combined membership of about 44,000 users and sympathetic to the Sweden Democrats party were rife with exceptionally dehumanising, ideologically extreme, and violence-promoting rhetoric, including praise for lone-acting terrorists and calls to follow their example, incitement to mass murder and “extermination” of refugees, Africans, Muslims, and centre-left politicians, burning mosques, assassination of cabinet ministers, bombing government offices, and other acts that would constitute terrorist offences.⁸⁶ The Swedish Defence Research Agency believes this type of dehumanisation may increase the risk of violent extremist acts.^{87 88}

There are signs that a new terror-glorifying XRW subculture, mainly flourishing on the network of

Telegram channels—called “Terrorgram” by some researchers—is radicalising young Swedes. In the past year, three youths without any known ties to XRW organisations but who have been active and seemingly radicalised on such networks have been investigated for potential involvement in violent XRW activity. Swedish security services have pointed to the online diffusion of XRW ideology throughout the western world as a cause for concern and has linked it to the growing threat of XRW terror.^{89 90}

Response

Given the lack of official data on XRW activity and violence, it is difficult to independently assess the Swedish response. The current anti-terror laws, a patchwork of legislation whose key law was introduced in 2003, have only been used once, in 2005, to prosecute XRW criminals but then yielded no convictions.⁹¹ A reformed terror law is being proposed.⁹² As mentioned previously, the new proposed law would conceivably have made it easier to prosecute recent major acts of XRW violence as terrorist offences.

In 2014, a new agency was launched that in 2018 became the SCPVE, after studying, among other things, the example of Denmark’s PVE agency, the Danish Centre for Prevention of Extremism.⁹³ The SCPVE, a part of the SNCCP, is tasked with coordinating and supporting municipalities, national agencies, and civil society in PVE work. CVE and CT work is chiefly the purview of the SSS in partnership with police and a range of other security agencies through collaborations such as the Counter-Terrorism Cooperation Council.⁹⁴ In 2018, the Swedish National Audit Office criticised the inconsistent intelligence-sharing between the SSS and the Swedish Police Authority, prompting those agencies to launch a new collaborative effort, Redex, to “reduce” violent-promoting extremist scenes.⁹⁵

The possibility of introducing new legislation to prohibit racist organizations, which would almost

certainly affect NRM, is being investigated by a government-appointed all-party parliamentary commission, tasked with delivering its final report on the issue by the end of February, 2021, at the latest.⁹⁶ A prohibition on racist organisations has been considered several times in modern Swedish history, particularly in the context of Sweden’s 1971 ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, but so far it has not resulted in such legislation.⁹⁷

Transnational connectivity

Sweden’s XRW scene exhibits a high degree of transnationality. As a phenomenon, it cannot be understood either historically or today without reference to the international ideological movement of which it forms an interactive element. Efforts to counteract the scene that fail to analyse it in transnational terms are unlikely to be effective. Recently, the SSS observed that “[t]he threat (intention and ability) of violence-promoting right-wing extremism in Sweden is affected to a high degree by actors and conditions outside the country’s borders.”⁹⁸

Throughout history, a continuous exchange of ideological discourse and “learning” is observed between Swedish and foreign XRW actors, facilitated by the English language, leading to a kind of isomorphism where Swedish XRW actors increasingly sound, look, and behave like those in other countries and vice versa. At the deadly “Unite the Right” rally held in Charlottesville, Virginia, in the summer of 2017, one of the organisers, leading white supremacist Matthew Heimbach of the Traditionalist Workers Party (TWP), told an interviewer, in response to a question about their methods of organising: “[We are] primarily following the European example of [Greek XRW group] Golden Dawn, the Nordic Resistance Movement, and other groups that are really at the vanguard of nationalist organizing in the world.”⁹⁹ As the U.S. anti-extremism group Anti-Defamation League stated in a report submitted to the U.S. Congress which explores the mutual influence

of European and American XRW actors, including between the United States and Sweden:

We are witnessing the internationalization of the white supremacist movement. Over the past decade, we have seen surging violence in the United States, Europe and beyond motivated by elements of white supremacy from Anders Breivik in Norway to Brenton Tarrant in New Zealand to Patrick Crusius in El Paso, Texas. These killers influence and inspire one another. European and American adherents are learning from each other, supporting each other and reaching new audiences.¹⁰⁰

When a young man was killed in the small town of Härnösand in May 2020 in unclear circumstances, the NRM's propaganda outlet Nordfront seized upon the event and published a partly fabricated story painting the man as a "heroic martyr murdered by an evil migrant."¹⁰¹ This martyrdom narrative quickly spread throughout Swedish XRW media and soon all over the world, with far-right outlets and media accounts repeating the story and publishing messages of support. Since 10 May 2020, such messages have been documented in Australia, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.¹⁰² This was not the first time in recent years the death of a Swede became significant for XRW actors in other countries. Brenton Tarrant, perpetrator of the 2019 Christchurch terror attack, painted the name "Ebba Åkerlund" on one of his rifles; Åkerlund, an 11-year-old girl, was one of the victims of a lethal 2017 terror attack in Stockholm, and Tarrant claimed in his manifesto to be "avenging" her.¹⁰³

NRM is today an international organisation, with Sweden as its hub and with minor branches in Finland, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland. In these countries, except for Finland, which has its own robust XRW scene, the guidance and usually the physical presence of Swedish NRM activists is crucial for local ideological counterparts' ability to mobilise. Neo-Nazis often cross borders in Scandinavia.

In 2019, Norwegian, Danish, and Finnish activists and sympathisers took part in NRM activities in Sweden.¹⁰⁴ In April 2019, NRM organised a public propaganda event in Copenhagen in which some 60 of the approximately 70 participants were Swedes, which turned violent.¹⁰⁵ In September 2019, an NRM delegation, including the leader, travelled to Iceland to socialise with local neo-Nazis and to lead them in public activism.^{106 107} In December 2019, the NRM with its leader participated in an international neo-Nazi rally in Helsinki.¹⁰⁸ Such trips directly enable XRW activism in the target countries that could not otherwise occur for lack of numbers and resources (with the exception of Finland).¹⁰⁹ Less experienced activists are able to learn the praxis of activism from the relatively well-organised NRM. The visits are also both a show of strength and a form of diplomacy, which consolidates NRM influence and authority over their members and sympathisers in the Nordic countries, and confer prestige both on the visitors and their hosts, raising the profiles of all actors involved, since the ability to organise political international travel—diplomatic missions—is viewed as a sign of importance among XRW actors.¹¹⁰ In 2019, NRM declared that one of its strategic five-year objectives is to exercise influence beyond the Nordic countries, stating:

Our struggle is also a global struggle that actually concerns all the white peoples of the world. Even though the most important thing, of course, is that we achieve the support we need at home and that we win over our own people here in the North, we also view it as part of our responsibility to be able to influence nationally-minded organisations around the world in a healthy and radical national-socialist direction.¹¹¹

In 2016, NRM hosted guests from Norway and Belarus in Sweden.¹¹² NRM also visits ideological allies outside of Scandinavia, particularly in Germany where it has close ties to Der III Weg.¹¹³ From June 2016 to February 2019, NRM made at least nine visits to Germany, three to Bulgaria, one to France, one to Belarus, one to Czechia, one to Italy, and one to Hungary, meeting with various European XRW actors.¹¹⁴

In the same period, there were some 90 cases of formal visits between Swedish and foreign XRW actors.¹¹⁵ Germany was the most frequent destination. On a few occasions, Swedish XRW actors have also gone to the United States and to South Africa.¹¹⁶ In addition to the same benefits as discussed above – the sharing of know-how; diplomatic relations with potential strategic allies; prestige-building within both the domestic and international scene—these transnational contacts also help develop among XRW actors a sense of global community and ideological solidarity with those considered “racial” or political counterparts in countries all over the world, so that an XRW actor as far away as New Zealand can feel intimately concerned with—and prompted to act in their own country in response to—events in Sweden, and vice versa.

