research-article

Fair allocation of indivisible goods and chores

Authors:

Ioannis Caragiannis,

Ayumi Igarashi,

Toby WalshAuthors Info & Claims

Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, Volume 36, Issue 1

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-021-09532-8

Published: 01 April 2022 Publication History

Abstract

We consider the problem of fairly dividing a set of indivisible items. Much of the fair division literature assumes that the items are “goods” that yield positive utility for the agents. There is also some work in which the items are “chores” that yield negative utility for the agents. In this paper, we consider a more general scenario in which an agent may have positive or negative utility for each item. This framework captures, e.g., fair task assignment, where agents can experience both positive and negative utility for each task. We demonstrate that whereas some of the positive axiomatic and computational results extend to this more general setting, others do not. We present several new and efficient algorithms for finding fair allocations in this general setting. We also point out several gaps in the literature regarding the existence of allocations that satisfy certain fairness and efficiency properties and examine the complexity of computing such allocations.

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Cohen SAgmon NDastani MSichman JAlechina NDignum V(2024)Near-Optimal Online Resource Allocation in the Random-Order ModelProceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3635637.3663113(2219-2221)Online publication date: 6-May-2024
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Sun ALi BDastani MSichman JAlechina NDignum V(2024)Allocating Contiguous Blocks of Indivisible Chores Fairly: RevisitedProceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3635637.3663042(1800-1808)Online publication date: 6-May-2024
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cover image Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems

Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems Volume 36, Issue 1

Apr 2022

875 pages

ISSN:1387-2532

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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2021.

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Kluwer Academic Publishers

United States

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Published: 01 April 2022

Accepted: 11 September 2021

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Cited By

Cohen SAgmon NDastani MSichman JAlechina NDignum V(2024)Near-Optimal Online Resource Allocation in the Random-Order ModelProceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3635637.3663113(2219-2221)Online publication date: 6-May-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3635637.3663113
Sun ALi BDastani MSichman JAlechina NDignum V(2024)Allocating Contiguous Blocks of Indivisible Chores Fairly: RevisitedProceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3635637.3663042(1800-1808)Online publication date: 6-May-2024
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H.V. VNimbhorkar PDastani MSichman JAlechina NDignum V(2024)Weighted Proportional Allocations of Indivisible Goods and Chores: Insights via MatchingsProceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3635637.3662931(780-788)Online publication date: 6-May-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3635637.3662931
Chakraborty MSegal-Halevi ESuksompong W(2024)Weighted Fairness Notions for Indivisible Items RevisitedACM Transactions on Economics and Computation10.1145/366579912:3(1-45)Online publication date: 6-Sep-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3665799
Babichenko YFeldman MHolzman RNarayan VMohar BShinkar IO'Donnell R(2024)Fair Division via Quantile SharesProceedings of the 56th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing10.1145/3618260.3649728(1235-1246)Online publication date: 10-Jun-2024
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Dai SGuo XMiao HGao GXu YZhang Y(2024)The existence and efficiency of PMMS allocationsTheoretical Computer Science10.1016/j.tcs.2024.114388989:COnline publication date: 21-Mar-2024
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Mutzari DAumann YKraus SAgmon NAn BRicci AYeoh W(2023)Resilient Fair Allocation of Indivisible GoodsProceedings of the 2023 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3545946.3599044(2688-2690)Online publication date: 30-May-2023
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Caragiannis INarang SAgmon NAn BRicci AYeoh W(2023)Repeatedly Matching Items to Agents Fairly and EfficientlyProceedings of the 2023 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3545946.3599038(2670-2672)Online publication date: 30-May-2023
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Shoshan HHazon NSegal-Halevi EAgmon NAn BRicci AYeoh W(2023)Efficient Nearly-Fair Division with Capacity ConstraintsProceedings of the 2023 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3545946.3598638(206-214)Online publication date: 30-May-2023
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