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Fair Public Decision Making

Authors:

Vincent Conitzer,

Rupert Freeman,

Nisarg ShahAuthors Info & Claims

EC '17: Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

Pages 629 - 646

https://doi.org/10.1145/3033274.3085125

Published: 20 June 2017 Publication History

Abstract

We generalize the classic problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to the problem of fair public decision making, in which a decision must be made on several social issues simultaneously, and, unlike the classic setting, a decision can provide positive utility to multiple players. We extend the popular fairness notion of proportionality (which is not guaranteeable) to our more general setting, and introduce three novel relaxations --- proportionality up to one issue, round robin share, and pessimistic proportional share --- that are also interesting in the classic goods allocation setting. We show that the Maximum Nash Welfare solution, which is known to satisfy appealing fairness properties in the classic setting, satisfies or approximates all three relaxations in our framework. We also provide polynomial time algorithms and hardness results for finding allocations satisfying these axioms, with or without insisting on Pareto optimality.

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Cited By

Elkind EObraztsova STeh NDastani MSichman JAlechina NDignum V(2024)Verifying Proportionality in Temporal VotingProceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3635637.3663122(2246-2248)Online publication date: 6-May-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3635637.3663122
Sun ALi BDastani MSichman JAlechina NDignum V(2024)Allocating Contiguous Blocks of Indivisible Chores Fairly: RevisitedProceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3635637.3663042(1800-1808)Online publication date: 6-May-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3635637.3663042
H.V. VNimbhorkar PDastani MSichman JAlechina NDignum V(2024)Weighted Proportional Allocations of Indivisible Goods and Chores: Insights via MatchingsProceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3635637.3662931(780-788)Online publication date: 6-May-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3635637.3662931
Show More Cited By

Index Terms

Fair Public Decision Making
1. Applied computing
  1. Law, social and behavioral sciences
    1. Economics
2. Theory of computation
  1. Theory and algorithms for application domains
    1. Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
      1. Algorithmic mechanism design

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cover image ACM Conferences

EC '17: Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

June 2017

740 pages

ISBN:9781450345279

DOI:10.1145/3033274

General Chair:
Constantinos Daskalakis
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA
,
Program Chairs:
Moshe Babaioff
Microsoft Research, Israel
,
Herv� Moulin
University of Glasgow, UK

Copyright � 2017 ACM.

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SIGecom: Special Interest Group on Economics and Computation

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New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 20 June 2017

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NSF
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EC '17

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SIGecom

EC '17: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

June 26 - 30, 2017

Massachusetts, Cambridge, USA

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EC '17 Paper Acceptance Rate 75 of 257 submissions, 29%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 664 of 2,389 submissions, 28%

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Cited By

Elkind EObraztsova STeh NDastani MSichman JAlechina NDignum V(2024)Verifying Proportionality in Temporal VotingProceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3635637.3663122(2246-2248)Online publication date: 6-May-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3635637.3663122
Sun ALi BDastani MSichman JAlechina NDignum V(2024)Allocating Contiguous Blocks of Indivisible Chores Fairly: RevisitedProceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3635637.3663042(1800-1808)Online publication date: 6-May-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3635637.3663042
H.V. VNimbhorkar PDastani MSichman JAlechina NDignum V(2024)Weighted Proportional Allocations of Indivisible Goods and Chores: Insights via MatchingsProceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3635637.3662931(780-788)Online publication date: 6-May-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3635637.3662931
Chakraborty MSegal-Halevi ESuksompong W(2024)Weighted Fairness Notions for Indivisible Items RevisitedACM Transactions on Economics and Computation10.1145/366579912:3(1-45)Online publication date: 6-Sep-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3665799
Aziz HLi BMoulin HWu XZhu X(2024)Almost Proportional Allocations of Indivisible Chores: Computation, Approximation and EfficiencyArtificial Intelligence10.1016/j.artint.2024.104118(104118)Online publication date: Mar-2024
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2024.104118
Kawase YMakino KSumita H(2024)Algorithms for Future Mobility SocietyAdvanced Mathematical Science for Mobility Society10.1007/978-981-99-9772-5_9(173-185)Online publication date: 14-Mar-2024
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-9772-5_9
Lackner MMaly JNardi OAgmon NAn BRicci AYeoh W(2023)Free-Riding in Multi-Issue DecisionsProceedings of the 2023 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3545946.3598877(2040-2048)Online publication date: 30-May-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3545946.3598877
Hoefer MSchmalhofer MVarricchio GAgmon NAn BRicci AYeoh W(2023)Best of Both Worlds: Agents with EntitlementsProceedings of the 2023 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3545946.3598686(564-572)Online publication date: 30-May-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3545946.3598686
Guo HLi WDeng B(2023)A Survey on Fair Allocation of ChoresMathematics10.3390/math1116361611:16(3616)Online publication date: 21-Aug-2023
https://doi.org/10.3390/math11163616
Shah NElkind E(2023)Pushing the limits of fairness in algorithmic decision-makingProceedings of the Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.24963/ijcai.2023/806(7051-7056)Online publication date: 19-Aug-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.24963/ijcai.2023/806
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