In recent years, individuals with origins or backgrounds in other countries, including Finland, Germany, Armenia, Estonia, Greece, Italy, Iran, Norway, Russia, Spain, and the United States have figured in NRM circles in Sweden, some as visitors, some as residents who support or participate in NRM activity such as gatherings, demonstrations, martial-arts practice and distributing propaganda material.¹¹⁷ The SSS, in a recent publication by the Swedish Defence University, provides details on 507 individuals who, the agency says, have been of interest in its work monitoring violence-promoting right-wing extremism in 2018 and 2019. Of them, 426 were born in Sweden, 63 are of unknown countries of birth, and the rest were born in Germany, Russia, Norway, Estonia, Finland, Iraq, Iran, and Poland.¹¹⁸ Seventeen of the individuals have taken part in paramilitary training in Russia, Czechia, Poland, and Bulgaria “among other [countries].” Nine others have, according to the agency, fought in the armed conflict in Ukraine.¹¹⁹

As discussed above, NRM also developed ties with RID, the Russian XRW group, which in turn has had relations with Swedish XRW actors for at least a decade, and previously had a Swedish branch.¹²⁰ Since at least 2012, they have had contacts with NRM.¹²¹

In 2015, a time of consolidation and new leadership for the NRM, a RID delegation, including the leader, Vorobyev, the group’s long-time representative in Sweden, Anatoly Udodov, and Denis Gariev, the head of RID’s paramilitary training programme Partizan, was invited to NRM’s annual high-profile political meeting, the “North Days.”¹²² At the meeting, the RID delegation presented NRM with a gift of money, invited them to join the international far-right network World National Conservative Movement, co-founded by RID, which afterwards began to list NRM as members, and gave a speech outlining RID’s pro-Russian position on the war in Ukraine.^{123 124}

Also present at the meeting were the three NRM activists who would later receive paramilitary training through RID’s Partizan programme in Russia, and then, in the winter of 2016/2017, carry out acts of terror in Sweden’s Gothenburg region.¹²⁵ The 2015 meeting, and NRM’s decision to host the RID delegation, is considered a pivotal mark in NRM’s position on the war in Ukraine and on geopolitics more generally, before which they had sided with Ukrainian nationalists, but after which they are considered to have maintained a pro-Russian position in line with RID.^{126 127} This realignment is considered potentially consequential “for Swedish and international security” by the SCPVE.¹²⁸ The SCPVE further considers the association between RID and NRM to have potentially made the latter a greater security threat.¹²⁹ Furthermore, the agency considers that:

[i]n [Sweden’s] work against violence-promoting extremism, the relation between [RID] and NRM cannot just be seen as a collaboration between two right-wing extremist groups. The Russian state’s support for domestic and foreign right-wing extremists means that [the possibility] cannot be excluded that a foreign power by supporting NRM is working to aggravate political polarisation in Sweden, or even by proxy recruiting Swedish extremists to fight for Russian interests internationally. It is difficult to determine exactly the consequences of RID’s and NRM’s relation, but it should nevertheless be seen as a cautionary example of how interconnected, and analytically difficult

to separate, the threat is to Swedish security from foreign powers and violence-promoting extremism.¹³⁰

A recent study by the Swedish Defence University highlights the potential role of influence operations by foreign powers seeking to amplify radical nationalist narratives in order to undermine cohesion within and between European countries, and potentially providing organisational and financial support to XRW actors.¹³¹

The NY, which disbanded in 2019, stressed the importance of international connections. Its members had ties to and drew inspiration from Junge Nationaldemokraten (JN), the youth wing of Germany's NPD.¹³² From 2011, NY sent delegations yearly to participate in Polish Independence Day rallies, where NY's leader has given a speech. NY was formally allied with the group All-Polish Youth and has also participated in political activity in Italy, Lithuania, Germany, and Hungary.¹³³ On at least three occasions between 2014 and 2017, NY representatives visited Ukraine, where their leader gave speeches and took part in conferences, to show their support for the country's XRW.¹³⁴

Ukraine also became a destination for Swedish XRW combat volunteers in 2014, who fought on the Ukrainian nationalist side.¹³⁵ ¹³⁶ Part of the motivation to fight in Ukraine was due to friendly ties established before the war between the neo-Nazi SvP party and Svoboda.¹³⁷ The two groups considered each other to be fraternal organisations and arranged meetings and conferences together.¹³⁸ SvP initially gave its support to Swedish combat volunteers traveling to Ukraine, and defended Svoboda from criticism by others in the XRW scene. However, in the summer of 2014, SvP pivoted, declaring their relations with Svoboda had collapsed and condemning them and other Ukrainian nationalist groups for having become allied to "American-Jewish forces."¹³⁹ Ukrainian nationalists have attempted to recruit Swedish NRM members to fight in Ukraine, but NRM's leadership, being pro-Russian in its geopolitical orientation, has not allowed members to go.¹⁴⁰

COVID-19 pandemic

The COVID-19 pandemic does not seem to have affected the Swedish XRW scene in any profound way. Overall, despite some cases of adapting its forms of activism and its messaging, it has thus far been largely unable to capitalise on the unique circumstances of the crisis. This may be related to the relatively low social impact of measures taken by the Swedish authorities to tackle the medical crisis, and the relatively high level of support shown by the public for ruling parties, leaving the XRW with no major protest movements or negative opinions to exploit.¹⁴¹

The Swedish Exit programme supporting persons leaving extremist scenes has, during the pandemic, seen an increase in the number of contacts from people concerned that someone in their family may be undergoing radicalisation particularly by XRW ideology. The director of the programme has stated that the isolation many are subjected to during the crisis is a major contributor to radicalisation processes, and that the prevailing conditions under the pandemic, including social uncertainty and more time spent online, increase the risk that people embrace extremist views.¹⁴²

Gender

Recent decades have seen the increasing participation of women in the Swedish XRW scene, but they are still a clear minority.¹⁴³ The increasing prominence of female XRW ideologues in the international scene has helped attract greater numbers of female sympathisers.¹⁴⁴ In 2003, it was estimated one of the biggest actors, the National Socialist Front party, had a female membership of 17 percent.¹⁴⁵ The female membership of NRM was estimated at around 19 percent in 2015.¹⁴⁶ In 2017, about 27 percent of a wave of new NRM recruits was female.¹⁴⁷ A 2018 study suggested that women make up about 10 percent of the white power (XRW) scene.¹⁴⁸ The results of a 2016 study on anti-immigrant websites suggest the proportion of


female writers for XRW propaganda websites may have been less than 10 percent.¹⁴⁹

Ideological anti-feminism is central to the Swedish XRW scene, which is characterised by extreme forms of nationalism insisting on the “racial purity” and “demographic vitality” of the nation. In this ideological perspective, women are primarily considered instruments of racial reproduction, able to give birth to either “the right” or “the wrong” kind of children. It follows that women’s behaviour, their values, their bodies, and their reproductive rights must be controlled, as individuals and as a collective, by men, in order to make certain they fulfil their “natural duty” to the nation as sexually available to men and as active mothers.¹⁵⁰ Women who are perceived in the XRW scene to embody good ideological values and to live in accordance with ultranationalist ideals, whether as activists alongside men in the political struggle or in childrearing outside of politics, are often praised and idolised in the scene. Women who are seen to deviate from these ideals, in particular women identified as feminists and women who do not give birth

to “racially pure” children, instead become targets of harassment, threats, and violence.¹⁵¹ Despite the prevalence of misogynistic attitudes and behaviour in the Swedish XRW scene, a minority of women have always been active and played key roles in it.¹⁵²

Statistical snapshot of the violent XRW threat¹⁵³

As shown in the graph below, the total activity of the violent XRW milieu in Sweden increased between 2015 and 2018. During this period, the NRM rose to almost completely dominate the field with its actions, such as “combat practice,” demonstrations, rallies and marches, indoctrination (organised group viewing of propaganda films and study circles of NRM manuals or Nazi literature), propaganda distribution (organised outings to distribute propaganda materials), and miscellaneous other activities such as social gatherings, forest hikes, etc.) 2019, however, saw a notable drop in the overall activities of the violent XRW milieu.



Total activity of the violent XRW milieu in Sweden.

In light-blue – all organisations, in dark-blue – the NRM, in black – all apart from the NRM.

Endnotes

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UNITED KINGDOM

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Legal situation

There is no specific definition of “right-wing extremism” (XRW) or “right-wing terrorism” in the British legal system (comprising the jurisdictions of England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland), or particular legislation targeting XRW groups.¹ The key legislation under which many right-wing extremists are convicted, The Terrorism Act (2000), defines terrorism as the use or threat of action designed to influence government, international governmental organisations, the public or a section of the public, for a “political, religious, racial, or ideological cause.”² The use of firearms or explosives (in the furtherance of such a cause) is automatically considered terrorism whether or not these conditions are met. Section 3(3) (a) of this act allows the Home Secretary to proscribe terrorist groups. This was used against an XRW group for the first time in 2016.

Policy and strategy documents do define right-wing extremism and neo-Nazism. The UK’s Counter-Extremism Strategy defines right-wing extremism as driven by a “core hatred of minorities, or to promote Islamophobic or antisemitic views.” Common ideological narratives include the notion that “Western civilization faces an impending ‘race war’, or that a multicultural society will lead to ‘white genocide’.” These ideas are used to instil fear, in order to convince the white population that different races or religions threaten their way of life.³ This definition recognises the so-called “great replacement” of native populations by outsiders, which is used to mobilise anti-immigrant sentiment, nationally and internationally.⁴

CONTEST, the British government’s counter-terrorism strategy, explains that right-wing extremists and neo-Nazis seek to exploit, “anxieties around globalisation, conflict and migration [...] These groups may

vary considerably in their rhetoric, but they share the racist view that minority communities are harming the interests of a ‘native’ population.”⁵ Narratives propagated by both Islamist and XRW groups are said to have “reinforced and even mutually benefited each other,” a process known as “cumulative extremism.”⁶

The idea that right-wing extremism shares features with other kinds of extremism finds expression in the Commission for Countering Extremism (CCE) report of October 2019. The CCE, founded in the aftermath of the Manchester Arena bombings in 2017, defines a new term, “hateful extremism,” which can incorporate both Islamist and XRW ideology.⁷ Hateful extremism is “hostile or supremacist beliefs directed at an out-group who are perceived as a threat to the wellbeing, survival or success of an in-group” that “cause, or are likely to cause, harm to individuals, communities or wider society.”⁸

History and key players of the XRW scene

To contextualise the contemporary XRW scene in Britain since 2015, it is necessary to recognise wider shifts within the milieu that predated this. The British National Party (BNP), the most electorally successful XRW party in British history, imploded in 2010 shortly after winning two seats in the 2009 European Parliamentary elections (with almost one million votes nationwide), and 1.9% of the vote in the 2010 general election.⁹ Meanwhile, the anti-Muslim street scene, exemplified by the English Defence League (EDL), lost momentum from 2013 onwards following the departure of its leader known as “Tommy Robinson” from the group, and the appearance of local splinter groups such as the North West Infidels (NWI).¹⁰

The more youthful component of Britain's overtly national-socialist milieu coalesced around National Action (NA), formed in 2013. This group, which paid great attention to a visual aesthetic that stylised and valorised action and violence, quickly attracted a youthful cohort of followers.¹¹ Whilst lone actors had previously been characteristic of XRW terrorism, NA came to represent a networked threat with police arresting numerous individuals, several of them teenagers, who were either directly involved with the group, or self-identified with it, for a range of terrorism-related offences.¹²

During the "Brexit" campaign, in June 2016, a white supremacist with a history of purchasing extreme-right propaganda from a U.S.-based neo-Nazi group called National Alliance, murdered Jo Cox MP in Batley, West Yorkshire.¹³ NA glorified the killer and the Home Secretary banned the group in December 2016, the first XRW outfit receiving such treatment.¹⁴ There was a surge in extreme right terrorist arrests over the next two years, resulting in three interlocking trials. These were largely for the offence of "membership" of a proscribed group, which was now a criminal offence, rather than representing a rise in violent activity per se. The ban, arrests, and prosecutions, led to the nullification of NA's "revolutionary" strategy.¹⁵

As a result of the aforementioned arrests/trials, the violent milieu currently appears to have reverted to being online, largely active around a loosely networked subcultural cluster of accelerationist Telegram groups that take some measure of inspiration from *Siege*, the collected writings of U.S. Nazi James Mason, who had a formative influence on the Atomwaffen Division (AWD).¹⁶ This includes Sonnenkreig Division and Feuerkrieg Division, the latter of which was derivative of, but also in tension with, AWD.¹⁷

This report focuses on groups within the XRW milieu that the British government has proscribed as "terrorist" organisations and on several lone-actor terrorists. This includes NA and groups viewed as

"aliases" for it: Scottish Dawn and National Socialist Anti-Capitalist Action (NS131); Sonnenkrieg Division and System Resistance Network; and, more recently, Feuerkrieg Division.¹⁸ Where appropriate, the report also discusses the activities of a legal far-right group, Britain First.¹⁹

Trends

There have been two cases since 2015 in which XRW terrorists carried out attacks resulting in death. Thomas Mair murdered Jo Cox MP on 16 June 2016 and Darren Osborne committed a vehicular attack on worshippers outside Finsbury Park mosque on 19 June 2017 that killed Makram Ali.²⁰ The threat from XRW terrorism appears to be rising, however. Since 2017, police and security agencies have disrupted eight terrorist plots.²¹ The most high-profile was a plot to murder Labour Party MP Rosie Cooper involving an XRW activist, formerly of National Action.²² Another NA member had previously attempted to murder a Sikh man in January 2015.²³

Whilst the number of terrorist plots is comparatively low, the number of arrests and convictions for other terrorist-related offences is much higher. Whilst an official list of XRW arrests and prosecutions since 2015 is not publicly available, collating various official reports and media coverage highlights that there have been about 90 arrests since January 2015.²⁴ These are for terrorist-related and other violent offences including possession of weapons, explosives, or inciting violence, prosecuted using other legal statutes. Militants often face multiple charges for an array of offences. These have included murder; attempted murder; inciting violence; possession and/or distribution of terrorist manuals, knives, guns, and explosives (including petrol bombs, nail bombs, pipe-bombs, and a CO2 bomb); arson against property, including mosques; and, membership of a proscribed group.²⁵

Given tight restrictions on firearms, efforts to obtain and use guns are extremely rare, making Thomas

Mair's attack on Jo Cox MP stand out even more. In terms of *modus operandi*, Osborne's was not the only recent vehicular attack. Between 2017 and 2020, there were four other such incidents. On 23 June 2017, Polish national Marek Zakrocki drove his van at Kamal Ahmed outside an Asian restaurant in north-west London, telling police he wished to kill a Muslim to "help the country."²⁶ There were further racist attacks using vehicles against pedestrians in Leicester (September 2017),²⁷ London (October 2018),²⁸ and Bristol (July 2020).²⁹

Most though not all of those arrested since 2015 are not members of any particular group. A spike in arrests and convictions between 2017 and 2019 reflects the 28 arrests made for belonging to a banned group, though not all have resulted in convictions. This highlights an increased willingness by the British government to use proscription to disrupt violent XRW groups rather than indicating a rise in violent activity per se. This began with the banning of National Action in December 2016. Since then, the Home Secretary has banned a further five groups: Scottish Dawn and National Socialist Anti-Capitalist Action (September 2017); Sonnenkrieg Division and System Resistance Network (February 2020); and Feuerkrieg Division (July 2020). Membership of these groups carries a penalty of up to 10 years imprisonment.

Notable arrests for membership of NA included a serving soldier, Finnish national Mikko Vehvilainen, who had been stockpiling legally-held weaponry for the supposedly imminent "race war," and who had sought to recruit other serving soldiers, and to assist NA members to join the armed forces.³⁰ More recently, police arrested a probationary member of the Metropolitan Police Service for NA membership.³¹ The overwhelming majority of those arrested for terrorism-related offences have been young men, though two women were also jailed for NA membership. There also appears to be a downward trend concerning the age of some of those arrested for terrorism-related offences. This includes a 16-year-old boy, who in January 2020 became the youngest person convicted of planning a terrorist attack in

the United Kingdom.³² The government's CHANNEL program (see "Response" section) has also seen a year-on-year rise in caseload since 2015/2016. The number of cases adopted for CHANNEL support relating to the XRW exceeded all other forms of extremism for the first time in 2018/2019, the latest for which figures are available.³³ XRW referrals accounted for 45% of those adopted for CHANNEL support, a rise of 1% on 2017/18. XRW referrals adopted for support accounted for 26% of the total in 2015/16 and 37% in 2016/17, so there is a significant upward trend in evidence.³⁴

Brenton Tarrant's terrorist attack in Christchurch, New Zealand, in March 2019 also energised Britain's violent milieu. It inspired several would-be perpetrators in the UK, including one man who attempted to murder a Bulgarian teenager the day after the attacks.³⁵ In another instance, police arrested a Luton man in December 2019 with a 2kg bag of sulphur powder and other bombmaking components who possessed a copy of Tarrant's manifesto on his computer.³⁶

Finances

Detailed information on the finances of right-wing extremists, especially terrorist groups, is in short supply. In 2017, Her Majesty's Treasury and the Home Office published a risk-assessment report on money laundering and terrorist financing. This stated that terrorist financing in the UK, including the XRW, is "varied, but usually low-level." Retail banking is the primary way that groups keep and move money. This is difficult to detect, as terrorists often act alone and amounts are very small, "often below £300."³⁷ There is no large-scale coordinated fundraising activity for terrorist groups. Attacks such as the Finsbury Park mosque attack cost the perpetrator, Darren Osborne, a mere £170 for the two-day hire of the van he used to plough into worshippers. The widespread use of crypto or digital currencies for terrorist financing is assessed as "low" in the risk-assessment report.³⁸

During 2013, NA raised money through its now banned PayPal account.³⁹ Anti-racism advocacy group *Hope Not Hate* reports that at least one larger donation (over \$1,000) came from the United States. Police sources indicate that NA founders often used their own resources to fund activities, having “come into money” via inheritances.⁴⁰ The North West NA group self-funded the cost of a private gym, costing about £5,000, including a £1,000 subvention from one of its founders, which served as a hub for the group following its ban. Matthew Collins writes that the group received funding from a British businessman based in Spain, who paid for mobile phones and travel expenses for the group.⁴¹

XRW groups in the UK have traditionally raised money through cash donations and bequests, but also crime. The North West Infidels (NWI) for instance were engaged in selling illegal drugs, though whether the individuals in question channelled these revenues into their political activities is unknown.⁴² More recently, XRW terror groups tend to avoid illicit trade, favouring donations and self-funding. The refusal of major payment processing companies to work with XRW groups has seen the development of alternative XRW crowdfunding sites (i.e., “Hatreon” and “Goy Fund Me”).⁴³ This has, arguably, cemented the “low cost, difficult to detect” model for XRW groups in the UK and elsewhere.

Whilst fundraising for terrorism within the United Kingdom appears to be negligible, there is evidence that British activists have provided logistical support to militant groups in Serbia, Kosovo, and Bulgaria.⁴⁴ Knights Templar International (KTI), allegedly led by former Britain First founder James Dowson, has met with the Shipka Bulgarian National Movement, a paramilitary-style organisation that defines itself as patriotic and seeks to thwart irregular migration into Europe, supplying its members with bulletproof vests, night-vision goggles, and drones to assist their patrols aimed at preventing migrants crossing the border from Turkey.⁴⁵ Dowson thanked supporters in the United States and the Philippines for financing the operation.⁴⁶ Reports also highlight Dowson’s

links to the pro-monarchist Serb group Order of the Dragon, and he has sought to equip Serb groups in northern Kosovo with *materiel* similar to that supposedly acquired for the Bulgarian vigilantes.⁴⁷ KTI filmed some of its propaganda in Serbia, often referencing the “great replacement” theory to mobilise current supporters and inspire new ones.⁴⁸

Online activities

The internet has been crucial for extreme right-wing terrorist groups. Indeed, many of these groups were “born digital” in the sense that—like AWD—those involved met through forums like the now defunct Iron March or Fascist Forge before moving their activities offline, evolving to become “real” groups.⁴⁹ Traditional far-right parties relied upon websites and forums for communication. The majority of newer groups utilise multiple platforms including end-to-end encrypted apps like Telegram to disseminate propaganda and bomb-making guides and its group-chat function for direct communication instead. Conversations begun on Telegram are, however, generally then switched to gaming chat platforms like Discord or Steam, encrypted chat apps like Wire, or secure email services, like Tutanota or Protonmail.⁵⁰

The resulting digital ecosystem might best be characterised as a “blind network” since those involved often are unknown to one another and geographically dispersed.⁵¹ Whilst lack of real-world contact may limit personal trust and group loyalty, it has enhanced international connectivity between militants. These looser digital networks seek to promote violence (constantly trumpeting its necessity and urgency) as a means of accelerating the collapse of “the System” whilst as an environment they exhibit none of the “internal brakes” on violence that real world organisations—even violent ones—contain.⁵²

The four key online platforms used by the British extreme right include Gab, Telegram, 4Chan, and BitChute, though militants also use end-to-end encrypted apps to communicate peer-to-peer and in

small invite-only groups. Despite being a banned terrorist group, NA videos propagating violent white supremacist ideology, remain accessible on the UK-based BitChute platform, which hosts material that may violate terms of service of mainstream sites like YouTube.⁵³ NA attempted to blend offline and online recruitment methods, and had a degree of success in doing so. Some of its older activists were former BNP members, with a grounding in more traditional recruitment methods.⁵⁴ The group was particularly adept at using slick propaganda, including the creation of racist memes, which it shared on university campuses (particularly in the Midlands region of England) and online in order to entice new recruits.⁵⁵

Since 2017, many of these accelerationist grouplets have migrated to Telegram, which they have used to incite violence. SKD spread similar violent and apocalyptic imagery, using the platform to call for Prince Harry to be shot as a “race traitor” and have advocated sexual violence and murder against the police.⁵⁶ FKD, an “accelerationist” group led—unknown to other members—by a 13-year-old Estonian boy,⁵⁷ used various platforms to forge a transnational web of contacts across Europe and North America, exhorting those involved to use violence to bring down the “System.”⁵⁸ The group used its Telegram channel to issue a death threat against the Chief Constable of West Midlands Police in September 2019 in response to the arrest of one of their members, a 16-year-old boy, on suspicion of the commission, preparation, and instigation of acts of terrorism.⁵⁹

Whilst much of the interaction between individuals within these blind networks remains virtual (and its violent talk often “performative”⁶⁰), there is some evidence of militants seeking to operationalise their digital contacts for terroristic ends. In January 2020, a Durham teenager became the youngest person convicted of planning a terror attack in the United Kingdom. He was jailed for six years and eight months.⁶¹ One of his many offences had including trying to build a bomb. To purchase the ingredi-

ents for his device he had turned to his contacts on Fascist Forge. He tried to purchase ammonium nitrate from one such contact, paying \$40 (£30.64) for it through an encrypted cash app, though the payment failed.⁶²

Telegram channels use violent imagery to disseminate their core message of violent confrontation and systemic collapse. Much of this imagery is transnational in nature, both in its creation and distribution. Many of the images associated with the milieu’s burgeoning aesthetic style were originally produced by a Canadian militant whilst much of the current crop of extremist images were produced by an American calling himself “Bjundabare.”⁶³ The imagery is usually violent, with vitriolic slogans directed towards inciting violence against Jews, Muslims, LGBTQ communities, and, frequently, the police. Many images celebrate right-wing terrorists as “Saints”, but also praises other figures like Theodore Kaczynski (the Unabomber) and Osama bin Laden. Much of his imagery was disseminated by British activists affiliated to FKD who turned them into posters and distributed them offline.

Groups such as Britain First, noted for staging confrontational “mosque invasions” and “Christian Patrols”, during which members of the group, copying Islamist attempts to enforce “Sharia law” with “Muslim Patrols” in east London,⁶⁴ patrolled in the same area using a former military Land Rover and distributing propaganda, are also prolific on the internet.⁶⁵ As well as having used the internet to sell merchandise, it is a crucial tool to spread its message. The group’s online presence is much more significant than its physical one.⁶⁶ To increase the reach of its online output, it has used paid advertising to push its content, and an army of “boosters” in the UK but also countries such as Spain and Australia who share content across platforms.⁶⁷ Analysis has shown that the group’s key approach is to portray Muslims and Islam as a dangerous other, an ideological approach described as “apocalyptic Christianity”.⁶⁸

Response

Right-wing extremism and terrorism come under the remit of the CONTEST strategy.⁶⁹ Right-wing extremism is dealt with under two pillars of CONTEST: “PURSUE” (where terrorists are pursued by the authorities), but especially “PREVENT”, the UK counter-radicalisation policy.⁷⁰ PREVENT is funded by the Home Office and other government departments in England and Wales. In Scotland, PREVENT is overseen by the Scottish Government. PREVENT does not officially operate in Northern Ireland, where security policy is managed by the Northern Ireland Office and The Security Service (MI5).

Implemented in 2003, PREVENT was originally a means-based programme focused on local authority areas with Muslim populations of over 5%.⁷¹ Since 2011, PREVENT takes a values-based approach, focusing on ideology and extremist ideas, giving equal priority to XRW and Islamist extremism.⁷² Alongside PREVENT is CHANNEL, the government’s voluntary de-radicalisation program, which operates in the pre-crime space.⁷³ It is a multi-agency safeguarding program, administered by local authorities. CHANNEL panels, who assess referrals, comprise individuals with experience in child and adult safeguarding, health, education, and the police.⁷⁴

Many agencies and arms of government are involved in countering XRW (and all forms of) extremism, led by the Home Office. The Home Office is also responsible for policing at all levels and MI5, which became the lead agency for detecting and countering XRW terrorism in April 2020.⁷⁵ MI5 works closely with Counter Terrorist Policing (CTP) to counter XRW terrorism. CTP units, organised on a regional basis, lead on investigative work and secure convictions. The Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism is responsible for strategy, policy and legislative responses to the threat of terrorism.⁷⁶

More broadly, “whole of society” or “public health” approaches to countering extremism are in evidence in the UK. The 2015 Counter-Terrorism and Security

Act imposed a duty on a range of public institutions including councils, schools, colleges, universities, and the health service to have “due regard” to people being drawn into terrorism, including the XRW (the “Prevent Duty”).⁷⁷ These efforts are underpinned by strategic communications and counter-narrative efforts implemented by the Home Office Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU), although its work has primarily focused on Islamist extremism.⁷⁸ A Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit, run by the London Metropolitan Police, works to remove illegal terrorist content from the web.

Transnational connectivity

Transnational connectivity has been an ingrained component of British XRW activism since the end of the First World War. The groups scrutinised in this brief are only the latest in a long line of groups to engage in such activity. This connectivity has been both online and offline. Older groups like Combat 18, notable for its letter bomb campaign, launched from Denmark in the late 1990s, is no longer active in the UK, though it retains an enduring “brand recognition.”⁷⁹ NA was particularly keen to embed itself at the centre of an international network. It did so through a range of activities aimed at building solidarity with other groups, its activists visiting militants in other countries to develop personal and political bonds, and being open to militants from other countries, particularly Poland, joining its own violent street activities

Before its proscription in 2016, NA participated in a range of demonstrations aimed at expressing its transnational solidarity with other violent groups and individuals, e.g., the demonstration supporting Gary Yarborough, one of the last remaining members of The Order, the U.S. terrorist group.⁸⁰ Other solidarity initiatives included a demonstration in support of the Ukrainian Right Sector. Unlike many other British XRW groups, NA was pro-Ukrainian rather than pro-Russian. At least two of its activists visited the Azov Regiment’s⁸¹ headquarters (December 2017),

though neither man took part in combat operations as foreign fighters.⁸² In exchange, the Ukrainian unit sent its Italian “emissary” back to the UK with a view of recruiting for the Azov Regiment but he came back unimpressed with NA.⁸³

The NA leadership sought to embed the group within an international militant network from the outset. One of its leaders, Benjamin Raymond, played a key role as an administrator on the Iron March forum through which he developed links with Brandon Russell, who founded Atomwaffen Division (AWD).⁸⁴ Russell subsequently visited London and met Raymond and another activist during the summer of 2015.⁸⁵ During the visit, Russell learned more about NA’s model of militancy and their efforts to gain media attention, which he translated back into his own activism upon returning to the United States.⁸⁶

Raymond also extended NA contacts into Scandinavia and the Baltic region. He forged a relationship with Suomen Vasterintaliike (Finnish Resistance Movement, PVL), the Finnish branch of the Nordiska Motståndsrörelsen (Nordic Resistance Movement, NRM), which was banned in November 2017. Raymond wrote that the PVL represented a “very good model”, presumably for NA to follow (he did not specify). He traveled to Finland in January 2015 to develop closer ties, meeting PVL leaders and giving a speech at its headquarters in Turku. During this visit, Raymond also met Swedish NRM militants and the Finnish ideologue Kai Murros, author of *Revolution—And How To Do It In Modern Society* (1999), with whom he “agreed on a Cambodian solution to the problems afflicting our nations.”⁸⁷

Later in 2015, NA activists took part in the Lithuanian Freedom march in Vilnius before travelling onwards to Latvia to participate in Latvian Legion day, which commemorates the exploits of the 15th and 16th Grenadiers of the Waffen SS.⁸⁸ These Baltic contacts endured, and as well as returning to Lithuania in the following year, Raymond, NA’s in-house graphic artist, helped inspire the aesthetic of the Lithuanian group Skydas. There is evidence that other NA militants were

also in touch with activists from this group. In turn, a Lithuanian activist noted for his graffiti became active with NA in the United Kingdom, helping it to develop its visual brand further.⁸⁹

The British XRW militant milieu has been impacted by the involvement of activists from Poland, many of whom had moved to the UK following Poland’s accession to the European Union. The Polish Nazi group Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski (National Rebirth of Poland, NOP) and others calling themselves “Polska Hooligans” provided physical muscle for street activities in the United Kingdom organized by NA and the NWI, highlighting an ongoing pattern of Anglo-Polish transnational connectivity dating back to at least the early 1990s. Several Polish activists were later jailed for their role in the violence at an NA/NWI rally in Liverpool in 2016.⁹⁰ NA activists have also taken part in NOP-organised protests in support of Janusz Waluś, who murdered ANC activist Chris Hani, attended the Polish Independence Day march, and participated in NOP activities in Poland, such as its 2015 conference.⁹¹

NA also forged links with German groups. NA activists travelled to Germany to participate in a demonstration on 1 May 2016 in Plauen, Saxony, organised by Der III Weg., a small national-socialist group, and the Antikapitalische Kollektiv (AKK), which focused on connecting “autonomous nationalist” groups from the *Kameradschaftsszene*. Thereafter, the NA website featured an interview with AKK in which they exchanged ideas on forms of “national resistance” before concluding, “together we are stronger.”⁹² Whilst in Germany, the NA activists also took the opportunity to pose for photos giving the Nazi salute inside the site of the Buchenwald concentration camp.⁹³

After NA was dismantled, transnational contacts continued, albeit largely online (see above). “Siege culture” groups like SRN and SKD modelled themselves ideologically and aesthetically on their violent U.S. counterparts. SRN evolved in part from the Vanguard Britannia group, which had named itself in homage to Vanguard America, the group to which James Fields

Jr., who murdered Heather Heyer in Charlottesville, belonged, whilst SKD described itself as “Atomwaffen with less guns.”⁹⁴

Technology has made it easier than ever for XRW groups to connect with one another and has accelerated their access to violent *materiel* such as bomb-making manuals (which are now easily accessible in online repositories) as well as other items such as manifestos and videos that can help to radicalise individuals. Transnational connectivity is not always a positive benefit, however. Networks spread across borders are open to disruption as are activists moving from one country to another. Likewise, these shared digital spaces are heavily monitored by state and civil society groups, increasing the risk that one’s digital footprint will lead to arrest and the collapse of the network itself once central figures are removed.

Forecast

The UK has been a hub for transnational XRW activity and propaganda for decades and is likely to remain so. Whilst physical organisations are currently of less salience than they were previously, it is too early to speak of a post-organisational extreme right. Particular narratives or communications hubs (for instance, a cluster of Telegram channels) are filling this gap and providing similar points of contact and networks for activists. The outlook for XRW terrorist groups is variable, but lone-actor or inspired attacks are likely to remain the key challenge. With MI5 taking the lead in monitoring extreme right terrorism,

those groups or activists predisposed to violence are now operating in a more hostile context than earlier.

The COVID-19 pandemic provides fertile ground for conspiratorial messaging to be spread online. The current “culture wars” regarding the legacy of the British Empire and its associated symbols, the Brexit process and the potential political, social and economic instability brought by a “no deal” outcome, could provide rallying points for XRW activists, and have implications for law and order and community relations, as well as inspiring XRW movements within the EU and elsewhere.⁹⁵ In the longer-term, the erosion of trust in democratic institutions and the media, which the XRW seeks to boost, could be more pernicious than more isolated terrorist actions.

Statistical snapshot of the violent XRW threat

Between 2015 and 2020, the UK witnessed a visible uptick in the threat emanating from the violent XRW milieu. The country saw 15 XRW terrorist plots (majority unsuccessful) and 90+ XRW terrorism arrests. In addition, the number of XRW PREVENT referrals to the police almost doubled between 2015/2016 and 2018/2019. These referrals also represented an increasing percentage of the total number of PREVENT referrals. Most referrals over the entirety of the period still related to the presumed radicalisation risk of an extreme Islamist or jihadist nature. However, referrals relating to XRW rose from 10 percent of all referrals in 2015/2016 to 24 percent in 2018/2019 and now constitute nearly a quarter of all referrals to PREVENT.

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	TOTAL
PLOTS (including successful attacks)	2	2	5 ⁹⁶	3	4	2	18
ARRESTS (XRW terrorism arrests)	3	2	24	32	24	11	96
CONVICTIONS (for XRW terrorism offences)	2	3	4	23	22	10	64
ACQUITTALS (of alleged XRW terrorists)	0	0	0	4	0	0	4

XRW terrorist plots, arrests, convictions, and acquittals in the UK⁹⁷

YEAR	Number of XRW PREVENT referrals	Percentage of total PREVENT referrals (in %)
2015-16	759	10
2016-17	968	16
2017-18	1312	18
2018-19	1389	24

XRW PREVENT referrals and XRW PREVENT referrals as a percentage of the total⁹⁸

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also the *Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe: the RTV dataset* also held at C-Rex. The large number of “XRW terrorism arrests” are not necessarily indicative of rising levels of physical violence or of growing numbers of terrorist “plots”. For instance, a substantial number of terrorism arrests during 2017 and 2018 were for membership of a proscribed organisation rather than for violence per se. The figures also record prosecutions involving the glorification of terrorism and the collection of information of a kind likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism. In addition, one should note that not every act of terrorism is prosecuted using terrorist legislation. Thus, offences such as making threats to kill, conspiracy to commit murder, attempted murder and murder are all included in these arrest figures, as are offences committed by right-wing extremists under the Explosives Substances Act, the Chemical Weapons Act and the Poison Act. Nor do the number of arrests necessarily correlate with the number of offences that police have charged an individual with, which often combine multiple terrorism charges with a range of other Public Order-related offences for example. The figures include four vehicular attacks – one of which was simply prosecuted as dangerous driving – where race and/or far right views were evident.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Joshua Fisher-Birch

Legal situation

Defining domestic terrorist attacks in the United States is not clear cut. International terrorism is defined as crimes that are meant to coerce or intimidate the civilian population or influence government policy with a connection to a foreign terrorist group designated by the US State Department.¹ After 2001, U.S. federal law defined domestic terrorism as illegal acts meant to intimidate, coerce, or impact government policy. However, it does not have associated prosecutable penalties.² The federal government prosecutes crimes that might fit domestic terrorism under other statutes, such as those prohibiting murder, threats, or the possession of explosives. The lack of domestic terrorism prosecutions means that quantifiable data regarding these cases are not readily available from federal agencies. At the federal level, attacks with XRW ideological motivation may be prosecuted as hate crimes if the target of violence is in a protected category. The terms “terrorist” and “extremist” are used with little distinction between the two by the U.S. government when referring to domestic actors.³

The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) define terrorism and extremism in the United States as it pertains to intelligence and investigations. Before 2019, the FBI used the term “white supremacist extremists,” in conjunction with “anti-government extremists” and “anti-abortion extremists” to refer to different types of right-wing domestic violent extremism.⁴ In 2019, the FBI created new categories for classifying “domestic violent extremists,” with three of the four classifications including XRW ideology: “racially motivated violent extremism,” which includes white supremacists, “anti-government/anti-authority extremism,” which includes the militia movement and sovereign citizens, and “abortion extremism.”⁵

Many U.S. federal agencies, including the DOJ and Department of Homeland Security (DHS), also use the term “domestic terrorism.”

Membership in XRW groups is not illegal in the United States, nor is hate speech. Thirty-four U.S. states and the District of Columbia have state laws criminalising acts of terrorism, and individuals may face terrorism charges in state court. The federal government and several states have laws criminalising “terroristic threats” and threats involving infrastructure or explosives.⁶ These threats are defined by the desire to cause fear, and includes both ideologically motivated threats, and those with no ideological motivation.⁷

The U.S. section of this report includes data on violent attacks plotted or committed by white supremacist extremists and anti-government extremists. Attacks were included if they were motivated by XRW ideology as indicated in databases or charging documents. Anti-abortion attacks, while part of the far-right environment in the United States, were not included because of their limited utility outside of the U.S. context. Attacks were also included if the perpetrator belonged to an XRW organisation, or was known to subscribe to XRW ideology and planned or committed an attack that resulted in hate-crimes charges.

Data for the dataset come from the Anti-Defamation League’s HEAT Map (Hate, Extremism, Anti-Semitism, Terrorism) and then ideologically restricted to incidents perpetrated by White Supremacists, Right-Wing (Other), and Right-Wing (Anti-Government).⁸ The dataset was then evaluated along with the University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and news reports. The Anti-Defamation League HEAT map broadly lists 199 incidents

between the years 2015 and 2020 involving terrorist plots/attacks, extremist murders, and extremist/police shootouts. When the data was ideologically restricted, checked for ideological motivations, and then augmented with GTD and news data, there were 75 total incidents, with 68 incidents after anti-abortion attacks were removed from the dataset.

History and key players of the XRW scene

The United States has a long history of XRW violence by white supremacists and anti-government actors. White supremacist violence has been perpetrated by mass movements, such as the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), small violent extremist groups such as The Order, and individual lone-actors such as Wade Michael Page.⁹ The anti-government movement, including anti-government militias and sovereign citizens, grew in the 1980s and 1990s in response to perceived federal abuses and overreach, such as the 1992 Ruby Ridge standoff, the 1993 Waco siege, and fears of firearms confiscation.¹⁰ By the 2010s, the American extreme right was characterised by a variety of different groups ranging from neo-Nazi outfits to new KKK incarnations, militias, sovereign citizens, and individuals motivated by a variety of single-issue hatreds.¹¹

From 2015 onward, the American violent XRW scene has consisted of the “alt-right” movement, groups inspired by James Mason’s neo-Nazi book *Siege*, and the continuing threat from anti-government extremists and individuals motivated by a variety of white supremacist ideologies:

1. The alt-right is a broad right-wing movement that has included violent white supremacists. The propaganda website The Daily Stormer was an influential alt-right outlet that promoted the 2017 Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, and glorified the vehicular attack committed there by James Alex Fields Jr. The Rise Above Movement (RAM), founded in 2017, described

itself as the “premier MMA (mixed martial arts) club of the alt-right.”¹² RAM focused on physical training and attacking left-wing protesters, and sought to imitate European extreme-right fighting clubs such as the Kyiv, Ukraine, based Reconquista Club, and the Russian and Ukrainian brand White Rex.¹³

2. Neo-Nazi groups inspired by *Siege*, including the Atomwaffen Division (founded in 2015, allegedly disbanded in March 2020 and then renamed to National Socialist Order in July 2020), The Base (founded in 2018), and Feuerkrieg Division (founded in 2018, allegedly disbanded in winter 2020), promote accelerationism, a violent ideology that encourages acts of terrorism to hasten the supposed collapse of government and society in order to build a new ethnostate.¹⁴ These groups are particularly dangerous because they may hold training camps, as in the case of Atomwaffen and The Base, share information on how to build explosives, as was the case with all three, and plot to commit acts of murder and terrorism, as was the case with The Base.
3. Individuals and small groups motivated by anti-government extremism, including right-wing anti-law enforcement beliefs and opposition to what is viewed as an unconstitutional government, have also led to several attacks since 2015. The anti-government “boogaloo” movement, which emerged in 2019, has advocated for a second American Civil War. While lone-actor violence in the US is not new, between 2015 and 2020, 50 attacks were committed by lone actors, resulting in the deaths of 58 people, and the wounding of 89.

Trends

Between 2015 and 2020, there were 68 cases in which the perpetrator was motivated by XRW ideology, or where the perpetrator was known to subscribe to XRW ideology or was affiliated with an XRW group

and plotted or perpetrated an attack resulting in hate-crimes charges. 2017 and 2020 were the years with the most incidents, at 15 each, and 2016 had the fewest, with seven incidents. Sixty-one people were killed in the 68 incidents and 97 injured. Overall, 98 people were arrested for right-wing violent extremist or ideologically motivated criminal offenses.

Twenty-one incidents (about 31% of the total), were motivated by anti-government ideology, including militia or sovereign citizen ideology. Thirty-seven incidents (54%), were committed by white supremacists. The remaining 10 incidents (15%), were committed by individuals who were motivated by single-issue ideologies such as male supremacism, anti-Muslim sentiment, or other XRW anti-immigrant ideologies.

In terms of target selection, 26 incidents (about 38%) targeted citizens/residents or perceived political opponents. Eighteen incidents (27%) targeted religious institutions. Seventeen incidents (25%) targeted government or law enforcement.

Twenty-five incidents (37%) were successful, meaning that an attack took place. Forty-three incidents (63%) were unsuccessful. Eighteen successful attacks (72% of successful attacks) resulted in at least one death or injury. Of the 16 successful attacks in which at least one person was killed, 11 incidents were perpetrated by white supremacists, three by perpetrators motivated by anti-government or sovereign citizen ideology, and two incidents by a single-issue attacker (male supremacism in both cases). Overall, individuals were successful 40% of the time while groups were successful 28% of the time.

Success rates dropped after reaching a high in 2018. The success rates for attacks chronologically were about 55% (2015), 14% (2016), 47% (2017), 63% (2018), 25% (2019), and 27% (2020). It is unclear what specifically accounted for the decline in the success rates of the attacks; however, in 2019, the U.S. federal government dedicated additional resources to combating white supremacist violent extremism.¹⁵

A disturbing trend was the increase in the number killed or wounded in successful attacks between 2017 and 2019. In 2017, 34 people were killed or wounded in seven attacks, averaging 4.9 people per attack. In 2018, 28 people were killed or wounded in five attacks, averaging 5.6 people per attack. In 2019, 50 people were killed or wounded in three attacks, averaging 16.7 people per attack. The increase is due to outlier high-casualty violent attacks committed by individuals, specifically the 2017 Charlottesville vehicular attack, the 2017 Pittsburgh synagogue attack, and the 2019 El Paso attack.¹⁶

Four significant attacks, including the three most lethal attacks, were committed by individual white supremacists with firearms. In these four attacks, 44 people were killed and 33 were injured. Dylann Roof murdered nine people on 17 June 2015 when he attacked a Charleston church whose congregation was predominantly African American.¹⁷ Robert Bowers killed 11 people and injured seven during his attack on a Pittsburgh synagogue on 27 October 2018.¹⁸ John Earnest attacked a synagogue in Poway, California, killing one person and injuring three others.¹⁹ Patrick Crusius killed 22 (which later increased to 23) and injured 23 people during an attack targeting Latinos at an El Paso Walmart on 3 August 2019.²⁰ Earnest and Crusius were both directly inspired by the Australian Brenton Tarrant, who murdered 51 people in Christchurch, New Zealand, in 2019.²¹ With the exception of Earnest's attack, the armed assaults increased in lethality over time. Earnest's rifle allegedly malfunctioned, which might explain why he did not murder more people.²²

Several plots by groups were disrupted by law enforcement before they could be carried out. Five plots by neo-Nazi accelerationist groups, two from The Base, two involving the Feuerkrieg Division, and one from the Atomwaffen Division, were halted before an attack could occur.²³ Similarly, six plots by members of anti-government or militia groups failed or were disrupted by law enforcement before attacks occurred.²⁴

The post-2018 increase in XRW plots to 12 in 2019 and 15 in 2020 can potentially be explained by the increasing importance of the internet and social media to transmit violent ideology, help form extremist communities, and augment capabilities. Five incidents in 2019 are attributable to primarily online groups such as the Feuerkrieg Division, or lone actors Crusius and Earnest, who participated in radicalising internet communities.²⁵ In 2020, there were three “boogaloo” movement-affiliated incidents, with two of those plots involving individuals who met one another on Facebook groups before that platform increased its focus on removing “boogaloo” content.²⁶ Additionally, three incidents in 2020 involving the groups the Atomwaffen Division and The Base involved group members coordinating online.²⁷ Two additional incidents in 2020, U.S. Army soldier Ethan Melzer’s attempt to coordinate online with the neo-Nazi satanic cult the Order of Nine Angles, and Timothy Wilson’s attempted bombing of a Missouri hospital, included online encrypted communication between individuals who would most likely have otherwise never met.²⁸

Finances

The U.S. extreme right is mostly self-funded, but some groups have been involved in the sale of t-shirts, books, and other merchandise. Anti-fascist activists have put pressure on online payment processors to de-platform and disrupt extreme-right businesses and crowdfunding. Following the revelation that white supremacists used PayPal to send money to help fund the 2017 Unite the Right rally, the company changed its policies to ban hate groups and prevent websites that promote hate or violence.²⁹ The social media site Gab lost access to PayPal and Stripe after one of their users, Bowers, committed the attack on a Pittsburgh synagogue.³⁰

Most violent attacks in the United States are committed by individuals or small groups that do not require elaborate funding schemes. Individuals and group members pay their own way and provide their

own equipment. In the United States, firearms and ammunition are generally inexpensive and available.

While some longstanding groups have relied on membership dues, violent groups such as The Base and Feuerkrieg Division are self-funded.³¹ The leader of The Base purchased land in Washington state using a front corporation to hide his identity.³² The source of the money is unclear. The Atomwaffen Division had several ventures, but their level of success is unknown.³³ RAM has relied on self-funding and the sale of merchandise; however, sales are most likely limited and not enough to pay for member expenses.³⁴

In several cases, extreme-right websites have requested donations through cryptocurrency. The Daily Stormer made frequent requests for readership funding in order to stay accessible and online. The website received a sizable Bitcoin donation of about \$60,000 at the time, following the 2017 Unite the Right rally.³⁵ The Fascist Forge web forum requested cryptocurrency donations in either Bitcoin, Ethereum, or Monero.³⁶ A Bitcoin wallet address associated with the site showed one transaction of about 5 US dollars, an Ethereum wallet address showed no transactions.³⁷

The Atomwaffen Division has had at least three sources of funding. Members of the group have engaged in small-scale sales of goods online. Co-founder Brandon Russell claimed that the group sold books online on eBay and used PayPal.³⁸ The group has also sold t-shirts and individuals have sold stickers with the group’s logo on the website Teespring.³⁹ There is no evidence suggesting that these commercial ventures were successful or netted Atomwaffen members more than small amounts of money. By doing business with a third party such as Teespring, individuals associated with extremist groups can avoid doing business directly with payment processors. Russell also claimed in messages on the Iron March forum that the group had established legitimate businesses.⁴⁰ The extent of the enterprise is unclear. Donations were the final source of funding, conducted through

a Google Wallet connected to one of the businesses Russell claimed to run.⁴¹

RAM has engaged in self-funding and the sale of clothing and accessories. It operates a clothing brand, “The Right Brand”, which is sold in partnership via the California-based store “Our Fight Clothing Co.”⁴² About 40% (21 out of 51) of the blog posts on the “Our Fight” website are by RAM members or praise them.⁴³ “Our Fight” also sells several European brands and is the official U.S. sales point for the white supremacist “Pride France” MMA brand, and merchandise from the Italian national-socialist hardcore band Green Arrows.⁴⁴ The store also sells brands from the “European Brotherhood” brand and the Ukrainian “Walknvt” brand. RAM fundraised on behalf of their members facing trial through the sale of stickers.⁴⁵

Online activities

The online space is the most critical mechanism for extreme-right connectivity, both within the United States and between the country and foreign groups. Web forums have been crucial for the formation of XRW groups and spreading their ideology. Iron March, a forum founded in 2011, has played a significant role in shaping the American movement and creating international connections.⁴⁶ By the time the forum became defunct in November 2017, it had about 1,200 consistent users and helped several of the most extreme neo-Nazi groups in the world network and recruit. The site was the online birthplace of the Atomwaffen Division and the Australian Antipodean Resistance. Iron March also served as a critical online meeting point for the British group National Action (NA) and the Scandinavian Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM), and several other groups.⁴⁷ Through graphics, suggested reading (especially Mason’s *Siege*), and user interaction, the forum developed a violent fascist culture reflected in Atomwaffen, NA, and others.⁴⁸ One former forum member asserted that community sentiment encouraged radicalisation by rewarding

the most extreme views.⁴⁹ After being formed on Iron March, Atomwaffen’s members murdered five people and were allegedly involved in at least two additional plots, one involving intimidation and the other explosives.⁵⁰

Following Iron March’s removal, a new forum, Fascist Forge, emerged to take its place in Spring 2018. Fascist Forge, which had 1,300 registered users in November 2019, sought to become the new online meeting place for the fascist extreme-right and glorified and encouraged terrorism.⁵¹ A high-ranking member of The Base created the forum, and the group used the site for recruitment until it was voluntarily removed in early 2020 due to scrutiny by media and law enforcement.⁵²

The “politically incorrect” (/pol) sections of bulletin boards, such as 8chan, have glorified and encouraged violence among lone actors. Before his attack, Tarrant posted links to his manifesto and live-stream on 8chan. The admitted Poway, California, synagogue shooter, Earnest, and the alleged El Paso mass shooter, Crusius, each posted their manifestos on 8chan/pol before their attacks. In all three cases, board users continued to spread manifestos, memes, and other content praising the shooters.⁵³ It is significant that Tarrant copycats have also used 8chan and posted their manifestos on the site, showing their allegiance to the forum and its users and hoping to radicalise others and inspire further acts of white supremacist violence. After 8chan’s removal, similar behaviour has continued on 8chan successor boards.⁵⁴

Encrypted communications tools, especially Telegram, have also been integral for recruitment, the spread of propaganda and violent how-to manuals, and encouraging acts of terrorism.⁵⁵ Telegram has been the preferred medium for several violent groups, including those linked to the Atomwaffen Division, due to its wide reach and the ability to engage in dissemination of propaganda, group chats, and encrypted person-to-person communication.⁵⁶ The app Wire has been used by The Base to establish

secure communications networks, share information, and encourage acts of violence.⁵⁷

Mainstream chat and social media sites have also played an important role in the American scene. Despite Facebook crackdowns on extreme-right content, the platform was used for advertising the deadly 2017 Unite the Right rally. In 2019 and 2020, the anti-government “boogaloo” movement has used the site extensively, and in two cases, attack plot participants located one another on the platform.⁵⁸ Steven Carrillo and Robert Alvin Justus Jr. reportedly met on a boogaloo Facebook group before Justus allegedly drove a vehicle and Carrillo shot and killed a security officer outside of an Oakland federal courthouse in May 2020.⁵⁹ Three men, Andrew Lynam, Stephen Parshall, and William Loomis, arrested in Las Vegas in May 2020 for allegedly plotting to use firebombs at a protest, had also reportedly met in an ideological boogaloo Facebook group.⁶⁰ Christchurch terrorist Tarrant live-streamed his attack on Facebook. White supremacists formerly used the gaming chat program Discord for networking and planning the Charlottesville rally.⁶¹ Alternative sites, including the social media network Gab, and the British video streaming site BitChute have arisen when mainstream platforms such as Twitter and YouTube have removed content.

Some sectors of the American extreme-right have used sites on the dark web when mainstream websites were removed. The Daily Stormer established itself on the dark web after internet infrastructure companies ceased providing them with services; however, the site is still available on the surface web.⁶² The Atomwaffen Division and the James Mason Siege Culture community also maintained sites on the dark web. Several bulletin boards, including 8chan successor sites, have dark web locations.

Response

The U.S. national security strategy related to XRW violence is managed at the federal investigatory level

by the FBI. The DHS is charged with data collection and analysis, and liaising with and supplying grants to local law enforcement. The Department of State designates foreign terrorist organisations. All law enforcement and intelligence agencies working on the domestic far-right threat must safeguard constitutionally protected speech.

The FBI elevated the threat posed by far-right extremism and “racially motivated violent extremism,” in particular, in 2020, placing it on the same threat level as foreign terrorist organisations such as ISIL.⁶³ Before 2020, in spring 2019, the FBI created a Domestic Terrorism-Hate Crimes Fusion Cell, in order to increase information-sharing between FBI agents working in the Counterterrorism Division and the Criminal Investigative Division.⁶⁴ The FBI also directed Joint Terrorism Task Forces, local partnerships with state and local law enforcement, to add a domestic terrorism focus.

The DHS directly identified the unique threat posed by right-wing extremism in September 2019, releasing a strategy document to assist local law enforcement agencies.⁶⁵ The strategy calls for public-private partnerships with tech companies, and the development of counter-messaging by tech companies, NGOs, and civil-society organisations. The DHS strategy built on the creation in April 2019 of the Office of Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention (OTVTP), which provides funding streams for local groups working on P/CVE issues such as training, interventions, and resilience.⁶⁶ OTVTP grants were awarded in September 2020. The OTVTP grant program was an update to the DHS’s Office of Community Partnerships CVE grant programme, in which two of the original 25 programmes in 2016 that received grants mentioned right-wing extremism.⁶⁷ An additional grantee in 2017, the only group specifically addressing deradicalization among right-wing extremists, had their funding withdrawn for unspecified reasons by the DHS in 2017.⁶⁸ The 2020 OTVTP grants went to 29 different projects, including three that directly address the extreme-right.⁶⁹ Several other programmes that

received 2020 OTVTP grants address issues such as targeted violence and youth and community education and resilience, which may overlap with efforts to prevent XRW violence.⁷⁰

The Department of State designated a foreign white supremacist terrorist organisation for the first time in April 2020. The Russian Imperial Movement (RID) and its leaders were labelled Specially Designated Global Terrorists due to the group's provision of paramilitary training to the European extreme-right.⁷¹

Transnational connectivity

Between 2015 and 2020, groups in the United States increased their connectivity with European actors. The Atomwaffen Division officially disbanded in the winter of 2020, with a small successor organisation announced in July 2020.⁷² The Feuerkrieg Division allegedly disbanded in the winter of 2020, and The Base fell apart after significant January 2020 arrests and the public revelation that their leader was in Russia.⁷³ As a result, future plots directed from these groups are unlikely; however, old communications links likely exist. It is also possible that new groups will emerge and adopt the transnational strategies of Atomwaffen, Feuerkrieg, or The Base. RAM has sought to make strong links with European extreme-right groups and brands in France, Ukraine, and Russia, and will likely continue to seek to make alliances. The danger remains from radicalizing online communities and their ability to inspire lone actors.

The Iron March-born Atomwaffen Division made direct connections with similar groups in Europe and inspired copycats. The German Atomwaffen Division, founded in the summer of 2018, has been closely linked to the American group. Germans were in contact with the American group in 2017.⁷⁴ The group's German affiliate made an approximately one-minute propaganda video released in June 2018. It included a man holding the Atomwaffen Division flag in front of Wewelsburg castle in West-

phalia, which was a Schutzstaffel (SS) staff college, and meeting place for high-ranking officers.⁷⁵ The video was the only non-American Atomwaffen Division content on the group's website, indicating the German chapter's officialness.⁷⁶

In 2019 and 2020, Atomwaffen also inspired imitators allegedly in Ukraine, Russia, and Brazil.⁷⁷ Despite affiliating themselves with Atomwaffen, none of these groups have been acknowledged as legitimate by the American group. The alleged Ukraine chapter was disavowed and condemned as imposters on the Atomwaffen website.⁷⁸

In November 2018, an American woman living in Germany was alerted by the Federal Criminal Police Office that a member of the Atomwaffen Division had entered Germany, possibly in order to attack her.⁷⁹ A year later, in November 2019, an alleged American Atomwaffen member, known in the local extreme-right scene through his National Socialist Black Metal (NSBM) connections, attempted to enter Germany but was turned away upon landing and sent back to his flight origin.⁸⁰ In December 2018, Washington state Atomwaffen cell leader Kaleb Cole travelled with suspected fellow member Aidan Bruce-Umbaugh to Poland, Czechia, and Ukraine, where he attended the Asgardsrei NSBM festival.⁸¹ Asgardsrei is a critical networking opportunity for the American and European extreme-right, and several groups have sent representatives, including the German Der III Weg., Italian CasaPound, Greek Golden Dawn, and individuals affiliated with the Ukrainian Azov Regiment.⁸²

Atomwaffen Division members had also communicated with their counterparts in the UK group NA. In the summer of 2015, Russell met with NA leader Ben Raymond in London, and individuals were photographed in front of Buckingham Palace holding Atomwaffen, NA, and Iron March flags.⁸³ Russell and Raymond had communicated on Iron March, and the two groups continued to correspond. These connections are significant because it allowed for Atomwaffen leadership to feel that it played

a role in spearheading an international neo-Nazi movement. After the British government proscribed NA, Atomwaffen members communicated with the System Resistance Network and the Sonnenkrieg Division.⁸⁴ Sonnenkrieg's alleged former leader, Andrew Dymock, has been accused of communicating with high-level Atomwaffen members using online gaming chat programs in 2018.⁸⁵ The communications between Atomwaffen and Sonnenkrieg were notable because both groups subscribed to neo-Nazi James Mason's Universal Order ideology and also because some members of both groups belonged to the satanic Order of Nine Angles.⁸⁶ Atomwaffen members likely sought to influence Sonnenkrieg in order to have international allies and expand their prestige in the American extreme-right scene. In both the NA and Sonnenkrieg cases, the shared language would have made communication easy.

The Base, a truly international group, sought to recruit in Europe in addition to Australia, Canada, and South Africa. The Base allowed members of other organisations to join without having to give up their original membership. The Base had at least two members in the UK, and the group's leader, Rinaldo Nazzaro, indicated that he was interested in recruiting more members in that country to create a more extensive network.⁸⁷ Nazzaro likely hoped to recruit members of the Sonnenkrieg Division due to the compatibility between the two groups' accelerationist ideology. More UK group members would allow for the creation of local propaganda featuring additional members and the possibility of creating multiple subgroups that could potentially coordinate attacks. The group's recruitment flyers were located in Belgium, and The Base recruited at least one individual in Finland.⁸⁸ For The Base, international connections signified status and would allow the group to claim a global presence, which would further increase recruitment. The FBI arrested a Canadian soldier and alleged member of The Base, Patrik Mathews, in January 2020 for allegedly plotting with fellow group members to attack a pro-firearms demonstration in Virginia.⁸⁹ Nazzaro himself was revealed to live in St. Petersburg, Russia.

However, his links with the Russian government remain unproven.⁹⁰

The Feuerkrieg Division was an international accelerationist group heavily inspired by the Atomwaffen Division. Feuerkrieg was primarily an online group and had members in the U.S., Russia, and several European countries, including Estonia, Latvia, Belgium, the UK, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, and Germany.⁹¹ The Feuerkrieg Division has been tied to at least two attack plots in the United States. Conor Climo, a Las Vegas man who plead guilty in February 2020 to possessing bomb-making components, had been in communication with Feuerkrieg, who were aware of and encouraged his plans to attack LGBTQ people and Jews.⁹² U.S. Army Specialist Jarrett William Smith, also affiliated with Feuerkrieg Division, pleaded guilty in February 2020 to disseminating explosives guides via Facebook chat.⁹³

RAM has strong links to the European extreme-right MMA scene. Members of the group, including their co-founder Robert Rundo, and two men who later pleaded guilty to conspiracy to riot charges, attended the white supremacist Shield and Sword MMA festival held in Ostritz, Germany, in April 2018, which was estimated to have had more than 1,000 attendees.⁹⁴ Between April 2018 and February 2020, Rundo and fellow RAM members also attended MMA events in Kyiv, Ukraine, and extreme-right political events in Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Serbia.⁹⁵ The U.S. government alleged that Rundo met with one of the Ukrainian National Corps leaders, which is linked to the Azov Regiment.⁹⁶ Rundo is alleged to live outside of the US and travel within Europe.⁹⁷

RAM's media wing, "Media2Rise," is partnered with the French MMA brand "Pride France," and with "White Rex" from Ukraine and Russia, as well as the "Our Fight Clothing Co." shop. "Media2Rise" features blogs and videos and advertises the writing of European groups such as the Russian and Ukrainian Wotan Jugend, and seeks to create a transnational extreme-right MMA counterculture where RAM is the principal American conduit.⁹⁸ RAM's clothing

brand is sold by a store that carries several other extreme-right clothing labels linked to the European MMA scene, including the white supremacist “Pride France” brand, of which “Our Fight” is the official US distributor.⁹⁹

Earnest and Crusius were both directly inspired by the actions of Tarrant. Earnest and Crusius’s manifestos were written in a similar style to Tarrant’s, all three chose vulnerable targets, and each posted links to their manifestos on the same 8chan board. Additional attacks following a similar model were committed in Bærum, Norway, and Halle, Germany. All subsequent attacks occurred within seven months of the first attack in Christchurch. Perpetrators learned from prior attacks, and in the case of the Halle shooter who used homemade weapons, sought to innovate in order to create a new model and increase the momentum of attacks.¹⁰⁰ The transnational Tarrant-inspired lone-actor shootings showed the danger of anonymous radicalising online communities that promote and encourage individual acts of terrorism.

Forecast

- The continuation of lone-actor attacks on vulnerable targets by individuals motivated by white supremacy or anti-government ideology.
- After the demise of Fascist Forge, it is possible that another XRW internet forum will emerge. The forum may be used as a recruitment funnel for a specific group that controls or influences the forum.
- Continued internationalisation of neo-Nazi accelerationist groups. These groups may function more as decentralised networks formed for the purpose of sharing information or linking individuals to one another.
- The further use of the internet to create new movements and groups. The continued emergence of online extremist subcultures, such as the “boogaloo” movement and groups solely

created online and coordinating violence, the violent adoption of conspiracy theories by online communities.

- After the high-profile arrests of members of neo-Nazi accelerationist groups, it is likely that white supremacists who aspire to commit acts of violence will attempt to keep a low profile. It is possible that instead of creating national-level groups that have the characteristics of organisations, individuals will seek to build and join small, localised cells where all participants are known to each other.
- Communications and messaging from groups may take a two-track approach, with propaganda and public messaging available on social media, while intragroup communication will occur on encrypted communications apps where users must be known to an administrator. Public-facing propaganda may be seen as more expendable in the face of social-media crackdowns.
- Cryptocurrency, especially those that have enhanced privacy, will be used increasingly for large online transactions.

Statistical snapshot of the XRW threat¹⁰¹

The success rates of XRW attacks increased dramatically in 2017 and 2018, but then declined in 2019 and 2020 as right-wing extremism became a nationwide law-enforcement priority. At the same time, there was an increase in the average number killed or wounded in successful attacks between 2017 and 2019. Consequently, while attacks are less likely to succeed, those that do have the potential to be deadlier, given the number of high-casualty attacks. The overall number of plots, however, has not declined. This can potentially be explained by the key role of the internet, and specifically online groups and web forums that encourage attacks. This is evidenced by five incidents in 2019 attributable to primarily online groups or individual actors who

participated in radicalising online communities. In 2020, this is further amplified by the “boogaloo” movement organising online,¹⁰² as well as the online

actions of the Atomwaffen and the now defunct group The Base, which broke up following law-enforcement interventions.¹⁰³

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	TOTAL
PLOTS (including successful attacks)	11	7	15	8	12	15	68
ARRESTS (XRW terrorism arrests)	15	10	17	17	15	24	98
CONVICTIONS (for XRW terrorism offences)	3	8	8	23	21	5	56

XRW terrorist plots, arrests, and convictions in the U.S. between 2015 and 2020

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NOTES



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